Part 17

To _avoid_ knowing himself is the prudence of the idealist. The idealist: a creature who has reasons for remaining in the dark concerning himself, and who is also clever enough to remain in the dark concerning these reasons also.

345.

_The tendency of moral evolution._--Every one's desire is that there should be no other teaching and valuation of things than those by means of which he himself succeeds. Thus the _fundamental tendency_ of the _weak_ and _mediocre_ of all times, has been to _enfeeble the strong and to reduce them to the level of the weak: their chief weapon in this process_ was the _moral principle._ The attitude of the strong towards the weak is branded as evil; the highest states of the strong become bad bywords.

The struggle of the many against the strong, of the ordinary against the extraordinary, of the weak against the strong: meets with one of its finest interruptions in the fact that the rare, the refined, the more exacting, present themselves as the weak, and repudiate the coarser weapons of power.

346.

(1) The so-called pure instinct for knowledge of all philosophers is dictated to them by their moral "truths," and is only seemingly independent.

(2) The "Moral Truths," "thus shall things be done," are mere states of consciousness of an instinct which has grown tired, "thus and thus are things done by us." The "ideal" is supposed to re-establish and strengthen an instinct; it flatters man to feel he can obey when he is only an automaton.

347.

_Morality as a means of seduction._--"Nature is good; for a wise and good God is its cause. Who, therefore, is responsible for the 'corruption of man'? Tyrants and seducers and the ruling classes are responsible--they must be wiped out": this is Rousseau's logic (compare with _Pascals_ logic, which concludes by an appeal to original sin).

Refer also to _Luther's_ logic, which is similar. In both cases a pretext is sought for the introduction of an insatiable lust of revenge as a _moral and religious_ duty. The hatred directed against the ruling classes tries to _sanctify_ itself ... (the "sinfulness of Israel" is the basis of the priest's powerful position).

Compare this with _Pauls_ logic, which is similar. It is always under the cover of God's business that these reactions appear, under the cover of what is right, or of humanity, etc. In the case of _Christ_ the rejoicings of the people appear as the cause of His crucifixion. It was an anti-priestly movement from the beginning. Even in the anti-Semitic movement we find the same trick: the opponent is overcome with moral condemnations, and those who attack him pose as _retributive Justice._

348.

_The incidents of the fight_: the fighter tries to transform his opponent into the _exact opposite_ of himself--imaginatively, of course. He tries to believe in himself to such an extent that he may have the courage necessary for the "good Cause" (as if he were the _good Cause_); as if reason, taste, and virtue were being assailed by his opponents.... The belief of which he is most in need, as the strongest means of defence and attack, _is the belief in himself,_ which, however, knows how to misinterpret itself as a belief in God. He never pictures the advantages and the uses of victory, but only understands victory for the sake of victory--for God's sake. Every small community (or individual), finding itself involved in a struggle, strives to convince itself of this: "_Good taste, good judgment, and virtue are ours._" War urges people to this _exaggerated self-esteem_....

349.

Whatever kind of _eccentric ideal_ one may have (whether as a "Christian," a "free-spirit," an "immoralist," or a German Imperialist), one should try to avoid insisting upon its being _the_ ideal; for, by so doing, it is deprived of all its privileged nature. One should have an ideal as a distinction; one should not propagate it, and thus level one's self down to the rest of mankind.

How is it, that in spite of this obvious fact, the majority of idealists indulge in propaganda for their ideal, just as if they had no right to it unless the _majority_ acquiesce therein?--For instance, all those plucky and insignificant girls behave in this way, who claim the right to study Latin and mathematics. What is it urges them to do this? I fear it is the instinct of the herd, and the terror of the herd: they fight for the "emancipation of woman," because they are best able to achieve their own private little distinction by fighting for it under the cover of a _charitable movement,_ under the banner bearing the device "For others."

The _cleverness_ of idealists consists in their persistently posing as the missionaries and "representatives" of an ideal: they thus "beautify" themselves in the eyes of those who still believe in disinterestedness and heroism. Whereas real heroism consists, _not_ in fighting under the banner of self-sacrifice, submission, and disinterestedness, but in _not fighting at all_.... "I am thus; I will be thus--and you can go to the devil!"

350.

_Every_ ideal assumes _love, hate, reverence,_ and _contempt._ Either positive feeling is the _primum mobile,_ or negative feeling is. _Hatred_ and _contempt_ are the _primum mobile_ in all the ideals which proceed from resentment.

B. _A Criticism of the "Good Man" of the Saint, etc._

351.

The "_good man_" Or, hemiplegia of virtue.--In the opinion of every strong and natural man, love and hate, gratitude and revenge, goodness and anger, affirmative and negative action, belong to each other. A man is good on condition that he knows how to be evil; a man is evil, because otherwise he would not know how to be good. Whence comes the morbidness and ideological unnaturalness which repudiates these compounds--which teaches a sort of one-sided efficiency as the highest of all things? Whence this hemiplegia of virtue, the invention of the good man? The object seems to be to make man amputate those instincts which enable him to be an enemy, to be harmful, to be angry, and to insist upon revenge.... This unnaturalness, then, corresponds to that dualistic concept of a wholly good and of a wholly bad creature (God, Spirit, Man); in the first are found all the positive, in the second all the negative forces, intentions, and states. This method of valuing thus believes itself to be "idealistic"; it never doubts that in its concept of the "good man," it has found the highest desideratum. When aspiring to its zenith it fancies a state in which all evil is wiped out, and in which only good creatures have actually remained over. It does not therefore regard the mutual dependence of the opposites good and evil as proved. On the contrary, the latter ought to vanish, and the former should remain. The first has a right to exist, the second ought not _to be with us at all...._ What, as a matter of fact, is the reason of this desire? In all ages, and particularly in the Christian age, much labour has been spent in trying to reduce men to this one-sided activity: and even to-day, among those who have been deformed and weakened by the Church, people are not lacking who desire precisely the same thing with their "humanisation" generally, or with their "Will of God," or with their "Salvation of the Soul." The principal injunction behind all these things is, that man should no longer do anything evil, that he should under no circumstances be harmful or _desire_ harm. The way to arrive at this state of affairs is to amputate all hostile tendencies, to suppress all the instincts of resentment, and to establish "spiritual peace" as a chronic disease.

This attitude of mind, in which a certain type of man is bred, starts out with this absurd hypothesis: good and evil are postulated as realities which are in a state of mutual contradiction (not as complementary values, which they are), people are advised to take the side of the good, and it is insisted upon that a good man resists and forswears evil until every trace of it is uprooted--_but with this valuation Life is actually denied,_ for in all its instincts Life has both yea and nay. But far from understanding these facts, this valuation dreams rather of returning to the wholeness, oneness, and strengthfulness of Life: it actually believes that a state of blessedness will be reached when the inner anarchy and state of unrest which result from these opposed impulses is brought to an end.--It is possible that no more dangerous ideology, no greater mischief _in the science of psychology,_ has ever yet existed, as this will to good: the most repugnant type of man has been reared, the man who is _not free,_ the bigot; it was taught that only in the form of a bigot could one tread the path which leads to God, and that only a bigot's life could be a godly life.

And even here, Life is still in the right--Life that knows not how to separate Yea from Nay: what is the good of declaring with all one's might that war is an evil, that one must harm no one, that one must not act negatively? One is still waging a war even in this, it is impossible to do otherwise! The good man who has renounced all evil, and who is afflicted according to his desire with the hemiplegia of virtue, does not therefore cease from waging war, or from making enemies, or from saying "nay" and doing "nay." The Christian, for instance, hates "sin"!--and what on earth is there which he does not call "sin"! It is precisely because of his belief in a moral antagonism between good and evil, that the world for him has grown so full of hatefulness and things that must be combated eternally. The "good man" sees himself surrounded by evil, and, thanks to the continual onslaughts of the latter, his eye grows more keen, and in the end discovers traces of evil in every one of his acts. And thus he ultimately arrives at the conclusion, which to him is quite logical, that Nature is evil, that man is corrupted, and that being good is an act of grace (that is to say, it is impossible to man when he stands alone). In short: _he denies Life,_ he sees how "good," as the highest value, _condemns_ Life.... And thus his ideology concerning good and evil ought to strike him as refuted. But one cannot refute a disease. Therefore he is obliged to conceive _another_ life!...

352.

Power, whether in the hands of a god or of a man, is always understood to consist in the ability to _harm_ as well as to _help._ This is the case with the Arabs and with the Hebrews, in fact with all strong and well-constituted races.

The dualistic separation of the two powers is fatal.... In this way morality becomes the poisoner of life.

353.

_A criticism of the good man._--Honesty, dignity, dutifulness, justice, humanity, loyalty, uprightness, clean conscience--is it really supposed that, by means of these fine-sounding words, the qualities they stand for are approved and affirmed for their own sake? Or is it this, that qualities and states indifferent in themselves have merely been looked at in a light which lends them some value? Does the worth of these qualities lie in themselves, or in the use and advantages to which they lead (or to which they seem to lead, to which they are expected to lead)?

I naturally do not wish to imply that there is any opposition between the _ego_ and the _alter_ in the judgment: the question is, whether it is the _results_ of these qualities, either in regard to him who possesses them or in regard to environment, society, "humanity," which lend them their value; or whether they have a value in themselves.... In other words: is it _utility_ which bids men condemn, combat, and deny the opposite qualities (duplicity, falseness, perversity, lack of self-confidence, inhumanity)? Is the essence of such qualities condemned, or only their consequences? In other words: were it _desirable_ that there should exist no men at all possessed of such qualities? _In any case, this is believed_.... But here lies the error, the shortsightedness, the monocularity of _narrow egoism._

Expressed otherwise: would it be desirable to create circumstances in which the whole advantage would be on the side of the just--so that all those with opposite natures and instincts would be discouraged and would slowly become extinct?

At bottom, this is a question of taste and of _æsthetics_: should we desire the most honourable types of men--that is to say, the greatest bores--alone to subsist? the rectangular, the virtuous, the upright, the good-natured, the straightforward, and the "blockheads"?

If one can imagine the total suppression of the huge number constituting the "others," even the just man himself ceases from having a right to exist,--he is, in fact, no longer necessary,--and in this way it is seen that coarse utility alone could have elevated such an _insufferable_ virtue to a place of honour.

Desirability may lie precisely on the other side. It might be better to create conditions in which the "just man" would be reduced to the humble position of a "useful instrument"--an "ideal gregarious animal," or at best a herdsman: in short, conditions in which he would no longer stand in the highest sphere, which requires _other qualities_.

354.

_The "good man" as a tyrant--_Mankind has always repeated the same error: it has always transformed a mere vital measure into the _measure_ and standard of life;--instead of seeking the standard in the highest ascent of life, in the problem of growth and exhaustion, it takes the _preservative measures_ of a very definite kind of life, and uses them to exclude all other kinds of life, and even to criticise Life itself and to select from among its forms. That is to say, man ultimately forgets that measures are a means to an end, and gets to like them for themselves: they take the place of a goal in his mind, and even become the standard of goals to him--that is to say, _a given species of man_ regards his means of existence as the only legitimate means, as the means which ought to be imposed upon all, as "truth," "goodness," "perfection": the given species, in fact, begins to _tyrannise._ ... It is a _form of faith,_ of instinct, when a certain species of man does not perceive that his kind has been conditioned, when he does not understand his relation to other species. At any rate, any species of men (a people or a race) seems to be doomed as soon as it becomes tolerant, grants equal rights, and no longer desires to be master.

355.

"All good people are weak: they are good because they are not strong enough to be evil," said the Latuka chieftain Comorro to Baker.

* * *

"Disasters are not to the faint-hearted," is a Russian proverb.

356.

Modest, industrious, benevolent, and temperate: thus you would that men were?--that _good men_ were? But such men I can only conceive as slaves, the slaves of the future.

357.

_The metamorphoses of slavery_; its disguise in the cloak of religion; its transfiguration through morality.

358.

_The ideal slave_ (the "good man").--He who cannot regard himself as a "purpose," and who cannot give himself any aim whatsoever, instinctively honours the morality of _unselfishness._ Everything urges him to this morality: his prudence, his experience, and his vanity. And even faith is a form of self-denial.

***

_Atavism_: delightful feeling, to be able to obey unconditionally for once.

***

Industry, modesty, benevolence, temperance, are just so many _obstacles_ in the way of _sovereign sentiments,_ of great _ingenuity,_ of an heroic purpose, of noble existence for one's self.

***

It is not a question of _going ahead_ (to that end all that is required is to be at best a herdsman, that is to say, the prime need of the herd), it is rather a matter of _getting along alone,_ of _being able to be another._

359.

We must realise _all_ that has been accumulated as the result of the highest moral _idealism_: how almost _all other values_ have crystallised round it. This shows that it has been desired for _a very long time_ and with the _strongest passions_--and that it has not yet been attained: otherwise it would have _disappointed_ everybody (that is to say, it would have been followed by a more moderate valuation).

The _saint_ as the _most powerful type_ of man: _this_ ideal it is which has elevated the value of moral perfection so high. One would think that the whole of science had been engaged in proving that the _moral_ man is the most _powerful_ and most godly.--The conquest of the senses and the passions--everything inspired _terror_;--the unnatural seemed to the spectators to be _supernatural_ and _transcendental...._

360.

Francis of Assisi: amorous and popular, a poet who combats the order of rank among souls, in favour of the lowest. The denial of spiritual hierarchy--"all alike before God."

Popular ideals: the good man, the unselfish man, the saint, the sage, the just man. O Marcus Aurelius!

361.

I have declared war against the anæmic Christian ideal (together with what is closely _I_ related to it), not because I want to annihilate it, but only to put an end to its _tyranny_ and clear the way for other _ideals,_ for _more robust_ ideals.... The _continuance_ of the Christian ideal belongs to the most desirable of desiderata: if only for the sake of the ideals which wish to take their stand beside it and perhaps above it--they must have opponents, and strong ones too, in order to grow _strong_ themselves. That is why we immoralists require the _power_ of _morality,_ our instinct of self-preservation insists upon our opponents maintaining their strength--all it requires is to _become master of them_.

C. _Concerning the Slander of the so-called Evil Qualities_.

362.

Egoism and its problem! The Christian gloominess of La Rochefoucauld, who saw egoism in everything, and imagined that he had therefore _reduced_ the worth of things and virtues! In opposition to him, I first of all tried to show that nothing else _could_ exist save egoism,--that in those men whose _ego_ is weak and thin, the power to love also grows weak,--that the greatest lovers are such owing to the strength of their _ego,_--that love is an expression of egoism, etc. As a matter of fact, the false valuation aims at the interest of those who find it useful, whom it helps--in fact, the herd; it fosters a pessimistic mistrust towards the basis of Life; it would fain undermine the most glorious and most well-constituted men (out of fear); it would assist the lowly to have the upper hand of their conquerors; it is the cause of universal dishonesty, especially in the most useful type of men.

363.

Man is an indifferent egoist: even the cleverest regards his habits as more important than his advantage.

364.

Egoism! But no one has yet asked: _what_ is the _ego_ like? Everybody is rather inclined to see all _egos_ alike. This is the result of the slave theory, of _universal suffrage,_ and of "equality."

365.

The behaviour of a higher man is the result of a very complex set of motives: any word such as "pity" _betrays_ nothing of this complexity. The most important factor is the feeling, "who am I? who is the other relative to me?"--Thus the valuing spirit is continually active.

366.

To think that the history of all moral phenomena may be simplified, as Schopenhauer thought,--that is to say, that _pity_ is to be found at the root of every moral impulse that has ever existed hitherto,--is to be guilty of a degree of nonsense and ingenuousness worthy only of a thinker who is devoid of all historical instincts and who has miraculously succeeded in evading the strong schooling in history which the Germans, from Herder to Hegel, have undergone.

367.

_My "pity."_--This is a feeling for which I can find no adequate term: I feel it when I am in the presence of any waste of precious capabilities, as, for instance, when I contemplate Luther: what power and what tasteless problems fit for back-woodsmen! (At a time when the brave and light-hearted scepticism of a Montaigne was already possible in France!) Or when I see some one standing below where he might have stood, thanks to the development of a set of perfectly senseless accidents. Or even when, with the thought of man's destiny in my mind, I contemplate with horror and contempt the whole system of modern European politics, which is creating the circumstances and weaving the fabric of the _whole_ future of mankind. Yes, to what could not "mankind" attain, if----! This is my "pity"; despite the fact that no sufferer yet exists with whom I sympathise in this way.

368.

Pity is a waste of feeling, a moral parasite which is injurious to the health, "it cannot possibly be our duty to increase the evil in the world." If one does good merely out of pity, it is one's self and not one's neighbour that one is succouring. Pity does not depend upon maxims, but upon emotions. The suffering we see infects us; pity is an infection.

369.

There is no such thing as egoism which keeps within its bounds and does not exceed them--consequently, the "allowable," the "morally indifferent" egoism of which some people speak, does not exist at all.

"One is continually promoting the interests of one's '_ego_' at the cost of other people "; "Living consists in living at the cost of others"--he who has not grasped this fact, has not taken the first step towards truth to himself.

370.

The "subject" is a piece of fiction: the _ego_ of which every one speaks when he blames egoism, does not exist at all.

371.

Our "ego"--which is _not_ one with the unitary controlling force of our beings!--is really only an imagined synthesis; therefore there can _be_ no "_egoistic_" _actions_.

372.

Since all instincts are unintelligent, utility cannot represent a standpoint as far as they are concerned. Every instinct, when it is active, sacrifices strength and other instincts into the bargain: in the end it is stemmed, otherwise it would be the end of everything owing to the waste it would bring about. Thus: that which is "unegoistic," self-sacrificing, and imprudent is nothing in particular --it is common to all the instincts; they do not consider the welfare of the whole _ego_ (_because they simply do not think!_), they act counter to our interests, against the _ego_: and often _for_ the _ego--_innocent in both cases!

373.