Part 11

(M306) Is it not nonsense to say a smell is like a thing which cannot be smelt, a colour is like a thing wh cannot be seen?

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(M307) Bodies exist without the mind, i.e. are not the mind, but distinct from it. This I allow, the mind being altogether different therefrom(193).

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(M308) Certainly we should not see motion if there was no diversity of colours.

(M309) Motion is an abstract idea, i.e. there is no such idea that can be conceived by itself.

(M310) Contradictions cannot be both true. Men are obliged to answer objections drawn from consequences. Introd.

(M311) The Will and Volition are words not used by the vulgar. The learned are bantered by their meaning abstract ideas.

Speculative Math, as if a man was all day making hard knots on purpose to unty them again.

Tho’ it might have been otherwise, yet it is convenient the same thing wch is M.V. should be also M.T., or very near it.

(M312) I must not give the soul or mind the scholastique name “pure act,” but rather pure spirit, or active being.

(M313) I must not say the Will or Understanding are all one, but that they are both abstract ideas, i.e. none at all—they not being even _ratione_ different from the Spirit, _quâ_ faculties, or active.

(M314) Dangerous to make idea & thing terms convertible(194). That were the way to prove spirits are nothing.

(M315) Qu. whether _veritas_ stands not for an abstract idea?

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(M316) ’Tis plain the moderns must by their own principles own there are no bodies, i.e. no sort of bodies without the mind, i.e. unperceived.

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(M317) Qu. whether the Will can be the object of prescience or any knowledge?

(M318) If there were only one ball in the world, it could not be moved. There could be no variety of appearance.

According to the doctrine of infinite divisibility, there must be some smell of a rose, v. g. at an infinite distance from it.

(M319) Extension, tho’ it exist only in the mind, yet is no property of the mind. The mind can exist without it, tho’ it cannot without the mind. But in Book II. I shall at large shew the difference there is betwixt the Soul and Body or extended being.

(M320) ’Tis an absurd question wch Locke puts, whether man be free to will?

Mem. To enquire into the reason of the rule for determining questions in Algebra.

It has already been observed by others that names are nowhere of more necessary use than in numbering.

(M321) I will grant you that extension, colour, &c. may be said to be without the mind in a double respect, i.e. as independent of our will, and as distinct from the mind.

(M322) Certainly it is not impossible but a man may arrive at the knowledge of all real truth as well without as with signs, had he a memory and imagination most strong and capacious. Therefore reasoning & science doth not altogether depend upon words or names(195).

(M323) I think not that things fall out of necessity. The connexion of no two ideas is necessary; ’tis all the result of freedom, i.e. ’tis all voluntary(196).

(M324) If a man with his eyes shut imagines to himself the sun & firmament, you will not say _he_ or _his mind_ is the sun, or is extended, tho’ neither sun or firmament be without mind.

(M325) ’Tis strange to find philosophers doubting & disputing whether they have ideas of spiritual things or no. Surely ’tis easy to know. Vid. De Vries(197), _De Ideis Innatis_, p. 64.

(M326) De Vries will have it that we know the mind agrees with things not by idea but sense or conscientia. So will Malbranch. This a vain distinction.

August 28th, 1708. The Adventure of the [Shirt?].

It were to be wished that persons of the greatest birth, honour, & fortune, would take that care of themselves, by education, industry, literature, & a love of virtue, to surpass all other men in knowledge & all other qualifications necessary for great actions, as far as they do in quality & titles; that princes out of them might always chose men fit for all employments and high trusts. Clov. B. 7.

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One eternity greater than another of the same kind.

In what sense eternity may be limited.

(M327) Whether succession of ideas in the Divine intellect?

(M328) Time is the train of ideas succeeding each other.

Duration not distinguish’d from existence.

Succession explain’d by before, between, after, & numbering.

Why time in pain longer than time in pleasure?

Duration infinitely divisible, time not so.

(M329) The same τὸ νῦν not common to all intelligences.

Time thought infinitely divisible on account of its measure.

Extension not infinitely divisible in one sense.

Revolutions immediately measure train of ideas, mediately duration.

(M330) Time a sensation; therefore onely in ye mind.

Eternity is onely a train of innumerable ideas. Hence the immortality of ye soul easily conceiv’d, or rather the immortality of the person, that of ye soul not being necessary for ought we can see.

Swiftness of ideas compar’d with yt of motions shews the wisdom of God.

Wt if succession of ideas were swifter, wt if slower?

(M331) Fall of Adam, use of idolatry, use of Epicurism & Hobbism, dispute about divisibility of matter, &c. expounded by material substances.

Extension a sensation, therefore not without the mind.

(M332) In the immaterial hypothesis, the wall is white, fire hot, &c.

Primary ideas prov’d not to exist in matter; after the same manner yt secondary ones are prov’d not to exist therein.

Demonstrations of the infinite divisibility of extension suppose length without breadth, or invisible length, wch is absurd.

(M333) World wthout thought is _nec quid_, _nec quantum_, _nec quale_, &c.

(M334) ’Tis wondrous to contemplate ye World empty’d of all intelligences.

Nothing properly but Persons, i.e. conscious things, do exist. All other things are not so much existences as manners of ye existence of persons(198).

Qu. about the soul, or rather person, whether it be not compleatly known?

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Infinite divisibility of extension does suppose the external existence of extension; but the later is false, ergo ye former also.

Qu. Blind man made to see, would he know motion at 1st sight?

Motion, figure, and extension perceivable by sight are different from those ideas perceived by touch wch goe by the same name.

Diagonal incommensurable wth ye side. Quære how this can be in my doctrine?

(M335) Qu. how to reconcile Newton’s 2 sorts of motion with my doctrine?

Terminations of surfaces & lines not imaginable _per se_.

Molyneux’s blind man would not know the sphere or cube to be bodies or extended at first sight(199).

Extension so far from being incompatible wth, yt ’tis impossible it should exist without thought.

(M336) Extension itself or anything extended cannot think—these being meer ideas or sensations, whose essence we thoroughly know.

No extension but surface perceivable by sight.

(M337) Wn we imagine 2 bowls v. g. moving in vacuo, ’tis only conceiving a person affected with these sensations.

(M338) Extension to exist in a thoughtless thing [or rather in a thing void of perception—thought seeming to imply action], is a contradiction.

Qu. if visible motion be proportional to tangible motion?

(M339) In some dreams succession of ideas swifter than at other times.

(M340) If a piece of matter have extension, that must be determined to a particular bigness & figure, but &c.

Nothing wthout corresponds to our primary ideas but powers. Hence a direct & brief demonstration of an active powerfull Being, distinct from us, on whom we depend.

The name of colours actually given to tangible qualities, by the relation of ye story of the German Count.

Qu. How came visible & tangible qualities by the same name in all languages?

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Qu. Whether Being might not be the substance of the soul, or (otherwise thus) whether Being, added to ye faculties, compleat the real essence and adequate definition of the soul?

(M341) Qu. Whether, on the supposition of external bodies, it be possible for us to know that any body is absolutely at rest, since that supposing ideas much slower than at present, bodies now apparently moving wd then be apparently at rest?

(M342) Qu. What can be like a sensation but a sensation?

Qu. Did ever any man see any other things besides his own ideas, that he should compare them to these, and make these like unto them?

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(M343) The age of a fly, for ought that we know, may be as long as yt of a man(200).

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Visible distance heterogeneous from tangible distance demonstrated 3 several ways:—

1st. If a tangible inch be equal or in any other reason to a visible inch, thence it will follow yt unequals are equals, wch is absurd: for at what distance would the visible inch be placed to make it equal to the tangible inch?

2d. One made to see that had not yet seen his own limbs, or any thing he touched, upon sight of a foot length would know it to be a foot length, if tangible foot & visible foot were the same idea—sed falsum id, ergo et hoc.

3dly. From Molyneux’s problem, wch otherwise is falsely solv’d by Locke and him(201).

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(M344) Nothing but ideas perceivable(202).

A man cannot compare 2 things together without perceiving them each. Ergo, he cannot say anything wch is not an idea is like or unlike an idea.

Bodies &c. do exist even wn not perceived—they being powers in the active being(203).

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Succession a simple idea, [succession is an abstract, i.e. an inconceivable idea,] Locke says(204).

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Visible extension is [proportional to tangible extension, also is] encreated & diminish’d by parts. Hence taken for the same.

If extension be without the mind in bodies. Qu. whether tangible or visible, or both?

Mathematical propositions about extension & motion true in a double sense.

Extension thought peculiarly inert, because not accompany’d wth pleasure & pain: hence thought to exist in matter; as also for that it was conceiv’d common to 2 senses, [as also the constant perception of ’em].

Blind at 1st sight could not tell how near what he saw was to him, nor even whether it be wthout him or in his eye(205). Qu. Would he not think the later?

Blind at 1st sight could not know yt wt he saw was extended, until he had seen and touched some one self-same thing—not knowing how _minimum tangibile_ would look in vision.

(M345) Mem. That homogeneous particles be brought in to answer the objection of God’s creating sun, plants, &c. before animals.

In every bodie two infinite series of extension—the one of tangible, the other of visible.

All things to a blind [man] at first seen in a point.

Ignorance of glasses made men think extension to be in bodies.

(M346) Homogeneous portions of matter—useful to contemplate them.

Extension if in matter changes its relation wth _minimum visibile_, wch seems to be fixt.

Qu. whether m.v. be fix’d?

(M347) Each particle of matter if extended must be infinitely extended, or have an infinite series of extension.

(M348) If the world be granted to consist of Matter, ’tis the mind gives it beauty and proportion.

Wt I have said onely proves there is no proportion at all times and in all men between a visible & tangible inch.

Tangible and visible extension heterogeneous, because they have no common measure; also because their simplest constituent parts or elements are specifically different, viz. _punctum visibile & tangibile_. N. B. The former seems to be no good reason.

(M349) By immateriality is solv’d the cohesion of bodies, or rather the dispute ceases.

Our idea we call extension neither way capable of infinity, i.e. neither infinitely small or great.

Greatest possible extension seen under an angle wch will be less than 180 degrees, the legs of wch angle proceed from the ends of the extension.

(M350) Allowing there be extended, solid, &c. substances without the mind, ’tis impossible the mind should know or perceive them; the mind, even according to the materialists, perceiving onely the impressions made upon its brain, or rather the ideas attending these impressions(206).

Unity _in abstracto_ not at all divisible, it being as it were a point, or with Barrow nothing at all; _in concreto_ not divisible _ad infinitum_, there being no one idea demonstrable _ad infinitum_.

(M351) Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once. Locke, b. 4. c. 3. s. 15.

Qu. whether we have clear ideas of large numbers themselves, or onely of their relations?

(M352) Of solidity see L. b. 2. c. 4. s. 1, 5, 6. If any one ask wt solidity is, let him put a flint between his hands and he will know. Extension of body is continuity of solid, &c.; extension of space is continuity of unsolid, &c.

Why may not I say visible extension is a continuity of visible points, tangible extension is a continuity of tangible points?

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(M353) Mem. That I take notice that I do not fall in wth sceptics, Fardella(207), &c., in that I make bodies to exist certainly, wch they doubt of.

(M354) I am more certain of ye existence & reality of bodies than Mr. Locke; since he pretends onely to wt he calls sensitive knowledge(208), whereas I think I have demonstrative knowledge of their existence—by them meaning combinations of powers in an unknown substratum(209).

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(M355) Our ideas we call figure & extension, not images of the figure and extension of matter; these (if such there be) being infinitely divisible, those not so.

’Tis impossible a material cube should exist, because the edges of a cube will appear broad to an acute sense.

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Men die, or are in [a] state of annihilation, oft in a day.

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(M356) Powers. Qu. whether more or one onely?

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Lengths abstract from breadths are the work of the mind. Such do intersect in a point at all angles. After the same way colour is abstract from extension.

Every position alters the line.

Qu. whether ideas of extension are made up of other ideas, v.g. idea of a foot made up of general ideas of an inch?

The idea of an inch length not one determin’d idea. Hence enquire the reason why we are out in judging of extension by the sight; for which purpose ’tis meet also to consider the frequent & sudden changes of extension by position.

No stated ideas of length without a minimum.

(M357) Material substance banter’d by Locke, b. 2. c. 13. s. 19.

(M358) In my doctrine all absurdities from infinite space &c. cease(210).

Qu. whether if (speaking grossly) the things we see were all of them at all times too small to be felt, we should have confounded tangible & visible extension and figure?

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(M359) Qu. whether if succession of ideas in the Eternal Mind, a day does not seem to God a 1000 years, rather than a 1000 years a day?

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But one only colour & its degrees.

Enquiry about a grand mistake in writers of dioptricks in assigning the cause of microscopes magnifying objects.

Qu. whether a born-blind [man] made to see would at 1st give the name of distance to any idea intromitted by sight; since he would take distance yt that he had perceived by _touch_ to be something existing without his mind, but he would certainly think that nothing _seen_ was without his mind(211)?

(M360) Space without any bodies existing _in rerum natura_ would not be extended, as not having parts—in that parts are assigned to it wth respect to body; from whence also the notion of distance is taken. Now without either parts or distance or mind, how can there be Space, or anything beside one uniform Nothing?

Two demonstrations that blind made to see would not take all things he saw to be without his mind, or not in a point—the one from microscopic eyes, the other from not perceiving distance, i.e. radius of the visual sphere.

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(M361) The trees are in the park, i.e. whether I will or no, whether I imagine anything about them or no. Let me but go thither and open my eyes by day, & I shall not avoid seeing them.

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By extension blind [man] would mean either the perception caused in his touch by something he calls extended, or else the power of raising that perception; wch power is without, in the thing termed extended. Now he could not know either of these to be in things visible till he had try’d.

Geometry seems to have for its object tangible extension, figures, & motion—and not visible(212).

A man will say a body will seem as big as before, tho’ the visible idea it yields be less than wt it was; therefore the bigness or tangible extension of the body is different from the visible extension.

Extension or space no simple idea—length, breadth, & solidity being three several ideas.

Depth or solidity _now_ perceived by sight(213).

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Strange impotence of men. Man without God wretcheder than a stone or tree; he having onely the power to be miserable by his unperformed wills, these having no power at all(214).

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Length perceivable by hearing—length & breadth by sight—length, breadth, & depth by touch.

(M362) Wt affects us must be a thinking thing, for wt thinks not cannot subsist.

Number not in bodies, it being the creature of the mind, depending entirely on its consideration, & being more or less as the mind pleases(215).

Mem. Quære whether extension be equally a sensation with colour? The mob use not the word extension. ’Tis an abstract term of the Schools.

(M363) Round figure a perception or sensation in the mind, but in the body is a power. L[ocke], b. 2. c. 8. s. 8.

Mem. Mark well the later part of the last cited section.

Solids, or any other tangible things, are no otherwise seen than colours felt by the German Count.

(M364) “Of” and “thing” causes of mistake.

The visible point of he who has microscopical eyes will not be greater or less than mine.

Qu. Whether the propositions & even axioms of geometry do not divers of them suppose the existence of lines &c. without the mind?

(M365) Whether motion be the measure of duration? Locke, b. 2. c. 14. s. 19.

Lines & points conceiv’d as terminations different ideas from those conceiv’d absolutely.

Every position alters a line.

(M366) Blind man at 1st would not take colours to be without his mind; but colours would seem to be in the same place with the coloured extension: therefore extension wd not seem to be without the mind.

All visible concentric circles whereof the eye is the centre are absolutely equal.

Infinite number—why absurd—not rightly solv’d by Locke(216).

Qu. how ’tis possible we should see flats or right lines?

Qu. why the moon appears greatest in the horizon(217)?

Qu. why we see things erect when painted inverted(218)?

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(M367) Question put by Mr. Deering touching the thief and paradise.

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(M368) Matter tho’ allowed to exist may be no greater than a pin’s head.

Motion is proportionable to space described in given time.

Velocity not proportionable to space describ’d in given time.

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(M369) No active power but the Will: therefore Matter, if it exists, affects us not(219).

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Magnitude when barely taken for the _ratio partium extra partes_, or rather for co-existence & succession, without considering the parts co-existing & succeeding, is infinitely, or rather indefinitely, or not at all perhaps, divisible, because it is itself infinite or indefinite. But definite, determined magnitudes, i.e. lines or surfaces consisting of points whereby (together wth distance & position) they are determin’d, are resoluble into those points.

Again. Magnitude taken for co-existence and succession is not all divisible, but is one simple idea.

Simple ideas include no parts nor relations—hardly separated and considered in themselves—nor yet rightly singled by any author. Instance in power, red, extension, &c.

(M370) Space not imaginable by any idea received from sight—not imaginable without body moving. Not even then necessarily existing (I speak of infinite space)—for wt the body has past may be conceiv’d annihilated.

(M371) Qu. What can we see beside colours? what can we feel beside hard, soft, cold, warm, pleasure, pain?

Qu. Why not taste & smell extension?

Qu. Why not tangible & visible extensions thought heterogeneous extensions, so well as gustable & olefactible perceptions thought heterogeneous perceptions? or at least why not as heterogeneous as blue & red?

Moon wn horizontal does not appear bigger as to visible extension than at other times; hence difficulties and disputes about things seen under equal angles &c. cease.

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All _potentiæ_ alike indifferent.

A. B. Wt does he mean by his _potentia_? Is it the will, desire, person, or all or neither, or sometimes one, sometimes t’other?

No agent can be conceiv’d indifferent as to pain or pleasure.

_We_ do not, properly speaking, in a strict philosophical sense, make objects more or less pleasant; but the laws of nature do that.

(M372) A finite intelligence might have foreseen 4 thousand years agoe the place and circumstances, even the most minute & trivial, of my present existence. This true on supposition that uneasiness determines the will.

(M373) Doctrines of liberty, prescience, &c. explained by billiard balls.

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Wt judgement would he make of uppermost and lowermost who had always seen through an inverting glass?

All lines subtending the same optic angle congruent (as is evident by an easy experiment); therefore they are equal.

We have not pure simple ideas of blue, red, or any other colour (except perhaps black) because all bodies reflect heterogeneal light.

Qu. Whether this be true as to sounds (& other sensations), there being, perhaps, rays of air wch will onely exhibit one particular sound, as rays of light one particular colour.

Colours not definable, not because they are pure unmixt thoughts, but because we cannot easily distinguish & separate the thoughts they include, or because we want names for their component ideas.

(M374) By Soul is meant onely a complex idea, made up of existence, willing, & perception in a large sense. Therefore it is known and it may be defined.

We cannot possibly conceive any active power but the Will.

(M375) In moral matters men think (’tis true) that they are free; but this freedom is only the freedom of doing as they please; wch freedom is consecutive to the Will, respecting only the operative faculties(220).

Men impute their actions to themselves because they will’d them, and that not out of ignorance, but whereas they have the consequences of them, whether good or bad.

This does not prove men to be indifferent in respect of desiring.

If anything is meant by the _potentia_ of A. B. it must be desire; but I appeal to any man if his desire be indifferent, or (to speak more to the purpose) whether he himself be indifferent in respect of wt he desires till after he has desired it; for as for desire itself, or the faculty of desiring, that is indifferent, as all other faculties are.

Actions leading to heaven are in my power if I will them: therefore I will will them.

Qu. concerning the procession of Wills _in infinitum_.