Part 15

(1) That all _pain_ and _unhappiness_ should have been falsified by being associated with what is wrong (guilt). (Thus pain was robbed of its innocence.)

(2) That all _strong emotions_ (wantonness, voluptuousness, triumph, pride, audacity, knowledge, assurance, and happiness in itself) were branded as sinful, as seductive, and as suspicious.

(3) That _feelings of weakness,_ inner acts of cowardice, lack of personal courage, should have decked themselves in the most beautiful words, and have been taught as desirable in the highest degree.

(4) That _greatness_ in man should have been given the meaning of disinterestedness, self-sacrifice for another's good, for other people; that even in the scientist and the artist, the _elimination of the individual personality_ is presented as the cause of the greatest knowledge and ability.

(5) That _love_ should have been twisted round to mean submission (and altruism), whereas it is in reality an act of appropriation or of bestowal, resulting in the last case from a superabundance in the wealth of a given personality. Only the _wholest_ people can love; the disinterested ones, the "objective" ones, are the worst lovers (just ask the girls!). This principle also applies to the love of God or of the "home country": a man must be able to rely absolutely upon himself. (Egotism may be regarded as the _pre-eminence of the ego,_ altruism as the _pre-eminence of others_.)

(6) Life regarded as a punishment (happiness as a means of seduction); the passions regarded as devilish; confidence in one's self as godless.

_The whole of psychology is a psychology of obstacles,_ a sort of _barricade_ built out of fear; on the one hand we find the masses (the botched and bungled, the mediocre) defending themselves, by means of it, against the _strong_ (and finally _destroying_ them in their growth ...); on the other hand, we find all the instincts with which these classes are best able to prosper, sanctified and alone held in honour by them. Let anyone examine the Jewish priesthood.

297.

_The vestiges of the depreciation of Nature_ through moral transcendence: The value of disinterestedness, the cult of altruism; the belief in a reward in the play of natural consequences; the belief in "goodness" and in genius itself, as if the one, like the other, were the _result of disinterestedness_; the continuation of the Church's sanction of the life of the citizen; the absolutely deliberate misunderstanding of history (as a means of educating up to morality) or pessimism in the attitude taken up towards history (the latter is just as much a result of the depreciation of Nature, as is that _pseudo-justification_ of history, that refusal to see history as the pessimist _sees_ it).

298.

"_Morality for its own sake_"--this is an important step in the denaturalisation of morals: in itself it appears as a final value. In this phase religion has generally become saturated with it: as, for instance, in the case of Judaism. It likewise goes through a phase in which it _separates itself from_ religion, and in which no God is "moral" enough for it: it then prefers the impersonal ideal.... This is how the case stands at present.

"_Art for Art's sake_": this is a similarly dangerous principle: by this means a false contrast is lent to things--it culminates in the slander of reality ("idealising" _into the hateful_). When an ideal is severed from reality, the latter is debased, impoverished, and calumniated. _"Beauty for Beauty's sake," "Truth for Truth's sake," "Goodness for Goodness' sake"_--these are three forms of the evil eye for reality.

_Art, knowledge, and morality_ are _means_: instead of recognising a life-promoting tendency in them, they have been associated with the _opposite of Life_--with "_God_"--they have also been regarded as revelations of a higher world, which here and there transpires through them....

"_Beautiful_" and "_ugly_," "_true_" and "_false_," "_good_" and "_evil_"--these things are _distinctions_ and _antagonisms_ which betray the preservative and promotive measures of Life, not necessarily of man alone, but of all stable and enduring organisms which take up a definite stand against their opponents. The _war_ which thus ensues is the essential factor: it is a means of _separating_ things, _leading to stronger_ isolation....

299.

_Moral naturalism_: The tracing back of apparently independent and supernatural values to their real "nature"--that is to say, to _natural immorality,_ to natural "utility," etc.

Perhaps I may designate the tendency of these observations by the term _moral naturalism_: my object is to re-translate the moral values which have apparently become independent and _unnatural_ into their real nature--that is to say, into their natural "_immorality_."

_N.B._--Refer to Jewish "holiness" and its natural basis. The case is the same in regard to _the moral law which has been made sovereign,_ emancipated from its real _feature_ (until it is almost the _opposite_ of Nature).

The stages in the _denaturalisation of morality_ (or so-called "_Idealisation_"):--

First it is a road to individual happiness,

then it is the result of knowledge,

then it is a Categorical Imperative,

then it is a way to Salvation,

then it is a denial of the will to live.

(The gradual progress of the _hostility_ of morality to _Life_.)

300.

The suppressed and effaced _Heresy_ in morality.--Concepts: paganism, master-morality, _virtù_.

301.

_My problem_: What harm has mankind suffered hitherto from morals, as also from its own morality? Intellectual harm, etc.

302.

Why are not human values once more deposited nicely in the rut to which they alone have a right--as routinary values? Many species of animals have already become extinct; supposing man were also to disappear, nothing would be lacking on earth. A man should be enough of a philosopher to admire even this "nothing" (_Nil admirari_).

303.

Man, a small species of very excitable animals, which--fortunately--has its time. Life in general on earth is a matter of a moment, an incident, an exception that has no consequence, something which is of no importance whatever to the general character of the earth; the earth itself is, like every star, a hiatus between two nonentities, an event without a plan, without reason, will, or self-consciousness--the worst kind of necessity--_foolish_ necessity.... Something in us rebels against this view; the serpent vanity whispers to our hearts, "All this must be false because it is revolting.... Could not all this be appearance? And man in spite of all, to use Kant's words"----

4. HOW VIRTUE IS MADE TO DOMINATE.

304.

_Concerning the ideal of the moralist._--In this treatise we wish to speak of the great _politics_ of virtue. We wrote it for the use of all those who are interested, not so much in the process of becoming virtuous as in that of making others virtuous--in how virtue _is made to dominate._ I even intend to prove that in order to desire this one thing--the dominion of virtue--the other must be systematically avoided; that is to say, one must renounce all hopes of becoming virtuous. This sacrifice is great: but such an end is perhaps a sufficient reward for such a sacrifice. And even greater sacrifices!... And some of the most famous moralists have risked as much. For these, indeed, had already recognised and anticipated the truth which is to be revealed for the first time in this treatise: that the _dominion of virtue_ is absolutely attainable _only by the use of the same means_ which are employed in the attainment of any other dominion, in any case not _by_ means of virtue itself....

As I have already said, this treatise deals with the politics of virtue: it postulates an ideal of these politics; it describes it as it ought to be, if anything at all can be perfect on this earth. Now, no philosopher can be in any doubt as to what the type of perfection is in politics; it is, of course, Machiavellianism. But Machiavellianism which is _pur, sans mélange, cru, vert, dans toute sa force, dans toute son âpreté,_ is superhuman, divine, transcendental, and can never be achieved by man--the most he can do is to approximate it. Even in this narrower kind of politics--in the politics of virtue--the ideal never seems to have been realised. Plato, too, only bordered upon it. Granted that one have eyes for concealed things, one can discover, even in the most guileless and most conscious _moralists_ (and this is indeed the name of these moral politicians and of the founders of all newer moral forces), traces showing that they too paid their tribute to human weakness. _They all aspired_ to virtue on their own account--at least in their moments of weariness; and this is the leading and most capital error on the part of any moralist--whose duty it is to be an _immoralist in deeds._ That he must not exactly _appear to be the latter,_ is another matter. Or rather it is _not_ another matter: systematic self-denial of this kind (or, expressed morally: dissimulation) belongs to, and is part and parcel of, the moralist's canon and of his self-imposed duties: without it he can never attain to his particular kind of perfection. Freedom from morality _and from truth_ when enjoyed for that purpose which rewards every sacrifice: for the sake of making _morality dominate_--that is the canon. Moralists are in need of the _attitudes of virtue,_ as also of the attitudes of truth; their error begins when they _yield_ to virtue, when they lose control of virtue, when they themselves become _moral_ or _true._ A great moralist is, among other things, necessarily a great actor; his only danger is that his pose may unconsciously become a second nature, just like his ideal, which is to keep his _esse_ and his _operari_ apart in a divine way; everything he does must be done _sub specie boni_--a lofty, remote, and exacting ideal! A _divine_ ideal! And, as a matter of fact, they say that the moralist thus imitates a model which is no less than God Himself: God, the greatest Immoralist in deeds that exists, but who nevertheless understands how to remain what He _is,_ the _good_ God....

305.

The dominion of virtue is not established by means of virtue itself; with virtue itself, one renounces power, one loses the Will to Power.

306.

The victory of a moral ideal is achieved by the same "immoral" means as any other victory: violence, lies, slander, injustice.

307.

He who knows the way fame originates will be suspicious even of the fame virtue enjoys.

308.

Morality is just as "immoral" as any other thing on earth; morality is in itself a form of immorality.

The great _relief_ which this conviction brings. The contradiction between things disappears, the unity of all phenomena is _saved----_

309.

There are some who actually go in search of what is immoral. When they say: "this is wrong," they believe it ought to be done away with or altered. On the other hand, I do not rest until I am quite clear concerning the _immorality_ of any particular thing which happens to come under my notice. When I discover it, I recover my equanimity.

310.

A. _The ways which lead to power_: the presentation of the new virtue under the name of an _old_ one,--the awakening of "interest" concerning it ("happiness" declared to be its reward, and _vice versâ_),--artistic slandering of all that stands in its way,--the exploitation of advantages and accidents with the view of glorifying it,--the conversion of its adherents into fanatics by means of sacrifices and separations,--symbolism _on a grand scale_.

B. _Power attained_: (1) Means of constraint of virtue; (2) seductive means of virtue; (3) the (court) etiquette of virtue.

311.

_By what means does a virtue attain to power?--_With precisely the same means as a political party: slander, suspicion, the undermining of opposing virtues that happen to be already in power, the changing of their names, systematic persecution and scorn; in short, _by means of acts of general "immorality."_

How does a _desire_ behave towards itself in order to become a _virtue_?--A process of rechristening; systematic denial of its intentions; practice in misunderstanding itself; alliance with established and recognised virtues; ostentatious enmity towards its adversaries. If possible, too, the protection of sacred powers must be purchased; people must also be intoxicated and fired with enthusiasm; idealistic humbug must be used, and a party must be won, which _either_ triumphs _or_ perishes--one must be _unconscious and naïf_.

312.

Cruelty has become transformed and elevated into tragic pity, so that we no longer recognise it as such. The same has happened to the love of the sexes which has become amour-passion; the slavish attitude of mind appears as Christian obedience; wretchedness becomes humility; the disease of the _nervus sympathicus,_ for instance, is eulogised as Pessimism, Pascalism, or Carlylism, etc.

313.

We should begin to entertain doubts concerning a man if we heard that he required reasons in order to remain respectable: we should, in any case, certainly avoid his society. The little word "for" in certain cases may be compromising; sometimes a single "for" is enough to refute one. If we should hear, in course of time, that such-and-such an aspirant for virtue was in need of _bad_ reasons in order to remain respectable, it would not conduce to increasing our respect for him. But he goes further; he comes to us, and tells us quite openly: "You disturb my morality, with your disbelief, Mr. Sceptic; so long as you cannot believe in my _bad reasons,_--that is to say, in my God, in a disciplinary Beyond, in free will, etc.,--you put obstacles in the way of my virtue.... Moral, sceptics must be suppressed: they prevent the _moralisation of the masses_."

314.

Our most sacred convictions, those which are permanent in us concerning the highest values, are _judgments emanating from our muscles._

315.

_Morality in the valuation of races and classes.--_In view of the fact that the _passions_ and _fundamental instincts_ in every race and class express the means which enable the latter to preserve themselves (or at least the means which have enabled them to live for the longest period of time), to call them "virtuous" practically means:

That they change their character, shed their skins, and blot out their past.

It means that they should cease from differentiating themselves from others.

It means that they are getting to resemble each other in their needs and aspirations--or, more exactly, _that they are declining...._

It means that the will to one kind of morality is merely the _tyranny_ of the particular species, which is adapted to that kind of morality, over other species: it means a process of annihilation or general levelling in favour of the prevailing species (whether it be to render the non-prevailing species harmless, or to exploit them); the "Abolition of Slavery"--a so-called tribute to "human dignity"; in truth, the _annihilation_ of a fundamentally different species (the undermining of its values and its happiness).

The qualities which constitute the strength of an _opposing race_ or class are declared to be the most evil and pernicious things it has: for by means of them it may be harmful to us (its virtues are slandered and rechristened).

When a man or a people harm us, their action constitutes an objection against them: but from their point of view we are desirable, because we are such as can be useful to them.

The insistence upon spreading "humaneness" (which guilelessly starts out with the assumption that it is in possession of the formula "What is human") is all humbug, beneath the cover of which a certain definite type of man strives to attain to power: or, more precisely, a very particular kind of instinct--the _gregarious instinct._ "The equality of men": this is what lies _concealed_ behind the tendency of _making_ ever more and more men _alike_ as men.

_The "interested nature" of the morality of ordinary people._ (The trick was to elevate the great passions for power and property to the positions of protectors of virtue.)

To what extent do all kinds of _business men_ and money-grabbers--all those who give and take credit--find it _necessary_ to promote the levelling of all characters and notions of value? the _commerce and the exchange of the world_ leads to, and almost purchases, virtue.

The _State_ exercises the same influence, as does also any sort of ruling power at the head of officials and soldiers; _science_ acts in the same way, in order that it may work in security and economise its forces. And the _priesthood_ does the same.

Communal morality is thus promoted here, because it is advantageous; and, in order to make it triumph, war and violence are waged against immorality--with what "right"? Without any right whatsoever; but in accordance with the instinct of self-preservation. The same classes avail themselves of immorality when it serves their purpose to do so.

316.

Observe the hypocritical colour which all _civil institutions_ are painted, just as if they were _the offshoots of morality_--for instance: marriage, work, calling, patriotism, the family, order, and rights. But as they were all established in favour of the _most mediocre_ type of man, to protect him from exceptions and the need of exceptions, one must not be surprised to find them sown with lies.

317.

_Virtue_ must be defended against its preachers: they are its worst enemies. For they teach virtue as an ideal _for all_; they divest virtue of the charm which consists in its rareness, its inimitableness, its exceptional and non-average character--that is to say, of its _aristocratic charm._ A stand must also be made against those embittered idealists who eagerly tap all pots and are satisfied to hear them ring hollow: what ingenuousness--to _demand_ great and rare things, and then to declare, with anger and contempt of one's fellows, that they do not exist!--It is obvious, for instance, that a _marriage_ is worth only as much as those are worth whom it joins--that is to say, that on the whole it is something wretched and indecent: no priest or registrar can make anything else of it.

_Virtue_[6] has all the instincts of the average man against it: it is not profitable, it is not prudent, and it isolates. It is related to passion, and not very accessible to reason; it spoils the character, the head, and the senses--always, of course, subject to the medium standard of men; it provokes hostility towards order, and towards the _lies_ which are concealed beneath all order, all institutions, and all reality--when seen in the light of its pernicious influence upon _others,_ it is _the worst of vices_.

I recognise virtue in that: (1) it does not insist upon being recognised; (2) it does not presuppose the existence of virtue everywhere, but precisely something else; (3) it does _not suffer_ from the absence of virtue, but regards it rather as a relation of perspective which throws virtue into relief: it does not proclaim itself; (4) it makes no propaganda; (5) it allows no one to pose as judge because it is always a _personal_ virtue; (6) it does precisely what is generally _forbidden_: virtue as I understand it is the actual _vetitum_ within all gregarious legislation; (7) in short, I recognise virtue in that it is in the Renaissance style--_virtù_--free from all moralic acid....

[Footnote 6: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--Virtue is used here, of course, in the sense of "the excellence of man," not in the sense of the Christian negative virtue.]

318.

In the first place[7] Messrs. Virtue-mongers, you have no superiority over us; we should like to make you take _modesty_ a little more to heart: it is wretched personal interests and prudence which suggest your virtue to you. And if you had more strength and courage in your bodies you would not lower yourselves thus to the level of virtuous nonentities. You make what you can of yourselves: partly what you are obliged to make,--that is to say, what your circumstances force you to _make,_--partly what suits your pleasure and seems useful to you. But if you do only what is in keeping with your inclinations, or what necessity exacts from you, or what is useful to you, you ought _neither to praise yourselves nor let others praise you_!... One is a _thoroughly puny kind of man_ when one is _only_ virtuous: nothing should mislead you in this regard! Men who have to be considered at all, were never such donkeys of virtue: their inmost instinct, that which determined their quantum of power, did not find its reckoning thus: whereas with your minimum amount of power nothing can seem more full of wisdom to you than virtue. But the _multitude_ are on your side: and because you _tyrannise_ over us, we shall fight you....

[Footnote 7: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--Here Nietzsche returns to Christian virtue which is negative and moral.]

319.

A _virtuous man_ is of a lower species because, in the first place, he has no "personality," but acquires his value by conforming with a certain human scheme which has been once and for ever fixed. He has no independent value: he may be compared; he has his equals, he _must_ not be an individual.

Reckoning up the qualities of the _good_ man, why is it they appear pleasant to us? Because they urge us neither to war, to mistrust, to caution, to the accumulating of forces, nor to severity: our laziness, our good nature, and our levity, have a _good time._ This, our _feeling of well-being,_ is _what we project into_ the good man in the form of a _quality,_ in the form of a _valuable possession._

320.

Under certain circumstances, virtue is merely a venerable form of stupidity: who could blame you for it? And this form of virtue has not been outlived even to-day. A sort of honest peasant-simplicity, which is possible, however, in all classes of society, and which one cannot meet with anything else than a respectful smile, still thinks to-day that everything is in good hands--that is to say, in "God's hands": and when it supports this proposition with that same modest assurance as that with which it would assert that two and two are four, we others naturally refrain from contradiction.

Why disturb _this_ pure foolery? Why darken it with our cares concerning man, people, goals, the future? Even if we wished to do so, we shouldn't succeed. _In_ all things these people see the reflection of their own venerable stupidity and goodness (in them the old God--_deus myops--_ still lives); we others see something else in everything: our problematic nature, our contradictions, our deeper, more painful, and more suspicious wisdom.

321.

He who finds a particular virtue an easy matter, ultimately laughs at it. Seriousness cannot be maintained once virtue is attained. As soon as a man has reached virtue, he jumps out of it--whither? Into devilry.

Meanwhile, how intelligent all our evil tendencies and impulses have become! What an amount of inquisitiveness torments them! They are all fishhooks of knowledge!

322.

The idea is to associate vice with something so terrible that at last one is obliged to run away from it in order to be rid of its associations. This is the well-known case of Tannhäuser. Tannhäuser, brought to his wits' end by Wagnerian music, cannot endure life any longer even in the company of Mrs. Venus: suddenly virtue begins to have a charm for him; a Thuringian virgin goes up in price, and what is even worse still, he shows a liking for Wolfram von Eschenbach's melody....

323.

_The Patrons of Virtue._--Lust of property, lust of power, laziness, simplicity, fear; all these things are interested in virtue; that is why it stands so securely.

324.