CHAPTER XIII
TRANSPORTING TWO MILLION AMERICAN SOLDIERS TO FRANCE
I
In March, 1918, it became apparent that the German submarine campaign had failed. The prospect that confronted the Allied forces at that time, when compared with the conditions which had faced them in April, 1917, forms one of the most impressive contrasts in history. In the first part of the earlier year the cause of the Allied Powers, and consequently the cause of liberty throughout the world, had reached the point almost of desperation. On both land and sea the Germans seemed to hold the future in their hands. In Europe the armies of the Central Powers were everywhere in the ascendant. The French and British were holding their own in France, and in the Somme campaign they had apparently inflicted great damage upon the German forces, yet the disintegration of the Russian army, the unmistakable signs of which had already appeared, was bringing nearer the day when they would have to meet the undivided strength of their enemy. At the time in question, Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro were conquered countries, and Italy seemed unable to make any progress against the Austrians. Bulgaria and Turkey had become practically German provinces, and the dream of a great Germanic eastern empire was rapidly approaching realization. So strong was Germany in a military sense, so little did she apprehend that the United States could ever assemble her resources and her men in time to make them a decisive element in the struggle, that the German war lords, in their effort to bring the European conflict to a quick conclusion, did not hesitate to take the step which was destined to make our country their enemy. Probably no nation ever adopted a war measure with more confidence in its success. The results which the German submarines could accomplish seemed at that time to be simply a matter of mathematical calculation. The Germans estimated that they could sink at least 1,000,000 tons a month, completely cut off Great Britain's supplies of food and war materials, and thus end the war by October or November of 1917. Even though the United States should declare war, what could an unprepared nation like our own accomplish in such a brief period? Millions of troops we might indeed raise, but we could not train them in three or four months, and, even though we could perform such a miracle, it was ridiculous to suppose that we could transport them to Europe through the submarine danger zone. I have already shown that the Germans were not alone in thus predicting the course of events. In the month of April, 1917, I had found the Allied officials just about as distressed as the Germans were jubilant. Already the latter, in sinking merchant ships, had had successes which almost equalled their own predictions; no adequate means of defence against the submarine had been devised; and the chiefs of the British navy made no attempts to disguise their apprehension for the future.
Such was the atmosphere of gloom which prevailed in Allied councils in April, 1917; yet one year later the naval situation had completely changed. The reasons for that change have been set forth in the preceding pages. In that brief twelve months the relative position of the submarine had undergone a marked transformation. Instead of being usually the pursuer it was now often the pursued. Instead of sailing jauntily upon the high seas, sinking helpless merchantmen almost at will, it was half-heartedly lying in wait along the coasts, seeking its victims in the vessels of dispersed convoys. If it attempted to push out to sea, and attack a convoy, escorting destroyers were likely to deliver one of their dangerous attacks; if it sought the shallower coastal waters, a fleet of yachts, sloops, and subchasers was constantly ready to assail it with dozens of depth charges. An attempt to pass through the Straits of Dover meant almost inevitable destruction by mines; an attempt to escape into the ocean by the northern passage involved the momentary dread of a similar end or the hazard of navigating the difficult Pentland Firth. In most of the narrow passages Allied submarines lay constantly in wait with their torpedoes; a great fleet of airplanes and dirigibles was always circling above ready to rain a shower of bombs upon the under-water foe. Already the ocean floor about the British Isles held not far from 200 sunken submarines, with most of their crews, amounting to at least 4,000 men, whose deaths involved perhaps the most hideous tragedies of the war. Bad as was this situation, it was nothing compared with what it would become a few months or a year later. American and British shipyards were turning out anti-submarine craft with great rapidity; the industries of America, with their enormous output of steel, had been enlisted in the anti-submarine campaign. The American and British shipbuilding facilities were neutralizing the German campaign in two ways: they were not only constructing war vessels on a scale which would soon drive all the German submarines from the sea, but they were building merchant tonnage so rapidly that, in March, 1918, more new tonnage was launched than was being destroyed. Thus by this time the Teutonic hopes of ending the war by the submarine had utterly collapsed; if the Germans were to win the war at all, or even to obtain a peace which would not be disastrous, some other programme must be adopted and adopted quickly.
Disheartened by their failure at sea, the enemy therefore turned their eyes once more toward the land. The destruction of Russian military power had given the German armies a great numerical superiority over those of the Allies. There seemed little likelihood that the French or the British, after three years of frightfully gruelling war, could add materially to their forces. Thus, with the grouping of the Powers, such as existed in 1917, the Germans had a tremendous advantage on their side, for Russia, which German statesmen for fifty years had feared as a source of inexhaustible man-supply to her enemies, had disappeared as a military power. But a new element in the situation now counterbalanced this temporary gain; that was the daily increasing importance of the United States in the war. The Germans, who in 1917 had despised us as an enemy, immediate or prospective, now despised us no longer. The army which they declared could never be raised and trained was actually being raised and trained by the millions. The nation which their publicists had denounced as lacking cohesion and public spirit had adopted conscription simultaneously with their declaration of war, and the people whom the Germans had affected to regard as devoted only to the pursuit of gain and pleasure had manifested a unity of purpose which they had never before displayed, and had offered their lives, their labours, and their wealth without limit to the cause of the Allies. Up to March, 1918, only a comparatively small part of this American army had reached Europe, but the Germans had already tested its fighting quality and had learned to respect it. Yet all these manifestations would not have disturbed the Germanic calculations except for one depressing fact. Even a nation of 100,000,000 brave and energetic people, fully trained and equipped for war, is not a formidable foe so long as an impassable watery gulf of three thousand miles separates them from the field of battle.
For the greater part of 1917 the German people believed that their submarines could bar the progress of the American armies. By March, 1918, they had awakened from this delusion. Not only was an American army millions strong in process of formation, but the alarming truth now dawned upon the Germans that it could be transported to Europe. The great industries of America could provide munitions and food to supply any number of soldiers indefinitely, and these, too, could be brought to the Western Front. Outwardly, the German chiefs might still affect to despise this new foe, but in their hearts they knew that it spelt their doom. They were not now dealing with a corrupt Czardom and hordes of ignorant and passionless Slavs, who could be eliminated by propaganda and sedition; they were dealing with millions of intelligent and energetic freemen, all animated by a mighty and almost religious purpose. Yet the situation, desperate as it seemed, held forth one more hope. If the German armies, which still greatly outnumbered the French and British, could strike and win a decisive victory before the Americans could arrive, then they might still force a satisfactory peace. "It is a race between Ludendorff and Wilson" is the terse and accurate way in which Lloyd George summed up the situation. The great blow fell on March 21, 1918; the British and the French met it with heroism, but it was quite evident that they were fighting against terrible odds. At this time the American army in France numbered about 300,000 men; it now became the business of the American navy, assisted by the British, to transport the American troops who could increase these forces sufficiently to turn the balance in the Allies' favour.
The supreme hour, to which all the anti-submarine labours of the preceding year were merely preliminary, had now arrived. Since the close of the war there has been much discussion of the part which the American navy played in bringing it to a successful end. Even during the war there was some criticism on this point. There were two more or less definite opinions in the public mind upon this question. One was that the main business of our war vessels was to convoy the American soldiers to France; the other emphasized the anti-submarine warfare as its most important duty. Anyone would suppose, from the detached way in which these two subjects have been discussed, that the anti-submarine warfare and the successful transportation of troops were separate matters. An impression apparently prevails that, at the beginning of the war, the American navy could have quietly decided whether it would devote its energies to making warfare on the submarine or to convoying American armies; yet the absurdity of such a conception must be apparent to anyone who has read the foregoing pages. The several operations in which the Allied navies engaged were all part of a comprehensive programme; they were all interdependent. According to my idea, the business of the American navy was to join its forces whole-heartedly with those of the Allies in the effort _to win the war_. Anything which helped to accomplish this great purpose became automatically our duty. Germany was basing her chances of success upon the submarine; our business was therefore to assist in defeating the submarine. The cause of the Allies was our cause; our cause was the cause of the Allies; anything which benefited the Allies benefited the United States; and anything which benefited the United States benefited the Allies. Neither we nor France nor England were conducting a separate campaign; we were separate units of an harmonious whole. At the beginning the one pressing duty was to put an end to the sinking of merchantmen, not because these merchantmen were for the larger part British, but because the failure to do so would have meant the elimination of Great Britain from the war, with results which would have meant defeat for the other Allies. Let us imagine, for a moment, what the sequence of events would have been had the submarine campaign against merchant shipping succeeded; in that case Britain and France would have been compelled to surrender unconditionally and the United States would therefore have been forced to fight the Central Empires alone. Germany's terms of peace would have included the surrender of all the Allied fleets; this would eventually have left the United States navy to fight the German navy reinforced by the ships of Great Britain, Austria, France, and Italy. In such a contest we should have been outnumbered about three or four to one. I have such confidence in the power and purpose of America as to believe that, even in a single-handed conflict with Germany, we should have won in the end; but it is evident that the problem would have been quite a different one from that of fighting in co-operation with the Allies against the Germanic foe.
Simply as a matter of self-interest and strategy it was certainly wisdom to throw the last ounce of our strength into the scale of the Allied navies; and it was therefore inevitable that we should first of all use our anti-submarine craft to protect all shipping sailing to Europe and to clear the sea of submarines. In doing this we were protecting the food supply not only of Great Britain, but of France and our other Allies, for most of the materials which we sent to our European friends were transported first to England and thence were shipped across the Channel. Moreover, our twelve months' campaign against the submarine was an invaluable preliminary to transporting the troops. Does any sane person believe that we could have put two million Americans into France had the German submarines maintained until the spring and summer of 1918 the striking power which had been theirs in the spring of 1917? Merely to state the question is to answer it. In that same twelve months we had gained much experience which was exceedingly valuable when we began transporting troops in great numbers. The most efficacious protection to merchant shipping, the convoy, was similarly the greatest safeguard to our military transports. Those methods which had been so successfully used in shipping food, munitions, and materials were now used in shipping soldiers. The section of the great headquarters which we had developed in London for routing convoys was used for routing transports, and the American naval officer, Captain Byron A. Long, who had demonstrated such great ability in this respect, was likewise the master mind in directing the course of the American soldiers to France.
In other ways we had laid the foundations for this, the greatest troop movement in history. In the preceding twelve months we had increased the oil tankage at Brest more than fourfold, sent over repair ships, and augmented its repair facilities. This port and all of our naval activities in France were under the command first of Rear-Admiral Wm. B. Fletcher, and later Rear-Admiral Henry B. Wilson. It was a matter of regret that we could not earlier have made Brest the main naval base for the American naval forces in France, for it was in some respects strategically better located for that purpose than was any other port in Europe. Even for escorting certain merchant convoys into the Channel Brest would have provided a better base than either Plymouth or Queenstown. A glance at the map explains why. To send destroyers from Queenstown to pick up convoys and escort them into the Channel or to French ports and thence return to their base involved a long triangular trip; to send such destroyers from Brest to escort these involved a smaller amount of steaming and a direct east and west voyage. Similarly, Queenstown was a much better location for destroyers sent to meet convoys bound for ports in the Irish Sea over the northern "trunk line." But unfortunately it was utterly impossible to use the great natural advantages of Brest in the early days of war; the mere fact that this French harbour possessed most inadequate tankage facilities put it out of the question, and it was also very deficient in docks, repair facilities, and other indispensable features of a naval base. At this time Brest was hardly more than able to provide for the requirements of the French, and it would have embarrassed our French allies greatly had we attempted to establish a large American force there, before we had supplied the essential oil fuel and repair facilities. The ships which we did send in the first part of the war were mostly yachts, of the "dollar-a-year" variety, which their owners had generously given to the national service; their crews were largely of that type of young business man and college undergraduate to whose skill and devotion I have already paid tribute. This little flotilla acquitted itself splendidly up and down the coast of France. Meanwhile, we were constructing fuel-oil tanks; and as soon as these were ready and repair ships were available, we began building up a large force at Brest--a force which was ultimately larger than the one we maintained at Queenstown; at the height of the troop movements it comprised about 36 destroyers, 12 yachts, 3 tenders, and several mine-sweepers and tugs. The fine work which this detachment accomplished in escorting troop and supply convoys is sufficient evidence of the skill acquired by the destroyers and other vessels in carrying out their duties in this peculiar warfare.
Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, a great organization had been created under the able direction of Rear-Admiral Albert Gleaves for maintaining and administering the fleet of transports and their ocean escorts. Also, as soon as war was declared the work was begun of converting into transports those German merchant ships which had been interned in American ports. The successful completion of this work was, in itself, a great triumph for the American navy. Of the vessels which the Germans had left in our hands, seventeen at New York, Boston, Norfolk, and Philadelphia, seemed to be adapted for transport purposes, but the Germans had not intended that we should make any such use of them. The condition of these ships, after their German custodians had left, was something indescribable; they reflected great discredit upon German seamanship, for it would have been impossible for any people which really loved ships to permit them to deteriorate as had these vessels and to become such cesspools of filth. For three years the Germans had evidently made no attempt to clean them; the sanitary conditions were so bad that our workmen could not sleep on board, but had to have sleeping quarters near the docks; they spent weeks scrubbing, scraping, and disinfecting, in a finally successful effort to make the ships suitable habitations for human beings. Not only had the Germans permitted such liners as the _Vaterland_ and the _Kronprinzessin Cecilie_ to go neglected, but, on their departure, they had attempted to injure them in all conceivable ways. The cylinders had been broken, engines had been smashed, vital parts of the machinery had been removed and thrown into the sea, ground glass had been placed in the oil cups, gunpowder had been placed in the coal--evidently in the hope of causing explosions when the vessels were at sea--and other damage of a more subtle nature had been done, it evidently being the expectation that the ships would break down when on the ocean and beyond the possibility of repair. Although our navy yards had no copies of the plans of these vessels or their machinery--the Germans having destroyed them all--and although the missing parts were of peculiarly German design, they succeeded, in an incredibly short time, in making them even better and speedier vessels than they had ever been before.
The national sense of humour did not fail the transport service when it came to rechristening these ships; the _Princess Irene_ became the _Pocahontas_, the _Rhein_ the _Susquehanna_; and there was also an ironic justice in the fact that the _Vaterland_, which had been built by the Germans partly for the purpose of transporting troops in war, actually fulfilled this mission, though not quite in the way which the Germans had anticipated. Meanwhile, both the American and the British mercantile marines were supplementing this German tonnage. The first troops which we sent to France, in June, 1917, were transported in ships of the United Fruit Company; and when the German blow was struck, in March, 1918, both the United States and Great Britain began collecting from all parts of the world vessels which could be used as troop transports. We called in all available vessels from the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and the Great Lakes; England stripped her trade routes to South America, Australia, and the East, and France and Italy also made their contributions. Of all the American troops sent to France from the beginning of the war, the United States provided transports for 46·25 per cent., Great Britain for 51·25, the remainder being provided by France and Italy. Of those sent between March, 1918, and the armistice, American vessels carried 42·15 per cent., British 55·40 per cent.[8]
Yet there was one element in the safe transportation of troops which was even more fundamental than those which I have named. The basis of all our naval operations was the dreadnoughts and the battle-cruisers of the Grand Fleet. It was this aggregation, as I have already indicated, which made possible the operation of all the surface ships that destroyed the effectiveness of the submarines. Had the Grand Fleet suddenly disappeared beneath the waves, all these offensive craft would have been driven from the seas, the Allies' sea lines of communication would have been cut, and the war would have ended in Germany's favour. From the time the transportation of troops began the United States had a squadron of five dreadnought battleships constantly with the Grand Fleet. The following vessels performed this important duty: the _New York_, Captain C. F. Hughes, afterward Captain E. L. Beach; the _Wyoming_, Captain H. A. Wiley, afterward Captain H. H. Christy; the _Florida_, Captain Thomas Washington, afterward Captain M. M. Taylor; the _Delaware_, Captain A. H. Scales; the _Arkansas_, Captain W. H. G. Bullard, afterward Captain L. R. de Steiguer; and the _Texas_, Captain Victor Blue. These vessels gave this great force an unquestioned preponderance, and made it practically certain that Germany would not attempt another general sea battle. Under Rear-Admiral Hugh Rodman, the American squadron performed excellent service and made the most favourable impression upon the chiefs of the Allied navies. Under the general policy of co-operation established throughout our European naval forces these vessels were quickly made a part of the Grand Fleet in so far as concerned their military operations. This was, of course, wholly essential to efficiency--a point the layman does not always understand--so essential, in fact, that it may be said that, if the Grand Fleet had gone into battle the day after our vessels joined, the latter might have decreased rather than increased the fighting efficiency of the whole; for, though our people and the British spoke the same language, the languages of the ships, that is, their methods of communication by signals, were wholly different. It was therefore our duty to stow our signal flags and books down below, and learn the British signal language. This they did so well that four days after their arrival they went out and manoeuvred successfully with the Grand Fleet. In the same way they adopted the British systems of tactics and fire control, and in every other way conformed to the established practices of the British. Too great praise cannot be given the officers and men of our squadron, not only for their efficiency and the cordiality of their co-operation, but for the patience with which they bore the almost continuous restriction to their ships, and the long vigil without the opportunity of a contact with the enemy forces. Just how well our ships succeeded in this essential co-operation was expressed by Admiral Sir David Beatty in the farewell speech which he made to them upon the day of their departure for home. He said in part:
"I want, first of all, to thank you, Admiral Rodman, the captains, officers, and ships' companies of the magnificent squadron, for the wonderful co-operation and the loyalty you have given to me and to my admirals; and the assistance that you have given us in every duty you had to undertake. The support which you have shown is that of true comradeship; and in time of stress, that is worth a very great deal.
"You will return to your own shores; and I hope in the sunshine, which Admiral Rodman tells me always shines there, you won't forget your 'comrades of the mist' and your pleasant associations of the North Sea....
"I thank you again and again for the great part the Sixth Battle Squadron played in bringing about the greatest naval victory in history. I hope you will give this message to your comrades: 'Come back soon. Good-bye and good luck!'"
But these were not the only large battleships which the United States had sent to European waters. Despite all the precautions which I have described, there was still one danger which constantly confronted American troop transports. By June and July, 1918, our troops were crossing the Atlantic in enormous numbers, about 300,000 a month, and were accomplishing most decisive results upon the battlefield. A successful attack upon a convoy, involving the sinking of one or more transports, would have had no important effect upon the war, but it would probably have improved German _moral_ and possibly have injured that of the Americans. There was practically only one way in which such an attack could be made; one or more German battle-cruisers might slip out to sea and assail one of our troop convoys. In order to prepare for such a possibility, the Department sent three of our most powerful dreadnoughts to Berehaven, Ireland--the _Nevada_, Captain A. T. Long, afterward Captain W. C. Cole; the _Oklahoma_, Captain M. L. Bristol, afterward Captain C. B. McVay; and the _Utah_, Captain F. B. Bassett, the whole division under the command of Rear-Admiral Thomas S. Rodgers. This port is located in Bantry Bay, on the extreme southwestern coast. For several months our dreadnoughts lay here, momentarily awaiting the news that a German raider had escaped, ready to start to sea and give battle. But the expected did not happen. The fact that this powerful squadron was ready for the emergency is perhaps the reason why the Germans never attempted the adventure.
II
A reference to the map which accompanies this chapter will help the reader to understand why our transports were able to carry American troops to France so successfully that not a single ingoing ship was ever struck by a torpedo. This diagram makes it evident that there were two areas of the Atlantic through which American shipping could reach its European destination. The line of division was about the forty-ninth parallel of latitude, the French city of Brest representing its most familiar landmark. From this point extending southward, as far as the forty-fifth parallel, which corresponds to the location of the city of Bordeaux, is a great stretch of ocean, about 200 miles wide. It includes the larger part of the Bay of Biscay, which forms that huge indentation with which our school geographies have made us Americans so familiar, and which has always enjoyed a particular fame for its storms, the dangers of its coast, and the sturdy and independent character of the people on its shores. The other distinct area to which the map calls attention extends northerly from the forty-ninth parallel to the fifty-second; it comprises the English Channel, and includes both the French channel ports, the British ports, the southern coast of Ireland, and the entrance to the Irish Sea. The width of this second section is very nearly the same as that of the one to the south, or about 200 miles.
Up to the present moment this narrative has been concerned chiefly with the northernmost of these two great sea pathways. Through this one to the north passed practically all the merchant shipping which was destined for the Allies. Consequently, as I have described, it was the great hunting ground of the German submarines. I have thus far had little to say of the Bay of Biscay section because, until 1918, there was comparatively little activity in that part of the ocean. For every ship which sailed through this bay I suppose that there were at least 100 which came through the Irish Sea and the English Channel. In my first report to the Department I described the principal scene of submarine activity as the area of the Atlantic reaching from the French island of Ushant--which lies just westward of Brest--to the tip of Scotland, and that remained the chief scene of hostilities to the end. Along much of the coastline south of Brest the waters were so shallow that the submarines could operate only with difficulty; it was a long distance from the German bases; the shipping consisted largely of coastal convoys; much of this was the coal trade from England; it is therefore not surprising that the Germans contented themselves with now and then planting mines off the most important harbours. Since our enemy was able to maintain only eight or ten U-boats in the Atlantic at one time it would have been sheer waste of energy to have stationed them off the western coast of France. They would have put in their time to little purpose, and meanwhile the ships and cargoes which they were above all ambitious to destroy would have been safely finding their way into British ports.
The fact that we had these two separate areas and that these areas were so different in character was what made it possible to send our 2,000,000 soldiers to France without losing a single man. From March, 1918, to the conclusion of the war, the American and British navies were engaged in two distinct transportation operations. The shipment of food and munitions continued in 1918 as in 1917, and on an even larger scale. With the passing of time the mechanism of these mercantile convoys increased in efficiency, and by March, 1918, the management of this great transportation system had become almost automatic. Shipping from America came into British ports, it will be remembered, in two great "trunk lines," one of which ran through the English Channel and the other up the Irish Sea. But when the time came to bring over the American troops, we naturally selected the area to the south, both because it was necessary to send the troops to France and because we had here a great expanse of ocean which was relatively free of submarines. Our earliest troop shipments disembarked at St. Nazaire; later, when the great trans-Atlantic liners, both German and British, were pressed into service, we landed many tens of thousands at Brest; and all the largest French ports from Brest to Bordeaux took a share. A smaller number we sent to England, from which country they were transported across the Channel into France; when the demands became pressing, indeed, hardly a ship of any kind was sent to Europe without its quota of American soldiers; but, on the whole, the business of transportation in 1918 followed simple and well-defined lines. We sent mercantile convoys in what I may call the northern "lane" and troop convoys in the southern "lane." We kept both lines of traffic for the most part distinct; and this simple procedure offered to our German enemies a pretty problem.
For, I must repeat, the German navy could maintain in the open Atlantic an average of only about eight or ten of her efficient U-boats at one time. The German Admiralty thus had to answer this difficult question: Shall we use these submarines to attack mercantile convoys or to attack troop convoys? The submarine flotilla which was actively engaged was so small that it was absurd to think of sending half into each lane; the Germans must send most of their submarines against cargo ships or most of them against troopships. Which should it be? If it were decided to concentrate on mercantile vessels then the American armies, which the German chiefs had declared to their people could never get to the Western Front, would reach France and furnish General Foch the reserves with which he might crush the German armies before winter. If, on the other hand, the Germans should decide to concentrate on troopships, then the food and supplies which were essential to the Allied cause would flow at an even greater rate into Great Britain and thence to the European nations. Whether it were more important, in a military sense, to cut the Allies' commercial lines of communication or to sink troop transports is an interesting question. It is almost impossible for the Anglo-Saxon mind to consider this as a purely military matter, apart from the human factors involved. The sinking of a great transport, with 4,000 or 5,000 American boys on board, would have been a dreadful calamity and would have struck horror to the American people; it was something which the Navy was determined to prevent, and which we did prevent. Considered as a strictly military question, however--and that was the only consideration which influenced the Germans--it is hard to see how the loss of one transport, or even the loss of several, would have materially affected the course of the war. In judging the purely military results of such a tragedy, we must remember that the Allied armies were losing from 3,000 to 5,000 men a day; thus the sinking of an American transport once a week would not have particularly affected the course of the war. The destruction of merchant shipping in large quantities, however, represented the one way in which the Germans could win. There were at least a hundred merchant ships to every one of our troopships; if a considerable number of the former could be sunk, Germany would have scored a decisive advantage. From the declaration of submarine warfare, the objective of the German Admiralty had been for "tonnage"; by March, 1918, as already said, the chances of destroying sufficient tonnage to win had become extremely slight; yet it still represented the one logical mission of the submarine.
The two alternatives, however, that of attacking mercantile convoys or troop convoys, hardly existed in fact. Let us suppose for a moment that the Germans had changed their programme, had taken their group of operating submarines from the northern trade routes, and had stationed them to the south, in the track of the troop transports. What would the results have been? "Lane," though a convenient word for descriptive purposes, is hardly an accurate one; for this ocean passage-way was really about 200 miles wide. Imagine eight or ten submarines, stretched across that expanse and hunting for troopships. At this rate the Germans would have had about one submarine for every twenty miles. Instead of finding themselves sailing amid a swarm of surface ships, as they were when they were stationed in the busy trade routes of the Irish Sea or the English Channel, the submarines would have found themselves drifting on a great waste of waters. Our troop convoys averaged not more than three a week even in the busiest period; in all probability the submarines would therefore have hung around for a month without catching a glimpse of one. Even if by some chance the patient vigil should finally have been rewarded, it is extremely unlikely that the submarine would ever have found a favourable opportunity to attack. We must keep in mind that the convoy room at the Admiralty knew, within certain limits, the location of submarines from day to day; any time one was located in the track of a troop convoy, therefore, a wireless to the convoy would have conveyed this information and directed it to reach the coast of France by another route.
At the beginning the speediest vessels only were used for transporting troops. Ships which made less than twelve knots an hour were not deemed safe for such precious cargoes; when the need for troops became more and more pressing and when our transport service had demonstrated great skill in the work, a few slower vessels were used; but the great majority of our troop transports were those which made twelve knots or more. Now one of the greatest protections which a ship possesses against submarine attack is unquestionably high speed. A submarine makes only eight knots when submerged--and it must submerge immediately if its attack is to be successful. It must be within at least a mile of its quarry when it discharges its torpedo; and most successful attacks were made within three hundred yards. Now take a pencil and a piece of paper and figure out what must be the location of a submarine, having a speed of eight knots, when it sights a convoy, which makes twelve knots and more, if it hopes to approach near enough to launch a torpedo. A little diagramming will prove that the U-boat must be almost directly in line of its hoped-for victim if it is to score a hit. But even though the god of Chance should favour the enemy in this way, the likelihood of sinking its prey would still be very remote. Like all convoys, the troopships began zigzagging as soon as they entered the danger zone; and this in itself made it almost impossible for a submarine to get its bearings and take good aim. I believe that these circumstances in themselves--the comparative scarcity of troop transports, the width of the "lane" in which they travelled, the high speed which they maintained, and their constant zigzagging, would have defeated most of the attempts which the Germans could have made to torpedo them. Though I think that most of them would have reached their destinations unharmed without any other protection, still this risk, small as it was, could not be taken; and we therefore gave them one other protection greater than any of those which I have yet mentioned--the destroyer escort. A convoy of four or five large troopships would be surrounded by as many as ten or a dozen destroyers. Very properly, since they were carrying human cargoes, we gave them an escort at least three times as large per vessel as that given to large mercantile convoys of twenty or more vessels; and this fact made them very uninviting baits for the most venturesome U-boat commanders.
When the engineers build a Brooklyn bridge they introduce an element which they call the factor of safety. It is their usual procedure to estimate the greatest weight which their structure may be called upon to bear under any conceivable circumstances and then they make it strong enough to stand a number of times that weight. This additional strength is the "factor of safety"; it is never called into use, of course, but the consciousness that it exists gives the public a sense of security which it could obtain in no other way. We adopted a similar policy in transporting these millions of American boys to Europe. We also had a large margin of safety. We did not depend upon one precaution to assure the lives of our soldiers; we heaped one precautionary measure on another. From the embarking of the troops at New York or at Hampton Roads to the disembarkation at Brest, St. Nazaire, La Pallice, Bordeaux, or at one of their other destinations, not the minutest safeguard was omitted. We necessarily thus somewhat diminished the protection of some of the mercantile convoys--and properly so. This was done whenever the arrival of a troop convoy conflicted with the arrival of a merchant convoy. Also, until they reached the submarine zone, they were attended by a cruiser or a battleship whose business it was to protect them against a German raider which might possibly have made its escape into the ocean; the work performed by these ocean escorts, practically all of which were American, was for the most part unobtrusive and unspectacular, but it constitutes a particularly fine example of efficiency and seamanlike devotion. At Berehaven, Ireland, as described above, we had stationed three powerful American dreadnoughts, momentarily prepared to rush to the scene in case one of the great German battle-cruisers succeeded in breaking into the open sea. Even the most minute precautions were taken by the transports.
The soldiers and crews were not permitted to throw anything overboard which might betray the course of a convoy; the cook's refuse was dropped at a particular time and in a way that would furnish no clue to a lurking submarine; even a tin can, if thrown into the sea, was first pierced with holes to make sure that it would sink. Anyone who struck a match at night in the danger zone committed a punishable offence. It is thus apparent why the Germans never "landed" a single one of our transports. The records show only three or four cases in which even attempts were made to do this; and those few efforts were feeble and ineffectual. Of course, the boys all had exciting experiences with phantom submarines; indeed I don't suppose that there is a single one of our more than 2,000,000 troops who has not entertained his friends and relatives with accounts of torpedo streaks and schools of U-boats.
But the Germans made no concerted campaign against our transports; fundamental conditions, already described, rendered such an offensive hopeless; and the skill with which our transport service was organized and conducted likewise dissuaded them. I have always believed that the German Admiralty ordered their U-boat captains to let the American transports alone; or at least not to attack except under very favourable circumstances, and this belief is rather confirmed by a passage in General Ludendorff's memoirs. "From our previous experience of the submarine war," General Ludendorff writes, "I expected strong forces of Americans to come, but the rapidity with which they actually did arrive proved surprising. General von Cramon, the German military representative at the Austro-Hungarian Headquarters, often called me up and asked me to insist on the sinking of American troopships; public opinion in Austria-Hungary demanded it. Admiral von Holtzendorff could only reply that everything was being done to reduce enemy tonnage and to sink troopships. It was not possible to direct the submarines against troopships exclusively. They could approach the coasts of Europe anywhere between the north of England and Gibraltar, a front of some fourteen hundred nautical miles. It was impossible effectively to close this area by means of submarines. One could have concentrated them only on certain routes; but whether the troopships would choose the same routes at the same time was the question. As soon as the enemy heard of submarines anywhere he could always send the ships new orders by wireless and unload at another port. It was, therefore, not certain that by this method we should meet with a sufficient number of troopships. The destruction of the enemy's freight tonnage would then have been undertaken only spasmodically, and would have been set back in an undesirable manner; and in that way the submarine war would have become diverted from its original object. The submarine war against commerce was therefore continued with all the vigour possible."
Apparently it became the policy of the German Admiralty, as I have said, to concentrate their U-boats on merchant shipping and leave the American troopships practically alone--at least those bound to Europe. Unfortunately, however, at no time did we have enough destroyers to provide escorts for all of these transports as fast as they were unloaded and ready to return to America, but as time in the "turn around" was the all-important consideration in getting the troops over, the transports were sent back through the submarine zone under the escort of armed yachts, and occasionally not escorted at all. Under these conditions the transports could be attacked with much less risk, as was shown by the fact that five were torpedoed, though of these happily only three were sunk.
III
The position of the German naval chiefs, as is shown by the quotation from General Ludendorff's book, was an extremely unhappy one. They had blatantly promised the German people that their submarines would prevent the transportation of American troops to Europe. At first they had ridiculed the idea that undisciplined, unmilitary America could ever organize an army; after we adopted conscription and began to train our young men by the millions, they just as vehemently proclaimed that this army could never be landed in Europe. In this opinion the German military chieftains were not alone. No such army movement had ever before been attempted. The discouraging forecast made by a brilliant British naval authority in July, 1917, reflected the ideas of too many military people on both sides of the ocean. "I am distressed," he said, "at the fact that it appears to me to be impossible to provide enough shipping to bring the American army over in hundreds of thousands to France, and, after they are brought over, to supply the enormous amount of shipping which will be required to keep them full up with munitions, food, and equipment."
It is thus not surprising that the German people accepted as gospel the promises of their Admiralty; therefore their anger was unbounded when American troops began to arrive. The German newspapers began to ask the most embarrassing questions. What had become of their submarines? Had the German people not been promised that their U-boats would sink any American troopships that attempted to cross the ocean? As the shipments increased, and as the effect of these vigorous fresh young troops began to be manifest upon the Western Front, the outcries in Germany waxed even more fierce and abusive. Von Capelle and other German naval chiefs made rambling speeches in the Reichstag, once more promising their people that the submarines would certainly win the war--speeches that were followed by ever-increasing arrivals of American soldiers in France. The success of our transports led directly to the fall of Von Capelle as Minister of Marine; his successor, Admiral von Mann, who was evidently driven to desperation by the popular outburst, decided to make one frantic attempt to attack our men. The new minister, of course, knew that he could accomplish no definite results; but the sinking of even one transport with several thousand troops on board would have had a tremendous effect upon German _moral_. When the great British liner _Justicia_ was torpedoed, the German Admiralty officially announced that it was the _Leviathan_, filled with American soldiers; and the jubilation which followed in the German press, and the subsequent dejection when it was learned that this was a practically empty transport, sailing westward, showed that an actual achievement of this kind would have raised their drooping spirits. Admiral von Mann, therefore, took several submarines away from the trade routes and sent them into the transport zone. But they did not succeed even in attacking a single east-bound troopship. The only result accomplished was the one which, from what I have already said, would have been expected; the removal of the submarines from the commercial lane caused a great fall in the sinking of merchant ships. In August, 1918, these sinkings amounted to 280,000 tons; in September and October, when this futile drive was made at American transports, the sinkings fell to 190,000 and 110,000 tons.
Too much praise cannot be given to the commanders of our troop convoys and the commanding officers of the troop transports, as well as the commanders of the cruisers and battleships that escorted them from America to the western edge of the submarine zone. The success of their valuable services is evidence of a high degree not only of nautical skill, judgment, and experience, but of the admirable seamanship displayed under the very unusual conditions of steaming without lights while continuously manoeuvring in close formation. Moreover, their cordial co-operation with the escorts sent to meet them was everything that could be desired. In this invaluable service these commanding officers had the loyal and enthusiastic support of the admirable petty officers and men whose initiative, energy, and devotion throughout the war enabled us to accomplish results which were not only beyond our expectations but which demonstrated that they are second to none in the world in the qualities which make for success in war on the sea.
On the whole, the safeguarding of American soldiers on the ocean was an achievement of the American navy. Great Britain provided a slightly larger amount of tonnage for this purpose than the United States; but about 82 per cent. of the escorting was done by our own forces. The cruiser escorts across the ocean to France were almost entirely American; and the destroyer escorts through the danger zone were likewise nearly all our own work. And in performing this great feat the American navy fulfilled its ultimate duty in the war. The transportation of these American troops brought the great struggle to an end. On the battlefield they acquitted themselves in a way that aroused the admiration of their brothers in the naval service. When we were reading, day by day, the story of their achievements, when we saw the German battle lines draw nearer and nearer to the Rhine, and, finally, when the German Government raised its hands in abject surrender, the eighteen months' warfare against the German submarines, in which the American navy had been privileged to play its part, appeared in its true light--as one of the greatest victories against the organized forces of evil in all history.
FOOTNOTE:
[8] These figures are taken from the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1919, page 207.
THE END
APPENDIX I
OFFICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO PUBLISH "THE VICTORY AT SEA"
U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND
14 June 1919.
From: Rear-Admiral Wm. S. Sims, U.S. Navy.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Requests Permission to Publish a Book on the Activities of the U.S. Navy during The Great War.
Reference (a): Paragraph 1534 of the Articles for the Government of the Navy of the United States.
1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a) I request authority to publish in my name a book descriptive of the activities of the U.S. Naval Forces operating in European waters during The Great War.
2. My object in preparing this book is to familiarize the American people with the great work accomplished by the Navy during the war. It will be a popular presentation written in a nontechnical style, illustrated with photographs taken in Europe and various diagrams indicating the nature of our activities.
[s] WM. S. SIMS.
9 July 1919. APPROVED. [s] Josephus Daniels.
HWS-MEF
2nd Indorsement. OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, Washington, D.C.
11 July 1919.
From: Director of Naval Intelligence.
To: President Naval War College.
1. Forwarded.
[s] A. P. NIBLACK.
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, WASHINGTON
June 26, 1919.
MY DEAR ADMIRAL:
I am sending you in the regular official course my approval of your plan to print and publish a book relative to the operations of the naval forces under your command during the great war. I am happy that you are going to undertake this, because I am sure it will be of great value to the Navy and of interest to the world.
With sentiments of esteem and high regard,
Sincerely yours, [s] JOSEPHUS DANIELS.
P.S.
Of course any facilities or assistance that the Navy Department can render you will be at your disposal.
Rear-Admiral W. S. Sims, U.S.N., President Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.
_Extract from Navy Regulations, 1913, Article 1534_
"(2) No person belonging to the Navy or employed under the Navy Department shall publish or cause or permit to be published, directly or indirectly, or communicate by interviews, private letters, or otherwise, except as required by his official duties, any information in regard to the foreign policy of the United States, or concerning the acts or measures of any department of the Government or of any officer acting thereunder, or any comments or criticisms thereon; or the text of any official instructions, reports, or letters upon any subject whatever, or furnish copies thereof to any person, without the express permission of the Navy Department.
"(4) Nothing in this article shall be construed as prohibiting officers from forwarding to the department, through official channels, well-considered comment and suggestions with a view to promoting the efficiency of the service and the public interests; on the contrary, such suggestions are invited, but they should be in regard to things or methods and not a criticism of persons, and should in all cases be accompanied by a well-digested plan for improvement. Such suggestions, if approved by the department, will be entered on the officer's record and he will be duly notified to that effect."
APPENDIX II
FIRST CABLE MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Sent April 14, 1917. Through: State Department.
File No. 25-9-2.
The situation is as follows:
The submarine issue is very much more serious than the people realize in America. The recent success of operations and the rapidity of construction constitute the real crisis of the war. The _moral_ of the enemy submarines is not broken, only about fifty-four are known to have been captured or sunk and no voluntary surrenders have been recorded. The reports of our press are greatly in error. Recent reports circulated concerning surrenders are simply to depreciate enemy _moral_ and results are [not] very satisfactory.
Supplies and communications of forces all fronts, including the Russians, are threatened and control of the sea actually imperilled.
German submarines are constantly extending their operations into the Atlantic, increasing areas and the difficulty of patrolling. Russian situation critical. Baltic fleet mutiny, eighty-five admirals, captains, and commanders murdered, and in some armies there is insubordination.
The amount of British, neutral and Allied shipping lost in February was 536,000 tons, in March, 517,000 tons, and in the first ten days of April 205,000 tons. With short nights and better weather these losses are increasing.
The British forces could not effectively prevent the escape of some raiders during the long nights, but the chances are better now.
The Allies were notified that hospital ships will continue to be sunk, this in order to draw destroyers away from operations against submarines to convoy hospital ships; in this way causing a large demand for large convoy forces in all areas not before necessary, and also partially immobilizing the main fleet.
On account of the immense theatre and the length and number of lines of communication, and the material deterioration resulting from three years' continuous operation in distant fields with inadequate base facilities, the strength of the naval forces is dangerously strained. This applies to all of the sea forces outside of the Grand Fleet. The enemy has six large and sixty-four small submarine mine-layers; the latter carry eighteen mines and the former thirty-four, also torpedoes and guns. All classes submarines for actual commission completed at a rate approaching three per week. To accelerate and insure defeat of the submarine campaign immediate active co-operation absolutely necessary.
The issue is and must inevitably be decided at the focus of all lines of communications in the Eastern Atlantic, therefore I very urgently recommend the following immediate naval co-operation.
Maximum number of destroyers to be sent, accompanied by small anti-submarine craft; the former to patrol designated high seas area westward to Ireland, based on Queenstown, with an advance base at Bantry Bay, latter to be an inshore patrol for destroyers: small craft should be of light draft with as high speed as possible but low speed also useful. Also repair ships and staff for base. Oil and docks are available but I advise sending continuous supply of fuel. German main fleet must be contained, demanding maximum conservation of the British main fleet. South of Scotland no base is so far available for this force.
At present our battleships can serve no useful purpose in this area, except that two divisions of dreadnoughts might be based on Brest for moral effect against anticipated raids by heavy enemy ships in the channel out of reach of the British main fleet.
The chief other and urgent practical co-operation is merchant tonnage and a continuous augmentation of anti-submarine craft to reinforce our advanced forces. There is a serious shortage of the latter craft. For towing the present large amount of sailing tonnage through dangerous areas sea-going tugs would be of great use.
The co-operation outlined above should be expedited with the utmost despatch in order to break the enemy submarine _moral_ and accelerate the accomplishment of the chief American objective.
It is very likely the enemy will make submarine mine-laying raids on our coast or in the Caribbean to divert attention and to keep our forces from the critical areas in the Eastern Atlantic through effect upon public opinion. The difficulty of maintaining submarine bases and the focussing of shipping on this side will restrict such operations to minor importance, although they should be effectively opposed, principally by keeping the Channel swept on soundings. Enemy submarine mines have been anchored as deep as ninety fathoms but majority at not more than fifty fathoms. Mines do not rise from the bottom to set depth until from twenty-four to forty-eight hours after they have been laid.
So far all experience shows that submarines never lay mines out of sight of landmarks or lights on account of danger to themselves if location is not known. Maximum augmentation merchant tonnage and anti-submarine work where most effective constitute the paramount immediate necessity.
Mr. Hoover informs that there is only sufficient grain supply in this country for three weeks. This does not include the supply in retail stores. In a few days Mr. Hoover will sail for the United States.
SIMS.
APPENDIX III
FIRST DETAILED REPORT ON THE ALLIED NAVAL SITUATION
LONDON, ENGLAND. April 19, 1917.
From: Rear-Admiral Wm. S. Sims, U.S.N.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Confirmation and elaboration of recent cablegrams concerning War situation and recommendations for U.S. Naval co-operation.
1. _Reception_:
My reception in this country has been exceptionally cordial and significant of the seriousness of present situation and the importance to be attached to the United States' entry into the war.
I was met at Liverpool by Rear-Admiral Hope, R.N., a member of Admiral Jellicoe's staff, and the Admiral of the Port, the former having been sent by the Admiralty to escort me to London. A special train was provided which made a record run, and within a few hours after arrival in London I was received by the First Sea Lord and his principal assistants in a special conference.
2. _Conferences_:
More or less hesitancy was noted at first in presenting a full statement of the true situation, particularly (as it developed later) on account of its seriousness, combined with a natural reluctance against appearing to seek assistance, and a hesitancy in taking chances of allowing information indirectly to reach the enemy, and thereby improve enemy _moral_.
I therefore positively took the position that I must be considered a part of the Admiralty organization, and that it was essential to safe and efficient co-operation that I be trusted with a full knowledge of the exact situation.
They finally consented, only after reference to the Imperial War Council, to my exposing the true state of affairs both as regards the military situation and rate of destruction of merchant shipping.
I have had daily conferences with the First Sea Lord, both at his office and residence, and also have been given entire freedom of the Admiralty and access to all Government Officials. I have freely consulted with such officials as the following:
Prime Minister.
First Lord of Admiralty (Sir Edward Carson).
Ministers of Munitions, Shipping, Trade, and other Cabinet officials.
First Sea Lord, and his assistants.
Chief of Naval Staff.
Directors (corresponding to our Chiefs of Bureaus) of Intelligence, Anti-submarine operations, Torpedoes, Mines, Mining, etc.
3. _General Statement of the Situation_:
Since the last declaration of the enemy Government, which from intelligence information was anticipated, the submarine campaign against merchant shipping of all Nations has resolved itself into the real issue of the war and, stated briefly, the Allied Governments have not been able to, and are not now, effectively meeting the situation presented.
4. As stated in my first despatch, the communications and supplies to all forces on all fronts, including Russian, are threatened, and the "Command of the Sea" is actually at stake.
5. My own views of the seriousness of the situation and the submarine menace have been greatly altered. My convictions and opinions, as probably those of the Department also, had been largely based upon Press reports and reports of our Attachés and other professional Americans who have been abroad during the War. All of this information has been either rigidly censored or else has been given out in such form that it would be of minimum assistance to enemy _moral_.
6. The necessity for secrecy, which the British Government has experienced, and which I repeatedly encounter in London, and even in the Admiralty itself, is impressive. There have been remarkable and unexpected leakages of information throughout the war. Certain neutral legations of smaller countries are now under strong suspicion.
7. The extent to which the submarine campaign is being waged is in itself excellent evidence of the importance attached to it by the enemy, and of the degree to which they counted, and still are counting, upon it.
The Intelligence Department has reliable information (as reliable as can be) that the enemy really reckoned that the Allies would be defeated in _two_ months through shortage of supplies.
8. With improved weather and the shorter nights now coming on we may expect even more enemy submarine success.
9. The Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet was yesterday in conference in the Admiralty as to what greater extent destroyers and auxiliaries of the Fleet may be utilized without endangering its power in the remote possibility of another fleet engagement.
The consensus of opinion seems to be that the latter will not occur, but there is not complete unanimity in this belief, and of course, in any case, the possibility must be adequately and continuously provided against.
_General discussion of situation_:
10. I delayed [four days] forwarding my first report of the situation with a view of obtaining the maximum information consistent with the importance of the time element. I was also somewhat deterred by a natural reluctance to alter so radically my preconceived views and opinions as to the situation.
11. The evidence is conclusive that, regardless of any enemy diversions such as raids on our coasts or elsewhere, the critical area in which the war's decision will be made is in the eastern Atlantic at the focus of all lines of communications.
The known number of enemy submarines and their rate of construction, allowing liberal factors for errors of information, renders it inevitable that the main submarine effort must continue to be concentrated in the above critical area.
12. Even in this critical area, it is manifest that the field is relatively large for the maximum number of submarines which the enemy can maintain in it. For example, with the present Admiralty policy (explained below) they are forced to cover all the possible trade routes of approach between the north of Scotland and Ushant.
13. From consideration of the above and all other essential information available, it is apparent that the enemy could not disperse his main submarine campaign into other quarters of the Globe without diminishing results in this and all areas to a degree which would mean failure to accomplish the Mission of the submarine campaign, which can be nothing else than a final decision of the war.
14. Considerable criticism has been, and still is, concentrated upon the Admiralty for not taking more effective steps and for failing to produce more substantial and visible results. One of the principal demands is for convoys of merchant shipping, and more definite and real protection within the war zone.
The answer, which manifestly is not publicly known, is simply that the necessary vessels are not available, and further that those which are available are suffering from the effects of three years of arduous service.
15. It is insistently asked (was asked by myself) why shipping is not directed to and concentrated at various rendezvous and from these convoyed through the dangerous areas. The answer is the same--the area is too large; the necessary vessels are not available.
16. However, I am now consulting with the Director of Shipping as to the practicability and advisability of attempting some approach to such a plan in case the United States is able to put in operation sufficient tonnage to warrant it.
17. After trying various methods of controlling shipping, the Admiralty now believes the best policy to be one of dispersion. They use about six relatively large avenues or arcs of approach to the United Kingdom and Channel, changing their limits or area periodically if necessity demands.
Generally speaking, one is to the north of Scotland, another to the north of Ireland, and three or four others covering the Irish Sea and Channel. Individual ships coming into any of these areas of approach are instructed, generally before sailing, to cross the twentieth meridian at certain and different latitudes and thence steer certain courses to port.
At times in the past they have found one of these avenues of approach free of submarines under such conditions as to lead them to concentrate shipping therein, but invariably the enemy has become aware of the course pursued.
18. The great difficulty in any method of shipping control is communication with the shipping itself and full co-operation by the merchant personnel. The moment a ship is captured the code either becomes dangerous or useless. The merchant code is being continually changed, and at all times it cannot be counted upon for more than a fortnight. The immense difficulty of changing the code and keeping shipping all over the world in touch with changes is apparent.
19. Continual trouble is experienced with some merchant Captains taking the law into their own hands and exhibiting contempt, or at least indifference, for Admiralty instructions. The American Liner _New York_ upon which I took passage furnishes a typical example. She was instructed to make Fastnet Light at daylight but she passed it about nine P.M., thus passing in daylight through the most dangerous area.
20. The Admiralty has had frequent conferences with Merchant masters and sought their advice. Their most unanimous demand is "Give us a gun and let us look out for ourselves." They are also insistent that it is impracticable for merchant vessels to proceed in formation, at least in any considerable numbers, due principally to difficulty in controlling their speed and to the inexperience of their subordinate officers. With this view I do not personally agree but believe that with a little experience merchant vessels could safely and sufficiently well steam in open formations.
21. The best protection against the submarine menace for all classes of ships, merchant as well as Naval, is SPEED and ZIGZAGGING, not more than fifteen minutes on a course. Upon this point no one disagrees, but on the contrary there is absolutely unanimity of opinion.
22. In the absence of adequate patrol craft, _particularly destroyers_, and until the enemy submarine _moral_ is broken, there is but one sure method of meeting the submarine issue upon which there is also complete unanimity--increased number of merchant bottoms, preferably small.
"More Ships! More Ships! More Ships!" is heard on every hand.
23. It is also significant that until very recently the Admiralty have been unable completely to convince some members of the Cabinet that the submarine issue is the deciding factor in the War. The civilian mind, here as at home, is loath to believe in unseen dangers, particularly until the pinch is felt in real physical ways.
24. The Prime Minister only two days ago expressed to me the opinion that it ought to be possible to find physical means of absolutely sealing up all escape for submarines from their own ports. The fact that all such methods (nets, mines, obstructions, etc.) inherently involve the added necessity of continuous protection and maintenance by our own Naval forces is seldom understood and appreciated. I finally convinced the Prime Minister of the fallacy of such propositions by describing the situations into which we would be led: namely, that in order to maintain our obstructions we would have to match the forces the enemy brought against them, until finally the majority if not all of our forces would be forced into dangerous areas where they would be subject to continual torpedo and other attack, in fact in a position most favourable to the enemy.
25. Entirely outside of the fact that the enemy does, and always can, force exits, and thereby nullify the close blockade, the weather is a serious added difficulty. The heaviest anchors obtainable have been used for nets, mines, and obstructions, only to have the arduous work of weeks swept away in a few hours of heavy weather. Moorings will not hold. They chafe through. In this respect we could be of great assistance, i.e. in supply of moorings and buoys.
26. The Channel is not now, and never has been, completely sealed against submarine egress, let alone the vaster areas of escape to the north. Submarines have gone under mine-fields, and have succeeded in unknown ways in evading and cutting through nets and obstructions.
27. In addition to submarines, heavy forces are free to raid, and in fact escape through, the Channel at any time when the enemy decides that the necessity or return will justify the risk. Hence the suggestion that two divisions of our fast Dreadnoughts might be based upon Brest, primarily for the resulting moral effect against such possible raids.
I was told yesterday by an important Admiralty official that while he thought the chances of raids in, or escape through, the Channel by heavy enemy forces out of reach of the Grand Fleet (North of Scotland) were very remote, nevertheless the possibility existed and was principally thwarted on moral grounds, that is, the uncertainty in his mind of the opposition which would be encountered. He agreed with others, including the First Sea Lord, that the addition of some of our heavy forces to those maintained in southern Channel approaches by the French and British would undoubtedly entirely preclude the possibility of such raids.
28. _Submarine Losses_:
It has been found necessary to accept _no_ reports of submarine losses as authentic and certain unless survivors are captured or the submarine itself is definitely located by dragging. No dependence even is placed upon evidence of oil on the surface after a submarine has been attacked and forced down, as there is reason to believe that when an enemy submarine dives to escape gunfire she is fitted to expel oil for the particular purpose of conveying the impression that she has been sunk and thereby avoid further pursuit. It has been shown that the amount of damage a submarine can stand is surprising and much more than was anticipated before the experience of the war. Upon a recent occasion a British submarine was mistaken for an enemy and though struck by several shells, dived and escaped to port.
The submarine losses which are certain since outbreak of war are as given in attached cablegram.
It is estimated that between thirty and forty submarines operate at a time in the waters surrounding the British Islands and French Coast. At least one is now known to be on White Sea trade lanes.
29. _Best anti-submarine weapons_:
One of the most efficient weapons now used by all destroyers and patrol craft against submarines is the so-called "Depth Charge," sample and drawings of which have been forwarded by our Naval Attaché. These are merely explosive charges designed to explode at a certain depth, formerly eighty feet, now about one hundred feet. They are dropped overboard where a submarine that has submerged is assumed to be and are counted upon to badly shake up and demoralize if they do not actually cause serious damage.
Howitzers and Bomb-throwers of large calibre are under construction, designed to throw similar depth charges to distances of about 2,000 yards. Details will be forwarded.
30. _Torpedo Protection_:
This subject may be summed up by the statement of the Captain of a British Dreadnought who said in effect that after a year's experience he did not fear being sunk by a torpedo. Unless struck by several the worst to be anticipated is damage to shafts or rudder, thus necessitating towing. Cruisers have often been struck and been able to reach port. Vital water-tight doors are kept continuously closed at sea.
Destroyer officers have been heard to express the curious opinion that the enemy ships were more or less unsinkable. This is probably to be explained by the fact that they carry very few supplies; that they have their storage spaces compartmented or filled with wood or other water-excluding material; and that when in port, they quarter their crews in barracks, and when leaving for a cruise carry the minimum amount of berthing and supply facilities. These points, however, are not positively known.
On the contrary, all vessels of the British Fleet must be kept fully supplied and fuelled at all times for extended cruising. This is particularly true of Battle-cruisers and Cruisers.
31. All officers of rank and actual experience consulted are convinced that the enemy have no unusual methods of protection, or in fact any "surprises" in ordnance or other fighting equipment.
32. All are agreed that the best protection against torpedoes is SPEED and ZIGZAGGING.
33. It is a common experience of the Naval as well as Merchant service that torpedo wakes are reported where none exist. Many reports are received of torpedoes barely missing ships. This was true in the Jutland Battle. The Captain on one Battleship said that he received numerous reports of torpedoes passing just ahead and just astern, nearly all of which he had reason to believe did not exist.
Streaks of suds, slicks, etc., are very deceiving and are easily mistaken for torpedo wakes, particularly when the danger of torpedoes is present. This accounts for many reports by passengers on liners and other merchant craft of seeing many torpedoes just miss their mark.
34. _Submarine versus Submarine_:
There has always been opposition to using submarines against submarines, principally on the grounds that the possibilities of their accomplishments would not be sufficiently great to justify the risk involved of mistaken identity and resulting damage to friends.
The Director of Anti-Submarine Warfare believes, however, that such operations promise well, and the experiment is now being tried with as many submarines as can be spared from the Grand Fleet. Some enemy submarines have been destroyed by this method, usually torpedoed. One valuable feature of this method lies in the fact that as long as our submarines are not so used, the enemy submarine is always perfectly safe in assuming that all submarines sighted are friends. If this certainty is removed the enemy will be forced to keep down more, and to take much greater precautions against detection. This is an advantage of no small account.
In addition to the possible offensive work that may be accomplished by our submarines on such duty, the plan furnishes us with more reliable information as to the limitations and capabilities of enemy vessels under the actual conditions existing in the areas in which they operate. Without this knowledge based on actual experience too much is left to conjecture which is liable to lead to a great deal of misdirected effort.
(Signed) WM. S. SIMS.
APPENDIX IV
THE QUESTION OF ARMING MERCHANT SHIPS
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Through Admiralty. From Queenstown.
Sent: June 28, 1917.
Admiralty for Secretary Navy Washington, providing it meets Admiralty's full approval.
From Admiral Sims.
Referring to Department's opinion, reported in last two cables, to the effect that adequate armament and trained crews constitute one of the most effective defensive anti-submarine measures, I again submit with all possible stress the following based on extended [Allied] war experience. The measures demanded, if enemy defeat in time is to be assured, are not defensive but offensive defensive. The merchantman's inherent weakness is lack of speed and protection. Guns are no defence against torpedo attack without warning, which is necessarily the enemy method of attack against armed ships. In this area alone during the last six weeks thirty armed ships were sunk by torpedoes without submarine being seen, although three of these were escorted each by a single destroyer. The result would of course have been the same no matter how many guns these ships carried or what their calibre. Three mystery ships, heavily manned by expert naval crews with much previous experience with submarine attack, have recently been torpedoed without warning. Another case within the month of mystery ship engaging submarine with gunfire at six thousand yards but submarine submerged and approached unseen and torpedoed ship at close range. The ineffectiveness of heaviest batteries against submarine attack is conclusively shown by Admiralty's practice always sending destroyers to escort their men-of-war. The comparative immunity of the relatively small number American ships, especially liners, is believed here to be due to the enemy's hopes that the pacifist movement will succeed. Cases are on record of submarines making successful gun attacks from advantageous sun position against armed ships without ship being able to see submarine. I submit that if submarine campaign is to be defeated it must be by offensive measures. The enemy submarine mission must be destruction of shipping and avoidance of anti-submarine craft. Enemy submarines are now using for their final approach an auxiliary periscope less than two inches in diameter. This information just acquired. All of the experience in this submarine campaign to date demonstrates that it would be a seriously dangerous misapprehension to base our action on the assumption that any armament on merchantmen is any protection against submarines which are willing to use their torpedoes. The British have now definitely decided the adoption, to the maximum practicable extent, convoys from sixteen to twenty ships. This is an offensive measure against submarines, as the latter will be subject to the attack of our anti-submarine craft whenever they come within torpedoing distance of convoyed merchantmen. Moreover it permits of concentrated attack by our forces and obliges the enemy to disperse his forces to cover the various routes of approach.
Concerning Department's reference to a scheme for protection of merchant shipping which will not interfere with present escort duties, I submit that the time element alone prevents utilization of any new anti-submarine invention. The campaign may easily be lost before any such schemes can come into effective operation. The enemy is certainly counting on maximum effort being exerted before long nights and bad weather of autumn, that is, in next three months. Heaviest effort may be anticipated in July and August. I again submit that protection of our coastlines and of Allied shipping must necessarily be carried out in field of enemy activity if it is to be effective. The mission of the Allies must be to force submarines to give battle. Hence no operations in home waters should take precedence over, or be allowed to diminish, the maximum effort we can exert in area in which enemy is operating, and must continue to operate in order to succeed.
SIMS.
APPENDIX V
THE ADVANTAGES OF THE CONVOY SYSTEM
LONDON, June 29, 1917.
From: Commander U.S. Naval Forces operating in European Waters.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: General report concerning military situation.
1. I feel that there is little to add to my recent cable despatches which, in view of the importance of the time element, have been made full and detailed.
2. To sum up my despatches briefly, I would repeat that I consider that the military situation is very grave indeed on account of the success of the enemy submarine campaign.
If the shipping losses continue as they have during the past four months, it is submitted that the Allies will be forced to dire straits indeed, if they will not actually be forced into an unsatisfactory peace.
The present rate of destruction is very much greater than the rate of building, and the shortage of tonnage is already so great that the efficiency of the naval forces is already reduced by lack of oil. Orders have just been given to use three-fifths speed, except in cases of emergency. This simply means that the enemy is winning the war.
3. My reasons for being so insistent in my cable despatches have been because of my conviction that measures of co-operation which we may take will be inefficient if they are not put into operation immediately, that is, within a month.
There is every reason to believe that the maximum enemy submarine effort will occur between now and the first of November, reaching its height probably during the latter part of July, if not earlier.
4. There is certainly no sovereign solution for the submarine menace except through well-established methods of warfare based upon fundamental military principles.
5. It is submitted that the cardinal military principle of concentration of effort is at present being pursued by the enemy and not by the Allies.
6. We are dispersing our forces while the enemy is concentrating his. The enemy's submarine mission is and must continue to be the destruction of merchant shipping. The limitations of submarines and the distances over which they must operate prevent them from attacking our naval forces, that is, anti-submarine craft. They cannot afford to engage anti-submarine craft with guns; they must use torpedoes. If they should do so to any considerable extent their limited supply would greatly reduce their period of operation away from base, and the number of merchantmen they could destroy. Their object is to avoid contact with anti-submarine craft. This they can almost always do, as the submarine can see the surface craft at many times the distance the surface craft can see a periscope, particularly one less than two inches in diameter.
Moreover, the submarine greatly fears the anti-submarine craft because of the great danger of the depth charges. Our tactics should therefore be such as to force the submarine to incur this danger in order to get within range of merchantmen.
7. It therefore seems to go without question that the only course for us to pursue is to revert to the ancient practice of convoy. This will be purely an offensive measure, because if we concentrate our shipping into convoys and protect it with our naval forces we will thereby force the enemy, in order to carry out his mission, to encounter naval forces which are not embarrassed with valuable cargoes, and which are a great danger to the submarine. At present our naval forces are wearing down their personnel and material in an attempted combination of escorting single ships, when they can be picked up, and also of attempting to seek and offensively engage an enemy whose object is to avoid such encounters. With the convoy system the conditions will be reversed. Although the enemy may easily know when our convoys sail, he can never know the course they will pursue or the route of approach to their destinations. Our escorting forces will thus be able to work on a deliberate prearranged plan, preserving their oil supplies and energy, while the enemy will be forced to disperse his forces and seek us. In a word, the handicap we now labour under will be shifted to the enemy; we will have adopted the essential principal of concentration while the enemy will lose it.
8. The most careful and thorough study of the convoy system made by the British Admiralty shows clearly that while we may have some losses under this system, owing to lack of adequate number of anti-submarine craft, they nevertheless will not be critical as they are at present.
9. I again submit that if the Allied campaign is to be viewed as a whole, there is no necessity for any high sea protection on our own coast. The submarine as a type of war vessel possesses no unusual characteristics different from those of other naval craft, with the single exception of its ability to submerge for a limited time. The difficulty of maintaining distant bases is the same for the submarine as it is for other craft. As long as we maintain control of the sea as far as surface craft are concerned, there can be no fear of the enemy establishing submarine bases in the Western Hemisphere.
10. To take an extreme illustration, if the enemy could be led or forced into diverting part of his submarine effort to the United States coast, or to any other area distant from the critical area surrounding the coast of France and the United Kingdom, the anti-submarine campaign would at once be won. The enemy labours under severe difficulties in carrying out his campaign, even in this restricted area, owing to the material limitations and the distances they must operate from their bases, through extremely dangerous localities. The extent of the United States coastline and the distances between its principal commercial ports preclude the possibility of any submarine effort in that part of the world except limited operations of diversion designed to affect public opinion, and thereby hold our forces from the vital field of action.
11. The difficulties confronting the convoy system are, of course, considerable. They are primarily involved in the widely dispersed ports of origin of merchant shipping; the difficulty of communication by cable; the time involved by communications by mail; and the difficulties of obtaining a co-operation and co-ordination between Allied Governments.
As reported by cable despatch, the British Government has definitely reached the decision to put the convoy system into operation as far as its ability goes. Convoys from Hampton Roads, Canada, Mediterranean, and Scandinavian countries are already in operation. Convoys from New York will be put in operation as soon as ships are available. The British navy is already strained beyond its capacity, and I therefore urgently recommend that we co-operate, at least to the extent of handling convoys from New York.
12. The dangers to convoys from high sea raiders is remote, but, of course, must be provided against, and hence the necessity for escorting cruisers or reserve battleships. The necessity is even greater, however, for anti-submarine craft in the submarine war zone.
13. As stated in my despatches, the arming of merchantmen is not a solution of the submarine menace, it serves the single purpose of forcing the submarine to use torpedoes instead of guns and bombs. The facts that men-of-war cannot proceed safely at sea without escort, and that in the Queenstown avenue of approach alone in the past six weeks there have been thirty armed merchantmen sunk, without having seen the submarine at all before the attack, seem to be conclusive evidence. A great mass of other evidence and war experience could be collected in support of the above.
14. The week ending June 19th has been one of great submarine activity. Evidence indicates that fifteen to nineteen of the largest and latest submarines have been operating, of which ten to thirteen were operating in the critical area to the west and south-west of the British Isles. The above numbers are exclusive of the smaller and earlier type of submarines, and submarines carrying mines alone. Two submarines are working to the westward of the Straits of Gibraltar. A feature of the week was the sinking of ships as far west as nineteen degrees. Three merchant ship convoys are en route from Hampton Roads, the last one, consisting of eighteen ships, having sailed on the 19th of June. One hundred and sixteen moored mines have been swept up during the week.
Twenty-two reports of encounters with enemy submarines in waters surrounding the United Kingdom have been reported during the week--three by destroyers, two by cruisers, two by mystery ships, one by French gunboat, three by submarines, nine by auxiliary patrol vessels, one by seaplane, and one by merchant vessel.
There is attached copy of report of operations by anti-submarine craft based on Queenstown.
(Signed) WM. S. SIMS.
APPENDIX VI
THE NAVY DEPARTMENT'S POLICY
From: Secretary of Navy.
To: Vice-Admiral Sims, U.S.S. _Melville_.
Received: July 10, 1917.
The following letter from the Secretary to the Secretary of State is quoted for your information and guidance as an index of the policy of the Department in relation to the co-operation of our naval forces with those of our Allies. Quote: After careful consideration of the present naval situation taken in connection with possible future situations which might arise, the Department is preparing to announce as its policy, in so far as it relates to the Allies. First, the most hearty co-operation with the Allies to meet the present submarine situation in European or other waters compatible with an adequate defence of our own home waters. Second, the most hearty co-operation with the Allies to meet any future situation arising during the present war period. Third, the realization that while a successful termination of the present war must always be the first Allied aim, and will probably result in diminished tension throughout the world, the future position of the United States must in no way be jeopardized by any disintegration of our main fighting fleet. Fourth, the conception that the present main military rôle of the United States naval force lies in its safeguarding the line of communications of the Allies. In pursuing this aim there will be generally speaking two classes of vessels engaged: minor craft and major craft, and two rôles of action, first, offensive and, second, defensive. Fifth, in pursuing the rôle set forth in paragraph four, the Department cannot too strongly insist on its opinion that the offensive must always be the dominant note in any general plans of strategy prepared. But as the primary rôle in all offensive preparations must perforce belong to the Allied powers, the Navy Department announces as its policy that in general it is willing to accept any joint plan of action of the Allies deemed necessary to meet immediate need. Sixth, pursuant to the above general policy, the Navy Department announces as its general plan of action the following: One, its willingness to send its minor fighting forces, composed of destroyers, cruisers, submarine chasers, auxiliaries in any number not incompatible with home needs, and to any field of action deemed expedient by the joint Allied Admiralties which would not involve a violation of our present state policy. Two, its unwillingness as a matter of policy to separate any division from the main fleet for service abroad, although it is willing to send the entire battleship fleet abroad to act as a united but co-operating unit when, after joint consultations of all Admiralties concerned, the emergency is deemed to warrant it and the extra tension imposed upon the line of communications due to the increase of fighting ships in European waters will stand the strain imposed upon it. Three, its willingness to discuss more fully plans for joint operations. End of Quote 11009.
(Sd) JOSEPHUS DANIELS.
APPENDIX VII
COMMENTS UPON NAVY DEPARTMENT'S POLICY
Office Vice-Admiral, Commanding U.S. Destroyer Forces European Waters. LONDON, July 16, 1917.
From: Vice-Admiral Sims.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Concerning Policy of U.S. Naval co-operation in war, and allied subjects.
1. The Department's cablegram of July 10, 1917, quoting a letter which had been addressed to the Secretary of State concerning naval policy in relation to the present war, was received on July 10th.
In view of the nature of certain parts of the policy set forth therein, I wish to indicate the general policy which has heretofore governed my recommendation.
2. I have assumed that our mission was to promote the maximum co-operation with the Allies in defeating a common enemy.
All of my despatches and recommendations have been based on the firm conviction that the above mission could and would be accomplished, and that hence such questions as the possibility of post war situations, or of all or part of the Allies being defeated and America being left alone, were not given consideration--in fact, I cannot see how we could enter into this war whole-heartedly if such considerations were allowed to diminish in any way the chances of Allied success.
3. The first course open to us which naturally occurs to mind is that we should look upon our service as part of the combined Allied service, of which the British Grand Fleet is the main body, and all other Allied naval forces disposed throughout the world, as necessary branches thereof.
This conception views our battleship fleet as a support or reserve of the Allied main body (the British Grand Fleet) and would lead to utilizing our other forces to fill in weak spots and to strengthen Allied lines, both offensively and defensively, wherever necessary.
Such a course might be considered as a disintegration of our fleet, and it is only natural, therefore, that hesitation and caution should be felt in its adoption.
4. I have felt, however, that it was possible to accomplish our mission without in any way involving the so-called disintegration of our fleet as a whole.
In the first instance I have assumed that our aim would be to project, or prepare to project, our maximum force against the enemy offensively.
5. An estimate of the situation shows clearly that the enemy is depending for success upon breaking down the Allies' lines of communications by virtue of the submarine campaign.
A necessary part of such a plan is to divert strength from the main fleet and from anti-submarine operations by such means as coastal raids, threats of landing operations, air raids, and attacks on hospital ships, which last necessitates destroyer escort for such vessels.
The submarine campaign itself, while it is of necessity concentrated primarily on the most vital lines of communications, is nevertheless carried out in such a manner as to lead the Allies to disperse, and not concentrate, their inadequate anti-submarine Forces.
The Allies are, of course, forced to contemplate at all times, and hence provide against, the possibility of another main fleet action.
6. A study of the submarine situation, the number of submarines available to the enemy, and the necessary lines of the Allies' communications, for both Army and Navy as well as civil needs, shows clearly that the enemy must direct his main effort in certain restricted areas.
These areas, as has repeatedly been reported, are included approximately in a circle drawn from about Ushant to the north of Scotland. The most effective field for enemy activity is, of course, close into the Irish Sea and Channel approaches, where all lines must focus.
But, as stated above, the enemy also attacks occasionally well out to sea and in other dispersed areas with a view of scattering the limited anti-submarine forces available.
It therefore seems manifest that the war not only is, but must remain, in European waters, in so far as success or failure is concerned.
7. Speaking generally, but disregarding for the moment the question of logistics, our course of action, in order to throw our main strength against the enemy, would be to move all our forces, including the battleship fleet, into the war area.
8. In view of the nature of the present sea warfare as effected by the submarine, such a movement by the battleships would necessitate a large force of light craft--much larger than our peace establishment provided. In addition to all destroyers, adequate protection of the fleet would require all other available light craft in the service, or which could be commandeered and put into service--that is, submarines, armed tugs, trawlers, yachts, torpedo boats, revenue cutters, mine-layers and mine-sweepers, and in fact any type of small craft which could be used as protective or offensive screens.
9. In view of the shipping situation, as affected by the submarine campaign, it has been impossible to date to see in what way our battleships could be supplied in case they were sent into the war area. This refers particularly to oil-burning vessels. It would therefore seem unwise to recommend such a movement until we could see clearly far enough ahead to ensure the safety of the lines of communication which such a force would require.
10. It is to be observed, however, that even in case the decision were made to move the battleships into the war area, it would unavoidably be greatly delayed both in getting together the necessary screening forces and also in getting such craft across the Atlantic.
In the meantime, and while awaiting a decision as to the movements of the battleship fleet, the submarine campaign has become so intensive, and the available anti-submarine craft have been so inadequate to meet it, that the necessity for increasing the anti-submarine forces in the war area to the maximum possible extent has become imperative.
11. As long, therefore, as the enemy fleet is contained by the stronger British fleet in a position of readiness, it would not seem a disintegration of our fleet to advance into the war area all the light craft of every description which would necessarily have to accompany the fleet in case it should be needed in this area.
Such movements of the light craft would not in any way separate them strategically from the battleships, as they would be operating between the enemy and our own main body and based in a position to fall back as the main body approached, or to meet it at an appointed place. This advance of light forces, strategically, would mean no delay whatever to our heavy forces, should the time come for their entry into the active war zone.
12. Another very important consideration is the fact that, pending the movement of the battleships themselves, all of the light forces would be gaining valuable war experience and would be the better prepared for operations of any nature in the future, either in connection with the fleet itself or independently.
It is also considered that it would not constitute a disintegration of our fleet to advance into the war zone, in co-operation with the British Grand Fleet or for other duty, certain units of our battleship fleet. These would merely constitute units advanced for purpose of enemy defeat, and which would always be in a position to fall back on the main part of our Fleet, or to join it as it approached the war zone.
It is for this reason that I recommended, on July 7, 1917, that all coal-burning dreadnoughts be kept in readiness for distant service in case their juncture with the Grand Fleet might be deemed advisable in connection with unexpected enemy developments.
It would, of course, be preferable to advance the entire fleet providing adequate lines of communications could be established to ensure their efficient operation. At the present time there is a sufficient coal supply in England to supply our coal-burning dreadnoughts, but the oil would be a very difficult problem as it must be brought in through the submarine zone.
When notified that the _Chester_, _Birmingham_, and _Salem_ were available for duty in the war area, I recommended, after consultation with the Admiralty, that they join the British Light Cruiser Squadrons in the North Sea, where there is always a constant demand for more ships, especially to oppose enemy raiding and other operations aimed at dispersing the Allied sea forces.
In view of the Department's reference to the Gibraltar situation, and also in consideration of the sea-keeping qualities of the seven gunboats of the _Sacramento_ class, it was recommended that they be based on Gibraltar for duty in assisting to escort convoys clear of the Straits, and particularly as this would release some British destroyers which are urgently needed in critical areas to the northward.
13. The Department's policy, as contained in its letter to the Secretary of State, refers in the first statement to an adequate defence of our own home waters. It would seem to be sound reasoning that the most effective defence which can be afforded to our home waters is an offensive campaign against the enemy which threatens those waters. Or in other words, that the place for protection of home waters is the place in which protection is necessary--that is, where the enemy is operating and must continue to operate in force.
As has been stated in numerous despatches, it is considered that home waters are threatened solely in the submarine zone--in fact are being attacked solely in that zone, and must continue to be attacked therein if the enemy is to succeed against us as well as against the European Entente.
The number of available enemy submarines is not unlimited, and the difficulties of obtaining and maintaining bases are fully as difficult for submarine as for surface craft.
The difficulties experienced by enemy submarines en route and in operating as far from their bases as they now do are prodigious.
Operations on our coast without a base are impracticable, except by very limited numbers for brief periods, purely as diversions.
In view of our distance from enemy home bases, the extent of our coastline, and the distances between our principal ports, it is a safe assumption that if we could induce the enemy to shift the submarine war area to our coasts his defeat would be assured, and his present success would be diminished more than in proportion to the number of submarines he diverted from the more accessible area where commerce necessarily focuses.
14. The Department's policy refers to willingness to extend hearty co-operation to the Allies, and to discuss plans for joint operations, and also to its readiness to consider any plans which may be submitted by the joint Allied Admiralties.
15. I submit that it is impossible to carry out this co-operation, to discuss plans with the various Admiralties, except in one way--and that is, to establish what might be termed an advance headquarters in the war zone composed of Department representatives upon whose recommendations the Department can depend.
I refer to exactly the same procedure as is now carried out in the army--that is, the General Headquarters in the field being the advance headquarters of the War Department at home, and the advance headquarters must of necessity be left a certain area of discretion and freedom of action as concerns the details of the measures necessitated by the military situations as they arise.
16. The time element is one of the most vital of all elements which enter into military warfare, and hence delays in communications by written reports, together with the necessity for secrecy, render it very difficult to discuss plans at long range. The enemy secret service has proved itself to be of extraordinary efficiency.
Moreover, I believe it to be very unsafe to depend upon discussion of military plans by cable, as well as by letter. The necessary inadequacy of written or cable communications needs no discussion. The opportunities for misunderstandings are great. It is difficult to be sure that one has expressed clearly one's meaning in writing, and hence phrases in a letter are very liable to misinterpretation. They cannot explain themselves.
17. One of the greatest military difficulties of this war, and perhaps of all Allied wars, has been the difficulty of co-ordination and co-operation in military effort. I am aware of a great mass of information in this connection which it is practically impossible to impart except by personal discussion.
It is unquestionable that efficiency would be greatly improved if _any one_ of the Allies--Italy, France, England, or the United States--were selected to direct all operations, the others merely keeping the one selected fully informed of their resources available, and submitting to complete control and direction in regard to the utilization of these resources.
18. If the above considerations are granted, it then becomes necessary to decide as to the best location in which to establish such advanced headquarters, or what might be called an advance branch war council at the front--that is, an advanced branch upon whose advice and decisions the War Council itself largely depends.
I fully realize the pressure and the influences which must have been brought to bear upon the Department from all of the Allies, and from various and perhaps conflicting sources.
I also realize that my position here in England renders me open to suspicion that I may be unduly influenced by the British viewpoint of the war. It should be unnecessary to state that I have done everything within my ability to maintain a broad viewpoint with the above stated mission constantly in mind.
19. From the _naval_ point of view it would seem evident that London is the best and most central location in the war area for what I have termed above the Advance Branch of our Naval War Council.
The British navy, on account of its size alone, is bearing the brunt of the naval war, and hence all naval information concerning the war therefore reaches and centres in London.
It will be quite possible for all of our advanced headquarters staff, or parts or divisions thereof, to visit Paris and other Allied Admiralties at any time.
I wish to make it quite clear that up to date it has been wholly impossible for me, with one military Aide, to perform all of the functions of such an advanced branch of the Department.
As stated in my despatches, it has been evident for some time that I have been approaching a state in which it would be physically impossible to handle the work without an increase of staff.
The present state of affairs is such that it is quite within range of possibility for serious errors to occur which may involve disaster to our ships, due to the physical impossibility of handling the administrative and other work with the thoroughness which is essential to safety.
20. I consider that a very minimum staff which would be required is approximately as follows. More officers could be well employed with resulting increase of efficiency:
(1) One Chief of Staff, who should be free to carry on a continuous estimate of the situation, based upon all necessary information. He would be given the freedom of the Operations Department of the British and French Admiralties.
(2) An officer, preferably of the rank of commander, for duties in connection with shipping and convoy to handle all the numerous communications in relation to the movements of American shipping, particularly military shipping, and also other shipping carrying American troops.
(3) An officer, at least a lieutenant-commander, for duties in connection with Anti-Submarine Division operations in order to insure perfect co-operation in that field of work between our service and other Allied Services.
(4) An officer of all-round ability and discretion for duties in connection with general military intelligence. He should be in constant touch with the Secret Service Departments of the Admiralties to insure that all military intelligence, which in any way affects the Navy Department or our Forces, is properly and promptly acted upon.
(5) At least two lieutenants or lieutenant-commanders of the line in my own office in connection with general administrative questions in addition to the one now available. The necessity for these additional officers is imperative.
(6) One communication officer to take general charge of codes and communications both with the Department at home, the Allied Admiralties, and with the various bases of our Forces in the war area. (At present Queenstown, Brest, Bordeaux, St. Nazaire, London, and Paris.)
(7) A paymaster to have complete charge of all financial matters connected with our naval organization abroad. This officer should be in addition to Paymaster Tobey, who is performing necessary and invaluable service on my staff in connection with all logistic questions.
(Signed) WM. S. SIMS.
APPENDIX VIII
MONTHLY LOSSES SINCE FEBRUARY, 1917, FROM ENEMY ACTION
During the twenty-one months of unrestricted submarine warfare from February, 1917, to October, 1918, inclusive, 3,843 merchant vessels (British fishing vessels included) of a total gross tonnage of 8,478,947 have been sunk by enemy action, a monthly average of 183 vessels totalling 403,760 gross tons. The October tonnage losses show a decrease from this average of 291,333 gross tons, or 72 per cent.
The following gives the tonnage losses by months from February, 1917, to October, 1918, inclusive:
=========+===========+==============+==========+==========+========= | British | Other Allied | Neutral | British | Period. | Merchant | Merchant | Merchant | Fishing | Total. | Vessels. | Vessels. | Vessels. | Vessels. | ---------+-----------+--------------+----------+----------+--------- 1917 | | | | | February | 313,486 | 84,820 | 135,090 | 3,478 | 536,334 March | 353,478 | 81,151 | 165,225 | 3,586 | 603,440 April | 545,282 | 134,448 | 189,373 | 5,920 | 875,023 May | 352,289 | 102,960 | 137,957 | 1,448 | 594,654 June | 417,925 | 126,171 | 139,229 | 1,342 | 684,667 July | 364,858 | 111,683 | 70,370 | 2,736 | 549,647 August | 329,810 | 128,489 | 53,018 | 242 | 511,559 September| 196,212 | 119,086 | 29,941 | 245 | 345,484 October | 276,132 | 127,932 | 54,432 | 227 | 458,723 November | 173,560 | 87,646 | 31,476 | 87 | 292,769 December | 253,087 | 86,981 | 54,047 | 413 | 394,528 ---------+-----------+--------------+----------+----------+---------
=========+===========+==============+==========+==========+========= | British | Other Allied | Neutral | British | Period. | Merchant | Merchant | Merchant | Fishing | Total. | Vessels. | Vessels. | Vessels. | Vessels. | ---------+-----------+--------------+----------+----------+--------- 1918 | | | | | January | 179,973 | 87,078 | 35,037 | 375 | 302,463 February | 226,896 | 54,904 | 36,374 | 686 | 318,860 March | 199,458 | 94,321 | 51,035 | 293 | 345,107 April | 215,453 | 50,879 | 11,361 | 241 | 277,934 May | 192,436 | 80,826 | 20,757 | 504 | 294,523 June | 162,990 | 51,173 | 38,474 | 639 | 253,276 July | 165,449 | 70,900 | 23,552 | 555 | 260,456 August | 145,721 | 91,209 | 41,946 | 1,455 | 280,331 September| 136,864 | 39,343 | 10,393 | 142 | 186,742 October | 57,607 | 41,308 | 13,512 | -- | 112,427 ---------+-----------+--------------+----------+----------+---------
APPENDIX IX
TONNAGE CONSTRUCTED BY ALLIED AND NEUTRAL NATIONS SINCE AUGUST, 1914
Construction of merchant shipping is shown in the following table, which gives tonnage completed since the beginning of the war for the United Kingdom, United States, and for other Allied and Neutral Nations.
================+===========+============+============+============ | United | United |Other Allied| Period. | Kingdom. | States. |and Neutral.|World Total. |Gross tons.|Gross tons. |Gross tons. |Gross tons. ----------------+-----------+------------+------------+------------ 1914 | 675,610 | 120,000[1]| 217,310 | 1,012,920 1915 | 650,919 | 225,122 | 325,959 | 1,202,000 1916 | 541,552 | 325,413 | 821,036 | 1,688,000 1917 | 1,163,474 |1,034,296 | 505,585 | 2,703,355 ----------------+-----------+------------+------------+------------ 1918 1st quarter| 320,280 | 328,541 | 220,496 | 869,317 2nd quarter| 442,966 | 559,939 | 240,369 | 1,243,274 3rd quarter| 411,395 | 834,250 | 232,127 | 1,477,772 October | 136,100 | 357,532[1]| 50,000 | 543,632 ----------------+-----------+------------+------------+------------ 1918 (10 months)| 1,310,741 |2,080,262 | 742,992 | 4,133,995 ----------------+-----------+------------+------------+------------ [1: Estimated.]
INDEX
_Aboukir_, _Hogue_ and _Cressy_ torpedoed by _U-29_, 84, 174
_Achates_, with convoy, 122
_Active_, flagship of Vice-Adm. Bayly, 58
Adams, Ensign Ashley D., in charge of subchaser units, 191
Aircraft against submarines, 275
_Alcock_, goes to relief of sinking mystery ship _Dunraven_, 163
Allied Naval Council, value of, 218
Amberger, Kapitän-Leutnant Gustav, of _U-58_, captured, 131; comment on treatment, 134
American forces in European waters, 204
Anti-submarine craft, use of, 26
Anti-submarine devices, search for, 8
_Arkansas_, on duty with the Grand Fleet, 303
Arming of merchant vessels, 25
_Aroostook_, mine-layer, 254, 264
_Aubrietia_, mystery ship, heading convoy, 118; sights submarine, 121
_Audacious_, sunk by mine, 174
Aviation, naval, development of, 282; extent at time of armistice, 286
Babcock, Commr. J. V., sails with Adm. Sims as aide, 2; at London headquarters, 205, 212, 214
_Badger_ in bombardment of Durazzo, 200
Bagley, Lt.-Commr. D. W., highly commended, 139
Baillargeon, J. C, volunteers services at London headquarters, 206
Baldwin Locomotive Works, constructors of the U.S. mobile railway batteries, 290
Balfour, Arthur James, discussion of submarine situation with, 9; with Commission to the United States, 9; advises Washington of critical submarine situation, 39
_Baltimore_, converted as mine-layer, 252, 261, 264
_Basilisk_, assisted by yacht _Lydonia_, sinks submarine, 136
Bassett, Capt. F. B., commanding the _Utah_, 305
Bastedo, Lt.-Commr. Paul H., in bombardment of Durazzo, 199, 201
Bayly, Vice-Adm. Lewis, letter of welcome to Commr. Taussig, 45; welcome to Americans at Queenstown, 46; instructs Americans as to duties, 49; characteristics, 52; meets _Fanning_ and congratulates officers and men on capture of submarine crew, 133; message commending American forces at Queenstown, 140; introduces Capt. G. Campbell of the "mystery ship," 142; has difficulty in identifying one such ship, 151
Beach, Capt. E. L., with the Grand Fleet, 303
Beatty, Adm. Sir David, attitude toward torpedo flags, 217; farewell speech to American Squadron, 304
Belknap, Capt. Reginald R., commanding mine-laying squadron, 252, 260, 264
_Benham_, highly commended, 139
Berrien, Commr. Frank D., commanding destroyer division, 129; highly commended, 139
"Big Bertha," American naval guns sent to destroy, 290
Billings, A. W. K., great work in connection with air service, 285
_Birmingham_, at Gibraltar, 134
Blakely, Lt.-Commr. C. A., highly commended, 139
Blakeslee, Lt.-Commr. E. G., at London headquarters, 212
Blue, Capt. Victor, with the Grand Fleet, 303
Boyd, Capt. David F., good work in convoying subchasers, 178
Brest, as destroyer base, 134, 300
Brindisi, rendezvous for attack on Durazzo, 200
Briscoe, Lt.-Commr. Benjamin, work on air service stations, 285
Bristol, Capt. M. L., commanding the _Oklahoma_, 305
British Admiralty, commends work of U.S. aviation pilots, 286
British Fleet, not in control of the seas, 16; at Scapa Flow, 28
_Broke_, sinks two German destroyers, 61
Browne, Ralph C, new type of submarine mine, 250
Bruges, submarine base, 19
Bullard, Capt. W. H. G., with the Grand Fleet, 303
Bumstead, Prof. H. A., at London headquarters, 213
_Bunker Hill_, converted as mine-layer, 254
Bushnell, David, inventor of submarine, 225
Butler, Capt. H. V., with mine-laying squadron, 264
Callan, Lt.-Commr. J. L., in charge of U.S. air forces in Italy, 284
Campbell, Capt. Gordon, at Queenstown, 58; exploits with mystery ships, 142; with "mystery ship" _Pargust_, 147; technique of operation, 148; heroism on _Dunraven_, 157; letter from Adm. Sims on _Dunraven_ exploit, 164
_Canandaigua_, mine-layer, 254, 260, 264
_Canonicus_, mine-layer, 254, 260, 264
Carpender, Lt. A. S., in command of _Fanning_, when submarine crew was captured, 132; receives D.S.O., 134
Carson, Sir Edward, discussion of submarine, 9; of convoy system, 95
Cecil, Lord Robert, on submarine situation with, 9
_Centurion_, in China, commanded by Jellicoe, 43
_Christabel_, encounter with submarine, 127
_Christopher_, goes to relief of sinking mystery ship _Dunraven_, 163
Christy, Capt. H. H., with the Grand Fleet, 303
Churchill, Rt. Hon. W., "digging the rats out of their holes," 246
Clinton-Baker, Rear-Adm., in command of British mine-laying operations, 257
Cluverius, Capt. W. T., with mine-laying squadron, 264
Cole, Capt. W. C., commanding the Nevada, 305
College boys and subchasers, 168
Commerce raiders, guarding against, 94, 112
Cone, Capt. Hutch I., at London headquarters, 212, 214; organizer American air forces, 284; severely injured on torpedoed _Leinster_, 285
Conner, Francis G., jumps overboard from _Fanning_ to save drowning German from crew of submarine, 132
Convoy of shipping to Scandinavia, 22
Convoy system, ancient use of, 86; merchant captains hostile to, 88, 93; Gibraltar experiment, 96; merchant captains won over, 96; the headquarters and staff, 103; details of operation, 103, 108; routing of the convoys, 110, 116; actual convoys described, 117; success of system, 136; relative parts taken by Great Britain and the United States, 138; most important agency in winning the war, 141
_Conyngham_, in first American destroyer contingent, 42; with convoy, 122, 124; destroys submarine, 125
Copeland, D. G., great work in connection with air service, 285
Corfu, subchaser base established at, 182; detachment performing excellent service, 194
Cork, American destroyer officers make state visit to, 48; sailors not permitted to visit, 71
Cotten, Capt. Lyman A., with subchasers, arrives at Plymouth, 177; work in training subchaser crews, 178; commanding subchaser squadrons, 182
Craven, Capt. T. T., great service in aviation, 283
Crenshaw, Capt. Arthur, good work in convoying subchasers, 178
_Cressy_, _Aboukir_ and _Hogue_ torpedoed by _U-29_, 84, 174
Cronan, Capt. William P., work in training subchaser crews, 178
_Cumberland_, escorting convoy, 119, 123
Cunningham, Major A. A., commanding Marine Corps aviation in Northern Bombing Group, 285
_Cushing_, at Queenstown, 139; deceived by "mystery ship," 147
_Danae_, attempt to torpedo, 128
Daniels, Secretary of War, instructs Adm. Sims to sail for England, 1
_Dartmouth_, in attack on Durazzo, 199
_Davis_, in first American destroyer contingent, 42
Davison, Trubee, organizer Yale aviation unit, recommended for Distinguished Service Medal, 282
De Bon, Vice-Adm., Chief of French Naval Staff, 221
De Steiguer, Capt. L. R., with the Grand Fleet, 303
_Decatur_, at Gibraltar, 135
Defrees, Capt. Joseph H., work on listening devices, 178
_Delaware_, on duty with Grand Fleet, 303
Depth charge, origin of, 78; effects of on submarines, 79
Destroyers, scarcity of in British navy, 28; a new type of war vessel, their history, 75; size and armament, 76; high efficiency, 76; how submarines are attacked, 82; use of in convoying merchant vessels, 95
Destroyers, American, arrive in Queenstown, 40; copy of sailing orders, 43; compared with British, 48; why placed under British Admiral at Queenstown, 61; number of at Queenstown, 63; enthusiasm of British public on arrival, 63; "the return of the _Mayflower_," 64; in action, 99; duties of, 101
_Deutschland_, "merchant" submarine, visits Newport News, 266
Di Revel, Vice-Adm., Italian Member Allied Naval Council, 222
Dortch, Lt.-Commr. I. F., highly commended, 139
_Drayton_, highly commended, 139
Duff, Vice-Adm. Sir Alexander L., in charge of convoy system, 103
_Duncan_, American destroyer, at Queenstown, 57
Dunlap, Col. R. H., at London headquarters, 215
_Dunraven_, mystery ship, heroism of captain and crew, 157; given Victoria Cross, 163, 164
Durazzo, bombardment of, 199
Earle, Rear-Adm., in charge of design of mobile railway batteries for Western Front, 290
Edwards, Lt.-Commr. W. A., at London headquarters, 212, 214; commands Yale aviation unit, 283; succeeds Capt. Cone in charge of aviation section, 285
Evans, Capt. E. R. G. R., British liaison officer with American destroyers, 44; exploit as commander of destroyer _Broke_, 61
Evans, Capt. F. T., in command of U.S. aviation centre at Pauillac, France, 284
Fairfield, Commr. Arthur P., with first American destroyer contingent, 42; highly commended, 139
_Fanning_, captures crew of submarine, 129
Farquhar, Lt.-Commr., highly commended, 139
_Fenian Ram_, Holland's submarine, 227
Fighting submarines from the air, 275
Fisher, Adm. Sir John, in charge of department for investigating anti-submarine devices, 8; tells of American-built submarines, first to cross Atlantic, 266
Fletcher, Rear-Adm. Wm. B., commanding Brest naval base, 300
_Florida_, on duty with Grand Fleet, 303
Foster, Arnold-, on building of submarines, 228
Fullinwider, Commr. S. P., efforts in perfection of new submarine mine, 250
Fulton, Robert, efforts in developing the submarine, 226
Funakoshi, Rear-Adm., Japanese member Allied Naval Council, 222
Furer, Commr. Julius A., work in development of subchasers, 175
Gannon, Capt. Sinclair, with mine-laying squadron, 264
Gates, Lt.-Commr. A. L., exploits at Dunkirk, 288
Geddes, Sir Eric, First Lord of the Admiralty, 219
George, King, meeting with, 9; popular with American sailors, 67
George, Lloyd, optimistic regarding submarine situation, 10; on convoy system, 95
German interned ships converted into transports, 301
Gibraltar, co-operation of American navy with British in operations at, 134
Gillmor, R. E., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206
Gleaves, Rear-Adm. Albert, organization for transport fleet, 301
Glinder, Franz, drowned when crew surrendered to _Fanning_, 134; buried with honours of war, 134
Good, P. F., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206
Goschen, Viscount, deemed submarine useless, 227
Graham, Capt. S. V., good work in convoying subchasers, 178
Grand Fleet, British, protected by destroyers, 73; immune from torpedo attack, 85
Greenslade, Capt. J. W., with mine-laying squadron, 264
Hammon, Ensign C. H., exploit at Pola, 287
Hanrahan, Commr. David C., highly commended, 139; commanding American mystery ship _Santee_, 166; in command of Northern Bombing Group, 285
Harwell, Elxer, jumps overboard from _Fanning_ to save drowning German from crew of submarine, 134
Helfferich, Dr. Karl, on effectiveness of the submarine, 14
Henry, Lt. Walter S., on _Fanning_, 130
Hepburn, Capt. Arthur J., work in training subchaser crews, 178; commanding squadron of subchasers, reaches Queenstown, 203
_Hogue_, _Cressy_ and _Aboukir_, torpedoed by _U-29_, 84, 174
Holland, John P., designer of the modern submarine, 227
Hope, Rear-Adm., receives Adm. Sims on arrival, 2
Hospital ships, torpedoing of, 29
_Housatonic_, mine-layer, 254, 260, 264
Howard, Lt.-Commr. D. L., highly commended, 139
Hughes, Capt. C. F., with the Grand Fleet, 303
Inventions, anti-submarine, search for, 8
Inverness and Invergordon, mine-assembly bases at, 256
Ives, Ensign Paul F., drops a "dud" on deck of submarine, 286
_Jacob Jones_, torpedoed by _U-53_, 107; highly commended, 139
Jacoby, Ensign Maclair, at bombardment of Durazzo, 201
Jellicoe, Adm., character and abilities, 5; statement of tonnage lost to submarines, 6; in conference with, 8; wounded in Boxer Rebellion, 43; letter of welcome to Commr. Taussig, 44; difficulty in having convoy system adopted, 89, 95; presides over Allied Naval Council, 219
Jessop, Capt. E. P., good work in convoying subchasers, 178
Johnson, Commr. Alfred W., with first American destroyer contingent, 42
Johnson, Capt. T. L., with mine-laying squadron, 264
_Justicia_, torpedoing of, 114; torpedoing announced as that of _Leviathan_ by German Admiralty, 314
Kelly, Commodore, in bombardment of Durazzo, 198; congratulates subchasers in this action, 203
Kennedy, Ensign S. C., record seaplane flight, 278
Keyes, Ensign K. B., extracts from seaplane flight report, 278
Keys, Adm. Sir Roger, reconstructs submarine barrage, 20
Killingholme, England, U.S. air station at, 278, 284
Kittredge, T. B., volunteers service at London headquarters, 206
Knox, Capt. D. W., at London headquarters, 215
_Kronprinzessin Cecilie_, converted into transport, 301
Lacaze, Adm., French Minister of Marine, 221
Leigh, Capt. Richard H., experiments with listening devices, 172; sent to Italy to construct subchaser base, 182; at London headquarters, 212, 214
Libbey, Commr. Miles A., work in perfection of listening devices, 178
Listening devices, development of, 171; especially advantageous on subchaser, 178; method of operation on subchasers, 184; of great value in the Otranto barrage, 196; tube climbed by submarine survivor, 197
Little, Col. L. McC., at London headquarters, 215
London headquarters, 204, 210; different departments of, 212; work of the Planning Section, 215
Long, Capt. A. T., commanding the _Nevada_, 305
Long, Capt. Byron A., at headquarters of convoy system, 103; at London headquarters, 212, 214; routing American troops to France, 300
Loomis, Coxswain David D., lookout on _Fanning_ when submarine crew was captured, 129
Lord Mayor of Cork, welcomes Americans at Queenstown, 45
_Lowestoft_, in attack on Durazzo, 199
_Luckenback_, shelled by submarine, 123
Ludlow, Ensign G. H., wounded, rescued from water, 287
_Lydonia_, assists in sinking submarine, 136
Lyons, Lt.-Commr. D., highly commended, 139
MacDonnell, Lt.-Commr. E. O., in charge of flying Caproni bombers from Italy to Flanders, 285
MacDougall, Capt. W. D., at London headquarters, 204
McBride, Capt. L. B., at London headquarters, 212, 214
McCalla, Capt., meets Adm. Jellicoe in China, 44
McCormick, E. H., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206
McCullough, Commr. Richard P., recommended for decoration, 136
_McDougal_, in first American destroyer contingent, 42; highly commended, 139
McDowell, Commr. Clyde S., work on listening devices, 178
McGrann, Commr. W. H., at London headquarters, 212
McNamee, Capt. L., at London headquarters, 215
McVay, Capt. C. B., commanding the _Oklahoma_, 305
Magruder, Rear-Adm. T. P., good work in convoying subchasers, 178
Mannix, Commr. D. Pratt, with mine-laying squadron, 264
Marshall, Capt. A. W., with mine-laying squadron, 264
_Mary Rose_, welcomes American destroyers at Queenstown, 41
_Massachusetts_, converted as mine-layer, 254
_Melville_, "Mother Ship" of the destroyers at Queenstown, 58, 62
Millard, H., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206
Milner, Lord, on convoy system, 95
Mine barrage, at first not effective against submarines, 20, 24
Mine barrage in North Sea, American, 245; immensity of, 252; how laid, 257
Mine laying by German submarines, 51, 273, 274
Mines, Americans perfect new type, 250; immense organization of supply and transport, 252
_Moewe_, commerce raider, 95
Murfin, Capt. Orin G., designer and builder of mine-assembly bases in Scotland, 256
Mystery ships, greatly aid in combating the submarine, 103; accompanying convoy, 118; method of operating, 118; operations of, 142; technique, 148; difficulty of identifying, 151; number in operation, 152; heroic fight of the _Dunraven_, 157; exploit of _Prize_, 165; American ship _Santee_, 166; _Stockforce_ destroys submarine, 183
_Nautilus_, submarine of Robert Fulton, 226
Naval guns, German, bombarding Dunkirk and Paris, 290
Naval guns, U.S., used on the Western Front, 289
Nelson, Capt. C. P., good work in convoying subchasers, 178; commanding subchaser squadrons at Corfu, 194; in bombardment of Durazzo, 199, 200
_Neptune_ attacked by _U-29_, 84, 85
_Nevada_, guarding transports, 304
_New York_, on duty with Grand Fleet, 303
Niblack, Rear-Adm. Albert P., commanding forces at Gibraltar, 134; asks that subchasers be sent to Gibraltar, 195
_Nicholson_, in submarine chase, 123; on convoy duty, 129; assists _Fanning_ in capture of submarine and crew, 130; highly commended, 139
_Noma_, goes to relief of sinking mystery ship _Dunraven_, 163
Northern Bombing Group, established, 284, 285
_O'Brien_, highly commended, 163
Oil, scarcity of, for Great Britain's fleet, 34
_Oklahoma_, guarding transports, 305
_Orama_, torpedoed, 125
Ostend, bombing of submarine base at, 285
Otranto barrage, the, 181, 195
Page, Ambassador Walter Hines, asks that high naval representative be sent to England, 1; states that England faces defeat by submarines, 8; on critical submarine situation, 38; advised of submarine peril, 52; a tower of strength, 207
_Pargust_, "mystery ship," destroys submarine, 147
_Parker_, in hunt for submarine, 119; highly commended, 139; supporting ship for subchasers at Plymouth, 182; seriously damages the _U-53_, 189
Pauillac, France, U.S. aviation centre at, 284
_Pennsylvania_, transmits mobilization orders to destroyer division, 42
Pershing, Gen., request for naval guns at St. Nazaire, 290; report of their skilful use, 293
Pescara, Italy, U.S. seaplane station at, 284
_Pisa_, in attack on Durazzo, 199
Pitt, William, early opinion of the submarine, 226
Planning Section at London headquarters, 215
Pleadwell, Capt. F. L., at London headquarters, 212
Plunkett, Adm. Charles P., commanding naval guns on Western Front, 289; aids in designing mobile railway batteries, 290
Plymouth, subchaser base at, 182
_Pocahontas_, converted from German liner to transport, 302
_Porter_, in first American destroyer contingent, 42
Porto Corsini, Italy, U.S. seaplane station at, 284
Poteet, Lt.-Commr. Fred H., with first American destroyer contingent, 42
Potter, Ensign Stephen, fight with enemy seaplane, 288
Powell, Lt.-Commr. Halsey, of destroyer _Parker_, 119; highly commended, 139
_Princess Irene_, converted into transport, 302
Pringle, Capt. J. R. P., at Queenstown, 58; commended by Adm. Bayly, 139
_Prize_, mystery ship, damages submarine and captures captain and two of crew, 165
Q-ships, _see_ Mystery ships
Queenstown, a destroyer base, 32; arrival of first American destroyers, 40; officially welcomes the Americans, 45
_Quinnebaug_, mine-layer, 254, 264
_René_, in westbound convoy, 129
Reynolds, Commr. W. H., with mine-laying squadron, 264
_Rhein_, converted into transport, 302
Richardson, R. M. D., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206
_Roanoke_, mine-layer, 254, 260, 264
Roberts, Lady, requests Adm. Sims to call, 66
Robison, Rear-Adm. S. S., work on listening devices, 178
Rodgers, Rear-Adm. Thomas S., commanding Dreadnought division in Bantry Bay, 305
Rodman, Adm. Hugh, commanding American squadron with the Grand Fleet, 303
Rose, Hans, humane commander of the _U-53_, 106; Allied forces ambitious to capture, 189; not on _U-53_ when depth charged, 190; visits Newport, and sinks merchantmen off Nantucket, 266
Royal Family, interested in American sailors, 67
_Sacramento_, at Gibraltar, 134
_San Diego_, sunk by mine off Fire Island, 274
_San Francisco_, converted as mine-layer, 252, 264
_San Giorgio_, in attack on Durazzo, 199
_San Marco_, in attack on Durazzo, 199
Sanders, Lt. William, commanding mystery ship _Prize_, 165; awarded Victoria Cross, 165
_Santa Maria_, compared in size to modern destroyer, 76
_Santee_, U.S. mystery ship, 150, 166
_Saranac_, mine-layer, 254, 264
Scales, Capt. A. H., with the Grand Fleet, 303
Schieffelin, Lt. John J., recommended for Distinguished Service Medal, 277
Schofield, Capt. Frank H., work on listening devices, 178; at London headquarters, 215
Schuyler, Commr. G. L., at London headquarters, 212
Schwab, Charles M., fabricates submarines for the Allies, 266
Seaplane base at Killingholme, England, taken over by U.S., 278
Seaplane stations of U.S. forces in Europe, 284
Sexton, Capt. W. R., at London headquarters, 212
_Shawmut_, mine-layer, 254, 264
Sims, Adm., ordered to England, 1; notifies Washington that war is being lost, 33; of the oil scarcity, 34; favours using U.S. naval forces in conjunction with Allies, 35; first report of critical submarine situation, 37; extent of duties in European waters, 62; significance of the Guildhall speech, 65; reception accorded by British people, 66; meets Lady Roberts, 66; first foreign naval officer to command British forces in war, 68; works for adoption of convoy system, 93, 95; congratulates officers and men of _Fanning_ on capture of submarine and crew, 134; has difficulty in identifying a "mystery ship," 151; letter to Capt. Campbell on _Dunraven_ exploit, 164; warns Navy Department of German submarines visiting U.S. coast, 267
Sinn Fein, controversy with American sailors, 69; in league with Germany, 72
Smith, Capt. S. F., at London headquarters, 212
Sparrow, Capt. H. G., good work in convoying subchasers, 178
Stark, Commr. Harold R., brings small destroyers from Manila to Gibraltar, 135; at London headquarters, 212
Stearns, Capt. C. D., with mine-laying squadron. 264
_Sterrett_, highly commended, 139
Stevens, L. S., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206
_Stockforce_, mystery ship, destroys submarine, 183
Stockton, G. B., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206
Strauss, Rear-Adm. Joseph, in command of U.S. mine-laying operations, 257
Subchasers, number built and bases used, 168; mobilized at New London, Conn., 173; great numbers ordered by Great Britain and France, 174, 179; hardships of the new crews, 176; trip from New London to Corfu, 195; an influence in the breakdown of Austria, 196; in attack on Durazzo, 198; congratulated on exploits of Durazzo by British Commodore and Italian Naval General Staff, 203
Submarine against submarine, 224; method of attack, 233
Submarine sinkings, gravity of, concealed by British, 2, 6; losses of shipping, 51, 141
Submarines, American built, first to cross Atlantic, 267 really submersible surface ships, 229; how operated, 229; an American invention, 225
Submarines, American, their part in the war, 224; attacked by destroyers through error, 236; the base at Berehaven, 238; witnesses U-boat destroy itself, 239
Submarines, British, the _H_-, _E_-, and _K_-boats, 224; destroy a U-boat, 238
Submarines, enemy, winning the war, 4, 7; number of, destroyed, 7; officers exaggerate sinkings, 13; difficulty of blockading the United States, 17; cruising period dependent upon supply of torpedoes, 19; mines and nets not effective against, 19; number operating simultaneously, 20, 21, 31; erroneous impression as to numbers operating, 20; every movement charted by Allies, 21, 271, 273; three different types of, 22; plans to pen in the bases, 23; playing hide and seek with destroyers, 33; on American coast, 36, 266; amount of shipping destroyed, 51; how attacked by destroyer, 82; method of attack on battleships, 84; operating on American coast impracticable, 91; individual locations and movements plotted each day, 104; destroyed by depth charges, 126, 128, 130, 136; decoying by "mystery ship," 142, 183; not taken seriously until after Weddingen's exploit, 174; concentrated in enclosed waters, 180; the Otranto barrage, 181; sinkings prevented by subchasers, 183; how located by listening devices, 184; _U-53_ seriously damaged by destroyer _Parker_, 189; suicide of entire crew of a depth charged submarine, 193; two submarines sunk by subchasers in bombardment of Durazzo, 202; Germans have difficulty in reaching home after Austrian surrender, 203; number destroyed by Allies and how, 224; U-boat destroys itself, 239; the cruiser submarines, 240; their various bases, 244; effectiveness of American North Sea mine barrage, 245; lay mines on American coast, 273, 274; aircraft an important factor against, 275; number sunk about British Isles, 296; forced to choose between transports and merchantmen, 306
_Surveyor_, yacht, assists in sinking submarine, 136
_Surveyor_, merchantmen torpedoed while being convoyed, 136
_Susquehanna_, converted from German liner to transport, 302
Swasey, A. Loring, services in designing of subchasers, 175
Taussig, Commr. Joseph K., in charge of first American destroyer contingent, 42; copy of sailing orders, 42; previous record, 43; welcoming letters from Admirals Jellicoe and Bayly, 44, 45; reports to Vice-Adm. Bayly at Queenstown, 46; highly commended, 139
Taylor, Capt. M. M., with the Grand Fleet, 303
_Texas_, on duty with Grand Fleet, 303
Thompson, Commr. Edgar, at London headquarters, 212
Thomson, Commr. T. A., at London headquarters, 212
Tobey, Capt. E. C., at London headquarters, 212, 214
Tomb, Capt. J. Harvey, with mine-laying squadron, 264
Tompkins, Capt. John T., work in organization of subchaser fleet, 178
Torpedo, track or wake made by, 81; effective range of, 83; duration of submarine's voyage dependent on number carried, 19; supply limited, 26; cost of, 77
Torpedo-boat, invention of, 76
Tozer, Capt. C. M., good work in convoying subchasers, 178
Transporting armies to France, 294; nationality of ships and percentage carried, 302
_Turtle_, first submarine, 225
Twining, Capt. N. C., at London headquarters, 212, 213
_U-29_, torpedoes _Hogue_, _Cressy_ and _Aboukir_, and is later sunk by _Dreadnought_, 84, 85
_U-53_, operates off American coast, 106; torpedoes the _Jacob Jones_, 107; seriously damaged by depth charges, 188; surrendered after armistice, 190; after visiting Newport, R.I., sinks several merchantmen, 266
_U-58_ depth charged and crew captured by _Fanning_ and _Nicholson_, 131
_U-151_, lays mines off American coast, 273
_U-156_, lays mines off American coast, 274
_UC-56_, practically destroyed by depth charge from _Christabel_, 128
_Utah_, guarding transports, 305
_Vaterland_, converted into transport, 301
Vauclain, Samuel M., great help in turning out mobile railway batteries, 290
_Venetia_, assists in sinking submarine, 136; seriously damages another, 136
Voysey, Miss, niece of Vice-Adm. Bayly, and charming hostess, 59
_Wadsworth_, in first American destroyer contingent, 42; highly commended, 139
_Wainwright_, in first American destroyer contingent, 42
Washington, Capt. Thomas, with the Grand Fleet, 303
Weatherhead, Ensign C. H., makes record seaplane flight, 278
Weddingen, Commr. Otto, torpedoes _Hogue_, _Cressy_ and _Aboukir_, and is in turn sunk by battleship _Dreadnought_, 84, 174
_Welshman_, narrow escape from being torpedoed, 130, 133
_Weymouth_, in attack on Durazzo, 199
_Wheeling_, depth charges submarine, 136
White, Sir William, on the submarine, 225
Whiting, Commr. Kenneth, great service in aviation, 283
Wiley, Capt. H. A., with the Grand Fleet, 303
Wilhelm, Kaiser, on effectiveness of the submarine, 13
_Wilkes_, on submarine hunt with _Parker_, 189
Williams, Lt.-Commr. Roger, at Queenstown, 57
Wilson, Rear-Adm. Henry B., commander of forces at _Gibraltar_, 134; at Brest, 134; commanding Brest naval base, 300
Wireless telegraphy, of the submarines and destroyers, 100; messages reveal locations of submarines, 105
Wortman, Lieut.-Commr. Ward K., with first American destroyer contingent, 42
_Wyoming_, on duty with Grand Fleet, 303
Y-guns, or howitzers, for hurling depth charges, 79
Yachts, good service on French coast, 301
Yale aviation unit, organization of, 282; renders great service, 283
Yarnell, Capt. H. E., at London headquarters, 215
Zeebrugge, bombing of submarine base at, 285
Zigzagging, efficacious protection against submarines, 87, 120
Zogbaum, Lt.-Commr. Rufus F., with first American destroyer contingent, 42
+-----------------------------------------------+ | Transcriber's Note: | | | | Inconsistent hyphenation and spelling in the | | original document have been preserved. | | | | Typographical errors corrected in the text: | | | | Page 136 Carthagena changed to Cartagena | | Page 151 out changed to our | | Page 194 saltest changed to saltiest | | Page 227 if changed to it | | Page 264 wift changed to swift | | Page 271 frm changed to from | | Page 278 Ensign changed to Ensigns | | Page 348 de Steigner changed to de Steiguer | +-----------------------------------------------+