Part 52

682 On the scheme of ideal Realism, “creation” of matter is presenting to finite minds sense-ideas or phenomena, which are, as it were, letters of the alphabet, in that language of natural order which God employs for the expression of _His_ Ideas to us.

683 The _independent_ eternity of Matter must be distinguished from an unbeginning and endless _creation_ of sensible ideas or phenomena, in percipient spirits, according to divine natural law and order, with implied immanence of God.

684 Because the question at issue with Atheism is, whether the universe of things and persons is finally substantiated and evolved in unthinking Matter or in the perfect Reason of God.

685 Of which Berkeley does _not_ predicate a _numerical_ identity. Cf. _Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous_.

686 “matter,” i.e. matter abstracted from all percipient life and voluntary activity.

687 “external”—not in Berkeley’s meaning of externality. Cf. sect. 90, note 2.

_ 688 Si non rogas, intelligo._ Berkeley writes long after this to Johnson thus:—“A succession of ideas (phenomena) I take to _constitute_ time, and not to be only the sensible measure thereof, as Mr. Locke and others think. But in these matters every man is to think for himself, and speak as he finds. One of my earliest inquiries was about _time_; which led me into several paradoxes that I did not think it fit or necessary to publish, particularly into the notion that the resurrection follows the next moment after death. We are confounded and perplexed about time—supposing a succession in God; that we have an abstract idea of time; that time in one mind is to be measured by succession of ideas in another mind: not considering the true use of words, which as often terminate in the will as in the understanding, being employed to excite and direct action rather than to produce clear and distinct ideas.” Cf. Introduction, sect. 20.

689 As the _esse_ of unthinking things is _percipi_, according to Berkeley, so the _esse_ of persons is _percipere_. The real existence of individual Mind thus depends on having ideas of some sort: the real existence of matter depends on a percipient.

690 This sentence is omitted in the second edition.

691 Cf. _New Theory of Vision_, sect. 43.

692 “objects of sense,” i.e. sensible things, practically external to each person. Cf. sect. 1, on the meaning of _thing_, as distinct from the distinguishable ideas or phenomena that are naturally aggregated in the form of concrete things.

693 Omitted in second edition.

694 Omitted in second edition.

695 Cf. Introduction, sect. 1-3. With Berkeley, the real essence of sensible things is given in perception—so far as our perceptions carry us.

696 e.g. Locke’s _Essay_, Bk. IV. ch. 3.

697 Berkeley advocates a Realism, which eliminates effective causation from the material world, concentrates it in Mind, and in physical research seeks among data of sense for their divinely maintained natural laws.

698 In interpreting the data of sense, we are obliged to assume that every _new_ phenomenon must have previously existed in some equivalent form—but not necessarily in this or that particular form, for a knowledge of which we are indebted to inductive comparisons of experience.

699 The preceding forms of new phenomena, being finally determined by Will, are, in that sense, arbitrary; but not capricious, for the Will is perfect Reason. God is the immanent cause of the natural order.

700 He probably refers to Bacon.

701 Omitted in second edition.

702 What we are able to discover in the all-comprehensive order may be subordinate and provisional only. Nature in its deepest meaning explains itself in the Divine Omniscience.

703 i.e. inductively.

704 i.e. deductively.

705 “seem to consider signs,” i.e. to be grammarians rather than philosophers: physical sciences deal with the grammar of the divine language of nature.

706 “A man may be well read in the language of nature without understanding the grammar of it, or being able to say,” &c.—in first edition.

707 “extend”—“stretch”—in first edition.

708 Omitted in second edition.

709 In the first edition, the section commences thus: “The best grammar of the kind we are speaking of will be easily acknowledged to be a treatise of _Mechanics_, demonstrated and applied to Nature, by a philosopher of a neighbouring nation, whom all the world admire. I shall not take upon me to make remarks on the performance of that extraordinary person: only some things he has advanced so directly opposite to the doctrine we have hitherto laid down, that we should be wanting in the regard due to the authority of so great a man did we not take some notice of them.” He refers, of course, to Newton. The first edition of Berkeley’s _Principles_ was published in Ireland—hence “neighbouring nation.” Newton’s _Principia_ appeared in 1687.

710 “Motion,” in various aspects, is treated specially in the _De Motu_. An imagination of trinal space presupposes locomotive experience—unimpeded, in contrast with—impeded locomotion. Cf. sect. 116.

711 Omitted in second edition.

712 Added in second edition.

713 Omitted in second edition.

714 See Locke’s _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 13, §§ 7-10.

715 “applied to”—“impressed on”—in first edition.

716 “applied to”—“impressed on”—in first edition.

717 “the _force_ causing the change”—which “force,” according to Berkeley, can only be attributed metaphorically to the so-called impelling body; inasmuch as _bodies_, or the data of sense, can only be signs of their consequent events, not efficient causes of change.

718 Added in second edition.

719 What follows to the end of this section is omitted in the second edition.

720 “seems impossible”—“is above my capacity”—in first edition.

721 In short, empty Space _is_ the sensuous idea of unresisted motion. This is implied in the _New Theory of Vision_. He minimises Space, treating it as a datum of sense.

722 He probably refers to Samuel Clarke’s _Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God_, which appeared in 1706, and a treatise _De Spatio Reali_, published in the same year.

723 Sect. 118-132 are accordingly concerned with the New Principles in their application to Mathematics. The foundation of the mathematical sciences engaged much of Berkeley’s thought in early life and in his later years. See his _Analyst_.

724 Numerical relations are _realised_ only in concrete experience.

725 Cf. _New Theory of Vision_, sect. 107, &c.

726 Ibid. sect. 122-125, 149-160.

727 An infinitely divided extension, being unperceived, must be unreal—if its existence is made real only in and through actual perception, or at least imagination. The only possible extension is, accordingly, sensible extension, which could not be infinitely divided without the supposed parts ceasing to be perceived or real.

728 “converted Gentile”—“pagan convert”—in first edition.

729 Cf. Locke’s _Essay_, Bk. I, ch. 3, § 25.

730 “will perhaps in virtue thereof be brought to admit,” &c.—“will not stick to affirm,” &c.—in first edition.

731 Omitted in second edition. See the _Analyst_.

732 “we must mean”—“we mean (if we mean anything)”—in first edition.

733 Omitted in the second edition.

734 Does this refer to the intended “Part II” of the _Principles_?

735 “men of great abilities and obstinate application,” &c.—“men of the greatest abilities and most obstinate application,” &c.—in first edition.

736 What follows to the end of this section is omitted in the second edition.

737 “absolute,” i.e. abstract, independent, irrelative existence—as something of which there can be no sensuous perception or conception.

738 Matter unrealised in perception—not the material world that is realised in percipient experience of sense.

739 Omitted in second edition.

740 Sect. 135-156 treat of consequences of the New Principles, in their application to sciences concerned with our notions of _Spirit_ or _Mind_; as distinguished from sciences of ideas in external Nature, and their mathematical relations. Individual mind, with Berkeley, needs data of sense in order to its realisation in consciousness; while it is dependent on God, in a relation which he does not define distinctly.

741 e.g. Locke suggests this.

742 Is this analogy applicable?

743 Omitted in second edition, as he had previously learned to distinguish _notion_ from _idea_. Cf. sect. 89, 142.

744 Ibid. In the omitted passage it will be seen that he makes _idea_ and _notion_ synonymous.

745 Is the reality of mind as dependent on having ideas (of some sort) as ideas are on mind; although mind is more deeply and truly real than its ideas are?

746 Introduced in second edition.

747 We know _other finite persons_ through sense-presented phenomena, but not as themselves phenomena. Cf. sect. 145. It is a mediate knowledge that we have of other persons. The question about the individuality of finite egos, as distinguished from God, Berkeley has not touched.

748 These sentences are omitted in the second edition.

749 “the soul,” i.e. the individual Ego.

750 Cf. sect. 2; 25-27.

751 This is Berkeley’s application of his new conception of the reality of matter, to the final human question of the self-conscious existence of the individual human Ego, after physical death. Philosophers and theologians were accustomed in his generation to ground their argument for a future life on the metaphysical assumption of the physical indivisibility of our self-conscious spirit, and on our contingent connexion with the body. “Our bodies,” says Bishop Butler, “are no more _ourselves_, or _part of ourselves_, than any other matter around us.” This train of thought is foreign to us at the present day, when men of science remind us that self-conscious life is found only in correlation with corporeal organisation, whatever may be the abstract possibility. Hope of continued life after physical death seems to depend on ethical considerations more than on metaphysical arguments, and on what is suggested by faith in the final outcome of personal life in a _divinely_ constituted universe.

752 Mind and the ideas presented to the senses are at opposite poles of existence. But he does not say that, thus opposed, they are each independent of the other.

753 What follows was introduced in the second edition, in which _notion_ is contrasted with _idea_.

754 Here is a germ of Kantism. But Berkeley has not analysed that activity of mind which constitutes _relation_, nor systematically unfolded the relations involved in the rational constitution of experience. There is more disposition to this in _Siris_.

755 As with Locke, for example.

756 Note this condemnation of the tendency to substantiate “powers of mind.”

757 Omitted in second edition. Berkeley was after all reluctant to “depart from received modes of speech,” notwithstanding their often misleading associations.

758 Omitted in second edition.

759 This is one of the notable sections in the _Principles_, as it suggests the _rationale_ of Berkeley’s rejection of Panegoism or Solipsism. Is this consistent with his conception of the reality of the material world? It is objected (e.g. by Reid) that ideal realism dissolves our faith in the existence of other persons. The difficulty is to shew how appearances presented to my senses, which are sensuous and subjective, can be media of communication between persons. The question carries us back to the theistic presupposition in the trustworthiness of experience—which is adapted to deceive if I am the only person existing. With Berkeley a chief function of ideas of sense is to signify other persons to each person. See _Alciphron_, Dial. IV; _New Theory of Vision Vindicated_, and _Siris_.

760 “repugnant”—for it would involve thought in incoherence, by paralysis of its indispensable causal presupposition.

761 Is not God the indispensable presupposition of trustworthy experience, rather than an empirical inference?

762 This suggests an explanation of the objective reality and significance of _ideas of sense_; through which they become media of social intercourse in the fundamentally divine universe. God so regulates the sense-given ideas of which human beings are individually percipient, as that, _while numerically different, as in each mind_, those ideas are nevertheless a sufficient medium for social intercourse, if the Power universally at work is morally trustworthy. Unless our God-given experience is deceiving, Solipsism is not a necessary result of the fact that no one but myself can be percipient of my sensuous experience.

763 Omitted in second edition.

764 Malebranche, as understood by Berkeley. See _Recherche_, Liv. III. p. ii. ch. 6, &c.

765 For all finite persons _somehow_ live, and move, and have their being “in God.” The existence of _eternal_ living Mind, and the _present_ existence of other men, are both _inferences_, resting on the same foundation, according to Berkeley.

766 The theistic trust in which our experience is rooted remaining latent, or being unintelligent.

767 Cf. sect. 25-28, 51-53, 60-66. His conception of Divine causation in Nature, as the constant omnipresent agency in all natural law, is the deepest part of his philosophy. It is pursued in the _De Motu_.

768 Is not the unbeginning and unending natural evolution, an articulate revelation of Eternal Spirit or Active Reason at the heart of the whole?

769 Omitted in second edition.

770 So Pascal in the _Pensées_.

771 Divine reason ever active in Nature is the necessary correlate to reason in man; inasmuch as otherwise the changing universe in which we live would be unfit to be reasoned about or acted in.

772 The existence of _moral_ evil, or what ought not to exist, is _the_ difficulty which besets faith in the fundamental divinity or goodness of the universe. Yet that faith is presupposed in interpretation of nature, which proceeds on the _postulate_ of universal order; and this implies the moral trustworthiness of the world which we begin to realise when we begin to be conscious. That we are living and having our being in omnipotent goodness is thus not an inference, but the implied basis of all real inferences. I have expanded this thought in my _Philosophy of Theism_. We cannot _prove_ God, for we must assume God, as the basis of all proof. Faith even in the uniformity of nature is virtually faith in omnipotent goodness immanent in the universe.

773 So Leibniz in his _Theodicée_, which was published in the same year as Berkeley’s _Principles_.

774 The divine presupposition, latent in all human reasoning and experience, is hid from the unreflecting, in whom the higher life is dormant, and the ideal in the universe is accordingly undiscerned. Unless the universe is assumed to be physically and morally trustworthy, i.e. unless God is presupposed, even natural science has no adequate foundation.

775 Our necessarily incomplete knowledge of the Universe in which we find ourselves is apt to disturb the fundamental faith, that the phenomena presented to us are significant of God. Yet we _tacitly assume_ that they are thus significant when we interpret real experience, physical or moral.

776 Omitted in second edition.

777 For the following extracts from previously unpublished correspondence of Berkeley and Sir John Percival, I am indebted to the kindness of his descendant, the late Lord Egmont.

778 What Berkeley seeks to shew is, not that the world of the senses is unreal, but in what its reality consists. Is it inexplicable chaos, or explicable expression of ever active Intelligence, more or less interpreted in natural science?

779 Leibniz: _De modo distinguendi Phenomena Realia ab Imaginariis_ (1707).

780 For some information relative to Gua de Malves, see Querard’s _La France Littéraire,_ tom. iii. p. 494.

781 The following is the translator’s Prefatory Note, on the objects of the _Dialogues,_ and in explanation of the three illustrative vignettes:—

“L’Auteur expose dans le premier Dialogue le sentiment du Vulgaire et celui des Philosophes, sur les qualités secondaires et premieres, la nature et l’existence des corps; et il prétend prouver en même tems l’insuffisance de l’un et de l’autre. La Vignette qu’on voit à la téte du Dialogue, fait allusion à cet objet. Elle représente un Philosophe dans son cabinet, lequel est distrait de son travail par un enfant qu’il appercoit se voyant lui-méme dans un miroir, en tendant les mains pour embrasser sa propre image. Le Philosophe rit de l’erreur où il croit que tombe l’enfant; tandis qu’on lui applique à lui-même ces mots tirés d’Horace:

_Quid rides?....de te_ _ Fabula narratur._

“Le second Dialogue est employé à exposer le sentiment de l’Auteur sur le même sujet, sçavoir, que les choses corporelles ont une existence réelle dans les esprits qui les apperçoivent; mais qu’elles ne sçauroient exister hors de tous les esprits à la fois, même de l’esprit infini de Dieu; et que par conséquent la Matière, prise suivant l’acception ordinaire du mot, non seulement n’existe point, mais seroit même absolument impossible. On a taché de représenter aux yeux ce sentiment dans la Vignette du Dialogue. Le mot grec νοῦς qui signifie _âme_, désigne l’àme: les rayons qui en partent marquent l’attention que l’âme donne à des idées ou objets; les tableaux qu’on a placés aux seuls endroits où les rayons aboutissent, et dont les sujets sont tirés de la description des beautés de la nature, qui se trouve dans le livre, représentent les idées ou objets que l’âme considère, pas le secours des facultes qu’elle a reçues de Dieu; et l’action de l’Étre suprème sur l’âme est figurée par un trait, qui, partant d’un triangle, symbole de la Divinité, et perçant les nuages dont le triangle est environné. s’étend jusqu’à l’âme pour la vivifier; enfin, on a fait en sorte de rendre le même sentiment par ces mots:

_Quæ noscere cumque Deus det,_ _ Esse puta._

“L’objet du troisième Dialogue est de répondre aux difficultés auxquelles le sentiment qu’on a établi dans les Dialogues précédens, peut être sujet, de l’éclaircir en cette sorte de plus, d’en développer toutes les heureuses conséquences, enfin de faire voir, qu’étant bien entendu, il revient aux notions les plus communes. Et comme l’Auteur exprime à la fin du livre cette dernière pensée, en comparant ce qu’il vient de dire, à l’eau que les deux Interlocuteurs sont supposés voir jaillir d’un jet, et qu’il remarque que la même force de la gravité fait élever jusqu’à une certaine hauteur et retomber ensuite dans le bassin d’où elle étoit d’abord partie; on a pris cet emblême pour le sujet de la Vignette de ce Dialogue; on a représenté en conséquence dans cette dernière Vignette les deux Interlocuteurs, se promenant dans le lieu où l’Auteur les suppose, et s’entretenant là-dessus, et pour donner au Lecteur l’explication de l’emblême, on a mis au bas le vers suivant:

_Urget aquas vis sursum, eadem flectitque deorsum._”

782 Collier never came fairly in sight of the philosophical public of last century. He is referred to in Germany by Bilfinger, in his _Dilucidationes Philosophicæ_ (1746), and also in the _Ada Eruditorum_, Suppl. VI. 244, &c., and in England by Corry in his _Reflections on Liberty and Necessity_ (1761), as well as in the _Remarks_ on the Reflections, and _Answers_ to the Remarks, pp. 7, 8 (1763), where he is described as “a weak reasoner, and a very dull writer also.” Collier was dragged from his obscurity by Dr. Reid, in his _Essays on the Intellectual Powers_, Essay II. ch. 10. He was a subject of correspondence between Sir James Mackintosh, then at Bombay, and Dr. Parr, and an object of curiosity to Dugald Stewart. A beautiful reprint of the _Clavis_ (of the original edition of which only seven copies were then known to exist) appeared in Edinburgh in 1836; and in the following year it was included in a collection of _Metaphysical Tracts by English Philosophers of the Eighteenth Century_, prepared for the press by Dr. Parr.

783 William, fourth Lord Berkeley of Stratton, born about 1663, succeeded his brother in 1697, and died in 1741 at Bruton in Somersetshire. The Berkeleys of Stratton were descended from a younger son of Maurice, Lord Berkeley of Berkeley Castle, who died in 1326. His descendant, Sir John Berkeley of Bruton, a zealous Royalist, was created first Lord Berkeley of Stratton in 1658, and in 1669 became Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, an office which he held till 1672, when he was succeeded by the Earl of Essex (see Burke’s _Extinct Peerages_). It is said that Bishop Berkeley’s father was related to him. The Bishop himself was introduced by Dean Swift, in 1713, to the Lord Berkeley of Stratton, to whom the _Dialogues_ are dedicated, as “a cousin of his Lordship.” The title of Berkeley of Stratton became extinct on the death of the fifth Lord in 1773.

784 This interesting Preface is omitted in his last edition of the _Dialogues_.

785 The Second Part of the _Principles_ was never published, and only in part written. See Editor’s Preface to the _Principles_.

_ 786 Principles_, Introduction, sect. 1.

787 Berkeley’s philosophy is professedly a “revolt” from abstract ideas to an enlightened sense of concrete realities. In these Dialogues _Philonous_ personates the revolt, and represents Berkeley. _Hylas_ vindicates the uncritical conception of independent Matter.

788 Berkeley’s zeal against Matter in the abstract, and all abstract ideas of concrete things, is therefore not necessarily directed against “universal intellectual notions”—“the principles and theorems of sciences.”

789 Here “reason” means reasoning or inference. Cf. _Theory of Vision Vindicated_, sect. 42, including the distinction between “suggestion” and “inference.”

790 “figure” as well as colour, is here included among the original data of sight.

791 “without the mind,” i.e. unrealised by any percipient mind.

792 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 14.

793 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 14, 15.

794 “Sensible qualities,” i.e. the significant appearances presented in sense.

795 Cf. _New Theory of Vision_, sect. 80-86.

796 Descartes and Locke for example.