Part 53

Concerning this system we remark that we do not intend to controvert the doctrine that Nârâya/n/a, who is higher than the Undeveloped, who is the highest Self, and the Self of all, reveals himself by dividing himself in multiple ways; for various scriptural passages, such as 'He is onefold, he is threefold' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2), teach us that the highest Self appears in manifold forms. Nor do we mean to object to the inculcation of unceasing concentration of mind on the highest Being which appears in the Bhâgavata doctrine under the forms of reverential approach, &c.; for that we are to meditate on the Lord we know full well from Sm/ri/ti and Scripture. We, however, must take exception to the doctrine that Sa@nkarsha/n/a springs from Vâsudeva, Pradyumna from Sa@nkarsha/n/a, Aniruddha from Pradyumna. It is not possible that from Vâsudeva, i.e. the highest Self, there should originate Sa@nkarsha/n/a, i.e. the individual soul; for if such were the case, there would attach to the soul non-permanency, and all the other imperfections which belong to things originated. And thence release, which consists in reaching the highest Being, could not take place; for the effect is absorbed only by entering into its cause.--That the soul is not an originated thing, the teacher will prove later on (II, 3, 17). For this reason the Bhâgavata hypothesis is unacceptable.

43. And (it is) not (observed that) the instrument is produced from the agent.

The Bhâgavata hypothesis is to be rejected for that reason also, that observation never shows us an instrument, such as a hatchet and the like, to spring from an agent such as Devadatta, or any other workman. But the Bhâgavatas teach that from an agent, viz. the individual soul termed Sa@nkarsha/n/a, there springs its instrument, viz. the internal organ termed Pradyumna, and again from this offspring of the agent another instrument, viz. the aha@nkâra termed Aniruddha. Such doctrines cannot be settled without observed instances. And we do not meet with any scriptural passage in their favour.

44. Or (if) in consequence of the existence of knowledge, &c. (Vâsudeva, &c. be taken as Lords), yet there is non-exclusion of that (i.e. the objection raised in Sûtra 42).

Let us then--the Bhâgavatas may say--understand by Sa@nkarsha/n/a, and so on, not the individual soul, the mind, &c., but rather Lords, i.e. powerful beings distinguished by all the qualities characteristic of rulers, such as pre-eminence of knowledge and ruling capacity, strength, valour, glory. All these are Vâsudevas free from faults, without a substratum (not sprung from pradhâna), without any imperfections. Hence the objection urged in Sûtra 42 does not apply.

Even on this interpretation of your doctrine, we reply, the 'non-exclusion of that,' i.e. the non-exclusion of the impossibility of origination, can be established.--Do you, in the first place, mean to say that the four individual Lords, Vâsudeva, and so on, have the same attributes, but do not constitute one and the same Self?--If so, you commit the fault of uselessly assuming more than one Lord, while all the work of the Lord can be done by one. Moreover, you offend thereby against your own principle, according to which there is only one real essence, viz. the holy Vâsudeva.--Or do you perhaps mean to say that from the one highest Being there spring those four forms possessing equal attributes?--In that case the objection urged in Sûtra 42 remains valid. For Sa@nkarsha/n/a cannot be produced from Vâsudeva, nor Pradyumna from Sa@nkarsha/n/a, nor Aniruddha from Pradyumna, since (the attributes of all of them being the same) there is no supereminence of any one of them. Observation shows that the relation of cause and effect requires some superiority on the part of the cause--as, for instance, in the case of the clay and the jar (where the cause is more extensive than the effect)--and that without such superiority the relation is simply impossible. But the followers of the Pâ/ñk/arâtra do not acknowledge any difference founded on superiority of knowledge, power, &c. between Vâsudeva and the other Lords, but simply say that they all are forms of Vâsudeva, without any special distinctions. The forms of Vâsudeva cannot properly be limited to four, as the whole world, from Brahman down to a blade of grass, is understood to be a manifestation of the supreme Being.

45. And on account of contradictions.

Moreover, manifold contradictions are met with in the Bhâgavata system, with reference to the assumption of qualities and their bearers. Eminence of knowledge and ruling capacity, strength, valour, and glory are enumerated as qualities, and then they are in some other place spoken of as Selfs, holy Vâsudevas, and so on.--Moreover, we meet with passages contradictory of the Veda. The following passage, for instance, blames the Veda, 'Not having found the highest bliss in the Vedas /S/â/nd/ilya studied this /s/âstra.'--For this reason also the Bhâgavata doctrine cannot be accepted.

Notes:

[Footnote 314: The characteristics of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, the three constituent elements (gu/n/a) of the pradhâna. Sâ. Kâ. 12, 13.]

[Footnote 315: Viz. the great principle (mahat). ahanka a, &c. Sâ. Kâ. 3.]

[Footnote 316: The arguments here referred to are enumerated in the Sâ. Kâ. 15: Sâ. Sûtras I, 189 ff.]

[Footnote 317: If we attempt to infer the nature of the universal cause from its effects on the ground of parallel instances, as, for instance, that of an earthen jar whose material cause is clay, we must remember that the jar has sprung from clay not without the co-operation of an intelligent being, viz. the potter.]

[Footnote 318: As had been asserted above for the purpose of inferring therefrom, according to the principle of the equality of cause and effect, the existence of the three constituents of the pradhâna.]

[Footnote 319: And a thing cannot consist of that of which it is the cause.]

[Footnote 320: Which differences cannot be reconciled with the Sâ@nkhya hypothesis of the object itself consisting of either pleasure or pain, &c.--'If things consisted in themselves of pleasure, pain, &c., then sandal ointment (which is cooling, and on that account pleasant in summer) would be pleasant in winter also; for sandal never is anything but sandal.--And as thistles never are anything but thistles they ought, on the Sâ@nkhya hypothesis, to be eaten with enjoyment not only by camels but by men also.' Bhâ.]

[Footnote 321: Sa/m/sargapûrvakatvaprasa@nga iti gu/n/ânâ/m/ sa/m/s/ri/sh/t/ânekavastuprak/ri/tikatvaprasaktir ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 322: For they limit one another.]

[Footnote 323: To proceed to the argument 'from the separateness of cause and effect' (Sâ. Kâ. 15).]

[Footnote 324: The next sentences furnish the answer to the question how the intelligent Self is known at all if it is not the object of perception.--Pratyakshatvâbhâve katham âtmasiddhir ity âsa@nkya anumânâd ity âha, prav/ri/ttîti. Anumânasiddhasya /k/etanasya na pravr/i/ttyâ/s/rayateti dar/s/ayitum evakâra/h/. Katham anumânam ity apekshâyâ/m/ tatprakâra/m/; sû/k/ayati kevaleti. Vailaksha/n/ya/m/ prâ/n/âdimattvam. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 325: Viz. that whatever moves or acts does so under the influence of intelligence.--Sâdhyapakshanikshiptatva/m/ sâdhyavati pakshe pravish/t/atvam eva ta/k/ /k/a sapakshanizkshiptatvasyâpy upalaksha/n/am, anpanyâso na vyabhi/k/ârabhûmin ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 326: It might be held that for the transformation of grass into milk no other cause is required than the digestive heat of the cow's body; but a reflecting person will acknowledge that there also the omniscient Lord is active. Bhâ.]

[Footnote 327: Anâdheyâti/s/ayasya sukhadukhaprâptiparihârarûpâti/s/aya/s/ûnyasyety artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 328: For the soul as being of an entirely inactive nature cannot of itself aim at release, and the pradhâna aims--ex hypothesi--only at the soul's undergoing varied experience.]

[Footnote 329: I.e. for the various items constituting enjoyment or experience.]

[Footnote 330: T/ri/tîyes'pi katipaya/s/abdâdyupalabdhir vâ samastatadupalabdhir vâ bhoga iti vikalpyâdye sarveshâm ekadaiva mukti/h/ syâd iti manvâno dvitîya/m/ pratyâha ubhayârthateti. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 331: The MSS. of Ânanda Giri omit sa/m/sârânu/kkh/edât; the Bhâmatî's reading is: Sarga/s/aktyanu/kkh/edavad d/ri/k/s/aktyanu/kkh/edât.]

[Footnote 332: On the theory that the soul is the cause of the pradhâna's activity we again have to ask whether the pradhâna acts for the soul's enjoyment or for its release, &c.]

[Footnote 333: Anantaro dosho mahadâdikâryotpâdâyoga/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 334: In the former case the five intellectual senses are looked upon as mere modifications of the sense of touch.]

[Footnote 335: Buddhi in the latter case being the generic name for buddhi, aha@nkâra, and manas.]

[Footnote 336: Lit. that which burns and that which is burned, which literal rendering would perhaps be preferable throughout. As it is, the context has necessitated its retention in some places.--The sufferers are the individual souls, the cause of suffering the world in which the souls live.]

[Footnote 337: In the case of the lamp, light and heat are admittedly essential; hence the Vedântin is supposed to bring forward the sea with its waves, and so on, as furnishing a case where attributes pass away while the substance remains.]

[Footnote 338: 'Artha,' a useful or beneficial thing, an object of desire.]

[Footnote 339: In reality neither suffering nor sufferers exist, as the Vedântin had pointed out in the first sentences of his reply; but there can of course be no doubt as to who suffers and what causes suffering in the vyavahârika-state, i.e. the phenomenal world.]

[Footnote 340: In order to explain thereby how the soul can experience pain.]

[Footnote 341: And that would be against the Sâ@nkhya dogma of the soul's essential purity.]

[Footnote 342: So that the fact of suffering which cannot take place apart from an intelligent principle again remains unexplained.]

[Footnote 343: Âtmanas tapte sattve pratibîmitatvâd yuktâ taptir iti /s/a@nkate sattveti. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 344: For it then indicates no more than a fictitious resemblance.]

[Footnote 345: The Sâ@nkhya Pûrvapakshin had objected to the Vedânta doctrine that, on the latter, we cannot account for the fact known from ordinary experience that there are beings suffering pain and things causing suffering.--The Vedântin in his turn endeavours to show that on the Sâ@nkhya doctrine also the fact of suffering remains inexplicable, and is therefore to be considered not real, but fictitious merely, the product of Nescience.]

[Footnote 346: Not only 'suffering as it were,' as it had been called above.]

[Footnote 347: For real suffering cannot be removed by mere distinctive knowledge on which--according to the Sâ@nkhya also--release depends.]

[Footnote 348: This in answer to the remark that possibly the conjunction of soul and pradhâna may come to an end when the influence of Darkness declines, it being overpowered by the knowledge of Truth.]

[Footnote 349: I.e. according as they are atoms of earth, water, fire, or air.]

[Footnote 350: Parima/nd/ala, spherical is the technical term for the specific form of extension of the atoms, and, secondarily, for the atoms themselves. The latter must apparently be imagined as infinitely small spheres. Cp. Vi/s/. Sût. VII, 1, 20.]

[Footnote 351: Viz. during the period of each pralaya. At that time all the atoms are isolated and motionless.]

[Footnote 352: When the time for a new creation has come.]

[Footnote 353: The &c. implies the activity of the Lord.]

[Footnote 354: The inherent (material) cause of an atomic compound are the constituent atoms, the non-inheient cause the conjunction of those atoms, the operative causes the ad/ri/sh/ta/ and the Lord's activity which make them enter into conjunction.]

[Footnote 355: I.e. in all cases the special form of extension of the effect depends not on the special extension of the cause, but on the number of atoms composing the cause (and thereby the effect).]

[Footnote 356: In order to escape the conclusion that the non-acceptance of the doctrine of Brahman involves the abandonment of a fundamental Vai/s/eshika principle.]

[Footnote 357: I.e. forms of extension different from sphericity, &c.]

[Footnote 358: The first of the three Sûtras quoted comprises, in the present text of the Vai/s/eshika-sûtras, only the following words, 'Kâra/n/abahutvâ/k/ /k/a;' the /k/a of the Sûtra implying, according to the commentators, mahattva and pra/k/aya.--According to the Vai/s/eshikas the form of extension called a/n/u, minute, has for its cause the dvitva inherent in the material causes, i.e. the two atoms from which the minute binary atomic compound originates.--The form of extension called mahat, big, has different causes, among them bahutva, i.e. the plurality residing in the material causes of the resulting 'big' thing; the cause of the mahattva of a ternary atomic compound, for instance, is the tritva inherent in the three constituent atoms. In other cases mahattva is due to antecedent mahattva, in others to pra/k/aya, i.e. accumulation. See the Upaskâra on Vai/s/. Sût. VII, 1, 9; 10.]

[Footnote 359: I.e. if the Vai/s/eshikas have to admit that it is the nature of sphericity, &c. not to produce like effects, the Vedântin also may maintain that Brahman produces an unlike effect, viz. the non-intelligent world.]

[Footnote 360: Like other things, let us say a piece of cloth, which consists of parts.]

[Footnote 361: Or, more particularly, to the conjunction of the atoms with the souls to which merit and demerit belong.--Ad/ri/sh/t/âpeksham ad/ri/sh/t/avatkshetraj/ñ/asa/my/ogâpeksham iti yâvat. Ãn. Gi.]

[Footnote 362: According to the Vai/s/eshikas intelligence is not essential to the soul, but a mere adventitious quality arising only when the soul is joined to an internal organ.]

[Footnote 363: The soul being all-pervading.]

[Footnote 364: Which is inadmissible on Vai/s/eshika principles, because sa/m/yoga as being a quality is connected with the things it joins by samavâya.]

[Footnote 365: Viz. from those things which are united by conjunction. The argument is that conjunction as an independent third entity requires another connexion to connect it with the two things related to each other in the way of conjunction.]

[Footnote 366: Viz. the absolute difference of samavâya and sa/m/yoga from the terms which they connect.]

[Footnote 367: Action (karman), &c. also standing in the samavâya relation to their substrates.]

[Footnote 368: Our Vai/s/eshika-sûtras read 'pratishedhabhâva/h/;' but as all MSS. of Sa@nkara have 'pratishedhâbhâva/h/' I have kept the latter reading and translated according to Ânandagiri's explanation: Kâryam anityam iti kârye vireshato nityatvanishedho na syâd yadi kâra/n/eszpy anityatvam atozs/n/ûnâ/m/ kâra/n/ânâ/m/ nityateti sûtrârtha/h/.]

[Footnote 369: Because they also are not perceptible; the ternary aggregates, the so-called trasare/n/us, constituting the minima perceptibilia.]

[Footnote 370: As they have no cause which could either be disintegrated or destroyed.]

[Footnote 371: This according to the Vedânta view. If atoms existed they might have originated from avidyâ by a mere pari/n/âma and might again be dissolved into avidyâ, without either disintegration or destruction of their cause taking place.]

[Footnote 372: The Sâ@nkhyas looking on everything (except the soul) as being the pradhâna in various forms.--There is no need of assuming with Govindânanda that by the Sâ@nkhya of the text we have to understand the Vedânta.]

[Footnote 373: Yayor dvayor madhya ekam avina/s/yad aparâ/s/ritam evâvatish/th/ate tâv ayutasiddhau yathâvayavâvayavinau.]

[Footnote 374: The connexion of cause and effect is of course samavâya.]

[Footnote 375: If the effect can exist before having entered into connexion with the cause, the subsequent connexion of the two is no longer samavâya but sa/m/yoga; and that contradicts a fundamental Vai/s/eshika principle.]

[Footnote 376: This clause replies to the objection that only those connexions which have been produced by previous motion are to be considered conjunctions.]

[Footnote 377: A clause meant to preclude the assumption that the permanent existence of the things connected involves the permanent existence of the connexion.]

[Footnote 378: It having been shown above that atoms cannot enter into sa/m/yoga with each other, it is shown now that sa/m/yoga of the soul with the atoms cannot be the cause of the motion of the latter, and that sa/m/yoga of soul and manas cannot be the cause of cognition.]

[Footnote 379: Ekasambandhyâkarsha/n/e yatra sambandhyantarâkarsha/n/a/m/ tatra sa/m/slesha/h/, sa tu sâvayavânâ/m/ jatukâsh/th/âdînâ/m/ d/ri/sh/t/o na tu niravayavai/h/ sâvayâvânâm, ato dvya/n/ukasya sâvayavasya niravayavena paramâ/n/unâ sa nopapadyate. Brahmavidyâbh.]

[Footnote 380: In answer to the question how, in that case, the practically recognised relation of abode, &c. existing between the cause and the effect is accounted for.]

[Footnote 381: For they must in that case have a northern end, an eastern end, &c.]

[Footnote 382: And that on that account the atoms which he considers as the ultimate simple constituents of matter cannot be decomposed.]

[Footnote 383: Because according to their opinion difference of size constitutes difference of substance, so that the continuous change of size in animal bodies, for instance, involves the continual perishing of old and the continual origination of new substances.]

[Footnote 384: The following notes on Bauddha doctrines are taken exclusively from the commentaries on the /S/a@nkarabhâshya, and no attempt has been made to contrast or reconcile the Brahminical accounts of Bauddha psychology with the teaching of genuine Bauddha books. Cp. on the chief sects of the Buddhistic philosophers the Bauddha chapter of the Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.--The Nihilists are the Mádhyamikas; the Idealists are the Yogâ/k/âras; the Sautrântikas and the Vaibháshikas together constitute the class of the Realists.--I subjoin the account given of those sects in the Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a.--Buddhasya hi mâdhyamika-yogá/k/âra-sautrântika-vaibhâshikasamj/ñ/akâs /k/atvâra/h/ /s/ishyâ/h/. Tatra buddhena prathama/m/ yân prati sarva/m/ /s/ûnyam ity upadish/t/a/m/ te màdhyamikâs te hi guru/n/â yathokta/m/ tathaiva /s/raddhayâ g/ri/hîtavanta iti k/ri/tvâ nâpak/ri/sh/t/â/h/ puna/s/ /k/a taduktasyârthasya buddhyanusâre/n/âkshepasyâk/ri/tatvân notk/ri/sh/t/abuddhaya iti mâdhyamikâ/h/. Anyais tu /s/ishyair guru/n/â sarva/s/ûnyatva upadish/t/e j/ñ/ânâtiriktasya sarvasya /s/ûnyatvam astu nâmeti gurûktir yoga iti bauddai/h/ paribhâshitopetâ/h/ tad upari /k/a j/ñ/ânasya tu /s/ûnyatva/m/ na sa/m/bhavati tathâtve jagadândhyaprasa@ngât sûnyasiddher apy asa/m/bhavâ/k/ /k/eti buddhamate â/k/âratvena paribhâshita âkshepos'pi k/ri/ta iti yogâ/k/ârâ/h/ vij/ñ/ânamâtrâstitvavâdina/h/. Tadanataram anyai/h/ /s/ishyai/h/ pratîtisiddhasya katha/m/ /s/ûnyatva/m/ vaktu/m/ /s/akyam ato j/ñ/ânavad vâhyârthos'pi satya ity ukte tarhi tathaiva sos'stu, para/m/ tu so s'numeyo na tu pratyaksha ity ukte tathâ@ngîk/ri/tyaiva/m/ /s/ishyamatim anus/ri/tya kiyatparyanta/m/ sûtra/m/ bhavishyatîti tai/h/ p/ri/sh/t/am atas te sautrântikâ/h/. Anye punar yady aya/m/ gha/t/a iti pratîtibalâd vâhyos'rtha upeyate tarhi tasyâ eva pratîter aparokshatvât sa katha/m/ parokshos'to vâhyos'rtho na pratyaksha iti bhâshâ viruddhety âkshipann atas te vaibhâshikâ/h/.]

[Footnote 385: The rûpaskandha comprises the senses and their objects, colour, &c.; the sense-organs were above called bhautika, they here re-appear as /k/aittika on account of their connexion with thought. Their objects likewise are classed as /k/aittika in so far as they are perceived by the senses.--The vij/ñ/ânaskandha comprises the series of self-cognitions (ahamaham ity âlayavj/ñ/ânapravâha/h/), according to all commentators; and in addition, according to the Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a, the knowledge, determinate and indeterminate, of external things (savikalpaka/m/ nirvikalpaka/m/ /k/a prav/ri/ttivij/ñ/ânasamj/ñ/itam).-- The vedanâskandha comprises pleasure, pain, &c.--The samj/ñ/âskandha comprises the cognition of things by their names (gaur a/s/va ityâdi/s/abdasamjalpitapratyaya/h/, Ân. Gi.; gaur a/s/va ityeva/m/ nâmavi/s/ish/t/asavikalpaka/h/ pratyaya/h/, Go. Ân.; sa/m/j/ñ/â yaj/ñ/adattâdipadatadullekhî savikalpapratyayo vâ, dvitîyapakshe vij/ñ/ânapadena savikalpapratyayo na grâhy/h/, Brahmavidyâbh.). The sa/m/skâraskandha comprises passion, aversion, &c., dharma and adharma.--Compare also the Bhâmatî.--The vij/ñ/ânaskandha is /k/itta, the other skandhas /k/aitta.]

[Footnote 386: It has to be kept in view that the sarvâstitvavâdins as well as the other Bauddha sects teach the momentariness (ksha/n/ikatva), the eternal flux of everything that exists, and are on that ground controverted by the upholders of the permanent Brahman.]

[Footnote 387: Mind, on the Bauddha doctrine, presupposes the existence of an aggregate of atoms, viz. the body.]

[Footnote 388: In consequence of which no release could take place.]

[Footnote 389: The Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a explains the last clause--from ksha/n/ikatvâ/k/ /k/a--somewhat differently: Api /k/a paramâ/n/ûnâm api ksha/n/ikatvâbhyupagamân melana/m/ na sambhavati, paramâ/n/ûnâ/m/ melana/m/ paramâ/n/ukriyâdhînam, tathâ /k/a svakriyâ/m/ prati paramâ/n/ûnâ/m/ kâra/n/atvât kriyâpûraksha/n/e paramâ/n/ubhir bhâvyam kriyâ /s/rayatayâ kriyâksha/n/eszpi teshâm avasthânam apekshitam eva/m/ melanakshaneszpi, nahi melanâ/s/rayasyâbhâve melanarûpâ prav/ri/ttir upapadyate, tathâ /k/a sthiraparamâ/n/usâdhyâ melanarûpâ prav/ri/tti/h/ katha/m/ teshâm ksha/n/ikatve bhavet.--Ânanda Giri also divides and translates differently from the translation in the text.]

[Footnote 390: The kâra/n/atvât of /S/a@nkara explains the pratyayatvât of the Sûtra; kârya/m/ praty ayate janakatvena ga/kkh/ati.]

[Footnote 391: The commentators agree on the whole in their explanations of the terms of this series.--The following is the substance of the comment of the Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a: Nescience is the error of considering that which is momentary, impure, &c. to be permanent, pure, &c.--Impression (affection, sa/m/skâra) comprises desire, aversion, &c., and the activity caused by them.--Knowledge (vij/ñ/âna) is the self-consciousness (aham ity âlayavij/ñ/ânasya v/ri/ttilâbha/h/) springing up in the embryo.--Name and form is the rudimentary flake--or bubble-like condition of the embryo.--The abode of the six (sha/d/âyatana) is the further developed stage of the embryo in which the latter is the abode of the six senses.--Touch (spar/s/a) is the sensations of cold, warmth, &c. on the embryo's part.--Feeling (vedaná) the sensations of pleasure and pain resulting therefrom.--Desire (t/ri/sh/n/â) is the wish to enjoy the pleasurable sensations and to shun the painful ones.--Activity (upâdâna) is the effort resulting from desire,--Birth is the passing out from the uterus.--Species (jâti) is the class of beings to which the new-born creature belongs.--Decay (jarâ).--Death (mara/n/am) is explained as the condition of the creature when about to die (mumûrshâ).--Grief (/s/oka) the frustration of wishes connected therewith.--Lament (paridevanam) the lamentations on that account.--Pain (du/h/kha) is such pain as caused by the five senses.--Durmanas is mental affliction.--The 'and the like' implies death, the departure to another world and the subsequent return from there.]