Part 37

_Phil._ To help you out, do but consider that if _extension_ be once acknowledged to have no existence without the mind, the same must necessarily be granted of motion, solidity, and gravity; since they all evidently suppose extension. It is therefore superfluous to inquire particularly concerning each of them. In denying extension, you have denied them all to have any real existence(800).

_Hyl._ I wonder, Philonous, if what you say be true, why those philosophers who deny the Secondary Qualities any real existence should yet attribute it to the Primary. If there is no difference between them, how can this be accounted for?

_Phil._ It is not my business to account for every opinion of the philosophers. But, among other reasons which may be assigned for this, it seems probable that pleasure and pain being rather annexed to the former than the latter may be one. Heat and cold, tastes and smells, have something more vividly pleasing or disagreeable than the ideas of extension, figure, and motion affect us with. And, it being too visibly absurd to hold that pain or pleasure can be in an unperceiving Substance, men are more easily weaned from believing the external existence of the Secondary than the Primary Qualities. You will be satisfied there is something in this, if you recollect the difference you made between an intense and more moderate degree of heat; allowing the one a real existence, while you denied it to the other. But, after all, there is no rational ground for that distinction; for, surely an indifferent sensation is as truly _a sensation_ as one more pleasing or painful; and consequently should not any more than they be supposed to exist in an unthinking subject.

_Hyl._ It is just come into my head, Philonous, that I have somewhere heard of a distinction between absolute and sensible extension(801). Now, though it be acknowledged that _great_ and _small_, consisting merely in the relation which other extended beings have to the parts of our own bodies, do not really inhere in the substances themselves; yet nothing obliges us to hold the same with regard to _absolute extension_, which is something abstracted from _great_ and _small_, from this or that particular magnitude or figure. So likewise as to motion; _swift_ and _slow_ are altogether relative to the succession of ideas in our own minds. But, it doth not follow, because those modifications of motion exist not without the mind, that therefore absolute motion abstracted from them doth not.

_Phil._ Pray what is it that distinguishes one motion, or one part of extension, from another? Is it not something sensible, as some degree of swiftness or slowness, some certain magnitude or figure peculiar to each?

_Hyl._ I think so.

_Phil._ These qualities, therefore, stripped of all sensible properties, are without all specific and numerical differences, as the schools call them.

_Hyl._ They are.

_Phil._ That is to say, they are extension in general, and motion in general.

_Hyl._ Let it be so.

_Phil._ But it is a universally received maxim that _Everything which exists is particular_(802). How then can motion in general, or extension in general, exist in any corporeal substance?

_Hyl._ I will take time to solve your difficulty.

_Phil._ But I think the point may be speedily decided. Without doubt you can tell whether you are able to frame this or that idea. Now I am content to put our dispute on this issue. If you can frame in your thoughts a distinct _abstract idea_ of motion or extension, divested of all those sensible modes, as swift and slow, great and small, round and square, and the like, which are acknowledged to exist only in the mind, I will then yield the point you contend for. But if you cannot, it will be unreasonable on your side to insist any longer upon what you have no notion(803) of.

_Hyl._ To confess ingenuously, I cannot.

_Phil._ Can you even separate the ideas of extension and motion from the ideas of all those qualities which they who make the distinction term _secondary_?

_Hyl._ What! is it not an easy matter to consider extension and motion by themselves, abstracted from all other sensible qualities? Pray how do the mathematicians treat of them?

_Phil._ I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form general propositions and reasonings about those qualities, without mentioning any other; and, in this sense, to consider or treat of them abstractedly(804). But, how doth it follow that, because I can pronounce the word _motion_ by itself, I can form the idea of it in my mind exclusive of body? or, because theorems may be made of extension and figures, without any mention of _great_ or _small_, or any other sensible mode or quality, that therefore it is possible such an abstract idea of extension, without any particular size or figure, or sensible quality(805), should be distinctly formed, and apprehended by the mind? Mathematicians treat of quantity, without regarding what other sensible qualities it is attended with, as being altogether indifferent to their demonstrations. But, when laying aside the words, they contemplate the bare ideas, I believe you will find, they are not the pure abstracted ideas of extension.

_Hyl._ But what say you to _pure intellect_? May not abstracted ideas be framed by that faculty?

_Phil._ Since I cannot frame abstract ideas at all, it is plain I cannot frame them by the help of _pure intellect_; whatsoever faculty you understand by those words(806). Besides, not to inquire into the nature of pure intellect and its spiritual objects, as _virtue_, _reason_, _God_, or the like, thus much seems manifest—that sensible things are only to be perceived by sense, or represented by the imagination. Figures, therefore, and extension, being originally perceived by sense, do not belong to pure intellect: but, for your farther satisfaction, try if you can frame the idea of any figure, abstracted from all particularities of size, or even from other sensible qualities.

_Hyl._Let me think a little——I do not find that I can.

_Phil._ And can you think it possible that should really exist in nature which implies a repugnancy in its conception?

_Hyl._ By no means.

_Phil._ Since therefore it is impossible even for the mind to disunite the ideas of extension and motion from all other sensible qualities, doth it not follow, that where the one exist there necessarily the other exist likewise?

_Hyl._ It should seem so.

_Phil._ Consequently, the very same arguments which you admitted as conclusive against the Secondary Qualities are, without any farther application of force, against the Primary too. Besides, if you will trust your senses, is it not plain all sensible qualities coexist, or to them appear as being in the same place? Do they ever represent a motion, or figure, as being divested of all other visible and tangible qualities?

_Hyl._ You need say no more on this head. I am free to own, if there be no secret error or oversight in our proceedings hitherto, that _all_ sensible qualities are alike to be denied existence without the mind(807). But, my fear is that I have been too liberal in my former concessions, or overlooked some fallacy or other. In short, I did not take time to think.

_Phil._ For that matter, Hylas, you may take what time you please in reviewing the progress of our inquiry. You are at liberty to recover any slips you might have made, or offer whatever you have omitted which makes for your first opinion.

_Hyl._ One great oversight I take to be this—that I did not sufficiently distinguish the _object_ from the _sensation_(808). Now, though this latter may not exist without the mind, yet it will not thence follow that the former cannot.

_Phil._ What object do you mean? the object of the senses?

_Hyl._ The same.

_Phil._ It is then immediately perceived?

_Hyl._ Right.

_Phil._ Make me to understand the difference between what is immediately perceived and a sensation.

_Hyl._ The sensation I take to be an act of the mind perceiving; besides which, there is something perceived; and this I call the _object_. For example, there is red and yellow on that tulip. But then the act of perceiving those colours is in me only, and not in the tulip.

_Phil._ What tulip do you speak of? Is it that which you see?

_Hyl._ The same.

_Phil._ And what do you see beside colour, figure, and extension(809)?

_Hyl._ Nothing.

_Phil._ What you would say then is that the red and yellow are coexistent with the extension; is it not?

_Hyl._ That is not all; I would say they have a real existence without the mind, in some unthinking substance.

_Phil._ That the colours are really in the tulip which I see is manifest. Neither can it be denied that this tulip may exist independent of your mind or mine; but, that any immediate object of the senses—that is, any idea, or combination of ideas—should exist in an unthinking substance, or exterior to _all_ minds, is in itself an evident contradiction. Nor can I imagine how this follows from what you said just now, to wit, that the red and yellow were on the tulip _you saw_, since you do not pretend to _see_ that unthinking substance.

_Hyl._ You have an artful way, Philonous, of diverting our inquiry from the subject.

_Phil._ I see you have no mind to be pressed that way. To return then to your distinction between _sensation_ and _object_; if I take you right, you distinguish in every perception two things, the one an action of the mind, the other not.

_Hyl._ True.

_Phil._ And this action cannot exist in, or belong to, any unthinking thing(810); but, whatever beside is implied in a perception may?

_Hyl._ That is my meaning.

_Phil._ So that if there was a perception without any act of the mind, it were possible such a perception should exist in an unthinking substance?

_Hyl._ I grant it. But it is impossible there should be such a perception.

_Phil._ When is the mind said to be active?

_Hyl._ When it produces, puts an end to, or changes, anything.

_Phil._ Can the mind produce, discontinue, or change anything, but by an act of the will?

_Hyl._ It cannot.

_Phil._ The mind therefore is to be accounted _active_ in its perceptions so far forth as _volition_ is included in them?

_Hyl._ It is.

_Phil._ In plucking this flower I am active; because I do it by the motion of my hand, which was consequent upon my volition; so likewise in applying it to my nose. But is either of these smelling?

_Hyl._ No.

_Phil._ I act too in drawing the air through my nose; because my breathing so rather than otherwise is the effect of my volition. But neither can this be called _smelling_: for, if it were, I should smell every time I breathed in that manner?

_Hyl._ True.

_Phil._ Smelling then is somewhat consequent to all this?

_Hyl._ It is.

_Phil._ But I do not find my will concerned any farther. Whatever more there is—as that I perceive such a particular smell, or any smell at all—this is independent of my will, and therein I am altogether passive. Do you find it otherwise with you, Hylas?

_Hyl._ No, the very same.

_Phil._ Then, as to seeing, is it not in your power to open your eyes, or keep them shut; to turn them this or that way?

_Hyl._ Without doubt.

_Phil._ But, doth it in like manner depend on _your_ will that in looking on this flower you perceive _white_ rather than any other colour? Or, directing your open eyes towards yonder part of the heaven, can you avoid seeing the sun? Or is light or darkness the effect of your volition?

_Hyl._ No, certainly.

_Phil._ You are then in these respects altogether passive?

_Hyl._ I am.

_Phil._ Tell me now, whether _seeing_ consists in perceiving light and colours, or in opening and turning the eyes?

_Hyl._ Without doubt, in the former.

_Phil._ Since therefore you are in the very perception of light and colours altogether passive, what is become of that action you were speaking of as an ingredient in every sensation? And, doth it not follow from your own concessions, that the perception of light and colours, including no action in it, may exist in an unperceiving substance? And is not this a plain contradiction?

_Hyl._ I know not what to think of it.

_Phil._ Besides, since you distinguish the _active_ and _passive_ in every perception, you must do it in that of pain. But how is it possible that pain, be it as little active as you please, should exist in an unperceiving substance? In short, do but consider the point, and then confess ingenuously, whether light and colours, tastes, sounds, &c. are not all equally passions or sensations in the soul. You may indeed call them _external objects_, and give them in words what subsistence you please. But, examine your own thoughts, and then tell me whether it be not as I say?

_Hyl._ I acknowledge, Philonous, that, upon a fair observation of what passes in my mind, I can discover nothing else but that I am a thinking being, affected with variety of sensations; neither is it possible to conceive how a sensation should exist in an unperceiving substance.—But then, on the other hand, when I look on sensible things in a different view, considering them as so many modes and qualities, I find it necessary to suppose a _material substratum_, without which they cannot be conceived to exist(811).

_Phil._ _Material substratum_ call you it? Pray, by which of your senses came you acquainted with that being?

_Hyl._ It is not itself sensible; its modes and qualities only being perceived by the senses.

_Phil._ I presume then it was by reflexion and reason you obtained the idea of it?

_Hyl._ I do not pretend to any proper positive _idea_ of it. However, I conclude it exists, because qualities cannot be conceived to exist without a support.

_Phil._ It seems then you have only a relative _notion_ of it, or that you conceive it not otherwise than by conceiving the relation it bears to sensible qualities?

_Hyl._ Right.

_Phil._ Be pleased therefore to let me know wherein that relation consists.

_Hyl._ Is it not sufficiently expressed in the term _substratum_, or _substance_?

_Phil._ If so, the word _substratum_ should import that it is spread under the sensible qualities or accidents?

_Hyl._ True.

_Phil._ And consequently under extension?

_Hyl._ I own it.

_Phil._ It is therefore somewhat in its own nature entirely distinct from extension?

_Hyl._ I tell you, extension is only a mode, and Matter is something that supports modes. And is it not evident the thing supported is different from the thing supporting?

_Phil._ So that something distinct from, and exclusive of, extension is supposed to be the _substratum_ of extension?

_Hyl._ Just so.

_Phil._ Answer me, Hylas. Can a thing be spread without extension? or is not the idea of extension necessarily included in _spreading_?

_Hyl._ It is.

_Phil._ Whatsoever therefore you suppose spread under anything must have in itself an extension distinct from the extension of that thing under which it is spread?

_Hyl._ It must.

_Phil._ Consequently, every corporeal substance, being the _substratum_ of extension, must have in itself another extension, by which it is qualified to be a _substratum_: and so on to infinity? And I ask whether this be not absurd in itself, and repugnant to what you granted just now, to wit, that the _substratum_ was something distinct from and exclusive of extension?

_Hyl._ Aye but, Philonous, you take me wrong. I do not mean that Matter is _spread_ in a gross literal sense under extension. The word _substratum_ is used only to express in general the same thing with _substance_.

_Phil._ Well then, let us examine the relation implied in the term _substance_. Is it not that it stands under accidents?

_Hyl._ The very same.

_Phil._ But, that one thing may stand under or support another, must it not be extended?

_Hyl._ It must.

_Phil._ Is not therefore this supposition liable to the same absurdity with the former?

_Hyl._ You still take things in a strict literal sense. That is not fair, Philonous.

_Phil._ I am not for imposing any sense on your words: you are at liberty to explain them as you please. Only, I beseech you, make me understand something by them. You tell me Matter supports or stands under accidents. How! is it as your legs support your body?

_Hyl._ No; that is the literal sense.

_Phil._ Pray let me know any sense, literal or not literal, that you understand it in.—How long must I wait for an answer, Hylas?

_Hyl._ I declare I know not what to say. I once thought I understood well enough what was meant by Matter’s supporting accidents. But now, the more I think on it the less can I comprehend it: in short I find that I know nothing of it.

_Phil._ It seems then you have no idea at all, neither relative nor positive, of Matter; you know neither what it is in itself, nor what relation it bears to accidents?

_Hyl._ I acknowledge it.

_Phil._ And yet you asserted that you could not conceive how qualities or accidents should really exist, without conceiving at the same time a material support of them?

_Hyl._ I did.

_Phil._ That is to say, when you conceive the _real_ existence of qualities, you do withal conceive Something which you cannot conceive?

_Hyl._ It was wrong, I own. But still I fear there is some fallacy or other. Pray what think you of this? It is just come into my head that the ground of all our mistake lies in your treating of each quality by itself. Now, I grant that each quality cannot singly subsist without the mind. Colour cannot without extension, neither can figure without some other sensible quality. But, as the several qualities united or blended together form entire sensible things, nothing hinders why such things may not be supposed to exist without the mind.

_Phil._ Either, Hylas, you are jesting, or have a very bad memory. Though indeed we went through all the qualities by name one after another, yet my arguments, or rather your concessions, nowhere tended to prove that the Secondary Qualities did not subsist each alone by itself; but, that they were not _at all_ without the mind. Indeed, in treating of figure and motion we concluded they could not exist without the mind, because it was impossible even in thought to separate them from all secondary qualities, so as to conceive them existing by themselves. But then this was not the only argument made use of upon that occasion. But (to pass by all that hath been hitherto said, and reckon it for nothing, if you will have it so) I am content to put the whole upon this issue. If you can conceive it possible for any mixture or combination of qualities, or any sensible object whatever, to exist without the mind, then I will grant it actually to be so.

_Hyl._ If it comes to that the point will soon be decided. What more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself, independent of, and unperceived by, any mind whatsoever? I do at this present time conceive them existing after that manner.

_Phil._ How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time unseen?

_Hyl._ No, that were a contradiction.

_Phil._ Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of _conceiving_ a thing which is _unconceived_?

_Hyl._ It is.

_Phil._ The tree or house therefore which you think of is conceived by you?

_Hyl._ How should it be otherwise?

_Phil._ And what is conceived is surely in the mind?

_Hyl._ Without question, that which is conceived is in the mind.

_Phil._ How then came you to say, you conceived a house or tree existing independent and out of all minds whatsoever?

_Hyl._ That was I own an oversight; but stay, let me consider what led me into it.—It is a pleasant mistake enough. As I was thinking of a tree in a solitary place, where no one was present to see it, methought that was to conceive a tree as existing unperceived or unthought of; not considering that I myself conceived it all the while. But now I plainly see that all I can do is to frame ideas in my own mind. I may indeed conceive in my own thoughts the idea of a tree, or a house, or a mountain, but that is all. And this is far from proving that I can conceive them _existing out of the minds of all Spirits_.

_Phil._ You acknowledge then that you cannot possibly conceive how any one corporeal sensible thing should exist otherwise than in a mind?

_Hyl._ I do.

_Phil._ And yet you will earnestly contend for the truth of that which you cannot so much as conceive?

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_Hyl._ I profess I know not what to think; but still there are some scruples remain with me. Is it not certain I _see things at a distance_? Do we not perceive the stars and moon, for example, to be a great way off? Is not this, I say, manifest to the senses?

_Phil._ Do you not in a dream too perceive those or the like objects?

_Hyl._ I do.

_Phil._ And have they not then the same appearance of being distant?

_Hyl._ They have.

_Phil._ But you do not thence conclude the apparitions in a dream to be without the mind?

_Hyl._ By no means.

_Phil._ You ought not therefore to conclude that sensible objects are without the mind, from their appearance, or manner wherein they are perceived.

_Hyl._ I acknowledge it. But doth not my sense deceive me in those cases?

_Phil._ By no means. The idea or thing which you immediately perceive, neither sense nor reason informs you that _it_ actually exists without the mind. By sense you only know that you are affected with such certain sensations of light and colours, &c. And these you will not say are without the mind.

_Hyl._ True: but, beside all that, do you not think the sight suggests something of _outness_ or _distance_?

_Phil._ Upon approaching a distant object, do the visible size and figure change perpetually, or do they appear the same at all distances?

_Hyl._ They are in a continual change.

_Phil._ Sight therefore doth not suggest, or any way inform you, that the visible object you immediately perceive exists at a distance(812), or will be perceived when you advance farther onward; there being a continued series of visible objects succeeding each other during the whole time of your approach.

_Hyl._ It doth not; but still I know, upon seeing an object, what object I shall perceive after having passed over a certain distance: no matter whether it be exactly the same or no: there is still something of distance suggested in the case.

_Phil._ Good Hylas, do but reflect a little on the point, and then tell me whether there be any more in it than this: From the ideas you actually perceive by sight, you have by experience learned to collect what other ideas you will (according to the standing order of nature) be affected with, after such a certain succession of time and motion.

_Hyl._ Upon the whole, I take it to be nothing else.

_Phil._ Now, is it not plain that if we suppose a man born blind was on a sudden made to see, he could at first have no experience of what may be _suggested_ by sight?

_Hyl._ It is.

_Phil._ He would not then, according to you, have any notion of distance annexed to the things he saw; but would take them for a new set of sensations, existing only in his mind?

_Hyl._ It is undeniable.

_Phil._ But, to make it still more plain: is not _distance_ a line turned endwise to the eye(813)?

_Hyl._ It is.

_Phil._ And can a line so situated be perceived by sight?

_Hyl._ It cannot.

_Phil._ Doth it not therefore follow that distance is not properly and immediately perceived by sight?

_Hyl._ It should seem so.

_Phil._ Again, is it your opinion that colours are at a distance(814)?

_Hyl._ It must be acknowledged they are only in the mind.

_Phil._ But do not colours appear to the eye as coexisting in the same place with extension and figures?

_Hyl._ They do.

_Phil._ How can you then conclude from sight that figures exist without, when you acknowledge colours do not; the sensible appearance being the very same with regard to both?

_Hyl._ I know not what to answer.