Part 23

(2) _What_ is it that determines the highest value here? What, in sooth, is morality?--It is the instinct of _decadence_; it is the means whereby the exhausted and the degenerate _revenge themselves._ _Historical_ proof: philosophers have always been decadents ... in the service of _nihilistic_ religions.

(3) It is the instinct of decadence coming to the fore as _will to power._ Proof: the absolute _immorality_ of the means employed by morality throughout its history.

General aspect: the values which have been highest hitherto constitute a specific case of the will to power; morality itself is a specific case of immorality.

462.

_The principal innovations_: Instead of "moral values," nothing but _naturalistic values._ Naturalisation of morality.

In the place of "sociology," a _doctrine of the forms of dominion._

In the place of "society," the _complex whole of culture,_ which is _my_ chief interest (whether in its entirety or in parts).

In the place of the "theory of knowledge," a _doctrine which laid down the value of the passions_ (to this a hierarchy of the passions would belong: the passions _transfigured_; their _superior rank,_ their "_spirituality_").

In the place of "metaphysics" and religion, the doctrine of _Eternal Recurrence_ (this being regarded as a means to the breeding and selection of men).

463.

My precursors: Schopenhauer. To what extent I deepened pessimism, and first brought its full meaning within my grasp, by means of its most extreme opposite.

Likewise: the higher Europeans, the pioneers of _great politics._

Likewise: the Greeks and their genesis.

464.

I have named those who were unconsciously my workers and precursors. But in what direction may I turn with any hope of finding my particular kind of philosophers themselves, or at least _my yearning for new philosophers_? In that direction, alone, where a _noble_ attitude of mind prevails, an attitude of mind which believes in slavery and in manifold orders of rank, as the prerequisites of any high degree of culture. In that direction, alone, where a _creative_ attitude of mind prevails, an attitude of mind which does not regard the world of happiness and repose, the "Sabbath of Sabbaths" as an end to be desired, and which, even in peace, honours the means which lead to new wars; an attitude of mind which would prescribe laws for the future, which for the sake of the future would treat everything that exists to-day with harshness and even tyranny; a daring and "immoral" attitude of mind, which would wish to see both the good and the evil qualities in man developed to their fullest extent, because it would feel itself able to put each in its right place--that is to say, in that place in which each would need the other. But what prospect has he of finding what he seeks, who goes in search of philosophers to-day? Is it not probable that, even with the best Diogenes-lantern in his hand, he will wander about by night and day in vain? This age is possessed of the _opposite_ instincts. What it wants, above all, is comfort; secondly, it wants publicity and the deafening din of actors' voices, the big drum which appeals to its Bank-Holiday tastes; thirdly, that every one should lie on his belly in utter subjection before the greatest of all lies--which is "the equality of men"--and should honour only those virtues which _make men equal and place them in equal positions._ But in this way, the rise of the philosopher, as I understand him, is made completely impossible--despite the fact that many may regard the present tendencies as rather favourable to his advent. As a matter of fact, the whole world mourns, to-day, the hard times that philosophers _used_ to have, hemmed in between the fear of the stake, a guilty conscience, and the presumptuous wisdom of the Fathers of the Church: but the truth is, that precisely these conditions were _ever so much more favourable_ to the education of a mighty, extensive, subtle, rash, and daring intellect than the conditions prevailing to-day. At present another kind of intellect, the intellect of the demagogue, of the actor, and perhaps of the beaver- and ant-like scholar too, finds the best possible conditions for its development. But even for artists of a superior calibre the conditions are already far from favourable: for does not every one of them, almost, perish owing to his want of discipline? They are no longer tyrannised over by an outside power--by the tables of absolute values enforced by a Church or by a monarch: and thus they no longer learn to develop their "inner tyrant," their _will._ And what holds good of artists also holds good, to a greater and more fatal degree, of philosophers. Where, then, are free spirits to be found to-day? Let any one show me a free spirit to-day!

465.

Under "Spiritual freedom" I understand something very definite: it is a state in which one is a hundred times superior to philosophers and other disciples of "truth" in one's severity towards one's self, in one's uprightness, in one's courage, and in one's absolute will to say nay even when it is dangerous to say nay. I regard the philosophers that have appeared heretofore as _contemptible libertines_ hiding behind the petticoats of the female "Truth."

END OF VOL. I.