Part 10

According to what standard is the objective value measured? According to the quantity of _increased_ and _more organised power_ alone.

675.

The value of all _valuing._--My desire would be to see the agent once more identified with the action, after action has been deprived of all meaning by having been separated in thought from the agent; I should like to see the notion of doing _something,_ the idea of a "purpose," of an "intention," of an object, reintroduced into the action, after action has been made insignificant by having been artificially separated from these things.

All "objects," "purposes," "meanings," are only manners of expression and metamorphoses of the one will inherent in all phenomena; of the will to power. To have an object, a purpose, or an intention, in fact _to will_ generally, is equivalent to the desire for _greater strength,_ for fuller growth, and for the _means_ thereto _in addition._

The most general and fundamental instinct in all action and willing is precisely on that account the one which is least known and is most concealed; for in practice we always follow its bidding, for the simple reason that we _are_ in ourselves its bidding....

All valuations are only the results of, and the narrow points of view in _servings this_ one will: valuing _in itself_ is nothing save this, _--will to power._

To criticise existence from the standpoint of any one of these values is utter nonsense and error. Even supposing that a process of annihilation follows from such a value, even so this process is in the service of this will.

The _valuation of existence itself!_ But existence is this valuing itself!--and even when we say "no," we still do what we _are._

We ought now to perceive the _absurdity_ of this pretence at judging existence; and we ought to try and discover _what_ actually takes place there. It is symptomatic.

676.

_Concerning the Origin of our Valuations._

We are able to analyse our body, and by doing so we get the same idea of it as of the stellar system, and the differences between organic and inorganic lapses. Formerly the movements of the stars were explained as the effects of beings consciously pursuing a purpose: this is no longer required, and even in regard to the movements of the body and its changes, the belief has long since been abandoned that they can be explained by an appeal to a consciousness which has a determined purpose. By far the greater number of movements have nothing to do with consciousness at all: _neither have they anything to do with sensation._ Sensations and thoughts are extremely _rare_ and _insignificant_ things compared with the innumerable phenomena occurring every second.

On the other hand, we believe that a certain conformity of means to ends rules over the very smallest phenomenon, which it is quite beyond our deepest science to understand; a sort of cautiousness, selectiveness, co-ordination, and repairing process, etc. In short, we are in the presence of an _activity_ to which it would be necessary to ascribe an _incalculably higher and more extensive intellect_ than the one we are acquainted with. We learn to _think less of_ all that is conscious: we unlearn the habit of making ourselves responsible for ourselves, because, as conscious beings fixing purposes, we are but the smallest part of ourselves.

Of the numerous influences taking effect every second, for instance, air, electricity, we feel scarcely anything at all. There might be a number of forces, which, though they never make themselves felt by us, yet influence us continually. Pleasure and pain are very rare and scanty phenomena, compared with the countless stimuli with which a cell or an organ operates upon another cell or organ.

It is the phase of the _modesty of consciousness._ Finally, we can grasp the conscious ego itself, merely as an instrument in the service of that higher and more extensive intellect: and then we may ask whether all conscious _willing,_ all conscious _purposes,_ all _valuations,_ are not perhaps only means by virtue of which something essentially _different is attained,_ from that which consciousness supposes. We _mean_: it is a question of our _pleasure_ and _pain_ but pleasure and pain might be the means whereby we _had something to do_ which lies outside our consciousness.

This is to show how very _superficial_ all conscious phenomena really are; how an action and the image of it differ; how _little_ we know about what _precedes_ an action; how fantastic our feelings, "freewill," and "cause and effect" are; how thoughts and images, just like words, are only signs of thoughts; the impossibility of finding the grounds of any action; the superficiality of all praise and blame; how _essentially our_ conscious life is composed of _fancies_ and _illusion_; how all our words merely stand for fancies (our emotions too), and how the _union of mankind_ depends upon the transmission and continuation of these fancies: whereas, at bottom, the real union of mankind by means of procreation pursues its unknown way. Does this belief in the common fancies of men really _alter_ mankind? Or is the whole body of ideas and valuations only an expression in itself of unknown changes? _Are there_ really such things as will, purposes, thoughts, values? Is the whole of conscious life perhaps no more than _mirage_? Even when values seem to _determine_ the actions of a man, they are, as a matter of fact, doing something quite different! In short, granting that a certain conformity of means to end might be demonstrated in the action of nature, without the assumption of a ruling ego: could not _our_ notion of purposes, and our will, etc., be only a _symbolic language_ standing for something quite different--that is to say, something not-willing and unconscious? only the thinnest semblance of that natural conformity of means to end in the organic world, but not in any way different therefrom?

Briefly, perhaps the whole of mental development is a matter of the _body:_ it is the consciously recorded history of the fact that a _higher body is forming._ The organic ascends to higher regions. Our longing to know Nature is a means by virtue of which the body would reach perfection. Or, better still, hundreds of thousands of experiments are made to alter the nourishment and the mode of living of the _body_: the body's consciousness and valuations, its kinds of pleasure and pain, are _signs of these changes and experiments. In the end, it is not a question concerning man; for he must be surpassed._

677.

_To what Extent are all Interpretations of the World Symptoms of a Ruling Instinct._

The _artistic_ contemplation of the world: to sit before the world and to survey it. But here the analysis of æsthetical contemplation, its reduction to cruelty, its feeling of security, its judicial and detached attitude, etc., are lacking. The artist himself must be taken, together with his psychology (the criticism of the instinct of play, as a discharge of energy, the love of change, the love of bringing one's soul in touch with strange things, the absolute egoism of the artist, etc.). What instincts does he sublimate?

The _scientific_ contemplation of the world: a criticism of the psychological longing for science, the desire to make everything comprehensible; the desire to make everything practical, useful, capable of being exploited--to what extent this is anti-æsthetic. Only that value counts, which may be reckoned in figures. How it happens that a mediocre type of man preponderates under the influence of science. It would be terrible if even history were to be taken possession of in this way--the realm of the superior, of the judicial. What instincts are here sublimated!

The religious contemplation of the world: a criticism of the religious man. It is not necessary to take the moral man as the type, but the man who has extreme feelings of exaltation and of deep depression, and who interprets the former with thankfulness or suspicion without, however, seeking their origin in _himself_ (nor the latter either). The man who essentially feels anything but free, who sublimates his conditions and states of submission.

The _moral_ contemplation of the world. The feelings peculiar to certain social ranks are projected into the universe: stability, law, the making of things orderly, and the making of things alike, are _sought_ in the highest spheres, because they are valued most highly,--above everything or behind everything.

What is _common_ to all: the ruling instincts _wish to be regarded_ as _the highest values in general,_ even as the _creative_ and _ruling powers._ It is understood that these instincts either oppose or overcome each other (join up synthetically, or alternate in power). Their profound antagonism is, however, so great, that in those cases in which they _all_ insist upon being gratified, a man of very thorough _mediocrity_ is the outcome.

678.

It is a question whether the origin of our apparent "knowledge" is not also a mere offshoot of our _older valuations,_ which are so completely assimilated that they belong to the very basis of our nature. In this way only _the more recent_ needs engage in battle _with results of the oldest needs._

The world is seen, felt, and interpreted thus and thus, in order that organic life may be preserved with this particular manner of interpretation. Man is _not_ only an individual, but the continuation of collective organic life in one definite line. The fact that _man_ survives, proves that a certain species of interpretations (even though it still be added to) has also survived; that, as a system, this method of interpreting has not changed. "Adaptation."

Our "dissatisfaction," our "ideal," etc., may possibly be the _result_ of this incorporated piece of interpretation, of our particular point of view: the organic world may ultimately perish owing to it just as the division of labour in organisms may be the means of bringing about the ruin of the whole, if one part happen to wither or weaken. The _destruction_ of organic life, and even of the highest form thereof, must follow the same principles as the destruction of the individual.

679.

Judged from the standpoint of the theory of descent, _individuation_ shows the continuous breaking up of one into two, and the equally continuous annihilation of individuals _for the sake of a few_ individuals, which evolution bears onwards; the greater mass always perishes ("the body").

The fundamental phenomena: _innumerable individuals are sacrificed for the sake of a few,_ in order to make the few possible.--One must not allow one's self to be deceived; the case is the same with _peoples_ and _races_: they produce the "body" for the generation of isolated and valuable _individuals,_ who continue the great process.

680.

I am opposed to the theory that the individual studies the interests of the _species,_ or of posterity, at the cost of his own advantage: all this is only apparent.

The excessive importance which he attaches to the _sexual instinct_ is not the _result_ of the latter's importance to the species, for procreation is the actual performance of the individual, it is his greatest interest, and therefore it is his _highest expression of power_ (not judged from the standpoint of consciousness, but from the very centre of the individual).

681.

The _fundamental errors_ of the biologists who have lived hitherto: it is not a matter of the species, but of rearing stronger individuals (the many are only a means).

Life is _not_ the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations, but will to power, which, proceeding from inside, subjugates and incorporates an ever-increasing quantity of "external" phenomena.

These biologists _continue_ the moral valuations ("the absolutely higher worth of Altruism," the antagonism towards the lust of dominion, towards war, towards all that which is not useful, and towards all order of rank and of class).

682.

In natural science, the moral depreciation of the _ego_ still goes hand in hand with the overestimation of the _species._ But the species is quite as illusory as the ego: a false distinction has been made. The ego is a hundred times _more_ than a mere unit in a chain of creatures; it is the chain _itself,_ in every possible respect, and the species is merely an abstraction suggested by the multiplicity and partial similarity of these chains. That the individual is _sacrificed_ to the species, as people often say he is, is not a fact at all: it is rather only an example of false interpretation.

683.

The formula of the _"progress"-superstition_ according to a famous physiologist of the cerebral regions:--

_"L'animal ne fait jamais de progrès comme espèce. L'homme seul fait de progrès comme espèce._"

No.

684.

_Anti-Darwin._--The _domestication of man:_ what definite value can it have, or has domestication in itself a definite value?--There are reasons for denying the latter proposition.

Darwin's school of thought certainly goes to great pains to convince us of the reverse: it would fain prove that the influence of domestication may be profound and fundamental. For the time being, we stand firmly as we did before; up to the present no results save very superficial modification or degeneration have been shown to follow upon domestication. And everything that escapes from the hand and discipline of man, returns almost immediately to its original natural condition. The type remains constant, man cannot "_dénaturer la nature_."

Biologists reckon upon the struggle for existence, the death of the weaker creature and the survival of the most robust, most gifted combatant; on that account they imagine a _continuous increase in the perfection of all creatures._ We, on the contrary, have convinced ourselves of the fact, that in the struggle for existence, accident serves the cause of the weak quite as much as that of the strong; that craftiness often supplements strength with advantage; that the _prolificness_ of a species is related in a remarkable manner to that species _chances of destruction_....

_Natural Selection_ is also credited with the power of slowly effecting unlimited metamorphoses: it is believed that every advantage is transmitted by heredity, and strengthened in the course of generations (when heredity is known to be so capricious that ...); the happy adaptations of certain creatures to very special conditions of life, are regarded as the result of _surrounding influences._ Nowhere, however, are examples of _unconscious selection_ to be found (absolutely nowhere). The most different individuals associate one with the other; the extremes become lost in the mass. Each vies with the other to maintain his kind; those creatures whose appearance shields them from certain dangers, do not alter this appearance when they are in an environment quite devoid of danger.... If they live in places where their coats or their hides do not conceal them, they do not adapt themselves to their surroundings in any way.

The _selection of the most beautiful_ has been so exaggerated, that it greatly exceeds the instincts for beauty in our own race! As a matter of fact, the most beautiful creature often couples with the most debased, and the largest with the smallest. We almost always see males and females taking advantage of their first chance meeting, and manifesting no taste or selectiveness at all.--Modification through climate and nourishment--but as a matter of fact unimportant.

There are no _intermediate forms.--_

The growing evolution of creatures is assumed. All grounds for this assumption are entirely lacking. Every type has its _limitations_: beyond these evolution cannot carry it.

_My general point of view. First proposition_: Man as a species is _not_ progressing. Higher specimens are indeed attained; but they do not survive. The general level of the species is not raised.

_Second proposition_: Man as a species does not represent any sort of progress compared with any other animal. The whole of the animal and plant world does not develop from the lower to the higher.... but all simultaneously, haphazardly, confusedly, and at variance. The richest and most complex forms--and the term "higher type" means no more than this--perish more easily: only the lowest succeed in maintaining their apparent imperishableness. The former are seldom attained, and maintain their superior position with difficulty, the latter are compensated by great fruitfulness.--In the human race, also, the _superior specimens,_ the happy cases of evolution, are the first to perish amid the fluctuations of chances for and against them. They are exposed to every form of decadence: they are extreme, and, on that account alone, already decadents.... The short duration of beauty, of genius, of the Cæsar, is _sui generis:_ such things are not hereditary. The _type_ is inherited, there is nothing extreme or particularly "happy" about a type----It is not a case of a particular fate, or of the "evil will" of Nature, but merely of the concept "superior type": the higher type is an example of an incomparably greater degree of complexity a greater sum of co-ordinated elements: but on this account disintegration becomes a thousand times more threatening. "Genius" is the sublimest machine in existence--hence it is the most fragile.

_Third propositio:_: The domestication (culture) of man does not sink very deep. When it does sink far below the skin it immediately becomes degeneration (type: the Christian). The wild man (or, in moral terminology, the _evil_ man) is a reversion to Nature--and, in a certain sense, he represents a recovery, a _cure_ from the effects of "culture." ...

685.

_Anti-Darwin._--What surprises me most on making a general survey of the great destinies of man, is that I invariably see the reverse of what to-day Darwin and his school sees or _will_ persist in seeing: selection in favour of the stronger, the better-constituted, and the progress of the species. Precisely the reverse of this stares one in the face: the suppression of the lucky cases, the uselessness of the more highly constituted types, the inevitable mastery of the mediocre, and even of those who are _below mediocrity._ Unless we are shown some reason why man is an exception among living creatures, I incline to the belief that Darwin's school is everywhere at fault. That will to power, in which I perceive the ultimate reason and character of all change, explains why it is that selection is never in favour of the exceptions and of the lucky cases: the strongest and happiest natures are weak when they are confronted with a majority ruled by organised gregarious instincts and the fear which possesses the weak. My general view of the world of values shows that in the highest values which now sway the destiny of man, the happy cases among men, the select specimens do not prevail: but rather the decadent specimens,--perhaps there is nothing more interesting in the world than this _unpleasant_ spectacle....

Strange as it may seem, the strong always have to be upheld against the weak; and the well-constituted against the ill-constituted, the healthy against the sick and physiologically botched. If we drew our morals from reality, they would read thus: the mediocre are more valuable than the exceptional creatures, and the decadent than the mediocre; the will to nonentity prevails over the will to life--and the general aim now is, in Christian, Buddhistic, Schopenhauerian phraseology: "It is better not to be than to be."

I _protest_ against this formulating of reality into a moral: and I loathe Christianity with a deadly loathing, because it created sublime words and attitudes in order to deck a revolting truth with all the tawdriness of justice, virtue, and godliness....

I see all philosophers and the whole of science on their knees before a reality which is the reverse of "the struggle for life," as Darwin and his school understood it--that is to say, wherever I look, I see those prevailing and surviving, who throw doubt and suspicion upon life and the value of life.--The error of the Darwinian school became a problem to me: how can one be so blind as to make _this_ mistake?

That _species_ show an ascending tendency, is the most nonsensical assertion that has ever been made: until now they have only manifested a dead level. There is nothing whatever to prove that the higher organisms have developed from the lower. I see that the lower, owing to their numerical strength, their craft, and ruse, now preponderate,--and I fail to see an instance in which an accidental change produces an advantage, at least not for a very long period: for it would be necessary to find some reason why an accidental change should become so very strong.

I do indeed find the "cruelty of Nature" which is so often referred to; but in a different place: Nature is cruel, but against her lucky and well-constituted children; she protects and shelters and loves the lowly.

In short, the increase of a species' power, as the result of the preponderance of its particularly well-constituted and strong specimens, is perhaps less of a certainty than that it is the result of the preponderance of its mediocre and lower specimens ... in the case of the latter, we find great fruitfulness and permanence: in the case of the former, the besetting dangers are greater, waste is more rapid, and decimation is more speedy.

686.

Man as he has appeared up to the present is the embryo of the man of the future; _all_ the formative powers which are to produce the latter, already lie in the former: and owing to the fact that they are enormous, the more _promising for the future_ the modern individual happens to be, the more _suffering_ falls to his lot. This is the profoundest concept of _suffering._ The formative powers clash.--The isolation of the individual need not deceive one--as a matter of fact, some uninterrupted current does actually flow through all individuals, and does thus unite them. The fact that they feel themselves isolated, is the _most powerful spur_ in the process of setting themselves the loftiest of aims: their search for happiness is the means which keeps together and moderates the formative powers, and keeps them from being mutually destructive.

687.

_Excessive intellectual_ strength sets _itself_ new goals; it is not in the least satisfied by the command and the leadership of the inferior world, or by the preservation of the organism, of the "individual."

We are _more_ than the individual: we are the whole chain itself, with the tasks of all the possible futures of that chain in us.

3. Theory of the Will to Power and of Valuations.

688.

_The unitary view of psychology._--We are accustomed to regard the development of a vast number of forms as compatible with one single origin.

My theory would be: that the will to power is the primitive motive force out of which all other motives have been derived;

That it is exceedingly illuminating to substitute _power_ for individual "happiness" (after which every living organism is said to strive): "It strives after power, after _more_ power";--happiness is only a symptom of the feeling of power attained, a consciousness of difference (it does not strive after happiness: but happiness steps in when the object is attained, after which the organism has striven: happiness is an accompanying, not an actuating factor);

That all motive force is the will to power; that there is no other force, either physical, dynamic, or psychic.

In our science, where the concept cause and effect is reduced to a relationship of complete equilibrium, and in which it seems desirable for the _same_ quantum of force to be found on either side, _all idea of a motive power is absent_: we only apprehend results, and we call these equal from the point of view of their content of force....