Part 14

_Answer:--Three powers lie concealed behind it_; (1) The instinct of the _herd_ opposed to the strong and the independent; (2) the instinct of all _sufferers_ and all _abortions_ opposed to the happy and well-constituted; (3) the instinct of the mediocre opposed to the exceptions.--_Enormous advantage of this movement,_ despite the cruelty, falseness, and narrow-mindedness which has helped it along (for the history of the _struggle of morality with the fundamental instincts of life_ is in itself the greatest piece of immorality that has ever yet been witnessed on earth ...).

275.

The fewest succeed in discovering a problem behind all that which constitutes our daily life, and to which we have become accustomed throughout the ages--our eye does not seem focussed for such things: at least, this seems to me to be the case in so far as our morality is concerned.

"Every man should be the preoccupation of his fellows"; he who thinks in this way deserves honour: no one ought to think of himself.

"Thou shalt": an impulse which, like the sexual impulse, cannot fathom itself, is set apart and is not condemned as all the other instincts are--on the contrary, it is made to be their standard and their judge!

The problem of "equality," in the face of the fact that we all thirst for distinction: here, on the contrary, we should demand of ourselves what we demand of others. That is so tasteless and obviously insane; but--it is felt to be holy and of a higher order. The fact that it is opposed to common sense is not even noticed.

Self-sacrifice and self-abnegation are considered distinguishing, as are also the attempt to obey morality implicitly, and the belief that one should be every one's equal in its presence.

The neglect and the surrender of Life and of well-being is held to be distinguished, as are also the complete renunciation of individual valuations and the severe exaction from every one of the same sacrifice. "The value of an action is once and for all _fixed_: every individual must submit to this valuation."

We see: an authority speaks--who speaks?--We must condone it in human pride, if man tried to make this authority as high as possible, for he wanted to feel as humble as he possibly could by the side of it. Thus--God speaks!

God was necessary as an unconditional sanction which has no superior, as a "Categorical Imperator": or, in so far as people believed in the authority of reason, what was needed was a "unitarian metaphysics" by means of which this view could be made logical.

Now, admitting that faith in God is dead: the question arises once more: "who speaks?" My answer, which I take from biology and not from metaphysics, is: "the _gregarious instinct speaks._" This is what desires to be master: hence its "thou shalt!"--it will allow the individual to exist only as a part of a whole, only in favour of the whole, it hates those who detach themselves from everything--it turns the hatred of all individuals against him.

276.

The whole of the morality of Europe is based upon the values _which are useful to the herd_: the sorrow of all higher and exceptional men is explained by the fact that everything which distinguishes them from others reaches their consciousness in the form of a feeling of their own smallness and egregiousness. It is the _virtues_ of modern men which are the causes of pessimistic gloominess; the mediocre, like the herd, are not troubled much with questions or with conscience--they are cheerful. (Among the gloomy strong men, Pascal and Schopenhauer are noted examples.)

_The more dangerous a quality seems to the herd, the more completely it is condemned._

277.

The morality of _truthfulness_ in the herd. "Thou shalt be recognisable, thou shalt express thy inner nature by means of clear and constant signs--otherwise thou art dangerous: and supposing thou art evil, thy power of dissimulation is absolutely the worst thing for the herd. We despise the secretive and those whom we cannot identify.--_Consequently_ thou must regard thyself as recognisable, thou mayest not remain _concealed_ from thyself, thou mayest not even believe in the possibility of thy ever _changing_." Thus, the insistence upon truthfulness has as its main object the _recognisability_ and the _stability_ of the individual. As a matter of fact, it is the object of education to make each gregarious unit believe in a certain _definite dogma_ concerning the nature of man: education _first creates this dogma_ and thereupon exacts "truthfulness."

278.

Within the confines of a herd or of a community--that is to say, _inter pares,_ the _over-estimation_ of truthfulness is very reasonable. A man must not allow himself to be deceived--and _consequently_ he adopts as his own personal morality that he should deceive no one!--a sort of mutual obligation among equals! In his dealings with the outside world caution and danger demand that he should _be on his guard against deception_: the first psychological condition of this attitude would mean that he is also on his guard against _his own people._ Mistrust thus appears as the source of truthfulness.

279.

_A criticism of the virtues of the herd._--Inertia is active: (1) In confidence, because mistrust makes suspense, reflection, and observation necessary. (2) In veneration, where the gulf that separates power is great and submission necessary: then, so that fear may cease to exist, everybody tries to love and esteem, while the difference in power is interpreted as a difference of value: and thus the relationship to the powerful _no longer has anything revolting in it._ (3) In the sense of truth. What is truth? Truth is that explanation of things which causes us the smallest amount of mental exertion (apart from this, lying is extremely fatiguing). (4) In sympathy. It is a relief to know one's self on the same level with all, to feel as all feel, and to _accept_ a belief which is already current; it is something passive beside the activity which appropriates and continually carries into practice the most individual rights of valuation (the latter process allows of no repose). (5) In impartiality and coolness of judgment: people scout the strain of being moved, and prefer to be detached and "objective." (6) In uprightness: people prefer to obey a law which is to hand rather than to _create_ a new one, rather than to command themselves and others: the fear of commanding--it is better to submit than to rebel. (7) In toleration: the fear of exercising a right or of enforcing a judgment.

280.

The instinct of the herd values the _juste milieu_ and the _average_ as the highest and most precious of all things: the spot where the majority is to be found, and the air that it breathes there. In this way it is the opponent of all order of rank; it regards a climb from the level to the heights in the same light as a descent from the majority to the minority. The herd regards the _exception,_ whether it be above or beneath its general level, as something which is antagonistic and dangerous to itself. Their trick in dealing with the exceptions above them, the strong, the mighty, the wise, and the fruitful, is to persuade them to become guardians, herdsmen, and watchmen--in fact, to become their _head-servants_: thus they convert a danger into a thing which is useful. In the middle, fear ceases: here a man is alone with nothing; here there is not much room even for misunderstandings; here there is equality; here a man's individual existence is not felt as a reproach, but as the _right_ existence; here contentment reigns supreme. Mistrust is active only towards the exceptions; to be an exception is to be a sinner.

281.

If, in compliance with our communal instincts, we make certain regulations for, ourselves and forbid certain acts, we do not of course, in common reason, forbid a certain kind of "existence," nor a certain attitude of mind, but only a particular application and development of this "existence" and "attitude of mind." But then the idealist of virtue, the _moralist,_ comes along and says: "God sees into the human heart! What matters it that ye abstain from certain acts: ye are not any better on that account!" Answer: Mr. Longears and Virtue-Monger, we do not want to be better at all, we are quite satisfied with ourselves, all we desire is that we should not _harm_ one another--and that is why we forbid certain actions when they take a particular direction--that is to say, when they are against our own interests: but that does not alter the fact that when these same actions are directed against the enemies of our community--against you, for instance--we are at a loss to know how to pay them sufficient honour. We educate our children up to them; we develop them to the fullest extent. Did we share that "god-fearing" radicalism which your holy craziness recommends, if we were green-horns enough to condemn the source of those forbidden "acts" by condemning the "heart" and the "attitude of mind" which recommends them, that would mean condemning our very existence, and with it its greatest prerequisite--an attitude of mind, a heart, a passion which we revere with all our soul. By our decrees we prevent this attitude of mind from breaking out and venting itself in a useless way--we are prudent when we prescribe such laws for ourselves; we are also _moral_ in so doing.... Have you no idea--however vague--what sacrifices it has cost us, how much self-control, self-subjection, and hardness it has compelled us to exercise? We are vehement in our desires; there are times when we even feel as if we could devour each other.... But the "communal spirit" is master of us: have you observed that this is almost a definition of morality?

282.

_The weakness of the gregarious animal_ gives rise to a morality which is precisely similar to that resulting from the weakness of the decadent man: they understand each other; they _associate_ with each other (the great decadent religions always rely upon the support of the herd). The gregarious animal, as such, is free from all morbid characteristics, it is in itself an invaluable creature; but it is incapable of taking any initiative; it must have a "leader"--the priests understand this.... The state is not subtle, not secret enough; the art of "directing consciences" slips its grasp. How is the gregarious animal infected with illness by the priest?

283.

_The hatred directed against the privileged in body and spirit_: the revolt of the ugly and bungled souls against the beautiful, the proud, and the cheerful. The weapons used: contempt of beauty, of pride, of happiness: "There is no such thing as merit," "The danger is enormous: it is right that one _should_ tremble and feel ill at ease," "Naturalness is evil; it is right to oppose all that is natural--even 'reason'" (all that is antinatural is elevated to the highest place).

It is again the _priests_ who exploit this condition, and who win the "people" over to themselves. "The sinner" over whom there is more joy in heaven than over "the just person." This is the struggle against "paganism" (the pang of conscience, a measure for disturbing the harmony of the soul).

_The hatred of the mediocre_ for the _exceptions,_ and of the herd for its independent members. (Custom actually regarded as "morality.") The revulsion of feeling _against_ "egotism": that only is worth anything which is done "for another." "We are all equal";--against the love of dominion, against "dominion" in general;--against privilege;--against sectarians, free-spirits, and sceptics;--against philosophy (a force opposing mechanical and automatic instincts); in philosophers themselves--"the categorical imperative," the essential nature of morality, "general and universal."

284.

The qualities and tendencies which are _praised_: peacefulness, equity, moderation, modesty, reverence, respectfulness, bravery, chastity, honesty, fidelity, credulity, rectitude, confidence, resignation, pity, helpfulness, conscientiousness, simplicity, mildness, justice, generosity, leniency, obedience, disinterestedness, freedom from envy, good nature, industry.

We must ascertain to what extent _such qualities_ are conditioned as means to the attainment of certain desires and _ends_ (often an "_evil_" end); or as results of dominating passions (for instance, _intellectuality_): or as the expressions of certain states of need--that is to say, as _preservative measures_ (as in the case of citizens, slaves, women, etc.).

In short, every one of them is not _considered "good" for its own sake,_ but rather because it approximates to a standard prescribed either by "society" or by the "herd," as a means to the ends of the latter, as necessary for their preservation and enhancement, and also as the result of an actual _gregarious instinct_ in the individual; these qualities are thus in the service of an instinct which is _fundamentally different_ from these _states of virtue._ For the herd is _antagonistic, selfish, and pitiless_ to the outside world; it is full of a love of dominion and of feelings of mistrust, etc.

In the "herdsman" this _antagonism_ comes to the _fore_ he must have qualities which are _the reverse of_ those possessed by the herd.

The mortal enmity of the herd towards all _order of rank_: its instinct is in favour of the _leveller_ (Christ). Towards all _strong individuals (the sovereigns)_ it is hostile, unfair, intemperate, arrogant, cheeky, disrespectful, cowardly, false, lying, pitiless, deceitful, envious, revengeful.

285.

My teaching is this, that the herd seeks to maintain and preserve one type of man, and that it defends itself on two sides--that is to say, against those which are decadents from its ranks (criminals, etc.), and against those who rise superior to its dead level. The instincts of the herd tend to a stationary state of society; they merely preserve. They have no creative power.

The pleasant feelings of goodness and benevolence with which the just man fills us (as opposed to the suspense and the fear to which the great innovating man gives rise) are our own sensations of personal security and equality: in this way the gregarious animal glorifies the gregarious nature, and then begins to feel at ease. This judgment on the part of the "comfortable" ones rigs itself out in the most beautiful words--and thus "morality" is born. Let any one observe, however, the _hatred of the herd_ for all truthful men.

286.

Let us not deceive ourselves! When a man hears the whisper of the moral imperative in his breast, as altruism would have him hear it, he shows thereby that he belongs to the _herd._ When a man is conscious of the opposite feelings,--that is to say, when he sees his danger and his undoing in disinterested and unselfish actions,--then he does not belong to the herd.

287.

My philosophy aims at a new _order of rank: not_ at an individualistic morality.[5] The spirit of the herd should rule within the herd--but not beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a fundamentally different valuation for their actions, as do also the independent ones or the beasts of prey, etc.

[Footnote 5: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE--Here is a broad distinction between Nietzsche and Herbert Spencer.]

3. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING MORALITY.

288.

_Morality regarded as an attempt at establishing human pride._--The "Free-Will" theory is anti-religious. Its ultimate object is to bestow the right upon man to regard himself as the _cause_ of his highest states and actions: it is a form of the growing _feeling of pride._

Man feels his power his "happiness"; as they say: there must be a will behind these states--otherwise they do not belong to him. Virtue is an attempt at postulating a modicum of will, past or present, as the necessary antecedent to every exalted and strong feeling of happiness: if the will to certain actions is regularly present in consciousness, a sensation of power may be interpreted as its result. This is a _merely psychological point of view,_ based upon the false assumption that nothing belongs to us which we have not consciously willed. The whole of the teaching of responsibility relies upon the ingenuous psychological rule that the will is the only cause, and that one must have been aware of having willed in order to be able to regard _one's self_ as a cause.

_Then comes the counter-movement_--that of the moral-philosophers. These men still labour under the delusion that a man is responsible only for what he has willed. The value of man is then made a _moral value_: thus morality becomes a _causa prima_; for this there must be some kind of principle in man, and "free will" is posited as _prima causa._ The _arrière pensée_ is always this: If man is not a _causa prima_ through his will, he must be irresponsible,--therefore he does not come within the jurisdiction of morals,--virtue or vice is automatic and mechanical....

In short: in order that man may respect himself he must be capable of becoming evil.

289.

_Theatricalness_ regarded as the result of "Free Will" morality. It is a step in the _development of the feeling of power itself_ to believe one's self to be the author of one's exalted moments (of one's perfection) and to have _willed_ them....

(Criticism: all perfect action is precisely unconscious and not deliberate; consciousness is often the expression of an imperfect and often morbid constitution. _Personal perfection regarded as determined by will, as an act of consciousness,_ as reason with dialectics, is a caricature, a sort of self-contradiction.... Any degree of consciousness renders perfection _impossible._ ... A form of _theatricalness_.)

290.

The _moral hypothesis,_ designed with a view to _justifying God,_ said: evil must be voluntary (simply in order that the _voluntariness of goodness_ might be believed in); and again, all evil and suffering have an _object which is salvation_.

The notion "guilt" was considered as something which had no connection at all with the ultimate cause of existence, and the notion "punishment" was held to be an educating and beneficent act, consequently an act proceeding from a _good_ God.

The absolute dominion of moral valuations _over_ all others: nobody doubted that God could not be evil and could do no harm--that is to say, perfection was understood merely as _moral_ perfection.

291.

How false is the supposition that an action must depend upon what has preceded it in consciousness! And morality has been measured in the light of this supposition, as also criminality....

The value of an action must be judged by its results, say the utilitarians: to measure it according to its origin involves the impossibility of _knowing_ that origin.

But do we know its results? Five stages ahead, perhaps. Who can tell what an action provokes and sets in motion? As a stimulus? As the spark which fires a powder-magazine? Utilitarians are simpletons.... And finally, they would first of all have to know _what_ is useful; here also their sight can travel only over five stages or so.... They have no notion of the great economy which cannot dispense with evil.

We do not know the origin or the results: has an action, then, any value?

We have yet the action itself to consider: the states of consciousness that accompany it, the yea or nay which follows upon its performance: does the value of an action lie in the subjective states which accompany it? (In that case, the value of music would be measured according to the pleasure or displeasure which it occasions in us ... which it gives to the _composer._ ...) Obviously feelings of value must accompany it, a sensation of power, restraint, or impotence--for instance, freedom or lightsomeness. Or, putting the question differently: could the value of an action be reduced to physiological terms? could it be the expression of completely free or constrained life?--Maybe its _biological_ value is expressed in this way....

If, then, an action can be judged neither in the light of its origin, nor its results, nor its accompaniments in consciousness, then its value must be _x_ unknown....

292.

It amounts to a _denaturalisation of morality,_ to _separate_ an action from a man; to direct hatred or contempt against "sin"; to believe that there are actions which are good or bad in themselves.

The _re-establishment of_ "_Nature_": an action in itself is quite devoid of value; the whole question is this: who performed it? One and the same "crime" may, in one case, be the greatest privilege, in the other infamy. As a matter of fact, it is the selfishness of the judges which interprets an action (in regard to its author) according as to whether it was useful or harmful to themselves (or in relation to its degree of likeness or unlikeness to them).

293.

The concept "reprehensible action" presents us with some difficulties. Nothing in all that happens can be reprehensible in itself: _one would not dare to eliminate it completely_; for everything is so bound up with everything else, that to exclude one part would mean to exclude the whole.

A reprehensible action, therefore, would mean a reprehensible world as a whole....

And even then, in a reprehensible world even reprehending would be reprehensible.... And the consequence of an attitude of mind that condemns everything, would be the affirmation of everything in practice.... If Becoming is a huge ring, everything that forms a part of it is of equal value, is eternal and necessary.--In all correlations of yea and nay, of preference and rejection, love and hate, all that is expressed is a certain point of view, peculiar to the interests of a certain type of living organism: everything that lives says _yea_ by the very fact of its existence.

294.

_Criticism of the subjective feelings of value.--_Conscience. Formerly people argued: conscience condemns this action, therefore this action is reprehensible. But, as a matter of fact, conscience condemns an action because that action has been condemned for a long period of time: all conscience does is to imitate. It does not create values. That which first led to the condemnation of certain actions, was _not_ conscience: but the knowledge of (or the prejudice against) its consequences.... The approbation of conscience, the feeling of well-being, of "inner peace," is of the same order of emotions as the artist's joy over his work--it proves nothing.... Self-contentment proves no more in favour of that which gives rise to it, than its absence can prove anything against the value of the thing which fails to give rise to it. We are far too ignorant to be able to judge of the value of our actions: in this respect we lack the ability to regard things objectively. Even when we condemn an action, we do not do so as judges, but as adversaries.... When noble sentiments accompany an action, they prove nothing in its favour: an artist may present us with an absolutely insignificant thing, though he be in the throes of the most exalted pathos during its production. It were wiser to regard these sentiments as misleading: they actually beguile our eye and our power, away from criticism, from caution and from suspicion, and the result often is that we make _fools_ of ourselves ... they actually make fools of us.

295.

We are heirs to the conscience-vivisection and self-crucifixion of two thousand years: in these two practices lie perhaps our longest efforts at becoming perfect, our mastery, and certainly our subtlety; we have affiliated natural propensities with a heavy conscience.

An attempt to produce an entirely opposite state of affairs would be possible: that is to say, to affiliate all desires of a beyond, all sympathy with things which are opposed to the senses, the intellect, and nature--in fact, all the ideals that have existed hitherto (which were all anti-worldly), with a heavy conscience.

296.

The great _crimes_ in _psychology_:--