Chapter 26

Now, of course, we must all admit that the excesses to which the romantic and personal view of nature may lead, if wholly unchecked by impersonal rationalism, are direful. Central African Mumbo-jumboism is one of unchecked romanticism's fruits. One ought accordingly to sympathize with that abhorrence of romanticism as a sufficient world-theory; one ought to understand that lively intolerance of the least grain of romanticism in the views of life of other people, which are such characteristic marks of those who {325} follow the scientific professions to-day. Our debt to science is literally boundless, and our gratitude for what is positive in her teachings must be correspondingly immense. But the S. P. R.'s Proceedings have, it seems to me, conclusively proved one thing to the candid reader; and that is that the verdict of pure insanity, of gratuitous preference for error, of superstition without an excuse, which the scientists of our day are led by their intellectual training to pronounce upon the entire thought of the past, is a most shallow verdict. The personal and romantic view of life has other roots besides wanton exuberance of imagination and perversity of heart. It is perennially fed by _facts of experience_, whatever the ulterior interpretation of those facts may prove to be; and at no time in human history would it have been less easy than now--at most times it would have been much more easy--for advocates with a little industry to collect in its favor an array of contemporary documents as good as those which our publications present. These documents all relate to real experiences of persons. These experiences have three characters in common: They are capricious, discontinuous, and not easily controlled; they require peculiar persons for their production; their significance seems to be wholly for personal life. Those who preferentially attend to them, and still more those who are individually subject to them, not only easily may find, but are logically bound to find, in them valid arguments for their romantic and personal conception of the world's course. Through my slight participation in the investigations of the S. P. R. I have become acquainted with numbers of persons of this sort, for whom the very word 'science' has become a name of reproach, for reasons that I now both understand {326} and respect. It is the intolerance of science for such phenomena as we are studying, her peremptory denial either of their existence or of their significance (except as proofs of man's absolute innate folly), that has set science so apart from the common sympathies of the race. I confess that it is on this, its humanizing mission, that the Society's best claim to the gratitude of our generation seems to me to depend. It has restored continuity to history. It has shown some reasonable basis for the most superstitious aberrations of the foretime. It has bridged the chasm, healed the hideous rift that science, taken in a certain narrow way, has shot into the human world.

I will even go one step farther. When from our present advanced standpoint we look back upon the past stages of human thought, whether it be scientific thought or theological thought, we are amazed that a universe which appears to us of so vast and mysterious a complication should ever have seemed to any one so little and plain a thing. Whether it be Descartes's world or Newton's, whether it be that of the materialists of the last century or that of the Bridgewater treatises of our own, it always looks the same to us,--incredibly perspectiveless and short. Even Lyell's, Faraday's, Mill's, and Darwin's consciousness of their respective subjects are already beginning to put on an infantile and innocent look. Is it then likely that the science of our own day will escape the common doom; that the minds of its votaries will never look old-fashioned to the grandchildren of the latter? It would be folly to suppose so. Yet if we are to judge by the analogy of the past, when our science once becomes old-fashioned, it will be more for its omissions of fact, for its {327} ignorance of whole ranges and orders of complexity in the phenomena to be explained, than for any fatal lack in its spirit and principles. The spirit and principles of science are mere affairs of method; there is nothing in them that need hinder science from dealing successfully with a world in which personal forces are the starting-point of new effects. The only form of thing that we directly encounter, the only experience that we concretely have, is our own personal life. The only complete category of our thinking, our professors of philosophy tell us, is the category of personality, every other category being one of the abstract elements of that. And this systematic denial on science's part of personality as a condition of events, this rigorous belief that in its own essential and innermost nature our world is a strictly impersonal world, may, conceivably, as the whirligig of time goes round, prove to be the very defect that our descendants will be most surprised at in our own boasted science, the omission that to their eyes will most tend to make it look perspectiveless and short.

[1] This Essay is formed of portions of an article in Scribner's Magazine for March, 1890, of an article in the Forum for July, 1892, and of the President's Address before the Society for Psychical Research, published in the Proceedings for June, 1896, and in Science.

[2] Written in 1891. Since then, Mr. Balfour, the present writer, and Professor William Crookes have held the presidential office.

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INDEX.

ABSOLUTISM, 12, 30. Abstract conceptions, 219. Action, as a measure of belief, 3, 29-30. Actual world narrower than ideal, 202. Agnosticism, 54, 81, 126. Allen, G., 231, 235, 256. Alps, leap in the, 59, 96. Alternatives, 156, 161, 202, 269. Ambiguity of choice, 156; of being, 292. Anaesthetic revelation, 294. A priori truths, 268. Apparitions, 311. Aristotle, 249. Associationism, in Ethics, 186. Atheist and acorn, 160. Authorities in Ethics, 204; _versus_ champions, 207. Axioms, 268.

BAGEHOT, 232. Bain, 71, 91. Balfour, 9. Being, its character, 142; in Hegel, 281. Belief, 59. See 'Faith.' Bellamy, 188. Bismarck, 228. Block-universe, 292. Blood, B. P., vi, 294. Brockton murderer, 160, 177. Bunsen, 203, 274.

CALVINISM, 45. Carlyle, 42, 44, 45, 73, 87, 173. 'Casuistic question' in Ethics, 198. Causality, 147. Causation, Hume's doctrine of, 278. Census of hallucinations, 312. Certitude, 13, 30. Chance, 149, 153-9, 178-180. Choice, 156. Christianity, 5, 14. Cicero, 92. City of dreadful night, 35. Clark, X., 50. Classifications, 67. Clifford, 6, 7, 10, 14, 19, 21, 92, 230. Clive, 228. Clough, 6. Common-sense, 270. Conceptual order of world, 118. Conscience, 186-8. Contradiction, as used by Hegel, 275-277. Contradictions of philosophers, 16. Crillon, 62 Criterion of truth, 15, 16; in Ethics, 205. Crude order of experience, 118. Crystal vision, 314. Cycles in Nature, 220, 223-4.

DARWIN, 221, 223, 226, 320. Data, 271. Davey, 313. Demands, as creators of value, 201. 'Determination is negation,' 286-290. Determinism, 150; the Dilemma of; 145-183; 163, 166; hard and soft, 149. Dogs, 57. Dogmatism, 12. Doubt, 54, 109. Dupery, 27.

EASY-GOING mood, 211, 213. Elephant, 282. Emerson, 23, 175. Empiricism, i., 12, 14, 17, 278. England, 228. Environment, its relation to great men, 223, 226; to great thoughts, 250. Error, 163; duty of avoiding, 18. Essence of good and bad, 200-1. Ethical ideals, 200. Ethical philosophy, 208, 210, 216. Ethical standards, 205; diversity of, 200. Ethics, its three questions, 185. Evidence, objective, 13, 15, 16. Evil, 46, 49, 161, 190. Evolution, social, 232, 237; mental, 245. Evolutionism, its test of right, 98-100. Expectancy, 77-80. Experience, crude, _versus_ rationalized, 118; tests our faiths, 105.

FACTS, 271. Faith, that truth exists, 9, 23; in our fellows, 24-5; school boys' definition of, 29; a remedy for pessimism, 60, 101; religious, 56; defined, 90; defended against 'scientific' objections, viii-xi, 91-4; may create its own verification, 59, 96-103. Familiarity confers rationality, 76. Fatalism, 88. Fiske, 255, 260. Fitzgerald, 160. Freedom, 103, 271. Free-will, 103, 145, 157.

GALTON, 242. Geniuses, 226, 229. Ghosts, 315, Gnosticism, 138-140, 165, 169. God, 61, 68; of Nature, 43; the most adequate object for our mind, 116, 122; our relations to him, 134-6; his providence, 182; his demands create obligation, 193; his function in Ethics, 212-215. Goethe, 111. Good, 168, 200, 201. Goodness, 190. Great-man theory of history, 232. Great men and their environment, 216-254. Green, 206, Gryzanowski, 240. Gurney, 306, 307, 311. Guthrie, 309. Guyau, 188.

HALLUCINATIONS, Census of, 312. Happiness, 33. Harris, 282. Hegel, 72, 263; his excessive claims, 272; his use of negation, 273, 290; of contradiction, 274, 276; on being, 281; on otherness, 283; on infinity, 284; on identity, 285; on determination, 289; his ontological emotion, 297. Hegelisms, on some, 263-298. Heine, 203. Helmholtz, 85, 91. Henry IV., 62. Herbart, 280. Hero-worship, 261. Hinton, C. H., 15. Hinton, J., 101. Hodgson, R., 308. Hodgson, S, H., 10. Honor, 50. Hugo, 213. Human mind, its habit of abstracting, 219. Hume on causation, 278. Huxley, 6, 10, 92. Hypnotism, 302, 309. Hypotheses, live or dead, 2; their verification, 105; of genius, 249.

IDEALS, 200; their conflict, 202. Idealism, 89, 291. Identity, 285. Imperatives, 211. Importance of individuals, the, 255-262; of things, its ground, 257. Indeterminism, 150. Individual differences, 259. Individuals, the importance of, 255-262 Infinite, 284. Intuitionism, in Ethics, 186, 189.

JEVONS, 249. Judgments of regret, 159.

KNOWING, 12. Knowledge, 85.

LEAP on precipice, 59, 96. Leibnitz, 43. Life, is it worth living, 32-62.

MAGGOTS, 176-7. Mahdi, the, 2, 6. Mallock, 32, 183. Marcus Aurelius, 41. Materialism, 126. 'Maybes,' 59. Measure of good, 205. Mediumship, physical, 313, 314. Melancholy, 34, 39, 42. Mental evolution, 246; structure, 114, 117. Mill, 234. Mind, its triadic structure, 114, 117; its evolution, 246; its three departments, 114, 122, 127-8. Monism, 279. Moods, the strenuous and the easy, 211, 213 Moralists, objective and subjective, 103-108. Moral judgments, their origin, 186-8; obligation, 192-7; order, 193; philosophy, 184-5. Moral philosopher and the moral life, the, 184-215. Murder, 178. Murderer, 160, 177. Myers, 308, 315, 320. Mystical phenomena, 300. Mysticism, 74.

NAKED, the, 281. Natural theology, 40-4. Nature, 20, 41-4, 56. Negation, as used by Hegel, 273. Newman, 10. Nitrous oxide, 294. Nonentity, 72.

OBJECTIVE evidence, 13, 15, 16. Obligation, 192-7. Occult phenomena, 300; examples of, 323. Omar Khayam, 160. Optimism, 60, 102, 163. Options offered to belief, 3, 11, 27. Origin of moral judgments, 186-8. 'Other,' in Hegel, 283.

PARSIMONY, law of, 132. Partaking, 268, 270, 275, 291. Pascal's wager, 5, 11. Personality, 324, 327. Pessimism, 39, 40, 47, 60, 100, 101, 161, 167. Philosophy, 65; depends on personal demands, 93; makes world unreal, 39; seeks unification, 67-70; the ultimate, 110; its contradictions, 16. Physiology, its _prestige_, 112. Piper, Mrs., 314, 319. Plato, 268 Pluralism, vi, 151, 178, 192, 264, 267. Positivism, 54, 108 Possibilities, 151, 181-2, 292, 294. Postulates, 91-2. Powers, our powers as congruous with the world, 86. Providence, 180. Psychical research, what it has accomplished, 299-327; Society for, 303, 305, 325. Pugnacity, 49, 51.

QUESTIONS, three, in Ethics, 185.

RATIONALISM, 12, 30. Rationality, the sentiment of, 63-110; limits of theoretic, 65-74; mystical, 74; practical, 82-4; postulates of, 152.

Rational order of world, 118, 125, 147. Reflex action and theism, 111-144. Reflex action defined, 113; it refutes gnosticism, 140-1. Regret, judgments of, 159. Religion, natural, 52; of humanity, 198. Religious hypothesis, 25, 28, 51. Religious minds, 40. Renan, 170, 172. Renouvier, 143. Risks of belief or disbelief, ix, 26; rules for minimizing, 94. Romantic view of world, 324. Romanticism, 172-3. Rousseau, 4, 33, 87. Ruskin, 37.

SALTER, 62. Scepticism, 12, 23, 109. Scholasticism, 13. Schopenhauer, 72, 169. Science, 10, 21; its recency, 52-4; due to peculiar desire, 129-132, 147; its disbelief of the occult, 317-320; its negation of personality, 324-6; cannot decide question of determinism, 152. Science of Ethics, 208-210. Selection of great men, 226. Sentiment of rationality, 63. Seriousness, 86. Shakespeare, 32, 235. Sidgwick, 303, 307. Sigwart, 120, 148. Society for psychical research, 303; its 'Proceedings,' 305, 325. Sociology, 259. Solitude, moral, 191. Space, 265. Spencer, 168, 218, 232-235, 246, 251, 260. Stephen, L., 1. Stephen, Sir J., 1, 30, 212. Stoics, 274. Strenuous mood, 211, 213. Subjectivism, 165, 170. 'Subliminal self,' 315, 321. Substance, 80. Suicide, 38, 50, 60. System in philosophy, 13, 185, 199.

TELEPATHY, 10, 309. Theism, and reflex action, 111-144. Theism, 127, 134-6; see 'God.' Theology, natural, 41; Calvinistic, 45. Theoretic faculty, 128. Thought-transference, 309. Thomson, 35-7, 45, 46. Toleration, 30. Tolstoi, 188. 'Totality,' the principle of, 277. Triadic structure of mind, 123. Truth, criteria of, 15; and error, 18; moral, 190-1.

UNITARIANS, 126, 133. Unknowable, the, 68, 81. Universe = M + x, 101; its rationality, 125, 137. Unseen world, 51, 54, 56, 61. Utopias, 168.

VALUE, judgments of, 103. Variations, in heredity, etc., 225, 249. Vaudois, 48. Veddah, 258. Verification of theories, 95, 105-8. Vivisection, 58.

WALDENSES, 47-9. Wallace, 239, 304, Whitman, 33, 64, 74. Wordsworth, 60. World, its ambiguity, 76; the invisible, 51, 54, 56; two orders of, 118. Worth, judgments of, 103. Wright, 52.

X., Miss, 314.

ZOLA, 172. Zöllner, 15.

By the Same Author

THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 2 vols. 8vo. New York: Henry Holt & Co. London; Macmillan & Co. 1890

PSYCHOLOGY: BRIEFER COURSE (TEXT BOOK). 12mo. New York: Henry Holt & Co. London: Macmillan & Co. 1892.

THE WILL TO BELIEVE, AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY. 12mo. New York, London. Bombay and Calcutta: Longmans, Green & Co. 1897.

HUMAN IMMORTALITY: TWO SUPPOSED OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE. 16mo. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1898.

TALKS TO TEACHERS ON PSYCHOLOGY: AND TO STUDENTS ON SOME OF LIFE'S IDEALS. 12mo. New York: Henry Holt & Co. London, Bombay and Calcutta: Longmans, Green & Co. 1899.

THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: A STUDY IN HUMAN NATURE. Gifford Lectures delivered at Edinburgh in 1901-1902. 8vo. New York, London, Bombay and Calcutta: Longmans, Green & Co. 1902.

PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING: POPULAR LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHY. New York, London, Bombay and Calcutta: Longmans, Green & Co. 1907.

A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE: HIBBERT LECTURES AT MANCHESTER COLLEGE ON THE PRESENT SITUATION IN PHILOSOPHY. New York, London, Bombay, and Calcutta: Longmans, Green & Co. 1909.

THE MEANING OF TRUTH; A SEQUEL TO "PRAGMATISM." New York, London, Bombay, and Calcutta; Longmans, Green & Co. 1909.

THE LITERARY REMAINS OF HENRY JAMES Edited, with an Introduction, by WILLIAM JAMES. With Portrait. Crown 8vo. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1885.

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