Part 9

(M103) Qu. whether the solitary man would not find it necessary to make use of words to record his ideas, if not in memory or meditation, yet at least in writing—without which he could scarce retain his knowledge.

We read in history there was a time when fears and jealousies, privileges of parliament, malignant party, and such like expressions of too unlimited and doubtful a meaning, were words of much sway. Also the words Church, Whig, Tory, &c., contribute very much to faction and dispute.

(M104) The distinguishing betwixt an idea and perception of the idea has been one great cause of imagining material substances(104).

(M105) That God and blessed spirits have Will is a manifest argument against Locke’s proofs that the Will cannot be conceiv’d, put into action, without a previous uneasiness.

(M106) The act of the Will, or volition, is not uneasiness, for that uneasiness may be without volition.

(M107) Volition is distinct from the object or idea for the same reason.

(M108) Also from uneasiness and idea together.

The understanding not distinct from particular perceptions or ideas.

The Will not distinct from particular volitions.

(M109) It is not so very evident that an idea, or at least uneasiness, may be without all volition or act.

The understanding taken for a faculty is not really distinct from ye will.

This allow’d hereafter.

(M110) To ask whether a man can will either side is an absurd question, for the word _can_ presupposes volition.

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(M111) Anima mundi, substantial form, omniscient radical heat, plastic vertue, Hylaschic principle—all these vanish(105).

(M112) Newton proves that gravity is proportional to gravity. I think that’s all(106).

Qu. whether it be the vis inertiæ that makes it difficult to move a stone, or the vis attractivæ, or both, or neither?

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Mem. To express the doctrines as fully and copiously and clearly as may be. Also to be full and particular in answering objections(107).

(M113) To say ye Will is a power; [therefore] volition is an act. This is idem per idem.

Wt makes men despise extension, motion, &c., & separate them from the essence of the soul, is that they imagine them to be distinct from thought, and to exist in unthinking substance.

An extended may have passive modes of thinking good actions.

There might be idea, there might be uneasiness, there might be the greatest uneasiness wthout any volition, therefore the....

(M114) Matter once allow’d, I defy any man to prove that God is not Matter(108).

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(M115) Man is free. There is no difficulty in this proposition, if we but settle the signification of the word _free_—if we had an idea annext to the word free, and would but contemplate that idea.

(M116) We are imposed on by the words will, determine, agent, free, can, &c.

(M117) Uneasiness precedes not every volition. This evident by experience.

(M118) Trace an infant in the womb. Mark the train & succession of its ideas. Observe how volition comes into the mind. This may perhaps acquaint you with its nature.

(M119) Complacency seems rather to determine, or precede, or coincide wth & constitute the essence of volition, than uneasiness.

(M120) You tell me, according to my doctrine a man is not free. I answer, tell me wt you mean by the word free, and I shall resolve you(109).

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(M121) Qu. Wt do men mean when they talk of one body’s touching another? I say you never saw one body touch, or (rather) I say, I never saw one body that I could say touch’d this or that other; for that if my optiques were improv’d, I should see intervalls and other bodies behind those whch now seem to touch.

Mem. Upon all occasions to use the utmost modesty—to confute the mathematicians wth the utmost civility & respect, not to style them Nihilarians, &c.

N. B. To rein in ye satyrical nature.

Blame me not if I use my words sometimes in some latitude. ’Tis wt cannot be helpt. ’Tis the fault of language that you cannot always apprehend the clear and determinate meaning of my words.

Say you, there might be a thinking Substance—something unknown—wch perceives, and supports, and ties together the ideas(110). Say I, make it appear there is any need of it and you shall have it for me. I care not to take away anything I can see the least reason to think should exist.

I affirm ’tis manifestly absurd—no excuse in the world can be given why a man should use a word without an idea(111). Certainly we shall find that wt ever word we make use of in matter of pure reasoning has, or ought to have, a compleat idea, annext to it, i.e. its meaning, or the sense we take it in, must be compleatly known.

’Tis demonstrable a man can never be brought to imagine anything should exist whereof he has no idea. Whoever says he does, banters himself with words.

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(M122) We imagine a great difference & distance in respect of knowledge, power, &c., betwixt a man & a worm. The like difference betwixt man and God may be imagin’d; or infinitely greater(112) difference.

(M123) We find in our own minds a great number of different ideas. We may imagine in God a greater number, i.e. that ours in number, or the number of ours, is inconsiderable in respect thereof. The words difference and number, old and known, we apply to that wch is unknown. But I am embrangled(113) in words—’tis scarce possible it should be otherwise.

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The chief thing I do or pretend to do is onely to remove the mist or veil of words(114). This has occasion’d ignorance & confusion. This has ruined the schoolmen and mathematicians, lawyers and divines.

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(M124) The grand cause of perplexity & darkness in treating of the Will, is that we imagine it to be an object of thought: (to speak with the vulgar), we think we may perceive, contemplate, and view it like any of our ideas; whereas in truth ’tis no idea, nor is there any idea of it. ’Tis _toto cælo_ different from the understanding, i.e. from all our ideas. If you say the Will, or rather volition, is something, I answer, there is an homonymy(115) in the word _thing_, wn apply’d to ideas and volition and understanding and will. All ideas are passive(116).

(M125) Thing & idea are much what words of the same extent and meaning. Why, therefore, do I not use the word thing? Ans. Because thing is of greater latitude than idea. Thing comprehends also volitions or actions. Now these are no ideas(117).

(M126) There can be perception wthout volition. Qu. whether there can be volition without perception?

(M127) Existence not conceivable without perception or volition—not distinguish’d therefrom.

(M128) N. B. Several distinct ideas can be perceived by sight and touch at once. Not so by the other senses. ’Tis this diversity of sensations in other senses chiefly, but sometimes in touch and sight (as also diversity of volitions, whereof there cannot be more than one at once, or rather, it seems there cannot, for of that I doubt), gives us the idea of time—or _is_ time itself.

Wt would the solitary man think of number?

(M129) There are innate ideas, i.e. ideas created with us(118).

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(M130) Locke seems to be mistaken wn he says thought is not essential to the mind(119).

(M131) Certainly the mind always and constantly thinks: and we know this too. In sleep and trances the mind _exists not_—there is no time, no succession of ideas(120).

(M132) To say the mind exists without thinking is a contradiction, nonsense, nothing.

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(M133) Folly to inquire wt determines the Will. Uneasiness, &c. are ideas, therefore unactive, therefore can do nothing, therefore cannot determine the Will(121).

(M134) Again, wt mean you by determine?

(M135) (M136) For want of rightly understanding time, motion, existence, &c., men are forc’d into such absurd contradictions as this, viz. light moves 16 diameters of earth in a second of time.

(M137) ’Twas the opinion that ideas could exist unperceiv’d, or before perception, that made men think perception(122) was somewhat different from the idea perceived, i.e. yt it was an idea of reflection; whereas the thing perceiv’d was an idea of sensation. I say, ’twas this made ’em think the understanding took it in, receiv’d it from without; wch could never be did not they think it existed without(123).

(M138) Properly speaking, idea is the picture of the imagination’s making. This is ye likeness of, and refer’d to the real idea, or (if you will) thing(124).

(M139) To ask, have we an idea of Will or volition, is nonsense. An idea can resemble nothing but an idea.

(M140) If you ask wt thing it is that wills, I answer, if you mean idea by the word thing, or anything like any idea, then I say, ’tis no thing at all that wills(125). This how extravagant soever it may seem, yet is a certain truth. We are cheated by these general terms, thing, is, &c.

(M141) Again, if by is you mean is perceived, or does perceive, I say nothing wch is perceived or does perceive wills.

(M142) The referring ideas to things wch are not ideas, the using the term “idea of(126),” is one great cause of mistake, as in other matters, so also in this.

(M143) Some words there are wch do not stand for ideas, viz. particles, will, &c. Particles stand for volitions and their concomitant ideas.

(M144) There seem to be but two colours wch are simple ideas, viz. those exhibited by the most and least refrangible rays; [the others], being the intermediate ones, may be formed by composition.

(M145) I have no idea of a volition or act of the mind, neither has any other intelligence; for that were a contradiction.

N. B. Simple ideas, viz. colours, are not devoid of all sort of composition, tho’ it must be granted they are not made up of distinguishable ideas. Yet there is another sort of composition. Men are wont to call those things compounded in which we do not actually discover the component ingredients. Bodies are said to be compounded of chymical principles, which, nevertheless, come not into view till after the dissolution of the bodies—wch were not, could not, be discerned in the bodies whilst remaining entire.

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(M146) All our knowledge is about particular ideas, according to Locke. All our sensations are particular ideas, as is evident. Wt use then do we make of abstract general ideas, since we neither know nor perceive them?

(M147) ’Tis allow’d that particles stand not for ideas, and yet they are not said to be empty useless sounds. The truth really is, they stand for operations of the mind, i.e. volitions.

(M148) Locke says all our knowledge is about particulars. If so, pray wt is the following ratiocination but a jumble of words? “Omnis homo est animal; omne animal vivit: ergo omnis homo vivit.” It amounts (if you annex particular ideas to the words “animal” and “vivit”) to no more than this: “Omnis homo est homo; omnis homo est homo: ergo, omnis homo est homo.” A mere sport and trifling with sounds.

(M149) We have no ideas of vertues & vices, no ideas of moral actions(127). Wherefore it may be question’d whether we are capable of arriving at demonstration about them(128), the morality consisting in the volition chiefly.

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(M150) Strange it is that men should be at a loss to find their idea of Existence; since that (if such there be distinct from perception) it is brought into the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection(129), methinks it should be most familiar to us, and we best acquainted with it.

(M151) This I am sure, I have no idea of Existence(130), or annext to the word Existence. And if others have that’s nothing to me; they can never make me sensible of it; simple ideas being incommunicable by language.

(M152) Say you, the unknown substratum of volitions & ideas is something whereof I have no idea. I ask, Is there any other being which has or can have an idea of it? If there be, then it must be itself an idea; which you will think absurd.

(M153) There is somewhat active in most perceptions, i.e. such as ensue upon our volitions, such as we can prevent and stop: e.g. I turn my eyes toward the sun: I open them. All this is active.

(M154) Things are twofold—active or inactive. The existence of active things is to act; of inactive to be perceiv’d.

(M155) Distinct from or without perception there is no volition; therefore neither is there existence without perception.

(M156) God may comprehend all ideas, even the ideas wch are painfull & unpleasant, without being in any degree pained thereby(131). Thus we ourselves can imagine the pain of a burn, &c. without any misery or uneasiness at all.

(M157) Truth, three sorts thereof—natural, mathematical, & moral.

(M158) Agreement of relation onely where numbers do obtain: of co-existence, in nature: of signification, by including, in morality.

(M159) Gyant who shakes the mountain that’s on him must be acknowledged. Or rather thus: I am no more to be reckon’d stronger than Locke than a pigmy should be reckon’d stronger than a gyant, because he could throw off the molehill wch lay upon him, and the gyant could onely shake or shove the mountain that oppressed him. This in the Preface.

(M160) Promise to extend our knowledge & clear it of those shamefull contradictions which embarrass it. Something like this to begin the Introduction in a modest way(132).

(M161) Whoever shall pretend to censure any part, I desire he would read out the whole, else he may perhaps not understand me. In the Preface or Introduction(133).

(M162) Doctrine of identity best explain’d by taking the Will for volitions, the Understanding for ideas. The difficulty of consciousness of wt are never acted surely solv’d thereby.

(M163) I must acknowledge myself beholding to the philosophers who have gone before me. They have given good rules, though certainly they do not always observe them. Similitude of adventurers, who, tho’ they attained not the desired port, they by their wrecks have made known the rocks and sands, whereby the passage of aftercomers is made more secure & easy. Preface or Introduction.

(M164) The opinion that men had ideas of moral actions(134) has render’d the demonstrating ethiques very difficult to them.

(M165) An idea being itself unactive cannot be the resemblance or image of an active thing.

(M166) Excuse to be made in the Introduction for using the word _idea_, viz. because it has obtain’d. But a caution must be added.

Scripture and possibility are the onely proofs(135) with Malbranch. Add to these what he calls a great propension to think so: this perhaps may be questioned. Perhaps men, if they think before they speak, will not be found so thoroughly persuaded of the existence of Matter.

(M167) On second thoughts I am on t’other extream. I am certain of that wch Malbranch seems to doubt of, viz. the existence of bodies(136).

(M168) Mem. To bring the killing blow at the last, e.g. in the matter of abstraction to bring Locke’s general triangle in the last(137).

(M169) They give good rules, tho’ perhaps they themselves do not always observe them. They speak much of clear and distinct ideas, though at the same time they talk of general abstract ideas, &c. I’ll [instance] in Locke’s opinion of abstraction, he being as clear a writer as I have met with.

Such was the candour of this great man that I perswade myself, were he alive(138), he would not be offended that I differ from him: seeing that even in so doing I follow his advice, viz. to use my own judgement, see with my own eyes, & not with another’s. Introduction.

(M170) The word thing, as comprising or standing for idea & volition, usefull; as standing for idea and archetype without the mind(139), mischievous and useless.

(M171) To demonstrate morality it seems one need only make a dictionary of words, and see which included which. At least, this is the greatest part and bulk of the work.

(M172) Locke’s instances of demonstration in morality are, according to his own rule, trifling propositions.

(M173) Qu. How comes it that some ideas are confessedly allow’d by all to be onely in the mind(140), and others as generally taken to be without the mind(141), if, according to you, all are equally and only in the mind? Ans. Because that in proportion to pleasure or pain ideas are attended with desire, exertion, and other actions which include volition. Now volition is by all granted to be in spirit.

(M174) If men would lay aside words in thinking, ’tis impossible they should ever mistake, save only in matters of fact. I mean it seems impossible they should be positive & secure that anything was true wch in truth is not so. Certainly I cannot err in matter of simple perception. So far as we can in reasoning go without the help of signs, there we have certain knowledge. Indeed, in long deductions made by signs there may be slips of memory.

(M175) From my doctrine there follows a cure for pride. We are only to be praised for those things which are our own, or of our own doing; natural abilitys are not consequences of our volitions.

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(M176) Mem. Candidly to take notice that Locke holds some dangerous opinions; such as the infinity and eternity of Space and the possibility of Matter’s thinking(142).

(M177) Once more I desire my reader may be upon his guard against the fallacy of words. Let him beware that I do not impose on him by plausible empty talk, that common dangerous way of cheating men into absurditys. Let him not regard my words any otherwise than as occasions of bringing into his mind determin’d significations. So far as they fail of this they are gibberish, jargon, & deserve not the name of language. I desire & warn him not to expect to find truth in my book, or anywhere but in his own mind. Wtever I see myself ’tis impossible I can paint it out in words.

(M178) N. B. To consider well wt is meant by that wch Locke saith concerning algebra—that it supplys intermediate ideas. Also to think of a method affording the same use in morals &c. that this doth in mathematiques.

(M179) _Homo_ is not proved to be _vivens_ by means of any intermediate idea. I don’t fully agree wth Locke in wt he says concerning sagacity in finding out intermediate ideas in matter capable of demonstration & the use thereof; as if that were the onely means of improving and enlarging demonstrative knowledge.

(M180) There is a difference betwixt power & volition. There may be volition without power. But there can be no power without volition. Power implyeth volition, & at the same time a connotation of the effects following the volition(143).

(M181) We have assuredly an idea of substance. ’Twas absurd of Locke(144) to think we had a name without a meaning. This might prove acceptable to the Stillingfleetians.

(M182) The substance of Body we know(145). The substance of Spirit we do not know—it not being knowable, it being a _purus actus_.

(M183) Words have ruin’d and overrun all the sciences—law, physique, chymistry, astrology, &c.

(M184) Abstract ideas only to be had amongst the learned. The vulgar never think they have any such, nor truly do they find any want of them. Genera & species & abstract ideas are terms unknown to them.

(M185) Locke’s out(146)—the case is different. We can have an idea of body without motion, but not of soul without thought.

(M186) God ought to be worship’d. This easily demonstrated when once we ascertain the signification of the words God, worship, ought.

(M187) No perception, according to Locke, is active. Therefore no perception (i.e. no idea) can be the image of, or like unto, that which is altogether active & not at all passive, i.e. the Will.

(M188) I can will the calling to mind something that is past, tho’ at the same time that wch I call to mind was not in my thoughts before that volition of mine, & consequently I could have had no uneasiness for the want of it.

(M189) The Will & the Understanding may very well be thought two distinct beings.

(M190) Sed quia voluntas raro agit nisi ducente desiderio. V. Locke, Epistles, p. 479, ad Limburgum.

You cannot say the m. t. [minimum tangibile] is like or one with the m. v. [minimum visibile], because they be both minima, just perceiv’d, and next door to nothing. You may as well say the m. t. is the same with or like unto a sound, so small that it is scarce perceiv’d.

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Extension seems to be a mode of some tangible or sensible quality according as it is seen or felt.

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(M191) The spirit—the active thing—that wch is soul, & God—is the Will alone. The ideas are effects—impotent things.

(M192) The concrete of the will & understanding I might call mind; not person, lest offence be given. Mem. Carefully to omit defining of person, or making much mention of it.

(M193) You ask, do these volitions make _one_ Will? Wt you ask is meerly about a word—unity being no more(147).

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N. B. To use utmost caution not to give the least handle of offence to the Church or Churchmen.

(M194) Even to speak somewhat favourably of the Schoolmen, and shew that they who blame them for jargon are not free of it themselves. Introd.

Locke’s great oversight seems to be that he did not begin with his third book; at least that he had not some thought of it at first. Certainly the 2d & 4th books don’t agree wth wt he says in ye 3d(148).

(M195) If Matter(149) is once allow’d to exist, clippings of weeds and parings of nails may think, for ought that Locke can tell; tho’ he seems positive of the contrary.

Since I say men cannot mistake in short reasoning about things demonstrable, if they lay aside words, it will be expected this Treatise will contain nothing but wt is certain & evident demonstration, & in truth I hope you will find nothing in it but what is such. Certainly I take it all for such. Introd.

(M196) When I say I will reject all propositions wherein I know not fully and adequately and clearly, so far as knowable, the thing meant thereby, this is not to be extended to propositions in the Scripture. I speak of matters of Reason and Philosophy—not Revelation. In this I think an humble, implicit faith becomes us (when we cannot comprehend or understand the proposition), such as a popish peasant gives to propositions he hears at mass in Latin. This proud men may call blind, popish, implicit, irrational. For my part I think it is more irrational to pretend to dispute at, cavil, and ridicule holy mysteries, i.e. propositions about things that are altogether above our knowledge, out of our reach. When I shall come to plenary knowledge of the meaning of any fact, then I shall yield an explicit belief. Introd.

Complexation of ideas twofold. Ys refers to colours being complex ideas.

Considering length without breadth is considering any length, be the breadth wt it will.

(M197) I may say earth, plants, &c. were created before man—there being other intelligences to perceive them, before man was created(150).

(M198) There is a philosopher(151) who says we can get an idea of substance by no way of sensation or reflection, & seems to imagine that we want a sense proper for it. Truly if we had a new sense it could only give us a new idea. Now I suppose he will not say substance, according to him, is an idea. For my part, I own I have no idea can stand for substance in his and the Schoolmen’s sense of that word. But take it in the common vulgar sense, & then we see and feel substance.

(M199) N. B. That not common usage, but the Schoolmen coined the word Existence, supposed to stand for an abstract general idea.

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