Chapter 12

REST AND BATTLE

The Battalion stood greatly in need of a respite from fighting. As we have seen, it had lost rather more than a third of its fighting strength. It is true that numbers had been practically maintained by a succession of drafts, but time was required to assimilate these men into the companies, and to complete their training, which was in some respects seriously deficient. Conscription had only come into operation in the spring, and voluntary supplies had fallen very low; the wastage of the first two months of the Somme had therefore to be made good by men whose average length of service was no more than three months. Some of them were by no means familiar with the handling or mechanism of their rifles, and knew nothing about a bomb, while their marching powers, as tested by the hot July sun and the dusty roads, fell short of the required standard. The Companies, also, which had suffered very unequally in the fighting, required considerable reorganisation, while many fresh N.C.O.'s had to be created, and made familiar with their duties as far as the short time available permitted.

The Brigade made a long two days' journey from Bouzincourt, a crowded little village west of Albert, through Beauval, where the inhabitants welcomed us for one night in our old billets, to Cramont. Here, in glorious midsummer weather the Battalion spent ten days enjoying with an intense pleasure, after the blasted and featureless battle front, the peacefulness of a charming village, with green fields and trees, almost beyond the sound of the guns. The whole of this period was allotted to Company Training, and many hours were spent in bayonet fighting and bombing. Every man, indeed, threw at least two live bombs, a practice which proved of the greatest value in the August fighting ahead.

Major Barron's cinematograph and Divisional Band made their reappearance, to the general pleasure; whilst all clothing received a much-needed disinfecting from a travelling thresher. The brief interlude was soon over. On 9th August the Battalion moved back in the same direction, though a detour caused by blocked roads, lengthened the return journey to three days. Bouzincourt was now the daily target of long-range guns, and as cellar room was very limited it was thought prudent for the Battalion to bivouac outside the village on the Senlis road. The Division was returning to exactly the same sector west of Pozières, where the 12th Division had been operating during our absence. The difficulties of the uphill advance may be estimated by the fact that the line had been advanced barely half a mile during that period. On the night of the 12th, however, our 5th Battalion, taking the Huns by surprise, won an important success by taking Ridge Trench or 6th Avenue, at the crest of the long slope, with a view northward and eastward. This they accomplished at the incredibly low cost of three casualties. Three platoons of the Oxfords crawled up in daylight next morning and successfully relieved them without incident. The remainder of that day passed quietly; the Battalion were in dugouts round the southern and eastern outskirts of Ovillers, in support to the Oxfords, comparatively comfortable and secure, and expecting no immediate call. But they were to undergo within 24 hours by far their severest ordeal since they landed in France.

The first hint of trouble came at 9.30 p.m. that evening, when a message from the Oxfords stated that the enemy were trying to bomb them out of the trench. An hour later the Brigade ordered bombs to be sent up, and Nos. 1 and 2 Platoons, under Lieut. Garside, were sent forward. It was at that time intended that the Oxfords themselves should undertake the counter-attack; but Sergt. Taylor went to the Oxford Headquarters to maintain close touch between the two Battalions. At 12.50 a.m. D Company were similarly put by the Brigade under the orders of Colonel Bartlett, and left with a further supply of bombs. Colonel Clarke realised that the situation was becoming more serious, and that further help might be demanded of him, though he was at present assured that one Company would be sufficient. The other two Companies were accordingly warned to be in instant readiness, and Captain Lewis moved C Company out of their dugouts into one of the communication trenches leading up to the Oxfords' Headquarters, which were in the line captured by the Bucks on July 23rd. Here they waited after bombs and a bandolier a-piece had been served out. Two hours passed in uncertainty. But at 2.50 a.m. an unwelcome message was received from Colonel Bartlett, asking Colonel Clarke if he would undertake the counter-attack. The latter most naturally refused, on the ground that Colonel Bartlett was on the spot, knew the ground (which our Battalion had never seen), and had his own Battalion with 1-1/2 of our Companies. The Brigadier, however, finding that the Oxfords were not in a position to take the action required, owing to their losses, made a virtue of necessity, and ordered Colonel Clarke to do so as soon as possible. It was now 3 a.m.; the Oxford Headquarters had already told us that 1-1/2 hours would be quite sufficient to get the Battalion into its assaulting position. The attack was therefore fixed for 4.45 a.m., and a 7-minutes barrage arranged with the artillery. C Company and the remaining two platoons of A began their journey forward with all speed, though time was found to give each man his tot of rum before starting. They reached Point 18 on the place of assembly (which will be remembered as the junction between Bucks and Berks on July 23rd) about 4.15. Here Colonel Clarke found the Company Commanders with Captain Pickford, of the Oxfords. The latter gave them the disastrous information that another hour would be required to get into position instead of the half hour previously estimated. Colonel Clarke instantly went back to Oxford Headquarters to make the necessary alterations with the artillery, and to secure a barrage commencing at 5.15 a.m. Meanwhile the Companies doubled up, with C leading and A in the rear. The need for haste was most urgent, for the day was breaking and the trench was seriously battered. The men crouched low as they ran, but the Hun probably saw their heads, for shrapnel was sprinkled along the communication trench, causing a few casualties. As Captain Blandy (O.C. A Company) approached the head of the communication trench in broad daylight, he looked at his watch and found it was already 5.10 a.m. His remaining two platoons were waiting for him, lying low in the trench, very weary, for they had been carrying all night. They got up and followed along at the rear of the Company. Turning right-handed they entered a vacant and much-broken fire trench. A man looked over the parapet and exclaimed: 'There are our boys going over on the right,' These were C and D Companies. An officer of the Oxfords came along at the moment trying to straighten things out, but he had no detailed orders, and did not know where the flanks of the Companies were to rest. Moreover, there was no barrage.

Thus the three Companies went over most bravely, in face of almost certain failure. They had 250 yards of absolutely unfamiliar ground to cover. The rifle and machine-gun fire was intense, and terribly accurate. The Huns, having no shells directed at them, stood up in their trenches aiming deliberately at each man in the broken and thinning lines. Short rushes were made from shell-hole to shell-hole, each rush proving very costly in casualties. Few, if any, of the men got within 100 yards of the enemy. Captain Attride had been wounded in the body, and Captain Lewis in the thigh, and hardly an officer was left. It was evident that no bravery or determination on earth could turn failure into success. The men began, therefore, in accordance with orders to edge into a shallow communication trench only half finished, which the 5th Berks had started from their old line to 6th Avenue. It was a poor shelter, but offered a chance of safe return. Captain Lewis reached it with his orderly's help, and, though grievously wounded, was brought back. Captain Attride was shot through the head as he reached the very edge, and pitched forward dead. He had commanded D Company for nine months with the greatest tact and ability; his many friends mourned the best of comrades. Captain Blandy was shot through the face and blinded for the time while stepping out of the way of a wounded man lying at the bottom of the trench. Some men still lay out scattered in shell-holes, not daring to move, for the Hun still aimed at every living thing, picking off the wounded if they stirred. After a while a British aeroplane flew low over the scene, sounding its horn. Sergt. Page resourcefully lit some flares, which he had with him, and the pilot flew back. He proved a good friend in necessity, for almost immediately our 9.2's opened on 6th Avenue, the heads of the Huns disappeared, and the survivors made quickly for the communication trench. One of them, in entering, stepped on the body of an officer; he turned him over, and saw that it was Captain Attride. The casualties were naturally very heavy. Besides those officers already mentioned the killed were Lieut. O'Hara (1st East Surrey Regiment, attached), 2nd Lieut. Beasley (whose little son was presented with the M.M. which his father had won by the King when he visited Reading in March, 1918), and 2nd Lieut. Bartram, while 2nd Lieut. Taylor was wounded. He lay out for 48 hours, tended throughout that time with wonderful devotion by Sergt. Westall, who well earned a bar to his D.C.M. This sergeant, the bravest of the brave, when with the 2/4th next autumn near Arras, was last seen in a shell-hole close to the German wire, during a daylight patrol, laughing at the Huns, who were firing rifle grenades at him, but has since returned safely from captivity in Germany. Casualties among other ranks were 140, of whom 28 were killed and 31 missing, of most, if not all, of whom, I fear, no news has ever been heard. Failure is often more heroic than success, and I believe that those who read this imperfect account will realise that on August 14th the Battalion showed the highest and hardest form of courage.

As soon as the high ridge west of Pozières had been taken, a converging movement began upon Thiepval, that stubbornly defended height, which was not to fall until the 27th September. The 48th Division, facing half left, now began to move towards it from the south-east, whilst continuous pressure was directed from the west, or the direction of our old front line. On August 18th the 143rd (Warwick) Brigade attacked on a line about 1,000 yards north of Ovillers, with their right secured by a bombing attack made by B Company 4th Royal Berks. The ground round here was one of the grimmest of crater fields; almost every one of the many trenches which scarred it being marked on the map as either 'destroyed' or 'much damaged.' The 143rd Brigade attacked about 5 p.m. The whole course of the attack was visible to our men holding the front line, who looked over the parapet cheering and shouting with excitement as the successive waves moved inevitably forward and disappeared into the German trenches. Major Aldworth (O.C. B Company) handled his men with great skill, capturing 27 prisoners and a machine gun, and driving many of the enemy into the hands of the 6th Warwicks. Confused and fierce fighting went on until midnight; attack and counter-attack succeeding each other as either side received fresh supplies of men and bombs, but B Company finally held their objectives. The value of the bomb practice at Cramont was evident, for the men threw splendidly. Lieut. L. E. Ridley was killed fighting bravely at the head of his bombing party. Captains Cruttwell and Lacy, Lieuts. Wix and Smith (3rd East Surreys, attached), were wounded, the two former while getting their Companies ready for an expected counter-attack during the night. The remaining casualties amounted to nine killed and 36 wounded.

The fighting strength of the Battalion had now been reduced to about 500, but it was to take one last highly successful part in the Somme fighting before being withdrawn.

The Division had now reached a point about midway between Ovillers and Thiepval. A deep and narrow valley separated them from the latter stronghold, which rose steeply 170 feet above: a line of broken stumps standing forlornly near the crest line, 1,000 yards away, marked where the apple orchards had run along the southern outskirts of the little village. The enemy's positions lay astride this valley, thrust forward in a pronounced salient towards Ovillers. The whole of the Division were engaged in this attack, the 145th Brigade being in the centre, with 143 on the right and 144 on the left. The two assaulting Battalions of the 145th Brigade were 5th Gloucesters on the left and ourselves on the right. Each Battalion had a frontage of about 300 yards, our objectives being the point of the salient (79) and its eastern face, running obliquely across the hill slope towards the valley on the left (_i.e._, from 79-92). The attack was launched at 5 p.m., heralded by a splendid barrage of three minutes' duration. More than 50 guns were firing on the Battalion's front alone, and their accuracy was perfect. The two Companies, A on the left, C on the right, moved up close behind the barrage, in which they showed complete confidence. On the right little difficulty was experienced, the trenches had been ruined, and many of their defenders buried. But the 8th Royal Warwicks, with whom our own men were to join hands in the trench running north from 92, were unable to reach their objectives, thus leaving an open flank. A strong point was therefore started at once in the heap of debris and scattered earth, known as Point 91, and a platoon of our old friends, 5th Royal Sussex, came up with the darkness and helped to dig a communication trench back to our old front line. No counter-attack developed, though shell-fire from the usual 5.9's was heavy for 12 hours, and the position was held securely until relief.

On the left there was more opposition. The key to the enemy's defence was Point 79: the trench here, and a collection of dugouts around it, had been almost untouched by our heavy guns. One of our platoons rushed up a communication trench leading from their assembly trench to Point 79, while two others kept pace along the open, one to the right and one to left. The enemy showed plenty of fight, standing on their parapets to throw bombs and to fire at the platoon advancing up the trench, in spite of cross-fire from Lewis guns, which did great execution amongst them. They delayed, but could not check the advance, which broke through them into the disputed point. Lance-Corpl. Rixon, of Reading, deserves much of the credit for this success. He was in charge of the first bombing party in the communication trench. When they were held up, he sprang on the parapet, and from that point of vantage directed the bomb throwers, escaping unhurt himself by singular good fortune. This gallant action subsequently earned him the M.M. Unable to retire under cover, since the available trenches on either flank were already occupied, the Germans fled back across the open down the slopes of the hill, affording a target which was not neglected. Ten only remained to be taken alive, but their dead were thick on the captured ground. The 5th Gloucesters were already in their objectives, and the left flank was secured. A section of the R.E.'s following closely up helped to put the defences of 79 in order.

There were now, owing to casualties, no officers with A Company, but there was no lack of direction or control, thanks to Sergeant White, an old Territorial of many years standing. He inspired the men with his energy, and kept them constantly at work, moving up and down throughout the night under a rain of shells. He was rewarded with the D.C.M.

The attack had been well planned and well executed, and happily cost very little life. Thirty one men were killed or missing, and 50 wounded (including 2nd Lieuts. Garside and Buck). The men were specially pleased and proud of their success, which had been gained at the expense of the 5th Grenadier Battalion of the Prussian Guard. The latter had recently been sent to Thiepval after a commendatory speech from the Kaiser, which, as often, had failed to ensure good fortune. We were relieved next day by the 74th Brigade, and returned to bivouac at Bouzincourt. The 48th Division, every unit of which had been engaged at least thrice, was to enjoy a well-earned rest. They received gratifying tributes to the value of the work achieved. The Army Commander wrote as follows: 'The Division has fought with only very short periods of rest since July 1st. Since then it has met and defeated many different units of the German Army, and has fully maintained the best traditions of British infantry. This record shows a high sense of discipline and honour in all ranks.' The Corps Commander (Lieut.-General Jacob) G.O.C., 2nd Corps, in forwarding his message to General Fanshawe, added his own tribute: 'Will you please express my gratitude and thanks to all the units under your command for their devotion to duty, and for the way they have fought and worked.... All ranks of artillery, engineers and infantry have carried out their tasks with such spirit and co-operation that the results have exceeded expectations. You have all done nobly and I congratulate you and your officers on the way the Division has worked. Your record in the recent operations is first rate.'