Part 53

797 On Primary and Secondary Qualities of Matter, and their mutual relations, cf. _Principles_, sect. 9-15. See also Descartes, _Meditations_, III, _Principia_, I. sect. 69; Malebranche, _Recherche_, Liv. VI. Pt. II. sect. 2; Locke’s _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 8.

798 Cf. _New Theory of Vision_, sect. 80.

799 What follows, within brackets, is not contained in the first and second editions.

800 Percipient mind is, in short, the indispensable realising factor of _all_ the qualities of sensible things.

801 Cf. _New Theory of Vision_, sect. 122-126; _Principles_, sect. 123, &c.; _Siris_, sect. 270, &c.

802 Cf. _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 15.

803 Is “notion” here a synonym for idea?

804 Cf. _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 16.

805 “Size or figure, or sensible quality”—“size, color &c.,” in the first and second editions.

806 In Berkeley’s later and more exact terminology, the data or implicates of pure intellect are called _notions_, in contrast to his _ideas_, which are concrete or individual sensuous presentations.

807 They need living percipient mind to make them real.

808 So Reid’s _Inquiry_, ch. ii, sect. 8, 9; _Essays on the Intellectual Powers_, II. ch. 16. Cf. _New Theory of Vision Vindicated_, sect. 8, &c.

809 i.e. figured or extended visible colour. Cf. _New Theory of Vision_, sect. 43, &c.

810 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 25, 26.

811 After maintaining, in the preceding part of this Dialogue, the inevitable dependence of all the qualities of Matter upon percipient Spirit, the argument now proceeds to dispose of the supposition that Matter may still be an unmanifested or unqualified _substratum_, independent of living percipient Spirit.

812 [See the _Essay towards a New Theory of Vision_, and its _Vindication_.] Note by the _Author_ in the 1734 edition.

813 Cf. _Essay on Vision_, sect. 2.

814 Cf. Ibid., sect. 43.

815 “an idea,” i.e. a phenomenon present to our senses.

816 This was Reid’s fundamental question in his criticism of Berkeley.

817 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 8.

818 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 25, 26.

819 In other words, the percipient activity of a living spirit is the necessary condition of the real existence of all ideas or phenomena immediately present to our senses.

820 An “explanation” afterwards elaborately developed by Hartley, in his _Observations on Man_ (1749). Berkeley has probably Hobbes in view.

821 The brain with the human body in which it is included constitutes a part of the material world, and must equally with the rest of the material world depend for its realisation upon percipient Spirit as the realising factor.

822 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 23.

823 “in stones and minerals”—in first and second editions.

824 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 29-33; also sect. 90.—The _permanence_ of a thing, during intervals in which it may be unperceived and unimagined by human beings, is here assumed, as a natural conviction.

825 In other words, men are apt to treat the omniscience of God as an inference from the dogmatic assumption that God exists, instead of seeing that our cosmic experience necessarily presupposes omnipotent and omniscient Intelligence at its root.

826 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 90. A permanent material world is grounded on Divine Mind, because it cannot but depend on Mind, while its reality is only partially and at intervals sustained by finite minds.

827 “necessarily inferred from”—rather necessarily presupposed in.

828 The present reality of Something implies the eternal existence of living Mind, if Something _must_ exist eternally, and if real or concrete existence involves living Mind. Berkeley’s conception of material nature presupposes a theistic basis.

829 He refers of course to Malebranche and his Divine Vision.

830 But Malebranche uses _idea_ in a higher meaning than Berkeley does—akin to the Platonic, and in contrast to the sensuous phenomena which Berkeley calls ideas.

831 The passage within brackets first appeared in the third edition.

832 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 25-33.

833 Cf. Ibid., sect. 3-24.

834 I _can_ represent to myself another mind perceiving and conceiving things; because I have an example of this my own conscious life. I _cannot_ represent to myself sensible things existing totally unperceived and unimagined; because I cannot, without a contradiction, have an example of this in my own experience.

835 “reason,” i.e. by reasoning.

836 Berkeley’s _material substance_ is a natural or divinely ordered aggregate of sensible qualities or phenomena.

837 Inasmuch as, according to Berkeley, it must be a living Spirit, and it would be an abuse of language to call this Matter.

838 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 25, 26.

839 It is here argued that as _volition_ is the only _originative_ cause implied in our experience, and which consequently alone puts true meaning into the term Cause, to apply that term to what is not volition is to make it meaningless, or at least to misapply it.

840 While thus arguing against the need for independent matter, as an instrument needed by God, Berkeley fails to explain how dependent matter can be a medium of intercourse between persons. It must be more than a subjective dream, however well ordered, if it is available for this purpose. Unless the visible and audible ideas or phenomena presented to me are actually seen and heard by other men, how can they be instrumental in intercommunication?

841 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 68-79.

842 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 20.

843 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 80, 81.

844 i.e. all Spirits and their dependent ideas or phenomena.

845 This, according to Hume (who takes for granted that Berkeley’s reasonings can produce no conviction), is the natural effect of Berkeley’s philosophy.—“Most of the writings of that very ingenious author (Berkeley) form the best lessons of scepticism which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers, Bayle not excepted.... That all his arguments, though otherwise intended, are, in reality, merely sceptical, appear from this—_that they admit of no answer, and produce no conviction_. Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion, which is the result of scepticism.” (Hume’s _Essays_, vol. II. Note N, p. 554.)

846 Omitted in last edition.

847 “Tell me, Hylas,”—“So Hylas”—in first and second editions.

848 Variously called _noumena_, “things-in-themselves,” absolute substances, &c.—which Berkeley’s philosophy banishes, on the ground of their unintelligibility, and thus annihilates all farther questions concerning them. Questions about existence are thus confined within the concrete or realising experiences of living spirits.

849 Berkeley claims that his doctrine supersedes scepticism, and excludes the possibility of fallacy in sense, in excluding an ultimately representative perception of Matter. He also assumes the reasonableness of faith in the reality and constancy of natural law. When we see an orange, the visual sense guarantees only colour. The other phenomena, which we associate with this colour—the other “qualities” of the orange—are, when we only _see_ the orange, matter of faith. We believe them to be realisable.

850 He accepts the common belief on which interpretation of sense symbols proceeds—that sensible phenomena are evolved in rational order, under laws that are independent of, and in that respect external to, the individual percipient.

851 Mediately as well as immediately.

852 We can hardly be said to have an _immediate_ sense-perception of an individual “thing”—meaning by “thing” a congeries of sense-ideas or phenomena, presented to different senses. We immediately perceive some of them, and believe in the others, which those suggest. See the last three notes.

853 He probably refers to Descartes, who _argues_ for the trustworthiness of our faculties from the veracity of God; thus apparently arguing in a circle, seeing that the existence of God is manifested to us only through our suspected faculties. But is not confidence in the trustworthiness of the Universal Power at the heart of the universe, the fundamental _presupposition_ of all human experience, and God thus the basis and end of philosophy and of experience?

854 As Locke does. See _Essay_, Bk. IV. ch. 11.

855 Cf. _Principles of Human Knowledge_, sect. 45-48.

856 And to be thus external to individual minds.

857 It is here that Berkeley differs, for example, from Hume and Comte and J.S. Mill; who accept sense-given phenomena, and assume the constancy of their orderly reappearances, _as a matter of fact_, while they confess total ignorance of the _cause_ of natural order. (Thus ignorant, why do they assume reason or order in nature?) The ground of sensible things, which Berkeley refers to Divine Power, Mill expresses by the term “_permanent possibility_ of sensation.” (See his _Examination of Hamilton_, ch. 11.) Our belief in the continued existence of a sensible thing _in our absence_ merely means, with him, our conviction, derived from custom, that we should perceive it under inexplicable conditions which determine its appearance.

858 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 25, 26.

859 Cf. Ibid., sect. 2, 27, 135-142.

860 Inasmuch as I am conscious of _myself_, I can gather, through the sense symbolism, the real existence of other minds, external to my own. For I cannot, of course, enter into the very consciousness of another person.

861 “reason,” i.e. reasoning or necessary inference—founded here on our sense of personal dependence; not merely on our faith in sense symbolism and the interpretability of the sensible world. Our belief in the existence of finite minds, external to our own, is, with Berkeley, an application of this faith.

862 “Matter,” i.e. Matter as abstract substance. Cf. _Principles_, sect. 135-138.

863 Does this imply that with Berkeley, _self_, as distinguished from the _phenomena_ of which the material world consists, is not a necessary presuppostion of experience? He says in many places—I am _conscious_ of “my own being,” and that my mind is myself. Cf. _Principles_, sect, 2.

864 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 8.

865 Cf. Ibid., sect. 20

866 This important passage, printed within brackets, is not found in the first and second editions of the _Dialogues_. It is, by anticipation, Berkeley’s answer to Hume’s application of the objections to the reality of abstract or unperceived Matter, to the reality of the Ego or Self, of which we are aware through memory, as identical amid the changes of its successive states.

867 See note 4 on preceding page.

868 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 142.

869 Cf. Ibid., sect. 2. Does he assume that he exists when he is not conscious of ideas—sensible or other? Or, does he deny that he is ever unconscious?

870 That is of matter supposed to exist independently of any mind. Berkeley speaks here of a _consciousness_ of matter. Does he mean consciousness of belief in abstract material Substance?

871 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 54-57.

872 Which he does not doubt.

873 This sentence expresses the whole question between Berkeley and his antagonists.

874 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 29-41.

875 The words within brackets are omitted in the third edition.

876 The index pointing to the originative causes in the universe is thus the ethical judgment, which fastens upon the free voluntary agency of _persons_, as absolutely responsible causes, not merely caused causes.

877 That only ideas or phenomena are presented to our senses may be assented to by those who nevertheless maintain that intelligent sensuous experience implies more than the sensuous or empirical data.

878 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 49.

879 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 58.

880 “without the mind,” i.e. without the mind of each percipient person.

881 This is the gist of the whole question. According to the Materialists, sense-presented phenomena are due to unpresented, unperceived, abstract Matter; according to Berkeley, to living Spirit; according to Hume and Agnostics, their origin is unknowable, yet (incoherently) they claim that we _can_ interpret them—in physical science.

882 A similar objection is urged by Erdmann, in his criticism of Berkeley in the _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_.

883 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 50; _Siris_, sect. 319.

884 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 58.

885 “order”—“series,” in first and second editions.

886 “Matter,” i.e. when the reality of “matter” is supposed to signify what Berkeley argues cannot be; because really meaningless.

887 “the connexion of ideas,” i.e. the physical coexistences and sequences, maintained in constant order by Power external to the individual, and which are disclosed in the natural sciences.

888 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 38. Berkeley is not for making things _subjective_, but for recognising ideas or phenomena presented to the senses as _objective_.

889 They are not mere illusory appearances but are the very things themselves making their appearance, as far as our limited senses allow them to be realised for us.

890 i.e. abstract Matter.

891 Cf. _New Theory of Vision_, sect. 49; and _New Theory of Vision Vindicated_, sect. 9, 10, 15, &c.

892 Cf. _New Theory of Vision_, sect. 84-86.

893 “the connexion of ideas,” i.e. the order providentially maintained in nature.

894 Cf. _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 23-25.

895 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 8-10, 86, 87.

896 This difficulty is thus pressed by Reid:—“The ideas in my mind cannot be the same with the ideas in any other mind; therefore, if the objects I perceive be only ideas, it is impossible that two or more such minds can perceive the same thing. Thus there is one unconfutable consequence of Berkeley’s system, which he seems not to have attended to, and from which it will be found difficult, if at all possible, to guard it. The consequence I mean is this—that, although it leaves us sufficient evidence of a Supreme Mind, it seems to take away all the evidence we have of other intelligent beings like ourselves. What I call a father, or a brother, or a friend, is only a parcel of ideas in my own mind ; they cannot possibly have that relation to another mind which they have to mine, any more than the pain felt by me can be the _individual pain_ felt by another. I am thus left alone as the only creature of God in the universe” (Hamilton’s _Reid_, pp. 284-285). Implied Solipsism or Panegoism is thus charged against Berkeley, unless his conception of the material world is further guarded.

897 Reid and Hamilton argue in like manner against a fundamentally representative sense-perception.

898 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 6.

899 Cf. Ibid., sect. 87-90.

900 Cf. Ibid., sect. 18.

901 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 24.

902 “unknown,” i.e. unrealised in percipient life.

903 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 28-33.

904 See also Collier’s _Clavis Universalis_, p. 6: “Two or more persons who are present at a concert of music may indeed in some measure be said to hear the _same_ notes; yet the sound which the one hears is _not the very same_ with the sound which another hears, _because the souls or persons are supposed to be different_.”

905 Berkeley seems to hold that in _things_ there is no identity other than perfect similarity—only in _persons_. And even as to personal identity he is obscure. Cf. _Siris_, sect. 347, &c.

906 But the question is, whether the very ideas or phenomena that are perceived by me _can_ be also perceived by other persons; and if not, how I can discover that “other persons” exist, or that any finite person except myself is cognizant of the ideal cosmos—if the sort of _sameness_ that Berkeley advocates is all that can be predicated of concrete ideas; which are thus only _similar_, or generically the same. Unless the ideas are _numerically_ the same, can different persons make signs to one another through them?

907 Omitted in author’s last edition.

908 This seems to imply that intercourse between finite persons is maintained through ideas or phenomena presented to the senses, under a tacit faith in divinely guaranteed correspondence between the phenomena of which I am conscious, and the phenomena of which my neighbour is conscious; so that they are _practically_ “the same.” If we are living in a fundamentally divine, and therefore absolutely trustworthy, universe, the phenomena presented to my senses, which I attribute to the agency of another person, are so attributed rightly. For if not, the so-called cosmos is adapted to mislead me.

909 This explanation is often overlooked by Berkeley’s critics.

910 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 82-84.

911 i.e. if you take the term _idea_ in its wholly subjective and popular meaning.

912 i.e. if you take the term _idea_ in its objective meaning.

913 “philosophic,” i.e. _pseudo_-philosophic, against which he argues.

914 Had this their relative existence—this realisation of the material world through finite percipient and volitional life—any beginning? May not God have been eternally presenting phenomena to the senses of percipient beings in cosmical order, if not on this planet yet elsewhere, perhaps under other conditions? Has there been any beginning in the succession of finite persons?

915 In the first and second editions only.

916 Is “creation” by us distinguishable from continuous evolution, unbeginning and unending, in divinely constituted order; and is there a distinction between creation or evolution of _things_ and creation or evolution of _persons_?

917 Cf. _Siris_, sect. 347-349.

918 “Matter,” i.e. Matter in this pseudo-philosophical meaning of the word.

919 Thus Origen in the early Church. That “Matter” is co-eternal with God would mean that God is eternally making things real in the percipient experience of persons.

920 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 85-156, in which the religious and scientific advantages of the new conception of matter and the material cosmos are illustrated, when it is rightly understood and applied.

921 “substance and accident”—“subjects and adjuncts,”—in the first and the second edition.

922 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 28-42. In _Siris_, sect. 294-297, 300-318, 335, 359-365, we have glimpses of thought more allied to Platonism, if not to Hegelianism.

923 “Matter,” i.e. matter unrealised in any mind, finite or Divine.

924 These two propositions are a summary of Berkeley’s conception of the material world. With him, the _immediate_ objects of sense, realise in _perception_, are independent of the _will_ of the percipient, and are thus external to his proper personality. Berkeley’s “material world” of enlightened Common Sense, resulting from two factors, Divine and human, is independent of each finite mind; but not independent of all living Mind.

925 “voces male intellectæ.” Cf. _Principles of Human Knowledge_, “Introduction,” sect. 6, 23-25, on the abuse of language, especially by abstraction.

926 “veterum philosophorum.” The history of ancient speculations about motion, from the paradoxes of Zeno downwards, is, in some sort, a history of ancient metaphysics. It involves Space, Time, and the material world, with the ultimate causal relation of Nature to Spirit.

927 “hujus ævi philosophos.” As in Bacon on motion, and in the questions raised by Newton, Borelli, Leibniz, and others, discussed in the following sections.

928 Sect. 3-42 are concerned with the principle of Causality, exemplified in the motion, or change of place and state, that is continually going on in the material world, and which was supposed by some to explain all the phenomena of the universe.

929 “vis.” The assumption that _active power_ is an immediate datum of sense is the example here offered of the abase of abstract words. He proceeds to dissolve the assumption by shewing that it is meaningless.

930 “principio”—the ultimate explanation or originating cause. Cf. sect. 36. Metaphors, or indeed empty words, are accepted for explanations, it is argued, when _bodily_ power or force, in any form, e.g. gravitation, is taken as the real cause of motion. To call these “occult causes” is to say nothing that is intelligible. The perceived sensible effects and their customary sequences are all we know. Physicists are still deluded by words and metaphors.

931 Cf. sect. 53, where _sense_, _imagination_, and _intelligence_ are distinguished.

932 Cf. _Principles_, Introd. 16, 20, 21; also _Alciphron_, Dial. VII. sect. 8, 17.

933 [La Materia altro non è che un vaso di Circe incantato, il quale serve per ricettacolo della forza et de’ momenti dell’ impeto. La forzae l’impeti sono astratti tanto sottili, sono quintessenze tanto spiritose, che in altre ampolle non si possono racchiudere, fuor che nell’ intima corpulenza de’ solidi naturali, Vide _Lezioni Accademiche_.]—AUTHOR. Torricelli (1608-47), the eminent Italian physicist, and professor of mathematics at Florence, who invented the barometer.

934 Borelli (1608-79), Italian professor of mathematics at Pisa, and then of medicine at Florence; see his _De Vi Percussionis_, cap. XXIV. prop. 88, and cap. XXVII.

935 “per effectum,” i.e. by its sensible effects—real power or active force not being a datum of the senses, but found in the spiritual efficacy, of which we have an example in our personal agency.

936 “vim mortuam.” The only power we can find is the living power of Mind. Reason is perpetually active in the universe, imperceptible through the senses, and revealed to _them_ only in its sensible effects. “Power,” e.g. “gravitation,” in things, _per se_, is distinguished from perceived “motion” only through illusion due to misleading abstraction. There is no _physical_ power, intermediate between spiritual agency, on the one hand, and the sensible changes we see, on the other. Cf. sect. 11.

937 “meditatione subigenda sunt.” Cf. _Theory of Vision Vindicated_, sect. 35, 70.

938 “distingui.” It is here argued that so-called power within the things of sense is not distinguishable from the sensibly perceived sequences. To the meaningless supposition that it is, he attributes the frivolous verbal controversies among the learned mentioned in the following section. The province of natural philosophy, according to Berkeley, is to inquire what the rules are under which sensible effects are uniformly manifested. Cf. _Siris_, sect. 236, 247, 249.

_ 939 Principia Math._ Def. III.

_ 940 De Vi Percussionis_, cap. I.