Part 54

941 “utiles.” Such words as “force,” “power,” “gravity,” “attraction,” are held to be convenient in physical reasonings about the _phenomena_ of motion, but worthless as philosophical expressions of the _cause_ of motion, which transcends sense and mechanical science. Cf. _Siris_, sect. 234, 235.

942 Cf. sect. 67.

943 “candem.” So in recent discussions on the conservation of force.

944 [Borellus.]—AUTHOR. See _De Vi Percussionis_, cap. XXIII.

945 [Leibnitius.]—AUTHOR.

946 On Berkeley’s reasoning all terms which involve the assumption that real causality is something presentable to the senses are a cover for meaninglessness. Only through self-conscious experience of personal activity does real meaning enter into the portion of language which deals with active causation. This is argued in detail in sect. 21-35.

947 Our concrete experience is assumed to be confined to (_a_) _bodies_, i.e. the data of the senses, and (_b_) _mind_ or _spirit_—sentient, intelligent, active—revealed by internal consciousness. Cf. _Principles_, sect. 1, 2, in which experience is resolved into _ideas_ and the _active intelligence_ which they presuppose. Here the word idea disappears, but, in accordance with its signification, “bodies” is still regarded as aggregates of external phenomena, the passive subjects of changes of place and state: the idealisation of the material world is tacitly implied, but not obtruded.

948 “nihilque,” &c. Cf. _Principles of Human Knowledge_, e.g. sect. 26, 65, 66. where the essential passivity of the _ideas_ presented to the senses, i.e. the material world, is maintained as a cardinal principle—on the positive ground of our percipient experience of sensible things. To speak of the cause of motion as _something sensible_, he argues (sect. 24), is merely to shew that we know nothing about it. Cf. sect. 28, 29, infra.

949 The phenomena that can be presented to the senses are taken as the measure of what can be attributed to the material world; and as the senses present _only_ conditioned change of place in bodies, we must look for the active cause in the invisible world which internal consciousness presents to us.

950 “_genus rerum cogitantium._” Cf. _Principles_, sect. 2.

951 “experientia didicimus.” Can the merely empirical data even of internal consciousness reveal this causal connexion between volition and bodily motions, without the venture of theistic faith?

952 “a primo et universali Principio” i.e. God, or the Universal Spirit, in whom the universe of bodies and spirits finds explanation; in a way which Berkeley does not attempt to unfold articulately and exhaustively in philosophical system.

_ 953 Phys._ θ. 4. 255 a 5-7.

_ 954 Princip. Math._ Def. III.

955 “resistentia.” Our muscular _sensation_ of resistance is apt to be accepted empirically as itself _active power in the concrete_, entering very much, as has been said, into the often inaccurate idea of power which is formed. See Editor’s Preface.

956 “nec incommode.” Cf. sect. 17, and note.

957 “hypothesis mathematica.” Cf. sect. 17, 35, 36-41, 66, 67; also _Siris_, sect. 250-251.

958 “nihil.” This section sums up Berkeley’s objections to crediting _matter_ with real power; the senses being taken as the test of what is contained in matter. It may be compared with David Hume, Thomas Brown, and J.S. Mill on Causation. Berkeley differs from them in recognising active power in spirit, while with them he resolves causation among bodies into invariable sequence.

959 Can the data presented to us reveal more than sequence, in the relation between our volitions and the corresponding movements of our bodies? Is not the difference found in the moral presupposition, which _supernaturalises_ man in his voluntary or morally responsible activity? This obliges us to see _ourselves_ as absolutely original causes of all bodily and mental states for which we can be morally approved or blamed.

960 “novumque genus.” Cf. sect. 21. We have here Berkeley’s antithesis of mind and matter—spirits and external phenomena presented to the senses—persons in contrast to passive ideas.

_ 961 De Anima_, I. ii. 13, 22, 24.

962 “Cartesius.” The antithesis of extended things and thinking things pervades Descartes; but not, as with Berkeley, on the foundation of the new conception of what is truly meant by matter or sensible things. See e.g. _Principia_, P. I. §§ 63, 64.

963 “alii.” Does he refer to Locke, who suggests the possibility of matter thinking?

964 See Aristotle, _De Anima_, I. ii. 5, 13; Diogenes Laertius, Lib. VI. i. 6.

_ 965 Nat. Ausc._ VIII. 15; also _De Anima_, III, x. 7.

966 Hardly any passage in the _Timæus_ exactly corresponds to this. The following is, perhaps, the most pertinent:—Κίνησιν γὰρ ἀπένειμεν αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ σώματος οἰκείαν, τῶν ἑπτὰ τὴν περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν μάλιστα οὖσαν (p. 34 a). Aristotle quotes the _Timæus_ in the same connexion, _De Anima_, I. iii. ii.

967 “philosophi Cartesiani.” Secundum Cartesium causa generalis omnium motuum et quietum est Deus.—Derodon, _Physica_, I. ix. 30.

_ 968 Principia Mathematica_—Scholium Generale.

969 “naturam naturantem esse Deum”—as we might say, God considered as imminent cause in the universe. See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Opera_, vol. XXII. Quest. 6, p. 27.

970 “juxta certam et constantem rationem.” While all changes in Nature are determined by Will, it is not capricious but rational Will. The so-called arbitrariness of the Language of Nature is relative to us, and from our point of view. In itself, the universe of reality expresses Perfect Reason.

971 “permaneret.” Cf. sect. 51.

972 “spectat potius ad philosophiam primam.” The drift of the _De Motu_ is to distinguish the physical sequences of molecular motion, which the physical sciences articulate, from the Power with which metaphysics and theology are concerned, and which we approach through consciousness.

973 “regulas.” Cf. _Siris_, sect. 231-235.

974 Having, in the preceding sections, contrasted perceived motions and their immanent originating Power—matter and mind—physics and metaphysics—he proceeds in this and the seven following sections to explain more fully what ha means by _principium_ and also the two meanings (metaphysical and mechanical) of _solutio_. By _principium_, in philosophy, he understands universally efficient supersensible Power. In natural philosophy the term is applied to the orderly sequences manifested to our senses, not to the active cause of the order.

975 “ratiocinio ... redditæ universales.” Relations of the data of sense to universalising reason are here recognised.

976 “natura motus.” Sect. 43-66 treat of the nature of the _effect_—i.e. perceptible motion, as distinguished from its true causal origin (_principium_) in mind or spirit. The origin of motion belongs to metaphysics; its nature, as dependent on percipient experience, belongs to physics. Is motion independent of a plurality of bodies; or does it involve bodies in relation to other bodies, so that absolute motion is meaningless? Cf. _Principles_, sect. 111-116.

977 “idea illa tenuissima et subtilissima.” The difficulty as to definition of motion is attributed to abstractions, and the inclination of the scholastic mind to prefer these to concrete experience.

978 Motion is thus defined by Aristotle:—Διὸ ἡ κίνησις ἐντελέχεια τοῦ κινητοῦ, ᾗ κινητόν. Nat. Ausc. III. ii; see also i. and iii. Cf. Derodon, _Physica_, I. ix.

979 Newton.

980 Cf. sect. 3-42.

981 Descartes, _Principia_, P. II. § 25; also Borellus, _De Vi Percussionis_, p. 1.

982 “res faciles difficillimas.” Cf. _Principles_, “Introduction,” sect. 1.

983 Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δὴ χαλεπὸν αὐτὴν λαβεῖν τί ἐστίν. _Nat. Ausc._ III. ii.

984 e.g. Zeno, in his noted argument against the possibility of motion, referred to as a signal example of fallacy.

985 “de infinite, &c.” Cf. _Principles_, sect. 130-132, and the _Analyst_ passim, for Berkeley’s treatment of infinitesimals.

986 “confundere.” Cf. sect. 3-42 for illustrations of this confusion.

987 The modern conception of the “conservation of force.”

988 Aristotle states the question in _Nat. Ausc._ VIII. cap. i, and solves it in cap. iv.

989 “mutatio loci” is the effect, i.e. motion perceived by sense; “vitale principium” the real cause, i.e. vital rational agency.

990 “moventis et moti,” i.e. as concauses.

991 “motum localem.” Sect. 52-65 discuss the reality of absolute or empty space, in contrast with concrete space realised in perception of the local relations of bodies. The meaninglessness of absolute space and motion is argued. Cf. _Principles_, sect. 116, 117. See Locke’s _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 13, 15, 17; also _Papers which passed between Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke in 1715-16_, pp. 55-59; 73-81; 97-103, &c. Leibniz calls absolute space “an ideal of some modern Englishman.”

992 Newton’s _Principia_, Def. Sch. III. See also Derodon, _Physica_, P. I. cap. vi. § 1.

993 Cf. Locke on a vacuum, and the “possibility of space existing without matter,” _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 13.

994 Note the account here given of _imagination_ and _intellect_, as distinguished from _sense_, which may be compared with αἴσθησις, φαντασία, and νοῦς in Aristotelian psychology.

995 “attributorum divinorum particeps.” See Samuel Clarke, in his _Demonstration_, and in the _Papers between Clarke and Leibnitz_.

996 “nostrum,” sc. corpus. When we imagine space emptied of bodies, we are apt to forget that our own bodies are part of the material world.

997 [Vide quæ contra spatium absolutum disseruntur in libro _De Principiis Cognitionis Humanæ_, idiomate anglicano decem abhine annis edito.]—AUTHOR. He refers to sect. 116 of the _Principles_.

998 He treats absolute space as nothing, and relative space as dependent on Perception and Will.

_ 999 Phys._ α. 5. 188a. 22, 23.

1000 See Locke, _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 13, §§ 7-10.

1001 Sect. 67-72 treat of the supposed ejection of motion from the striking body into the body struck. Is this only metaphorical? Is the motion received by the latter to be supposed identical with, or equivalent to, that given forth by the former?

_ 1002 Principia_, Def. IV.

_ 1003 Lezioni Accademiche._

_ 1004 De Vi Percussionis_, cap. IX.

1005 Newton’s third law of motion.

1006 Berkeley sees in motion only a link in the chain which connects the sensible and intelligible worlds—a conception unfolded in his _Siris_, more than twenty years later.

1007 “provincia sua.” The _De Motu_, so far as it treats of motion perceptible to the senses, is assigned to physics; in contrast to theology or metaphysics, alone concerned with active causation.