Part 18

_The origin of moral values._--Selfishness has as much value as the physiological value of him who possesses it. Each individual represents the whole course of Evolution, and he is not, as morals teach, something that begins at his birth. If he represent the _ascent_ of the line of mankind, his value is, in fact, very great; and the concern about his maintenance and the promoting of his growth may even be extreme. (It is the concern about the promise of the future in him which gives the well-constituted individual such an extraordinary right to egoism.) If he represent _descending_ development, decay, chronic sickening, he has little worth: and the greatest fairness would have him take as little room, strength, and sunshine as possible from the well-constituted. In this case society's duty is to _suppress egoism_ (for the latter may sometimes manifest itself in an absurd, morbid, and seditious manner): whether it be a question of the decline and pining away of single individuals or of whole classes of mankind. A morality and a religion of "love," the _curbing_ of the self-affirming spirit, and a doctrine encouraging patience, resignation, helpfulness, and co-operation in word and deed may be of the highest value within the confines of such classes, even in the eyes of their rulers: for it restrains the feelings of rivalry, of resentment, and of envy,--feelings which are only too natural in the bungled and the botched,--and it even deifies them under the ideal of humility, of obedience, of slave-life, of being ruled, of poverty, of illness, and of lowliness. This explains why the ruling classes (or races) and individuals of all ages have always upheld the cult of unselfishness, the gospel of the lowly and of "God on the Cross."

The preponderance of an altruistic way of valuing is the result of a consciousness of the fact that one is botched and bungled. Upon examination, this point of view turns out to be: "I am not worth much," simply a psychological valuation; more plainly still: it is the feeling of impotence, of the lack of the great self-asserting impulses of power (in muscles, nerves, and ganglia). This valuation gets translated, according to the particular culture of these classes, into a moral or religious principle (the pre-eminence of religious or moral precepts is always a sign of low culture): it tries to justify itself in spheres whence, as far as it is concerned, the notion "value" hails. The interpretation by means of which the Christian sinner tries to understand himself, is an attempt at justifying his lack of power and of self-confidence: he prefers to feel himself a sinner rather than feel bad for nothing: it is in itself a symptom of decay when interpretations of this sort are used at all. In some cases the bungled and the botched do not look for the reason of their unfortunate condition in their own guilt (as the Christian does), but in society: when, however, the Socialist, the Anarchist, and the Nihilist are conscious that their existence is something for which some one must be _guilty,_ they are very closely related to the Christian, who also believes that he can more easily endure his ill ease and his wretched constitution when he has found some one whom he can hold _responsible_ for it. The instinct of _revenge_ and _resentment_ appears in both cases here as a means of enduring life, as a self-preservative measure, as is also the favour shown to _altruistic_ theory and practice. The _hatred of egoism,_ whether it be one's own (as in the case of the Christian), or another's (as in the case of the Socialists), thus appears as a valuation reached under the predominance of revenge; and also as an act of prudence on the part of the preservative instinct of the suffering, in the form of an increase in their feelings of co-operation and unity.... At bottom, as I have already suggested, the discharge of resentment which takes place in the act of judging, rejecting, and punishing egoism (one's own or that of others) is still a self-preservative measure on the part of the bungled and the botched. In short: the cult of altruism is merely a particular form of egoism, which regularly appears under certain definite physiological circumstances.

When the Socialist, with righteous indignation, cries for "justice," "rights," "equal rights," it only shows that he is oppressed by his inadequate culture, and is unable to understand why he suffers: he also finds pleasure in crying;--if he were more at ease he would take jolly good care not to cry in that way: in that case he would seek his pleasure elsewhere. The same holds good of the Christian: he curses, condemns, and slanders the "world"--and does not even except himself. But that is no reason for taking him seriously. In both cases we are in the presence of invalids who feel better for crying, and who find relief in slander.

374.

Every society has a tendency to reduce its opponents to _caricatures,_--at least in its own imagination,--as also to starve them. As an example of this sort of caricature we have our "_criminal._" In the midst of the Roman and aristocratic order of values, the _Jew_ was reduced to a caricature. Among artists, "Mrs. Grundy and the bourgeois" become caricatures; while among pious people it is the heretics, and among aristocrats, the plebeian. Among immoralists it is the moralist. Plato, for instance, in _my_ books becomes a caricature.

375.

All the instincts and forces which morality praises, seem to me to be essentially the same as those which it slanders and rejects: for instance, justice as will to power, will to truth as a means in the service of the will to power.

376.

The _turning of_ man's _nature inwards._ The process of turning a nature inwards arises when, owing to the establishment of peace and society, powerful instincts are prevented from venting themselves outwardly, and strive to survive harmlessly inside in conjunction with the imagination. The need of hostility, cruelty, revenge, and violence is reverted, "it steps backwards"; in the thirst for knowledge there lurks both the lust of gain and of conquest; in the artist, the powers of dissimulation and falsehood find their scope; the instincts are thus transformed into demons with whom a fight takes place, etc.

377.

_Falsity._--Every _sovereign instinct_ makes the others its instruments, its retainers and its sycophants: it never allows itself to be called by its more hateful name: and it brooks no terms of praise in which it cannot _indirectly_ find its share. Around every sovereign instinct all praise and blame in general crystallises into a rigorous form of ceremonial and etiquette. This is _one_ of the causes of falsity.

_Every_ instinct _which aspires to dominion,_ but which finds itself under a yoke, requisitions all the most beautiful names and the _most generally accepted_ values to strengthen it and to support its self-esteem, and this explains why _as a rule_ it dares to come forward under the name of the "master" it is combating and from whom it would be free (for instance, under the domination of Christian values, the desires of the flesh and of power act in this way). This is the _other_ cause of falsity.

In both cases _complete ingenuousness_ reigns: the falseness _never_ even occurs to the mind of those concerned. It is the sign of a _broken_ instinct when man sees the motive force and its "expression" ("the mask") as separate things--it is a sign of inner contradiction and is much less formidable. Absolute _innocence_ in bearing, word, and passion, a "good conscience" in falseness, and the certainty wherewith all the grandest and most pompous words and attitudes are appropriated--all these things are necessary for victory.

In the _other case_: that is to say, when _extreme clearsightedness_ is present, the genius of the _actor_ is needful as well as tremendous discipline in self-control, if victory is to be achieved. That is why priests are the cleverest and _most conscious_ hypocrites; and then come princes, in whom their position in life and their antecedents account for a certain histrionic gift. Society men and diplomatists come third, and women fourth.

_The fundamental thought_: Falsity seems so deep, so many-sided, and the _will_ is directed so inexorably against perfect self-knowledge and accurate self-classification, that one is _very probably right in supposing that Truth_ and _the will to truth_ are perhaps something quite different and only _disguises._ (The need of _faith_ is the greatest obstacle in the way of truthfulness.)

378.

"Thou shalt not tell a falsehood": people insist upon truthfulness. But the acknowledgment of facts (the refusal to allow one's self to be lied to) has always been greatest with liars: they actually recognised the reality of this popular "truthfulness." There is too much or too little being said continually: to insist upon people's _exposing themselves_ with every word they say, is a piece of naïveté.

People say what they think, they are "truthful"; but _only under certain circumstances_: that is to say, provided they be _understood_ (_inter pares_), and understood with good will into the bargain (_once more inter pares_). One conceals one's self in the presence of the _unfamiliar_: and he who would attain to something, says what he would fain have people think about him, but _not_ what he thinks. ("The powerful man is always a liar.")

379.

The great counterfeit coinage of Nihilism concealed beneath an artful abuse of moral values:--

_(a)_ Love regarded as self-effacement; as also pity.

_(b)_ The _most impersonal intellect_ ("the philosopher") can know the _truth_, "the true essence and nature of things."

_(c)_ Genius, _great men_ are _great,_ because they do not strive to further their own interests: the _value_ of man _increases_ in proportion as he effaces himself.

_(d)_ Art as the work of the "_pure free-willed subject_"; misunderstanding of "objectivity."

_(e)_ Happiness as the object of life: _virtue_ as a means to an end.

The pessimistic condemnation of life by Schopenhauer is a _moral_ one. Transference of the gregarious standards into the realm of metaphysics.

The "individual" lacks sense, he must therefore have his origin in "the thing in itself" (and the significance of his existence must be shown to be "error"); parents are only an "accidental cause."--The mistake on the part of science in considering the individual as the result of all past life instead of the epitome of all past life, is now becoming known.

380.

1. Systematic _falsification of history,_ so that it may present a proof of the moral valuation:

_(a)_ The decline of a people and corruption. _(b)_ The rise of a people and virtue. _(c)_ The zenith of a people ("its culture") regarded as the result of high moral excellence.

2. Systematic falsification of _great men, great creators,_ and _great periods._ The desire is to make _faith_ that which distinguishes great men: whereas carelessness in this respect, scepticism, "immorality," the right to repudiate a belief, belongs to greatness (Cæsar, Frederick the Great, Napoleon; but also Homer, Aristophanes, Leonardo, Goethe). The principal fact--their "free will"--is always suppressed.

381.

A great _lie_ in history; as if the _corruption of the Church were the cause_ of the Reformation! This was only the pretext and self-deception of the agitators--very strong needs were making themselves felt, the brutality of which sorely required a spiritual dressing.

382.

Schopenhauer declared high intellectuality to be the _emancipation_ from the will: he did not wish to recognise the freedom from moral prejudices which is coincident with the emancipation of a great mind; he refused to see what is the typical immorality of genius; he artfully contrived to set up the only moral value he honoured--self-effacement, as the one _condition_ of highest intellectual activity: "objective" contemplation. "Truth," even in art, only manifests itself after the withdrawal of the _will_....

Through all moral idiosyncrasies I see a _fundamentally different valuation._ Such absurd distinctions as "genius" and the world of will, of morality and immorality, _I know nothing about at all._ The moral is a lower kind of animal than the immoral, he is also weaker; indeed--he is a type in regard to morality, but he is not a type of his own. He is a copy; at the best, a good copy--the standard of his worth lies _without_ him. I value a man according to the _quantum of power and fullness of his will_: not according to the enfeeblement and moribund state thereof. I consider that a philosophy which _teaches_ the denial of will is both defamatory and slanderous.... I test the _power_ of a _will_ according to the amount of resistance it can offer and the amount of pain and torture it can endure and know how to turn to its own advantage; I do not point to the evil and pain of existence with the finger of reproach, but rather entertain the hope that life may one day be more evil and more full of suffering than it has ever been.

The zenith of intellectuality, according to Schopenhauer, was to arrive at the knowledge that all is to no purpose--in short, to recognise what the good man already _does_ instinctively.... He denies that there can be higher states of intellectuality--he regards his view as a _non plus ultra.._.. Here intellectuality is placed much lower than goodness; its highest value (as art, for instance) would be to lead up to, and to advise the adoption of, morality, the absolute predominance of _moral values._

Next to Schopenhauer I will now characterise _Kant_: there was nothing Greek in Kant; he was quite anti-historical (cf. his attitude in regard to the French Revolution) and a moral fanatic (see Goethe's words concerning the radically evil element in human nature[8]). _Saintliness_ also lurked somewhere in his soul.... I require a criticism of the saintly type.

Hegel's value: "Passion."

Herbert Spencer's tea-grocer's philosophy: total absence of an ideal save that of the mediocre man.

Fundamental instinct of all philosophers, historians, and psychologists: everything of _value_ in mankind, art, history, science, religion, and technology must be shown to be _morally valuable_ and _morally conditioned,_ in its aim, means, and result. Everything is seen in the light of this highest value; for instance, Rousseau's question concerning civilisation, "Will it make man grow better?"--a funny question, for the reverse is _obvious,_ and is a fact which speaks _in favour_ of civilisation.

[Footnote 8: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--This is doubtless a reference to a passage in a letter written by Goethe to Herder, on 7th June 1793, from the camp at Marienborn, near Mainz, in which the following words occur:--"_Dagegen hat aber auch Kant seinen philosophischen Mantel, nachdem er ein langes Menschenleben gebraucht hat, ihn von mancherlei sudelhaften Vorurteilen zu reinigen, freventlich mit dem Schandfleck des radikalen Bösen beschlabbert, damit doch auch Christen herbeigelockt werden den Saum zu küssen?--_("Kant, on the other hand, after he had tried throughout his life to keep his philosophical cloak unsoiled by foul prejudices, wantonly dirtied it in the end with the disreputable stain of the 'radical evil' in human nature, in order that Christians too might be lured into kissing its hem.") From this passage it will be seen how Goethe had anticipated Nietzsche's view of Kant; namely, that he was a Christian in disguise.]

383.

_Religious morality.--_Passion, great desire; the passion for power, love, revenge, and property: the moralists wish to uproot and exterminate all these things, and "purify" the soul by driving them out of it.

The argument is: the passions often lead to disaster--therefore, they are evil and ought to be condemned. Man must wring himself free from them, otherwise he cannot be a _good_ man....

This is of the same nature as: "If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out." In this particular case when, with that "bucolic simplicity," the Founder of Christianity recommended a certain practice to His disciples, in the event of sexual excitement, the result would not be only the loss of a particular member, but the actual castration of the whole of the man's character.... And the same applies to the moral mania, which, instead of insisting upon the control of the passions, sues for their extirpation. Its conclusion always is: only the emasculated man is a good man.

Instead of making use of and of _economising_ the great sources of passion, those torrents of the soul which are often so dangerous, overwhelming, and impetuous, morality--this most shortsighted and most corrupted of mental attitudes--would fain make them _dry up._

384.

_Conquest over the passions?_--No, not if this is to mean their enfeeblement and annihilation. _They must be enlisted in our service_: and to this end it may be necessary to tyrannise them a good deal (not as individuals, but as communities, races, etc.). At length we should trust them enough to restore their freedom to them: they love us like good servants, and willingly go wherever our best interests lie.

385.

_Intolerance on the part of morality_ is a sign of man's _weakness_: he is frightened of his own "immorality," he must _deny_ his strongest _instincts,_ because he does not yet know how to use them. Thus the most fruitful quarters of the globe remain uncultivated longest: the power is lacking that might become master here....

386.

There are some very simple peoples and men who believe that continuous fine weather would be a desirable thing: they still believe to-day in _rebus moralibus,_ that the "good man" alone and nothing else than the "good man" is to be desired, and that the ultimate end of man's evolution will be that only the good man will remain on earth (and that it is only to that end that all efforts should be directed). This is in the highest degree an _uneconomical_ thought; as we have already suggested, it is the very acme of simplicity, and it is nothing more than the expression of the _agreeableness_ which the "good man" creates (he gives rise to no fear, he permits of relaxation, he gives what one is able to take).

With a more educated eye one learns to desire exactly the reverse--that is to say, an ever greater _dominion of evil,_ man's gradual emancipation from the narrow and aggravating bonds of morality, the growth of power around the greatest forces of Nature, and the ability to enlist the passions in one's service.

387.

The whole idea of the hierarchy of the _passions_: as if the only right and normal thing were to be led by _reason_--whereas the passions are abnormal, dangerous, half-animal, and moreover, in so far as their end is concerned, nothing more than _desires for pleasure...._

Passion is deprived of its dignity (1) as if it only manifested itself in an unseemly way and were not necessary and always the _motive force_, (2) inasmuch as it is supposed to aim at no high purpose--merely at pleasure....

The misinterpretation of passion and _reason,_ as if the latter were an independent entity, and not a state of relationship between all the various passions and desires; and as though every passion did not possess its quantum of reason....

388.

How it was that, under the pressure of the dominion of an ascetic and _self-effacing morality,_ it was precisely the passions--love, goodness, pity, even justice, generosity, and heroism, which were necessarily misunderstood?

It is the _richness of a personality,_ the fullness of it, its power to flow over and to bestow, its instinctive feeling of ease, and its affirmative attitude towards itself, that creates great love and great sacrifices: these passions proceed from strong and godlike personalism as surely as do the desire to be master, to obtrude, and the inner certainty that one has a right to everything. The _opposite_ views, according to the most accepted notions, are indeed common views; and if one does not stand firmly and bravely on one's legs, one has nothing to give, and it is perfectly useless to stretch out one's hand either to protect or to support others....

How was it possible to _transform_ these instincts to such an extent that man could feel that to be of value which is directed against himself, so that he could sacrifice himself for another self! O the psychological baseness and falseness which hitherto has laid down the law in the Church and in Church-infected philosophy!

If man is thoroughly sinful, then all he can do is to hate himself. As a matter of fact, he ought not to regard even his fellows otherwise than he does himself; the love of man requires a justification, and it is found in the fact that _God commanded it._--From this it follows that all the natural instincts of man (to love, etc.) appear to him to be, in themselves, prohibited; and that he re-acquires a right to them only after having _denied_ them as an obedient worshipper of God. ... Pascal, the admirable _logician_ of Christianity, _went as far as this_! let any one examine his relations to his sister. "Not to make one's self loved," seemed Christian to him.

389.

Let us consider how dearly a moral canon such as this ("an ideal") makes us pay. (Its enemies are--well? The "egoists.")

The melancholy astuteness of self-abasement in Europe (Pascal, La Rochefoucauld)--inner enfeeblement, discouragement, and self-consumption of the non-gregarious man.

The perpetual process of laying stress upon mediocre qualities as being the most valuable (modesty in rank and file, Nature converted into an instrument).

Pangs of conscience associated with all that is self-glorifying and original: thus follows the unhappiness--the _gloominess_ of the world from the standpoint of stronger and better-constituted men!

Gregarious consciousness and timorousness transferred to philosophy and religion.

Let us leave the psychological impossibility of a purely unselfish action out of consideration!

390.

My ultimate conclusion is, that the _real_ man represents a much higher value than the "desirable" man of any ideal that has ever existed hitherto; that all "desiderata" in regard to mankind have been absurd and dangerous dissipations by means of which a particular kind of man has sought to establish _his_ measures of preservation and of growth as a law for all; that every "desideratum" of this kind which has been made to dominate has _reduced_ man's worth, his strength, and his trust in the future; that the indigence and mediocre intellectuality of man becomes most apparent, even to-day, when he reveals a _desire_; that man's ability to fix values has hitherto been developed too inadequately to do justice to the actual, not merely to the "desirable," _worth of man_; that, up to the present, ideals have really been the power which has most slandered man and power, the poisonous fumes which have hung over reality, and which have _seduced men to yearn for nonentity_....

D. _A Criticism of the Words: Improving, Perfecting, Elevating._

391.

The standard _according_ to which the value of moral valuations is to be determined.

The fundamental fact _that has been overlooked_: The contradiction between "becoming more moral" and the elevation and the strengthening of the type man.

_Homo natura_: The "will to power."

392.

Moral values regarded as _values of appearance_ and compared with _physiological_ values.

393.