CHAPTER VII.
REORGANISATION, AND THE BATTLE OF THE MENIN ROAD.
On the 2nd August, 1917, the remnant of the Battalion was relieved by the 9th Royal Irish Rifles (36th--Ulster--Division), and assembled at a camp near VLAMERTINGHE, where they found the members of B team and food, and had a good sleep. At 10 p.m. that night we moved in motor ’buses to the WATOU area, where we took over our old camp. Lieutenant G. M. Fismer, R.A.M.C., and one Other Rank had been wounded in coming out of the line, and Lieutenant J. E. Ratcliffe reported as Medical Officer; on the following day Lieutenant W. L. Price and Second Lieutenants R. Grisdale and A. P. Smith and 108 Other Ranks reported as reinforcements.
On the 5th we marched to ABEELE, where we entrained and travelled via ST. OMER and WATTEN to AUDRUICQ, arriving there about 5 p.m. Here we found lurries waiting to take us to our new billeting area, AUDREHEM, a pleasant village just big enough to hold us.
On the 7th, Second Lieutenant Holden came back from attachment to the R.E.’s with 23 Other Ranks, and Captain C. M. Denton and 34 Other Ranks reported as reinforcements. During the next few days Captain Houghton, Second Lieutenant Vincent and Second Lieutenant Swaine rejoined us and Major de Wend Fenton. Second Lieutenant F. Shippobottom and Second Lieutenant A. B. Fergie reported for duty along with nine Other Ranks, while on the 18th Second Lieutenant J. Hailwood and A. Martin, and on the 21st Second Lieutenants A. H. Doleman, S. A. H. Pruden, and Iners joined us, followed by Second Lieutenants H. W. C. Griffiths, H. Dance, and J. Oldham on the 22nd.
The following honours were announced for gallantry in action in the recent battle:--
BAR TO D.S.O. Lieutenant-Colonel R. Hindle, D.S.O. MILITARY CROSS Second Lieutenant H. C. Vincent, B Company. Second Lieutenant H. Lonsdale, C Company. D.C.M. 24908 Lance-Corporal E. Ashton, A Company. 201260 Lance-Corporal T. Butcher, A Company. MILITARY MEDAL 200057 Sergeant J. Heaps, Headqrs. 201530 Lance-Corporal P. Norris, B Company. 200643 Sergeant J. E. Cookson, D Company. 34879 Sergeant J. Cosgrove, C Company. 200809 Corporal F. Pitcher, B Company. 200414 Lance-Corporal W. H. Clarkson, Headqrs. 202761 Private J. Spencer, D Company. 200146 Private J. Bates, Transport. 200357 Private J. H. Parkinson, Transport. 12910 Private D. Rathbone, C Company. 31987 Lance-Corporal J. Walmsley, A Company.
It is fashionable among fighting men to belittle the honours which they themselves have earned, knowing as they do that many individuals employed at bases have received decorations which were never meant to be conferred for anything except gallantry in action, while others who have abundantly deserved them have either died before they were granted or have had no witness surviving to report their conduct; it is therefore only fair to mention that when “immediate awards,” such as the above, are made to fighting men, it is as a result of reports sent in by eyewitnesses, which, in our Battalion at any rate, were tested by cross-examining those mentioned in them as to the deeds of others, the resulting list of recommendations being further checked and often cut down by Brigade.
We enjoyed our stay at AUDREHEM, knowing that our last battle had raised us to the status of Storm Troops, and that when we moved up again it would be for another attack and not back to the demoralising influences of trench life. With this in view we carefully reorganised and trained, all ranks working together keenly with one end in view--efficiency, with the result that in six weeks a tired, straggling, muddy, shaken remnant was transformed once more into a smart Battalion, well organised and equipped, and trained with special reference to attacking concrete blockhouses. Officers daily attended lectures by one of their number on some phase of the attack, and Company Commanders held daily conferences of their N.C.O.’s and senior Privates, so that however heavy might be the casualties among leaders, someone might remain with the necessary knowledge to carry on. Every fine day Companies marched with their cookers to the training area at GUEMY, and remained there all day doing progressive field training; there was football, boxing, a Divisional horse show, and other delights, as well as Brigade days, and the Commander-in-Chief himself came one day to see us at work; so the days slipped by until the 14th September. Captain Duckworth went as Second in Command to the 1/8th King’s Liverpool Regiment, and various other Officers left us sick or to other units, so that when B team had been detailed the following Officers moved up to take part in the attack:--
Lieutenant-Colonel R. Kindle, D.S.O. Commanding. Captain A. T. Houghton Second in Command. Captain R. N. Buckmaster Adjutant. Lieutenant Bardsley Transport Officer. Second Lieutenant Brooke Intelligence Officer. Second Lieutenant Whitehouse Signalling Officer. Lieutenant Radcliffe, R.A.M.C. Medical Officer. Lieutenant E. G. Baker } Second Lieutenant A. P. Smith } A Company. Second Lieutenant H. Dance } Second Lieutenant J. Oldham }
Captain F. W. S. Baker } Major Fenton } B Company. Second Lieutenant Holmes } Second Lieutenant Fergie }
Captain R. H. Tautz } Second Lieutenant Pruden } C Company. Second Lieutenant Grisdale }
Lieutenant Holden } Lieutenant Price } D Company. Second Lieutenant Martin } Second Lieutenant Myers }
On the 14th the Battalion, including B team, marched to AUBRUICQ, proceeding thence by train to a point near YPRES, where we took over a bivouac camp near GOLDFISH CHATEAU--a muddy field with pits dug all over it, each just big enough to shelter two or three men, and covered with sheets of corrugated iron.
Since 31st July, 1917, the ground along the STEENBEEK captured by us on that day had been the scene of bloody fighting, two attempts by other Divisions to advance beyond the Black Line of the previous attack having been made and having failed, so that with small variations the front taken over by us on 15th September was identical with that held when we had come out six weeks before.
The ground over which we had to pass was commanded by two spurs--the GRAFENSTAFEL SPUR half a mile to the north, and the GALLIPOLI SPUR, part of which was within our frontage, to the south; and apart from the concrete blockhouses on our own front, every yard of our advance was raked by machine gun bullets from innumerable others on our flanks, so that until these were put out of action no advance was possible without appalling losses. Add to this the total absence of landmarks in that amorphous wilderness, where no trees, no blade of grass remained, every square yard of ground having been churned up by our shell fire--the extreme difficulty of distinguishing one blockhouse from another--the fact that Companies had been reduced to three Platoons and Platoons to only 20 men owing to lack of sufficient reinforcements--and when you have studied the maps and photographs and tried to visualise the ground, you may form some idea of what the Battalion had to do on the 20th September, 1917. The GRAFENSTAFEL ROAD was our one hope of keeping direction--the road which, as the photographs clearly show, became utterly indistinguishable from the surrounding mire within 200 yards of our starting point; when this failed, general direction was only kept by use of the compass.
The material paragraphs of the Operation Order and the official account of the battle are as follows:--
THE OPERATION ORDER.
1.
(a) The 55th Division will attack on Z day. The 9th Division will be on the right, and the 58th Division on the left.
(b) The 165th Infantry Brigade will be on the right, the 164th Infantry Brigade on the left, the 166th Brigade less two Battalions will be in reserve.
(c) The 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment and the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment will be in the right or KEIR sector.
The 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers in the centre or COTTS sector.
The 1/8th Liverpool Regiment in the left or SCHULER sector.
The 1/5th Royal Lancaster Regiment will be attached to the 164th Infantry Brigade and be available for the countering of enemy counter-attacks.
2. On the night 13th/14th the (German) 2nd Guards Reserve Division came into the line opposite to the 55th Divisional front and is reported to be holding the line with all three regiments up, one Battalion of each Regiment being in the line, one in support, and one in immediate reserve.
Those in reserve are located west of the PASSCHENDALE RIDGE.
3.
(a) First pause of the barrage RED DOTTED LINE. First objective in YELLOW LINE. Final objective in GREEN LINE.
4. It is the intention to capture and occupy as a line of resistance the GREEN LINE.
The attack will be made in stages under cover of a creeping barrage.
There will be a pause of at least half an hour on the RED DOTTED LINE and again on the YELLOW LINE.
5. The plan of attack and objectives will be as follows:--
In the KEIR sector:
The 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment will attack at ZERO in four waves, the first two waves extended and the second two in columns.
Objectives:--First two waves Red Dotted Line. Second two waves Yellow Line,
after which they will support the capture of the Green Line.
In the COTTS sector:--
The 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers will attack at ZERO, in four waves.
Objectives:--First wave Red Dotted Line. Second wave Yellow Line. Third wave Green Line, an advanced strong point established at Green House.
In the SCHULER sector:--
Two Companies 1/8th Liverpool Regiment will attack at ZERO in two waves.
Objectives:--First wave Red Dotted Line. Second wave Yellow Line.
Two Companies will be in the hands of the Officer Commanding 1/8th Liverpool Regiment.
6. The Battalion will assemble in three lines at 20 yards’ distance, the leading line being about 150 yards west of the assembly line of the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment in the following order:--
First wave, from right to left--14 Platoon, 13 Platoon, 1 Platoon, 2 Platoon.
Second wave, from right to left--9 Platoon, 10 Platoon, 11 Platoon, 5 Platoon, 6 Platoon, 7 Platoon.
Third wave, from right to left--15 Platoon, machine guns, 3 Platoon.
Captain Houghton will be responsible for the taping of these lines and supplying two guides to each Company to lead them to their position of assembly.
7. Distribution of Companies during the advance:--
First wave, from right to left--Two Platoons D Company, two Platoons A Company.
Second wave, from right to left--C Company, B Company.
Third wave, from right to left--One Platoon D Company, one Platoon A Company.
The first wave will form two lines of extended order before crossing the Yellow Line.
The objective of the first wave will be an outpost line passing through FOKKER FARM--D 14 c 9 9 and D 14 d 1 5.
Garrisons will be detailed in advance:--For FOKKER FARM by A Company, and dugouts D 14 d 1 6 by D Company.
Strong points will be constructed at these points and others in between should it be found necessary, the principle being that the whole front should be:--
(a) Covered by enfilade machine gun or Lewis gun fire.
(b) Under observation.
The objective of the second wave will be approximately the Green Line.
The garrison will be detailed beforehand for the dugouts D 14 c 4 9 by B Company.
The objectives of the third wave will be to ensure that the first and second waves reach their objectives.
Garrisons will be detailed beforehand for dugouts D 14 c 4 4 and MARTHA HOUSE by D Company.
Dugouts at D 14 a 2 O and KANSAS HOUSE by A Company.
8. Unexpected concrete defences encountered during the advance will be garrisoned and consolidated, as soon as the final objective is taken, on the following principle: Each wave will be responsible for all ground between itself and the leading line of the wave in its rear. Should any pockets of the enemy still remain, they will be mopped up as this is taking place.
12. The reserve Battalion (1/5th Royal Lancaster Regiment) will arrive in the area AISNE--HINDU COT--POND FARM about the time that the Green Line is taken.
The role of this Battalion will be to deliver an immediate counter-stroke against any hostile counter-attack.
13. Prisoners’ escorts, messengers, etc., when returning to their Companies from the rear, will take back six bandoliers of S.A.A. from the forward dumps.
14. Dress:--Fighting order, with packs instead of haversacks. Every N.C.O. and man will carry:--
1 No. 23 rifle grenade. 2 Aeroplane flares. 4 Sandbags. 1 Bandolier extra S.A.A.--Carried in the pack. 1 Lewis gun magazine
Parties of men specially selected to deal with dugouts will carry two No. 23 rifle grenades.
Every rifle grenadier will carry six Hales No. 24 rifle grenades.
Shovels will be carried by every man, less runners, signallers, stretcher-bearers, and Nos. 1 and 2 of Lewis gun teams.
Men carrying shovels will not carry the entrenching tool.
Bayonets will not be fixed until immediately before leaving the assembly line.
15. The Battalion will be fitted out on the early morning of Y day. Bombs and S.A.A. will be drawn from the St. Jean dump by small parties from each Company. At the same time parties will draw shovels and sandbags from the Divisional R.E. dump, St. Jean--Wieltje Road, 600 yards west of Wieltje. These carrying parties must have returned to Congreve Walk--Liverpool Line by 5 30 a.m. on Y day. After that hour there must be no movement over the open.
16. The Brigade main dump is at C 23 c 3 1 (old German front line). Advanced Brigade dumps are established at Spree Farm (C 18 d 5 3) and at dugouts C 18 d 7 5.
17. All ranks will carry during the attack the iron ration and the unexpended portion of Z day’s rations.
Rations for Z plus 1 day will be dumped as far forward as possible. Water bottles will be filled from the water-carts on the evening of Y day.
18. Barrage map will be issued later.
19. Points for Liaison:--
With 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers KANSAS HOUSE. D 14 a 0 2. With 1/6th Liverpool Regiment D 14 c 5 4. D 14 c 95 40.
20. Headquarters 164th and 165th Infantry Brigades will be the Wieltje dugout. Battalion Headquarters will be at the commencement Capricorn Keep and dugouts C 18 d 8 6; subsequent moves will be notified.
21. Aid Post:--Pond Farm, C 18 b 8 0.
22. ZERO HOUR will be 5 40 a.m.
Watches will be synchronised.
23. Communication between Companies and Battalion Headquarters will be by runner and visual.
All messages will be duplicated by a second means of transmission.
Two pigeons will be carried by D Company and two by A Company, moving in the leading wave.
Second Lieutenant Whitehurst will be responsible for:--
(a) Laying a wire from Battalion Headquarters to Brigade forward station at Pond Farm, and from Battalion Headquarters to Battalion forward command post.
(b) Establishing visual between Battalion Headquarters and Battalion forward command post about D 13 central, if practicable.
(c) Establishing relay runner posts about D 13 c 2 6, D 13 d 1 6, and Keir Farm.
Contact ’plane can be recognised by a rectangular attachment on both lower planes and a white dumb-bell on either side of the body.
Whenever the ’plane calls for signals by sounding the klaxon horn or firing a white Verey light, the most advanced lines of infantry will:--
(a) Light flares in the bottom of a shell hole.
(b) Show Watson fans--white and coloured sides alternately 30 seconds.
The ’plane will call for signals at ZERO plus 1 hour. ZERO plus 2 hours. ZERO plus 2½ hours.
and at such other times as may be necessary.
S.O.S. signal is a rifle grenade bursting into two red and two green lights.
24. Second Lieutenant Brooke will be responsible for:--
(a) Keeping liaison with 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment during their advance to the Yellow Line.
(b) Establishing a Battalion forward command post about D 13 central and keeping the whole front under close observation.
25. Acknowledge in writing.
18th September, 1917. (Signed) R. N. L. BUCKMASTER, Issued at 8 a.m. Captain and Adjutant, 1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment.
* * * * *
EXTRACTED FROM WAR DIARY.
YPRES.
15th September. Fairly quiet day.
One Other Rank reinforcement. One Other Rank to Field Ambulance sick.
16th September. About 10 45 a.m. 10 enemy aeroplanes dropped bombs in the vicinity of the camp, causing one casualty. Road near camp heavily shelled at dusk.
Two Other Ranks wounded.
17th September. Situation normal. Reconnaissance of forward area carried out. W day in connection with forthcoming operations.
One Other Rank killed in VLAMERTINGHE.
18th September (X day). Day spent in fitting out, etc. On the evening of this day the Battalion moved forward to the Congreve Walk--Liverpool Trench line, running through the village of St. Jean. Our artillery were very active throughout the night.
Two Other Ranks wounded. One Other Rank died of wounds.
ST. JEAN (TRENCHES).
19th September. Commencing at dawn, our artillery opened the 24 hours’ bombardment preparatory to the attack. The enemy’s reply during the day was exceedingly feeble.
Commencing 9 30 p.m., the Battalion moved off from ST. JEAN by Platoons at 200 yards’ distance, via the WIELTJE--GRAVENSTAFEL road. The night was quiet, and there was practically no hostile shelling.
Battalion Headquarters were established at CAPRICORN KEEP (C 18 d 55 65) at 11 p.m. The KEEP consisted of six very strong dugouts of reinforced concrete. Three were taken over as headquarters by this unit and three by the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment.
Casualties:--Two Other Ranks killed; three Other Ranks wounded.
20th September. The Battalion was reported in position of assembly at 1 a.m. The lines to be taken up by the various waves were marked by tape, which had been laid as soon as darkness permitted. When once in position the assaulting troops lay in shell holes until ZERO hour. A continuous drizzling rain made the ground sticky and the going bad. The line of assembly was a north--south line running through SOMME (D 13 c 50 25). During the night things were fairly quiet, though lively artillery fire developed on our right soon after 3 a.m.
ZERO hour was at 5 40 a.m., at which time the artillery barrage opened.
The 1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment moved forward from the assembly position in rear of the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment. The 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment had for its objective (1) the RED DOTTED LINE and (2) the YELLOW LINE, and it was intended that the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment should “leap-frog” at the YELLOW LINE and capture and consolidate the GREEN LINE.
The enemy barrage was promptly opened on the approximate line of our assembly position--a proof that the enemy were fully prepared for the attack. This caused the three rear waves, i.e., the four Companies of the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, to close well up on to the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment, and it appears that in a good many cases this was overdone, causing the two units to be intermingled and considerably undermining the principles of organisation.
The creeping barrage was being governed by two new principles, tried for the first time and designed to combat and counteract the enemy’s new system of defence:--(1) there were two definite pauses in the barrage, during which it was intended that Companies should replace casualties from the rear and generally reorganise; (2) the barrage started to move forward at the rate of six minutes every hundred yards and later at the rate of eight minutes every hundred yards.
The attack to commence with went well, though a great many casualties were inflicted by enemy machine gun fire, which from the start was very well directed. AISNE FARM was reported taken at 6 5 a.m., though a Platoon of the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashires had to give assistance in the attack on this strong point. A message timed 8 17 a.m. stated, “Attack appears to be going well.”
The first pause was made on the RED DOTTED LINE, though apparently very little reorganisation was found practicable. Soon after moving forward again considerable trouble was caused by hostile machine guns on the flanks bringing enfilade fire to bear on our advancing troops. According to reports received, this was particularly the case on the right, where the left Battalion of the 165th Infantry Brigade was held up before GALLIPOLI, as a result of which an enemy machine gun on Hill 37 was playing havoc with the waves in the valley through which we were advancing.
The result of these obstructions on either flank was that the men of this Battalion in many cases inclined outwards, leaving an exceedingly thin line facing the original objective. In some cases whole Platoons found themselves attacking strong points on the frontage of other Battalions. Particularly was this so in the case of GALLIPOLI, in the ultimate capture of which men of this Battalion very materially assisted.
Very few of our men reached the YELLOW LINE, though a message from the Battalion O.P., timed 8 45 a.m., stated that it appeared to be taken and consolidation commenced. Finally, therefore, a line of resistance was sited and consolidated about mid-day between the RED DOTTED and YELLOW LINE, with posts of Lewis gun teams thrown out 50 to 100 yards to the front.
The enemy was not finally dislodged from the vicinity of GALLIPOLI and the adjoining SUVLA until after 10 a.m., by which time the barrage was of no further assistance.
20th September. At 10 50 a.m. the enemy was reported massing for a counter-attack in the vicinity of NILE and FOKKER FARMS, but nothing except heavy shelling materialised on our front. Soon after 1 p.m. various S.O.S.’s were sent up, and apparently local counter-attacks, without any success, were launched on both our flanks.
In the afternoon an effort was made to reorganise the Battalion, which was now reported to consist of only four Officers and 60 rifles in the firing line. The right Battalion frontage was now being held by a mixed line of the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment and the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, stiffened by two Companies of the 1/5th Royal Lancaster Regiment, who, as Battalion in Brigade reserve, and detailed to assist in the capture of the objective and to deal with any hostile counter-attack, had dug themselves in on a line in rear of our consolidated positions.
About 7 p.m. an Officers’ patrol went forward to reconnoitre KEIR FARM and discover whether it was held by the enemy. This patrol, however, did not succeed in its objective and lost its way, and the project had to be postponed till the following morning.
As soon as darkness allowed, an effort was made to examine our positions and to find out whether measures for defence were complete. They were found to be held by at least six Lewis guns, while there were in all four machine guns, two of which were German, and proved very useful against the enemy.
During the night patrols were sent out, and a further effort made to find the defences of KEIR FARM. KEIR FARM was not identified, and it was therefore assumed that it no longer existed as a concrete defence. No signs of the enemy were seen. The night passed without incident, though shelling on both sides was maintained fairly consistently.
Casualties:--
Officers:--
Killed--Captain F. W. S. Baker (Commanding B Company), Second Lieutenant A. B. Fergie.
Wounded--Captain R. H. Tautz, M.C. (Commanding C Company), Second Lieutenant E. G. Baker (Commanding A Company), Second Lieutenant A. P. Smith, Second Lieutenant H. Dance, Second Lieutenant J. Oldham, Second Lieutenant R. Grisedale, Second Lieutenant A. Martin, Second Lieutenant B. Myers, Second Lieutenant C. B. Holmes (died of wounds, 28th September, 1917).
Other Ranks:--Killed 23, Wounded 161, Missing 11; Total 195.
Four Other Ranks reinforcements from base.
The following notes by an Officer who was present are added to complete the account:--
At about 10 p.m. the Battalion began to arrive by Platoons, each Platoon coming up in silence, knowing we were close up to the enemy outposts, winding in single file over the uneven ground, being shown its tape, filing along it and lying down to wait for the dawn; the assembly was completed by 1 a.m.--the hour fixed, and apparently unknown to the enemy.
At this hour, to add to the discomfort, a steady drizzle set in, but a tot of rum was served out and most of the men were soon asleep, to be waked at dawn by the crash of our opening barrage.
Battalion Headquarters retired to CAPRICORN KEEP, while the Medical Officer and his men settled in POND GALLERIES. Both these blockhouses had been built of concrete by the Boche to shelter his reserves from our shelling in earlier days--during the days that followed they were severely tested, but never failed us.
At ZERO, 5 40 a.m., while it was still dark, down came our creeping barrage, and the King’s Own began to advance. Our men had been told to give them a good start and, full of eagerness as they were, would have done so had the answering enemy barrage not come down on their tails; this had been foreseen and its position judged from previous registration, and the assembly position was just in front--but only just--and the “shorts” got some of our men, causing the rest to hurry and close up on the King’s Own, who were already passing AISNE FARM. We had to complete the capture of this, and lost heavily in the process.
Under terrific machine gun fire from the front and both flanks, causing casualties at every step, the two Battalions struggled forward to get to grips with their unseen enemies, and soon arrived at the two groups of blockhouses, LOOS and GALLIPOLI, with four others lying between them.
These two groups, though the latter was off the allotted front, at once became the immediate objectives--the left hand Companies took the LOOS blockhouses one by one, nine in all, with bomb and bayonet; the Companies on the right swung round and joined the King’s Liverpool Regiment in storming GALLIPOLI; in the centre small parties of men, their Officers having been hit, took the other four and so reached the RED LINE.
Lieutenant Brooke went forward, and, with a few signallers, established a forward command post near LOOS; our machine gunners came up and turned five of the newly-taken Hun machine guns round on the enemy, and things seemed to be going well, but the hour-long pause of the barrage was too long, the hail of cross-fire from more distant machine guns still continued, and the men, who had sought cover in shell holes, were out of sight and scattered, though strenuous efforts to reorganise were made by the few leaders who remained, and with a certain amount of success. But the line had lost its cohesion, and when the barrage went on only a portion of the line saw it and attempted to follow.
Lieutenant Brooke had notified the capture of the Red Line to Battalion Headquarters, but no further message coming through, the Second in Command went forward to clear up the situation; on reaching the Red Line he could at first see no one, but soon stumbled into a shell hole full of men, and was able, running from one hole to another, to locate the whole line up to the flanks of the adjoining Battalions, and to estimate the casualties.
The barrage had already passed the Green Line and the machine guns in the blockhouses were active. Their crews could see every movement, and the troops on both flanks were stationary, so that at the moment no further advance was likely to succeed--moreover, everyone had had time to feel the reaction. So the order was given to dig in and to send out small patrols to try to occupy the ground immediately in front, and by this means the line was advanced still further.
Lieutenant Holden took charge of one of these, while Second Lieutenant Pruden supervised consolidation.
About this time the Hun seems to have realised the position, for he opened out with every gun he had, shelling the captured pillboxes and putting a very heavy barrage all round the aid post and Battalion Headquarters, but his attempt at counter-attack was beaten off by machine gun, Lewis gun, and rifle fire.
We afterwards found out that SUVLA and THE CAPITOL had not been taken, nor had CROSS COTS--had they been the cross-machine gun fire on us would have been much less intense.
No praise is too high for our stretcher-bearers, who--all through that day and the succeeding days--toiled without intermission bringing in wounded; the aid post was in the line of the Hun barrage, a concrete structure, with a passage two feet wide on the enemy side with chambers opening off it; the stretcher cases had to be dressed out in the open, while the passage was crowded with walking wounded, some of them Huns--the look of utter weariness and dejection on the faces of the latter was a thing not easily forgotten.
The runners did splendid work; a few were killed as they made their way over the shell-tossed ground--the wonder is that any escaped.
For five days the Battalion remained in those shell holes, beating off one counter-attack after another with the help of our gunners, who were truly magnificent. At first it was impossible to reorganise properly owing to the mixing of Battalions, but ultimately a definite frontage was allotted to us by Brigade, and that night we sorted ourselves out from the King’s Own and Companies were picked out and given a definite bit of line--A and B in front, C and D in close support. At the same time the line was advanced considerably, especially on the right, the posts on HILL 37 having been taken by the right Brigade.
Getting rations up to the line was a terrible business--runners and guides kept losing their way, and more than one party nearly entered Hun territory; but guide wires were laid to Companies, the C.Q.M.S.’s did their work splendidly, and the men were fed and kept going.
About 25th September we were relieved by the 59th Division, a genial lot--full strength--who seemed to expect to find trenches and dugouts! Thanks to the tapes and wires which had been laid, relief was quick, and we all dribbled back to ST. JEAN, where Companies assembled by the cookers and had hot tea and rum served out. They were actually singing--the revulsion, I suppose.
After a lot of delay we got into trucks on the DECAUVILLE railway (a metre gauge affair). The Commanding Officer was balanced on the back of the little engine, and as we started, some wit shouted out, “Don’t move, sir! You might upset her!”
Additional light is thrown on the course of the battle by the Platoon narratives:--
Lieutenant E. G. Baker, Commanding A Company, was hit in the head during the advance. No. 1 Platoon Commander, Lieutenant Smith, was badly wounded in the thigh before the first strong point was reached. Private Wyre fired some rifle grenades into it, after which the Platoon rushed it with men of other units, and bombed and bayonetted the enemy out. Sergeant Beaumont then led them towards SCHULER GALLERIES, when he was shot through the head about 50 yards behind the Red Line. About 16 men under Private Wyre found their way to the Red Line; others, with an Officer of the King’s Own, went forward on the left. He said he would take them to the Yellow Line, but was killed by a sniper. They were willing to go on, but had no leader till Sergeant Knowles of No. 3 came up and took a small party out under heavy cross-machine gun fire to the domed strong point on the road.
No. 2 got on all right till Lieutenant Dance was hit in the arm. They took a small strong point on the right with others helping, and also helped to take AISNE FARM, where one Hun Officer and eight men were taken.
Sergeant Knowles took eight men to the left to take the strong point in the road, but there were about 30 enemy in a trench in front of it, and he was compelled to fall back again for lack of support. Two sections helped to take the strong point in front of LOOS.
Captain Baker, Commanding B Company, was wounded at 6 30 a.m., but continued to advance; he was killed at 7 a.m. at a strong point about 150 yards to the right of LOOS. At this same point five out of the Lewis gun team of seven were put out of action (one killed and four wounded). Sergeant-Major Roberts bombed the strong point.
Sergeant Pitcher, of No. 6, with five men, assisted in the attack on the strong points at LOOS and was severely wounded. Second Lieutenant Fazackerley, during the pause in the barrage, advanced with Lance-Corporal Clayton and four men to a point on a ridge to find a possible position for Lewis gun. Here they were subject to intense enfilade machine gun fire from the right flank in the direction of GALLIPOLI, which made it impossible to advance further until the right flank had advanced.
Second Lieutenant Martin, Commanding No. 11, was badly wounded immediately after zero, and Sergeant Murphy assumed command. This Platoon assisted in the capture of AISNE HOUSE; at least 20 Germans were taken there.
In No. 10 Lance-Corporal Charnley was wounded immediately after zero, and during the pause Mr. Myers and one or two others were sniped, and when they moved forward again only one bomber remained.
In No. 9, at nightfall, Mr. Fergie, Mr. Holmes, and two Sergeants went forward to reconnoitre a forward position. The two Officers were struck by a shell and were both very badly wounded. Lance-Corporal Anderton took over command. Private Pendlebury was wounded on the afternoon of the 23rd for the third time. C Company Commander (Captain Tautz) was wounded at the first pause.
No. 13, owing to the darkness, got mixed up with the 1/4th King’s Own on the left flank, and helped the Lancashire Fusiliers to carry SCHULER GALLERIES.
D Company Headquarters Lewis gun team, when near GALLIPOLI, was shot down by machine gun fire, but Corporal Prescott retrieved the gun. Visual communication with the Battalion forward signalling post was opened from behind a dugout at D 13 b 1 0 by Private Roocroft, Company Signaller, and Private Parkinson, of B Company, and was maintained by shutter and lamp until the night of the 21st. On the morning of the 21st, Corporal Prescott and Private Goodwin, Company Runner, went forward of the line and shot some enemy snipers who had been annoying the troops in the line. On the evening of the 23rd, during an intensely heavy bombardment, Corporal Prescott volunteered and kept observation all the time, though wounded in the shoulder by shrapnel, and refused to go to the aid post until the troops were relieved.
No. 14 attacked the strong point at D 13 d 2 6 in conjunction with a party of the 1/4th King’s Own, then Second Lieutenant Holden and the remaining men of his party moved to attack GALLIPOLI, which was holding up the advance. This fight lasted about an hour.
On the 21st September, Second Lieutenant Holden, who was patrolling to KEIR FARM, was writing a message to send by pigeon when he was killed. There were four other casualties, and the pigeons were killed.
No. 15. At 10 a.m. on 21st September, Second Lieutenant Pruden took a small patrol to KEIR FARM. During the night an advanced post held by Lance-Corporal Gorton and five men with two Lewis guns was buried. One gun was in action again immediately, and the other after six hours.
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EXTRACTED FROM WAR DIARY.
TRENCHES.
21st September. There was fairly lively shelling at dawn, but the situation was reported quiet at 7 30 a.m. The front was continually patrolled before daylight and no signs of the enemy found. During the morning a further Officers’ patrol worked forward to KEIR FARM and confirmed the previous report that it was practically non-existent. On the afternoon of this day the strength of the Companies in the line was reported at 90, though it was known there were still many more men of this unit who had become merged in the Battalions on either flank.
At about 4 40 p.m. the 1/8th King’s Liverpool Regiment, on the left of the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers, attacked and occupied SCHULER FARM. Owing to the small amount of resistance encountered it was decided that the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers should take CROSS COTTS and that then the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment should conform by moving forward to the new alignment. The attack on CROSS COTTS, however, never materialised, as at 6 30 p.m. heavy enemy counter-attacks were launched on Hill 37 on our right, and on the London Division on our left, the front held by this unit simply being subjected to an intense bombardment. Our artillery promptly replied to the S.O.S., and no enemy succeeded in reaching our lines.
During the ensuing night a further effort was made to complete the reorganisation by separating the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment and the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment. This unit took over the south, viz., 200 yards of the KEIR sector, extending approximately from D 13 d 23 32 to D 13 d 23 75. By this means a few more men were collected together. The Battalion was then organised on a two-Company frontage with two Companies in support, and the whole line was straightened and pushed forward an average depth of 50 yards. It was found that the only practicable way of doing this was by arranging a system of guide wires of a fixed length, which were taken out by posts in advance and, after their direction, etc., had been checked, the rear wave advanced along them by Platoons and took up the new alignment. It was intended that this process should be repeated by leap-frogging the two waves until the YELLOW LINE was reached, but owing to the still imperfect state of organisation, it was decided to postpone this movement until the following night.
During this night, however, guide wires were laid from the main line to the isolated Lewis gun posts 100 yards in front. This ensured cohesion and gave the most forward men confidence. Guide wires were also made from the main line of resistance to Battalion Headquarters to facilitate the work during the night of carrying parties bringing up S.A.A. and food.
The enemy’s artillery was quiet during the night, but our own was very busy, apparently with gas shells, upon the enemy’s batteries.
Killed:--Second Lieutenant H. Holden and two Other Ranks.
Wounded:--Two Other Ranks.
22nd September. There was a certain amount of shelling about dawn, otherwise the day was quiet.
As soon as it was dark, the right of the Battalion was advanced 150 yards and connected with a machine gun in a shell hole near KEIR FARM about D 13 d 60 55. This movement, which was successfully carried out with the help of guide wires, brought our line round in such a way as to face the enemy, whose position now ran approximately north-west--south-east. Connection was also maintained with the 165th Brigade on our right, but in view of the fact that the latter were being relieved, it was not considered advisable to carry out any further advance, so as to avoid any possibility of bringing down an enemy S.O.S. barrage.
The usual posts were pushed out in advance of the new line.
Owing to the exhaustion of several Officers in the line, two were brought down for a rest to Battalion Headquarters, and the Signalling and Intelligence Officers took over control of the Companies. The night was quiet. Two Companies of the 2/6th North Staffordshires came into support to our Brigade.
Casualties:--Two Other Ranks wounded.
23rd September. The day passed without incident. Patrols before dawn saw nothing of the enemy. An S.O.S. was sent up on our right at 3 50 p.m., but nothing materialised.
At 5 p.m. the enemy heavily bombarded our positions, and our front line system and the vicinity of Battalion Headquarters were heavily bombarded for three hours. By 8 15 p.m. all was quiet again and the relief was begun. The relieving unit was the 2/6th North Staffordshires (59th Division), who took over our frontage with one Company. Relief was completed without casualties about 11 p.m.
A special effort was made to secure identifications before being relieved, and a patrol that went out with this object in view returned with two prisoners, who were encountered in NO MAN’S LAND. The capture of these prisoners proved the presence of the third German Division opposite this part of the line since the attack was launched on the 20th.
Upon relief, Companies concentrated at St. Jean, where, after hot tea had been supplied from the cookers, a train was provided to take the Battalion to VLAMERTINGHE.
24th September. The Battalion arrived at camp south of VLAMERTINGHE at 4 30 a.m. Morning was spent in resting, etc. At 3 p.m. the Brigade entrained and travelled from VLAMERTINGHE to POPERINGHE, detrained at POPERINGHE, and boarded ’buses at a point about one mile south-west of the town. By this means we went to WATOU area, and were accommodated in tents at Hill Camp (K 12 d 7 8).
143 Other Ranks from reinforcement camp.
11 Other Ranks from base.
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TELEGRAMS:
“Please convey to all ranks 55th Division the Army Commander’s congratulations on the fine record of the Division during the hard fighting of the past two months. The Army Commander wishes specially to thank all ranks for their splendid efforts, which have contributed greatly to the success of the last attack and to wish them all good luck and success in the future. Despite their long period in the line prior to commencement of operations they have well maintained and increased their high reputation.
“FIFTH ARMY.”
“Brigadier-General Stuart and all ranks West Lancashire Reserve Brigade send heartiest congratulations to West Lancashire Division on their splendid success.”
“Well done, 55th West Lancashire Division! Accept my most hearty congratulations. I sincerely trust your losses are not heavy.
“DERBY.”
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To All Ranks of the 55th (West Lancashire) Division.
I regret that owing to the move of the Division I have not been able to see all units since the fight on 20th September. I hope to do so later as opportunity offers.
The messages received from higher Commanders and others since the battle have been published from time to time as received and have no doubt been read by all ranks, who will see from these messages how well the higher Commanders have appreciated the work of the Division.
In addition, I have recently been allowed to see the reports on the Division rendered to General Headquarters by the Army and the Corps in which we served. In these reports the Division is spoken of as “a good fighting Division possessing the right spirit” and as “a first-rate Division.” I know that all ranks throughout the Division will share the pride that I feel myself in reading those opinions of the Commanders under whom we have served.
I have also had the advantage of reading scores of stories of individual courage, determination, endurance, and self-sacrifice, narrated by Commanding Officers in bringing the services of individuals of all ranks to notice for recognition. These stories increase my pride in the Division and my confidence in it.
The West Lancashire Division had a good reputation before the recent fighting in front of Ypres. You have now won for it a reputation second to none in the Expeditionary Force, and every soldier in the Division may well be proud of belonging to it. That reputation I feel confident you will cherish and maintain. We are now in an easy part of the line, but ordinary trench duties demand constant alertness, endurance, and conscientious observance of orders; besides it is up to us at all times to take advantage of any opportunities for aggressive action which will cause loss or damage to the enemy. It is by such action, as well as by smartness and good discipline when out of the line, that the great reputation of the West Lancashire Division can, and I am sure will, be kept up by each soldier in it, of every rank.
H. S. JEUDWINE, 55th Division Headquarters, Major-General, 10th October, 1917. Commanding 55th Division.
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The following decorations were awarded in respect of the battle and announced on 11th November:--
MILITARY CROSS Captain A. T. Houghton. Second Lieutenant S. A. H. Pruden. Second Lieutenant L. Brooke.
D.C.M. 200051 C.S.M. Roberts, H. 200077 Corporal Prescott, S.
MILITARY MEDAL 200782 Private Parks, T. 201197 Corporal Thompson, J. 200682 Private Coupe, F. 200895 Lance-Sergeant Knowles, R. 12154 Lance-Corporal Cayton, R. 290665 Private Pendlebury, T. 202967 Private Yates, W. 291178 Private Goodwin, H. 201350 Corporal Robinson, J. 29679 Private Parkinson, T. 34304 Private Jones, T. 16940 Private Cunningham, D. 202099 Private Wyre, F. 200756 Lance-Corporal Gorton, F. 201542 Sergeant Bell, H. 6693 Lance-Sergeant Murphey, J. 200352 Private Thistleton, T. 238002 Private Roocroft, W.