Part 6

An artist cannot endure reality; he turns away or back from it: his earnest opinion is that the worth of a thing consists in that nebulous residue of it which one derives from colour, form, sound, and thought; he believes that the more subtle, attenuated, and volatile, a thing or a man becomes, _the more valuable he becomes: the less real,_ the greater the worth. This is Platonism: but Plato was guilty of yet further audacity in the matter of turning tables--he measured the degree of reality according to the degree of value, and said: The more there is of "idea" the more there is of Being. He twisted the concept "reality" round and said: "What ye regard as real is an error, and the nearer we get to the 'idea' the nearer we are to 'truth.'"--Is this understood? It was the _greatest of all rechristenings:_ and because Christianity adopted it, we are blind to its astounding features. At bottom, Plato, like the artist he was, _placed appearance before_ Being! and therefore lies and fiction before truth! unreality before actuality!--He was, however, so convinced of the value of appearance, that he granted it the attributes of "Being," "causality," "goodness," and "truth," and, in short, all those things which are associated with value.

The concept value itself regarded as a cause: first standpoint.

The ideal granted all attributes, conferring honour: second standpoint.

573.

The idea of the "true world" or of "God" as absolutely spiritual, intellectual, and good, is an _emergency measure_ to the extent to which the _antagonistic_ instincts are all-powerful....

Moderation and existing humanity is reflected exactly in the humanisation of the gods. The Greeks of the strongest period, who entertained no fear whatever of themselves, but on the contrary were pleased with themselves, brought down their gods to all their emotions.

The spiritualisation of the idea of God is thus very far from being a sign of _progress_: one is heartily conscious of this when one reads Goethe--in his works the vaporisation of God into virtue and spirit is felt as being upon a lower plane.

574.

The nonsense of all metaphysics shown to reside in the derivation of the conditioned out of the unconditioned.

It belongs to the nature of thinking that it adds the unconditioned to the conditioned, that it invents it--just as it thought of and invented the "ego" to cover the multifariousness of its processes i it measures the world according to a host of self-devised measurements--according to its fundamental fictions "the unconditioned," "end and means," "things," "substances," and according to logical laws, figures, and forms.

There would be nothing which could be called knowledge, if thought did not first so _re-create_ the world into "things" which are in its own image. It is only _through_ thought that there is _untruth._

The _origin_ of thought, like that of _feelings,_ cannot be traced: but that is _no_ proof of its primordiality or absoluteness! It simply shows that we cannot get _behind it,_ because we have nothing else save thought and feeling.

575.

To know is to _point to past experience:_ in its nature it is a _regressus in infinitum._ That which halts (in the face of a so-called _causa prima_ or the unconditioned, etc.) is _laziness,_ weariness.

576.

_Concerning the psychology of metaphysics_--the influence of fear. That which has been most feared, the cause of the _greatest suffering_ (lust of power, voluptuousness, etc.), has been treated with the greatest amount of hostility by men, and eliminated from the "real" world. Thus the _passions_ have been step by step _struck out,_ God posited as the opposite of evil--that is to say, reality is conceived to be the _negation of the passions and the emotions_ (i.e. _nonentity_).

_Irrationality,_ impulsive action, accidental action, is, moreover, hated by them (as the cause of incalculable suffering). _Consequently_ they denied this element in the absolute, and interpreted it as absolute "rationality" and "conformity of means to ends."

_Change_ and _perishability_ were also feared; and by this fear an oppressed soul is revealed, full of distrust and painful experiences (the case with _Spinoza_: a man differently constituted would have regarded this change as a charm).

A nature overflowing and _playing_ with energy, would call precisely the _passions, irrationality_ and _change, good_ in a eudemonistic sense, together with their consequences: danger, contrast, ruin, etc.

577.

Against the value of that which always remains the same (remember Spinoza's artlessness and Descartes' likewise), the value of the shortest and of the most perishable, the seductive flash of gold on the belly of the serpent _vita_----

578.

_Moral values in epistemology itself:_--

The faith in reason--why not mistrust?

The "real world" is the good world--why?

Appearance, change, contradiction, struggle, regarded as immoral: the desire for a world which _knows nothing_ of these things.

The transcendental world discovered, _so that_ a place may be kept for "moral freedom" (as in Kant).

Dialectics as the road to virtue (in Plato and Socrates: probably because sophistry was held to be the road to immorality).

Time and space are ideal: consequently there is unity in the essence of things; consequently no sin, no evil, no imperfection, a _justification_ of God.

Epicurus _denied_ the possibility of knowledge, in order to keep the moral (particularly the hedonistic) values as the highest.

Augustine does the same, and later Pascal ("corrupted reason"), in favour of Christian values.

Descartes' contempt for everything variable; likewise Spinoza's.

579.

_Concerning the psychology of metaphysics._--This world is only apparent: _therefore_ there must be a real world;--this world is conditioned: _consequently_ there must be an unconditioned world;--this world is contradictory: _consequently_ there is a world free from contradiction;--this world is evolving: _consequently_ there is somewhere a static world:--a host of false conclusions (blind faith in reason: if A exists, then its opposite B must also _exist_). Pain _inspires these conclusions_: at bottom they are _withes_ that such a world might exist; the hatred of a world which leads to suffering is likewise revealed by the fact that another and _better_ world is imagined: the _resentment_ of the metaphysician against reality is creative here.

_The second_ series of questions: _wherefore_ suffer? ... and from this a conclusion is derived concerning the relation of the real world to our apparent, changing, suffering, and contradictory world: (1) Suffering as the consequence of error: how is error possible? (2) Suffering as the consequence of guilt: how is guilt possible? (A host of experiences drawn from the sphere of nature or society, universalised and made absolute.) But if the conditioned world be causally determined by the unconditioned, then the _freedom to err, to be sinful,_ must also be derived from the same quarter: and once more the question arises, _to what purpose?_ ... The world of appearance, of Becoming, of contradiction, of suffering, is therefore _willed; to what purpose?_

The error of these conclusions; two contradictory concepts are formed--because one of them corresponds to a reality, the other "_must_" also correspond to a reality. "_Whence_" would one otherwise derive its contradictory concept? _Reason_ is thus a source of revelation concerning the absolute.

But the _origin_ of the above contradictions _need not necessarily_ be a supernatural source of reason: it is sufficient to oppose t_he real genesis_ of the concepts, this springs from practical spheres, from utilitarian spheres, hence the _strong faith_ it commands _(one is threatened with ruin_ if one's conclusions are not in conformity with this reason; but this fact is no "_proof_" of what the latter asserts).

_The preoccupation of metaphysicians with pain,_ is quite artless. "Eternal blessedness": psychological nonsense. Brave and creative men never make pleasure and pain ultimate questions--they are incidental conditions: both of them must be desired when one _will attain to_ something. It is a sign of fatigue and illness in these metaphysicians and religious men, that they should press questions of pleasure and pain into the foreground. Even _morality_ in their eyes derives its great importance _only_ from the fact that it is regarded as an essential condition for abolishing pain.

_The same holds good of the preoccupation with appearance and error_ the cause of pain. A superstition that happiness and truth are related (confusion: happiness in "certainty," in "faith").

580.

To what extent are the various _epistemological positions_ (materialism, sensualism, idealism) consequences of valuations? The source of the highest feelings of pleasure ("feelings of value") may also judge concerning the problem of _reality_!

The measure of _positive knowledge_ is quite a matter of indifference and beside the point; as witness the development of Indici.

The Buddhistic _negation_ of reality in general (appearance pain) is perfectly consistent: undemonstrability, inaccessibility, lack of categories, not only for an "absolute world," but a recognition of the _erroneous procedures_ by means of which the whole concept has been reached. "Absolute reality," "Being in itself," a contradiction. In a world of _Becoming,_ reality is merely a _simplification_ for the purpose of practical ends, or a _deception_ resulting from the coarseness of certain organs, or a variation in the tempo of Becoming.

The logical denial of the world and Nihilism is a consequence of the fact that we must oppose nonentity with Being, and that Becoming is denied. ("_Something_" becomes.)

581.

_Being_ and _Becoming._--"_Reason_" developed upon a sensualistic basis upon the _prejudices of the senses_--that is to say, with the belief in the truth of the judgment of the senses.

"Being," as the generalisation of the concept "_Life_" (breath), "to be animate," "to will," "to act upon," "become."

The opposite is: "to be inanimate," "_not_ to become," "_not_ to will." _Thus_: "Being" is _not_ opposed to "not-Being," to "appearance," nor is it opposed to death (for only that can be dead which can also live).

The "soul," the "ego," posited as _primeval facts;_ and introduced wherever _there is Becoming._

582.

_Being_--we have no other idea of it than that which we derive from "_living._"--How then can everything "be" dead?

583.

_A._

I see with astonishment that science resigns itself to-day to the fate of being reduced to the world of appearance: we certainly have no organ of knowledge for the real world--be it what it may.

At this point we may well ask: With what organ of knowledge is this contradiction established?...

The fact that a world which is accessible to our organs is also understood to be dependent upon these organs, and the fact that we should understand a world as subjectively conditioned, are _no_ proofs of the actual _possibility_ of an objective world. Who urges us to believe that subjectivity _is_ real or essential?

The absolute is even an absurd concept: an "absolute mode of existence" is nonsense, the concept "being," "thing," is always _relative_ to us.

The trouble is that, owing to the old antithesis "apparent" and "real," the correlative valuations "of little value" and "absolutely valuable" have been spread abroad.

The world of appearance does not strike us as a "valuable" world; appearance is on a lower plane than the highest value. Only a "real" world can be absolutely "valuable"....

_Prejudice of prejudices!_ It is perfectly possible in itself that the real nature of things would be so unfriendly, so opposed to the first conditions of life, that appearance is necessary in order to make life possible.... This is certainly the case in a large number of situations--for instance, marriage.

Our empirical world would thus be conditioned, even in its limits to knowledge, by the instinct of self-preservation, we regard that as good, valuable, and true, which favours the preservation of the species....

_(a)_ We have no categories which allow us to distinguish between a real and an apparent world. (At the most, there could exist a world of appearance, but not _our_ world of appearance.)

_(b)_ Taking the _real_ world for granted, it might still be the _less valuable_ to us; for the quantum of illusion might be of the highest order, owing to its value to us as a preservative measure. (Unless _appearance_ in itself were sufficient to condemn anything?)

_(c)_ That there exists a correlation between the _degrees of value_ and the _degrees of reality_ (so that the highest values also possessed the greatest degree of reality), is a metaphysical postulate which starts out with the hypothesis that we _know_ the order of rank among values; and that this order is a _moral_ one. It is only on this hypothesis that _truth_ is necessary as a definition of all that is of a superior value.

_B._

It is of cardinal importance that the _real world_ should be suppressed. It is the most formidable inspirer of doubts, and depredator of values, concerning the _world which we are_: it was our most dangerous_ attempt_ heretofore on the life of Life.

_War_ against all the hypotheses upon which a real world has been imagined. The notion that _moral values_ are the _highest_ values, belongs to this hypothesis.

The superiority of the moral valuation would be refuted, if it could be shown to be the result of an _immoral_ valuation--a specific case of real immorality: it would thus reduce itself to an _appearance,_ and as an _appearance_ it would cease from having any right to condemn appearance.

_C._

Then the "Will to Truth" would have to be examined psychologically: it is not a moral power, but a form of the Will to Power. This would have to be proved by the fact that it avails itself of every _immoral_ means there is; above all, of the metaphysicians.

At the present moment we are face to face with the necessity of testing the assumption that moral values are the highest values, _Method in research_ is attained only when all _moral prejudices_ have been overcome: it represents a conquest over morality....

584.

The aberrations of philosophy are the outcome of the fact that, instead of recognising in logic and the categories of reason merely a means to the adjustment of the world for utilitarian ends (that is to say, especially, a useful _falsification_), they were taken to be the criterion of truth--particularly of _reality._ The "criterion of truth" was, as a matter of fact, merely the _biological utility of a systematic falsification of this sort, on principle:_ and, since a species of animals knows nothing more important than its own preservation, it was indeed allowable here to speak of "truth." Where the artlessness came in, however, was in taking this anthropocentric idiosyncrasy as the _measure of things,_ as the canon for recognising the "real" and the "unreal": in short, in making a relative thing absolute. And behold, all at once, the world fell into the two halves, "real" and "apparent": and precisely that world which man's reason had arranged for him to live and to settle in, was discredited. Instead of using the forms as mere instruments for making the world manageable and calculable, the mad fancy of philosophers intervened, and saw that in these categories the concept of that world is given which does not correspond to the concept of the world in which man lives.... The means were misunderstood as measures of value, and even used as a condemnation of their original purpose....

The purpose was, to deceive one's self in a useful way: the means thereto was the invention of forms and signs, with the help of which the confusing multifariousness of life could be reduced to a useful and wieldy scheme.

But woe! a _moral category_ was now brought into the game: no creature would deceive itself, no creature may deceive itself--consequently there is only a will to truth. What is "truth"?

The principle of contradiction provided the scheme: the real world to which the way is being sought cannot be in contradiction with itself, cannot change, cannot evolve, has no beginning and no end.

That is the greatest error which has ever been committed, the really fatal error of the world: it was believed that in the forms of reason a criterion of reality had been found--whereas their only purpose was to master reality, by _misunderstanding_ it intelligently....

And behold, the world became false precisely owing to the qualities _which constitute its reality,_ namely, change, evolution, multifariousness, contrast, contradiction, war. And thenceforward the whole fatality was there.

1. How does one get rid of the false and merely apparent world? (it was the real and only one).

2. How does one become one's self as remote as possible from the world of appearance? (the concept of the perfect being as a contrast to the real being; or, more correctly still, as _the contradiction of life_....).

The whole direction of values was towards the _slander of life_; people deliberately confounded ideal dogmatism with knowledge in general: so that the opposing parties also began to reject _science_ with horror.

Thus the road to science was _doubly_ barred: first, by the belief in the real world; and secondly, by the opponents of this belief. Natural science and psychology were (1) condemned in their objects, (2) deprived of their artlessness....

Everything is so absolutely bound and related to everything else in the real world, that to condemn, or to _think away_ anything, means to condemn and think away the whole. The words "this should not be," "this ought not to be," are a farce.... If one imagines the consequences, one would ruin the very source of Life by suppressing everything which is in any sense whatever _dangerous or destructive._ Physiology proves this _much better_!

We see how morality _(a) poisons_ the whole concept of the world, _(b)_ cuts off the way to _science, (c)_ dissipates and undermines all real instincts (by teaching that their root is _immoral_).

We thus perceive a terrible tool of decadence at work, which succeeds in remaining immune, thanks to the holy names and holy attitudes it assumes.

585.

The awful recovery of our _consciousness:_ not of the individual, but of the human species. Let us reflect; let us think backwards; let us follow the narrow and broad highway.

_A._

Man seeks "the truth": a world that does not contradict itself, that does not deceive, that does not change, a _real_ world--a world in which there is no suffering: contradiction, deception, variability---the causes of suffering! He does not doubt that there is such a thing as a world as it ought to be; he would fain find a road to it. (Indian criticism: even the ego is apparent and _not_ real.)

Whence does man derive the concept of _reality_? --Why does he make variability, deception, contradiction, the origin of _suffering;_ why not rather of his happiness? ...

The contempt and hatred of all that perishes, changes, and varies: whence comes this valuation of stability? Obviously, the will to truth is _merely_ the longing for a _stable world._

The senses deceive; reason corrects the errors: _therefore,_ it was concluded, reason is the road to a static state; the most _spiritual_ ideas must be nearest to the "real world."--It is from the senses that the greatest number of misfortunes come they are cheats, deluders, and destroyers.

Happiness can be promised only by Being: change and happiness exclude each other. The loftiest desire is thus to be one with Being. That is the formula for the way to happiness.

_In summa:_ The world as it _ought_ to be exists; this world in which we live is an error--this our world should _not_ exist.

_The belief in Being_ shows itself only as a result: the real primum _mobile_ is the disbelief in Becoming, the mistrust of Becoming, the scorn of all Becoming....

What kind of a man reflects in this way? An unfruitful, _suffering_ kind, a world-weary kind. If we try and fancy what the opposite kind of man would be like, we have a picture of a creature who would not require the belief in Being; he would rather despise it as dead, tedious, and indifferent....

The belief that the world which ought to be, is, really exists, is a belief proper to the unfruitful, _who do not wish to create a world as it should be._ They take it for granted, they seek for means and ways of attaining to it. "The will to truth"--_is the impotence of the will to create._

To recognise that something } Antagonism in is _thus_ or _thus:_ } the degrees of To act so that something will } energy in be _thus_ or _thus:_ } various natures.

The fiction of a world which corresponds to our desires; psychological artifices and interpretations calculated to associate all that we honour and regard as pleasant, with this _real world._

"The will to truth" at this stage is essentially _the art of interpretation:_ to which also belongs that interpretation which still possesses strength.

The same species of men, grown one degree poorer, _no longer possessed of the power_ to interpret and to create fictions, produces the Nihi_lists._ A Nihilist is the man who says of the world as it is, that it ought _not_ to exist, and of the world as it ought to be, that it does not exist. According to this, existence (action, suffering, willing, and feeling) has no sense: the pathos of the "in vain" is the Nihilist's pathos--and as pathos it is moreover an _inconsistency_ on the part of the Nihilist.

He who is not able to introduce his will into things, the man without either will or energy, at least invests them with some meaning, _i.e._ he believes that a will is already in them.

The degree of a man's _will-power_ may be measured from the extent to which he can dispense with the meaning in things, from the extent to which he is able to endure a world without meaning: _because he himself arranges a small portion of it._

The _philosophical objective view of things_ may thus be a sign of poverty both of will and of energy. For energy organises what is closest and next; the "scientists," whose only desire is to _ascertain_ what exists, are such as cannot arrange things _as they ought to be._

The _artists,_ an intermediary species, they at least set up a symbol of what should exist,--they are productive inasmuch as they actually _alter_ and transform; not like the scientists, who leave everything as it is.

_The connection between philosophers and the pessimistic religions;_ the same species of man (_they attribute the highest degree of reality_ to the _things which are valued highest_).

_The connection between philosophers and moral men_ and their evaluations (the _moral_ interpretation of the world as the sense of the world: after the collapse of the religious sense).

_The overcoming of philosophers_ by the annihilation of the world of being: intermediary period of Nihilism; before there is sufficient strength present to transvalue values, and to make the world of becoming, and of appearance, the _only_ world to be deified and called good.

_B._

Nihilism as a normal phenomenon may be a symptom of increasing _strength_ or of increasing _weakness_:--

Partly owing to the fact that the strength _to create_ and _to will_ has grown to such an extent, that it no longer requires this collective interpretation and introduction of a _sense_ ("present duties," state, etc.);

Partly owing to the fact that even the creative power necessary to invent sense, declines, and disappointment becomes the ruling condition. The inability to _believe_ in a sense becomes "unbelief."

What is the meaning of _science_ in regard to both possibilities?