Part 19

Reflecting upon generalities is always retrograde: the last of the "desiderata" concerning men, for instance, have never been regarded as problems by philosophers. They always postulate the "_improvement_" of man, quite guilelessly, as though by means of some intuition they had been helped over the note of interrogation following the question, _why_ necessarily "_improve!_" To what extent is it _desirable_ that man should be more _virtuous,_ or more _intelligent,_ or _happier!_ Granting that nobody yet _knows_ the "wherefore?" of mankind, all such desiderata have no sense whatever; and if one aspires to one of them--who knows?--perhaps one is frustrating the other. Is an increase of virtue compatible with an increase of intelligence and insight? _Dubito_: only too often shall I have occasion to show that the reverse is true. Has virtue, as an end, in the strict sense of the word, not always been opposed to happiness hitherto? And again, does it not require misfortune, abstinence, and self-castigation as a necessary means? And if the aim were to arrive at the _highest insight,_ would it not therefore be necessary to renounce all hope of an increase in happiness, and to choose danger, adventure, mistrust, and seduction as a road to enlightenment?... And suppose one will have happiness; maybe one should join the ranks of the "poor in spirit."

394.

The wholesale deception and fraud of so-called _moral improvement._

We do not believe that one man can be another if he is not that other already--that is to say, if he is not, as often happens, an accretion of personalities or at least of parts of persons. In this case it is possible to draw another set of actions from him into the foreground, and to drive back "the older man." ... The man's aspect is altered, but _not_ his actual nature.... It is but the merest _factum brutum_ that any one should cease from performing certain actions, and the fact allows of the most varied interpretations. Neither does it always follow therefrom that the habit of performing a certain action is entirely arrested, nor that the reasons for that action are dissipated. He whose destiny and abilities make him a criminal never unlearns anything, but is continually adding to his store of knowledge: and long abstinence acts as a sort of tonic on his talent.... Certainly, as far as society is concerned, the only interesting fact is that some one has ceased from performing certain actions; and to this end society will often raise a man out of those circumstances which make him _able_ to perform those actions: this is obviously a wiser course than that of trying to break his destiny and his particular nature. The Church,--which has done nothing except to take the place of, and to appropriate, the philosophic treasures of antiquity,--starting out from another standpoint and wishing to secure a "soul" or the "salvation" of a soul, believes in the expiatory power of punishment, as also in the obliterating power of forgiveness: both of which supposed processes are deceptions due to religious prejudice--punishment expiates nothing, forgiveness obliterates nothing; what is done cannot be undone. Because some one forgets something it by no means proves that something has been wiped out.... An action leads to certain consequences, both among men and away from men, and it matters not whether it has met with punishment, or whether it has been "expiated," "forgiven," or "obliterated," it matters not even if the Church meanwhile canonises the man who performed it. The Church believes in things that do not exist, it believes in "Souls"; it believes in "influences" that do not exist--in divine influences; it believes in states that do not exist, in sin, redemption, and spiritual salvation: in all things it stops at the surface and is satisfied with signs, attitudes, words, to which it lends an arbitrary interpretation. It possesses a method of counterfeit psychology which is thought out quite systematically.

395.

"Illness makes men better," this famous assumption which is to be met with in all ages, and in the mouth of the wizard quite as often as in the mouth and maw of the people, really makes one ponder. In view of discovering whether there is any truth in it, one might be allowed to ask whether there is not perhaps a fundamental relationship between morality and illness? Regarded as a whole, could not the "improvement of mankind"--that is to say, the unquestionable softening, humanising, and taming which the European has undergone within the last two centuries--be regarded as the result of a long course of secret and ghastly suffering, failure, abstinence, and grief? Has illness made "Europeans" "better"? Or, put into other words, is not our modern soft-hearted European morality, which could be likened to that of the Chinese, perhaps an expression of physiological _deterioration_?... It cannot be denied, for instance, that wherever history shows us "man" in a state of particular glory and power, his type is always dangerous, impetuous, and boisterous, and cares little for humanity; and perhaps, in those cases in which _it seems otherwise,_ all that was required was the courage or subtlety to see sufficiently below the surface in psychological matters, in order even in them to discover the general proposition: "the more healthy, strong, rich, fruitful, and enterprising a man may feel, the more immoral he will be as well." A terrible thought, to which one should on no account give way. Provided, however, that one take a few steps forward with this thought, how wondrous does the future then appear! What will then be paid for more dearly on earth, than precisely this very thing which we are all trying to promote, by all means in our power--the humanising, the improving, and the increased "civilisation" of man? Nothing would then be more expensive than virtue: for by means of it the world would ultimately be turned into a hospital: and the last conclusion of wisdom would be, "everybody must be everybody else's nurse." Then we should certainly have attained to the "Peace on earth," so long desired! But how little "joy we should find in each other's company"! How little beauty, wanton spirits, daring, and danger! So few "actions" which would make life on earth worth living! Ah! and no longer any "deeds"! But have not all the _great_ things and deeds which have remained fresh in the memory of men, and which have not been destroyed by time, been _immoral_ in the deepest sense of the word?...

396.

The priests--and with them the half-priests or philosophers of all ages--have always called that doctrine true, the educating influence of which was a benevolent one or at least seemed so--that is to say, tended to "improve." In this way they resemble an ingenuous plebeian empiric and miracle-worker who, because he had tried a certain poison as a cure, declared it to be no poison. "By their fruits ye shall know them"--that is to say, "by our truths." This has been the reasoning of priests until this day. They have squandered their sagacity, with results that have been sufficiently fatal, in order to make the "proof of power" (or the proof "by the fruits ") pre-eminent and even supreme arbiter over all other forms of proof. "That which makes good must be good; that which is good cannot lie"--these are their inexorable conclusions--"that which bears good fruit must consequently be true; there is no other criterion of truth." ...

But to the extent to which "improving" acts as an argument, deteriorating must also act as a refutation. The error can be shown to be an error, by examining the lives of those who represent it: a false step, a vice can refute.... This indecent form of opposition, which comes from below and behind--the doglike kind of attack, has not died out either. Priests, as psychologists, never discovered anything more interesting than spying out the secret vices of their adversaries--they prove Christianity by looking about for the world's filth. They apply this principle more particularly to the greatest on earth, to the geniuses: readers will remember how Goethe has been attacked on every conceivable occasion in Germany (Klopstock and Herder were among the first to give a "good example" in this respect--birds of a feather flock together).

397.

One must be very immoral in order to _make people moral by deeds._ The moralist's means are the most terrible that have ever been used; he who has not the courage to be an immoralist in deeds may be fit for anything else, but not for the duties of a moralist.

Morality is a menagerie; it assumes that iron bars may be more useful than freedom, even for the creatures it imprisons; it also assumes that there are animal-tamers about who do not shrink from terrible means, and who are acquainted with the use of red-hot iron. This terrible species, which enters into a struggle with the wild animal, is called "priests."

***

Man, incarcerated in an iron cage of errors, has become a caricature of man; he is sick, emaciated, ill-disposed towards himself, filled with a loathing of the impulses of life, filled with a mistrust of all that is beautiful and happy in life--in fact, he is a wandering monument of misery. How shall we ever succeed in vindicating this phenomenon--this artificial, arbitrary, and _recent_ miscarriage--the sinner--which the priests have bred on their territory?

***

In order to think fairly of morality, we must put two _biological_ notions in its place: the _taming_ of the wild beasts, and the _rearing of a particular species._

The priests of all ages have always pretended that they wished to "_improve_" ... But we, of another persuasion, would laugh if a lion-tamer ever wished to speak to us of his "improved" animals. As a rule, the taming of a beast is only achieved by deteriorating it: even the moral man is not a better man; he is rather a weaker member of his species. But he is less harmful....

398.

What I want to make clear, with all the means in my power, is:--

_(a)_ That there is no worse confusion than that which confounds _rearing_ and _taming_: and these two things have always been confused.... Rearing, as I understand it, is a means of husbanding the enormous powers of humanity in such a way that whole generations may build upon the foundations laid by their progenitors--not only outwardly, but inwardly, organically, developing from the already existing stem and growing _stronger_....

_(b)_ That there is an exceptional danger in believing that mankind as a whole is developing and growing stronger, if individuals are seen to grow more feeble and more equally mediocre. Humanity--mankind--is an abstract thing: the object of _rearing,_ even in regard to the most individual cases, can only be the _strong_ man (the man who has no breeding is weak, dissipated, and unstable).

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS CONCERNING THE CRITICISM OF MORALITY.

399.

These are the things I demand of you--however badly they may sound in your ears: that you subject moral valuations themselves to criticism. That you should put a stop to your instinctive moral impulse--which in this case demands submission and not criticism--with the question: "why precisely submission?" That this yearning for a "why?"--for a criticism of morality should not only be your present form of morality, but the sublimest of all moralities, and an honour to the age you live in. That your honesty, your will, may give an account of itself, and not deceive you: "why not?"--Before what tribunal?

400.

The three _postulates_:--

All that is ignoble is high (the protest of the "vulgar man").

All that is contrary to Nature is high (the protest of the physiologically botched).

All that is of average worth is high (the protest of the herd, of the "mediocre").

Thus in the _history of morality_ a _will to power_ finds expression, by means of which, either the slaves, the oppressed, the bungled and the botched, those that suffer from themselves, or the mediocre, attempt to make those valuations prevail which favour _their_ existence.

From a biological standpoint, therefore, the phenomenon Morality is of a highly suspicious nature. Up to the present, morality has developed at the _cost_ of: the ruling classes and their specific instincts, the well-constituted and _beautiful_ natures, the independent and privileged classes in all respects.

Morality, then, is a sort of counter-movement opposing Nature's endeavours to arrive at a _higher type._ Its effects are: mistrust of life in general (in so far as its tendencies are felt to be immoral), --hostility towards the senses (inasmuch as the highest values are felt to be opposed to the higher instincts),--Degeneration and self-destruction of "higher natures," because it is precisely in them that the conflict becomes _conscious._

401.

_Which values have been paramount hitherto?_

Morality as the leading value in all phases of philosophy (even with the Sceptics). Result: this world is no good, a "true world" must exist somewhere.

What is it that here determines the highest value? What, in sooth, is morality? The instinct of decadence; it is the exhausted and the disinherited who _take their revenge_ in this way and play the _masters_....

Historical proof: philosophers have always been decadents and always in the pay of Nihilistic religions.

The instinct of decadence appears as the will to power. The introduction of its system of means: its means are absolutely immoral.

General aspect: the values that have been highest hitherto have been a special instance of the will to power; morality itself is a particular instance of _immorality._

***

Why the Antagonistic Values always succumbed.

1. How was this actually _possible!_ Question: why did life and physiological well-constitutedness succumb everywhere? Why was there no affirmative philosophy, no affirmative religion?

The historical signs of such movements: the pagan religion. Dionysos _versus_ the Christ. The Renaissance. Art.

2. The strong and the weak: the healthy and the sick; the exception and the rule. There is no doubt as to who is the stronger....

_General view of history_; Is man an _exception_ in the history of life on this account?--An objection to _Darwinism._ The means wherewith the weak succeed in ruling have become: instincts, "humanity," "institutions." ...

3. The proof of this rule on the part of the weak is to be found in our political instincts, in our social values, in our arts, and in our _science._

***

The _instincts of decadence_ have become master of the _instincts of ascending_ life.... The _will to nonentity_ has prevailed over the _will to life_!

Is this _true_? is there not perhaps a stronger guarantee of life and of the species in this victory of the weak and the mediocre?--is it not perhaps only a means in the collective movement of life, a mere slackening of the pace, a protective measure against something even more dangerous?

Suppose the _strong_ were masters in all respects, even in valuing: let us try and think what their attitude would be towards illness, suffering, and sacrifice! _Self-contempt on the part of the weak_ would be the result: they would do their utmost to disappear and to extirpate their kind. And would this be _desirable_?--should we really like a world in which the subtlety, the consideration, the intellectuality, the _plasticity_--in fact, the whole influence of the weak--was lacking?[9] ...

We have seen two "wills to power" at war _(in this special case we had a principle_: that of agreeing with the one that has hitherto succumbed, and of disagreeing with the one that has hitherto triumphed): we have recognised the "real world" as a "_world of lies_" and morality as a _form of immorality._ We do _not_ say "the stronger is wrong."

We have understood _what_ it is that has determined the highest values hitherto, and _why_ the latter should have prevailed over the opposite value: it was numerically the _stronger_.

If we now purify _the opposite value_ of the infection, the half-heartedness, _and the degeneration,_ with which we identify it, we restore Nature to the throne, free from moralic acid.

[Footnote 9: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--We realise here the great difference between Nietzsche and those who draw premature conclusions from Darwinism. There is no brutal solution of modern problems in Nietzsche's philosophy. He did not advocate anything so ridiculous as the total suppression of the weak and the degenerate. What he wished to resist and to overthrow _was their supremacy, their excessive power._ He felt that there was a desirable and stronger type which was in need of having its hopes, aspirations, and instincts upheld in defiance of Christian values.]

402.

_Morality,_ a useful error; or, more clearly still, a necessary and expedient lie according to the greatest and most impartial of its supporters.

403.

One ought to be able to acknowledge the truth up to that point where one is sufficiently elevated no longer to require the _disciplinary school of moral error._--When one judges life morally, it _disgusts_ one.

Neither should false personalities be invented; one should not say, for instance, "Nature is cruel." It is precisely when one perceives _that there is no such central controlling and responsible force that one is relieved!_

_Evolution of man._ A. He tried to attain to a certain power over Nature and over himself. (Morality was necessary in order to make man triumph in his struggle with Nature and "wild animals.")

B. If power over Nature has been attained, this power can be used as a help in our development: Will to Power as a self-enhancing and self-strengthening principle.

404.

Morality may be regarded as the _illusion of a species,_ fostered with the view of urging the individual to sacrifice himself to the future, and seemingly granting him such a very great value, that with that _self-consciousness_ he may tyrannise over, and constrain, other sides of his nature, and find it difficult to be pleased with himself.

We ought to be most profoundly thankful for what morality has done hitherto: _but now it is no more than a burden_ which may prove fatal. _Morality itself_ in the form of honesty urges us to deny morality.

405.

To what extent is the _self-destruction of morality_ still a sign of its own strength? We Europeans have within us the blood of those who were ready to die for their faith; we have taken morality frightfully seriously, and there is nothing which we have not, at one time, sacrificed to it. On the other hand, our intellectual subtlety has been reached essentially through the vivisection of our consciences. We do not yet know the "whither" towards which we are urging our steps, now that we have departed from the soil of our forebears. But it was on this very soil that we acquired the strength which is now driving us from our homes in search of adventure, and it is thanks to that strength that we are now in mid-sea, surrounded by untried possibilities and things undiscovered--we can no longer choose, we must be conquerors, now that we have no land in which we feel at home and in which we would fain "survive." A concealed "_yea_" is driving us forward, and it is stronger than all our "nays." Even our _strength_ no longer bears with us in the old swampy land: we venture out into the open, we attempt the task. The world is still rich and undiscovered, and even to perish were better than to be half-men or poisonous men. Our very strength itself urges us to take to the sea; there where all suns have hitherto sunk we know of a new world....

III.

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.

1. GENERAL REMARKS.

406.

Let us rid ourselves of a few superstitions which heretofore have been fashionable among philosophers!

407.

Philosophers are prejudiced _against_ appearance, change, pain, death, the things of the body, the senses, fate, bondage, and all that which has no purpose.

In the first place, they believe in: absolute knowledge, (2) in knowledge for its own sake,

(3) in virtue and happiness as necessarily related,

(4) in the recognisability of men's acts. They are led by instinctive determinations of values, in which _former_ cultures are reflected (more dangerous cultures too).

408.

What have philosophers _lacked_! (1) A sense of history, (2) a knowledge of physiology, (3) a goal in the future.--The ability to criticise without irony or moral condemnation.

409.

Philosophers have had (1) from times immemorial a wonderful capacity for the _contradictio in adjecto,_ (2) they have always trusted concepts as unconditionally as they have mistrusted the senses: it never seems to have occurred to them that notions and words are our inheritance of past ages in which thinking was neither very clear nor very exact.

What seems to dawn upon philosophers last of all: that they must no longer allow themselves to be presented with concepts already conceived, nor must they merely purify and polish up those concepts; but they must first _make_ them, _create_ them, themselves, and then present them and get people to accept them. Up to the present, people have trusted their concepts generally, as if they had been a wonderful _dowry_ from some kind of wonderland: but they constitute the inheritance of our most remote, most foolish, and most intelligent forefathers. This _piety_ towards that _which already exists in us_ is perhaps related to the _moral element in science._ What we needed above all is absolute scepticism towards all traditional concepts (like that which a certain philosopher may already have possessed--and he was Plato, of course: for he taught _the reverse_).

410.

Profoundly mistrustful towards the dogmas of the theory of knowledge, I liked to look now out of this window, now out of that, though I took good care not to become finally fixed anywhere, indeed I should have thought it dangerous to have done so--though finally: is it within the range of probabilities for an instrument to criticise its own fitness? What I noticed more particularly was, that no scientific scepticism or dogmatism has ever arisen quite free from all _arrières pensées_--that it has only a secondary value as soon as the motive lying immediately behind it is discovered.

Fundamental aspect: Kant's, Hegel's, Schopenhauer's, the sceptical and epochistical, the historifying and the pessimistic attitudes--all have a _moral_ origin. I have found no one who has dared to _criticise the moral valuations,_ and I soon turned my back upon the meagre attempts that have been made to describe the evolution of these feelings (by English and German Darwinians).

How can Spinoza's position, his denial and repudiation of the moral values, be explained? (It was the result of his Theodicy!)

411.

_Morality regarded as the highest form of protection._--Our world is _either_ the work and expression (the _modus_) of God, in which case it must be _in the highest degree perfect_ (Leibnitz's conclusion ...),--and no one doubted that he knew what perfection must be like,--and then all evil can only be _apparent_ (Spinoza is _more radical,_ he says this of good and evil), or it must be a part of God's high purpose (a consequence of a particularly great mark of favour on God's part, who thus allows man to choose between good and evil: the privilege of being no automaton; "freedom," with the ever-present danger of making a mistake and of choosing wrongly.... See Simplicius, for instance, in the commentary to Epictetus).