Part 5

The task of the second pâda is to refute, by arguments independent of Vedic passages, the more important philosophical theories concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedânta view.--The first adhikara/n/a (1-10) is directed against the Sâ@nkhyas, whose doctrine had already been touched upon incidentally in several previous places, and aims at proving that a non-intelligent first cause, such as the pradhâna of the Sâ@nkhyas, is unable to create and dispose.--The second adhikara/n/a (11-17) refutes the Vai/s/eshika tenet that the world originates from atoms set in motion by the ad/ri/sh/t/a.--The third and fourth adhikara/n/as are directed against various schools of Bauddha philosophers. Adhik. III (18-27) impugns the view of the so-called sarvâstitvavâdins, or bâhyârthavâdins, who maintain the reality of an external as well as an internal world; Adhik. IV (28-32) is directed against the vij/ñ/ânavâdins, according to whom ideas are the only reality.--The last Sûtra of this adhikara/n/a is treated by Râmânuja as a separate adhikara/n/a refuting the view of the Mâdhyamikas, who teach that everything is void, i.e. that nothing whatever is real.--Adhik. V (33-36) is directed against the doctrine of the Jainas; Adhik. VI (37-41) against those philosophical schools which teach that a highest Lord is not the material but only the operative cause of the world.

The last adhikara/n/a of the pâda (42-45) refers, according to the unanimous statement of the commentators, to the doctrine of the Bhâgavatas or Pâ/ñk/arâtras. But /S/a@nkara and Râmânuja totally disagree as to the drift of the Sûtrakâra's opinion regarding that system. According to the former it is condemned like the systems previously referred to; according to the latter it is approved of.--Sûtras 42 and 43, according to both commentators, raise objections against the system; Sûtra 42 being directed against the doctrine that from the highest being, called Vâsudeva, there is originated Sa@nkarsha/n/a, i.e. the jiva, on the ground that thereby those scriptural passages would be contradicted which teach the soul's eternity; and Sûtra 43 impugning the doctrine that from Sa@nkarsha/n/a there springs Pradyumna, i.e. the manas.--The Sûtra on which the difference of interpretation turns is 44. Literally translated it runs, 'Or, on account of there being' (or, 'their being') 'knowledge and so on, there is non-contradiction of that.'--This means, according to /S/a@nkara, 'Or, if in consequence of the existence of knowledge and so on (on the part of Sa@nkarsha/n/a, &c. they be taken not as soul, mind, &c. but as Lords of pre-eminent knowledge, &c.), yet there is non-contradiction of that (viz. of the objection raised in Sûtra 42 against the Bhâgavata doctrine).'--According to Râmânuja, on the other hand, the Sûtra has to be explained as follows: 'Or, rather there is noncontradiction of that (i.e. the Pa/ñk/arâtra doctrine) on account of their being knowledge and so on (i.e. on account of their being Brahman).' Which means: Since Sa@nkarsha/n/a and so on are merely forms of manifestation of Brahman, the Pâ/ñk/arâtra doctrine, according to which they spring from Brahman, is not contradicted.--The form of the Sûtra makes it difficult for us to decide which of the two interpretations is the right one; it, however, appears to me that the explanations of the 'vâ' and of the 'tat,' implied in Râmânuja's comment, are more natural than those resulting from /S/a@nkara's interpretation. Nor would it be an unnatural proceeding to close the polemical pâda with a defence of that doctrine which--in spite of objections--has to be viewed as the true one.

PÂDA III.

The third pâda discusses the question whether the different forms of existence which, in their totality, constitute the world have an origin or not, i.e. whether they are co-eternal with Brahman, or issue from it and are refunded into it at stated intervals.

The first seven adhikara/n/as treat of the five elementary substances.--Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the ether is not co-eternal with Brahman, but springs from it as its first effect.--Adhik. II (8) shows that air springs from ether; Adhik. IV, V, VI (10; 11; 12) that fire springs from air, water from fire, earth from water.--Adhik. III (9) explains by way of digression that Brahman, which is not some special entity, but quite generally 'that which is,' cannot have originated from anything else.

Adhik. VII (13) demonstrates that the origination of one element from another is due, not to the latter in itself, but to Brahman acting in it.

Adhik. VIII (14) teaches that the reabsorption of the elements into Brahman takes place in the inverse order of their emission.

Adhik. IX (15) remarks that the indicated order in which the emission and the reabsorption of the elementary substances take place is not interfered with by the creation and reabsorption of the organs of the soul, i.e. the sense organs and the internal organ (manas); for they also are of elemental nature, and as such created and retracted together with the elements of which they consist.

The remainder of the pâda is taken up by a discussion of the nature of the individual soul, the jîva.--Adhik. X (16) teaches that expressions such as 'Devadatta is born,' 'Devadatta has died,' strictly apply to the body only, and are transferred to the soul in so far only as it is connected with a body.

Adhik. XI (17) teaches that the individual soul is, according to Scripture, permanent, eternal, and therefore not, like the ether and the other elements, produced from Brahman at the time of creation.--This Sûtra is of course commented on in a very different manner by /S/a@nkara on the one hand and Râmânuja on the other. According to the former, the jîva is in reality identical--and as such co-eternal--with Brahman; what originates is merely the soul's connexion with its limiting adjuncts, and that connexion is moreover illusory.--According to Râmânuja, the jîva is indeed an effect of Brahman, but has existed in Brahman from all eternity as an individual being and as a mode (prakâra) of Brahman. So indeed have also the material elements; yet there is an important distinction owing to which the elements may be said to originate at the time of creation, while the same cannot be said of the soul. Previously to creation the material elements exist in a subtle condition in which they possess none of the qualities that later on render them the objects of ordinary experience; hence, when passing over into the gross state at the time of creation, they may be said to originate. The souls, on the other hand, possess at all times the same essential qualities, i.e. they are cognizing agents; only, whenever a new creation takes place, they associate themselves with bodies, and their intelligence therewith undergoes a certain expansion or development (vikâsa); contrasting with the unevolved or contracted state (sanko/k/a) which characterised it during the preceding pralaya. But this change is not a change of essential nature (svarûpânyathâbhâva) and hence we have to distinguish the souls as permanent entities from the material elements which at the time of each creation and reabsorption change their essential characteristics.

Adhik. XII (18) defines the nature of the individual soul. The Sûtra declares that the soul is 'j/ñ/a.' This means, according to /S/a@nkara, that intelligence or knowledge does not, as the Vai/s/eshikas teach, constitute a mere attribute of the soul which in itself is essentially non-intelligent, but is the very essence of the soul. The soul is not a knower, but knowledge; not intelligent, but intelligence.--Râmânuja, on the other hand, explains 'j/ñ/a' by 'j/ñ/at/ri/,' i.e. knower, knowing agent, and considers the Sûtra to be directed not only against the Vai/s/eshikas, but also against those philosophers who--like the Sâ@nkhyas and the Vedântins of /S/a@nkara's school--maintain that the soul is not a knowing agent, but pure /k/aitanya.--The wording of the Sûtra certainly seems to favour Râmânuja's interpretation; we can hardly imagine that an author definitely holding the views of /S/a@nkara should, when propounding the important dogma of the soul's nature, use the term j/ñ/a of which the most obvious interpretation j/ñ/ât/ri/, not j/ñ/ânam.

Adhik. XIII (19-32) treats the question whether the individual soul is a/n/u, i.e. of very minute size, or omnipresent, all-pervading (sarvagata, vyâpin). Here, again, we meet with diametrically opposite views.--In /S/a@nkara's opinion the Sûtras 19-38 represent the pûrvapaksha view, according to which the jîva is a/n/u, while Sûtra 29 formulates the siddhânta, viz. that the jîva, which in reality is all-pervading, is spoken of as a/n/u in some scriptural passages, because the qualities of the internal organ--which itself is a/n/u--constitute the essence of the individual soul as long as the latter is implicated in the sa/m/sâra.--According to Râmânuja, on the other hand, the first Sûtra of the adhikara/n/a gives utterance to the siddhânta view, according to which the soul is of minute size; the Sûtras 20-25 confirm this view and refute objections raised against it; while the Sûtras 26-29 resume the question already mooted under Sûtra 18, viz. in what relation the soul as knowing agent (j/ñ/ât/ri/) stands to knowledge (j/ñ/âna).--In order to decide between the conflicting claims of these two interpretations we must enter into some details.--/S/a@nkara maintains that Sûtras 19-28 state and enforce a pûrvapaksha view, which is finally refuted in 29. What here strikes us at the outset, is the unusual length to which the defence of a mere primâ facie view is carried; in no other place the Sûtras take so much trouble to render plausible what is meant to be rejected in the end, and an unbiassed reader will certainly feel inclined to think that in 19-28 we have to do, not with the preliminary statement of a view finally to be abandoned, but with an elaborate bonâ fide attempt to establish and vindicate an essential dogma of the system. Still it is not altogether impossible that the pûrvapaksha should here be treated at greater length than usual, and the decisive point is therefore whether we can, with /S/a@nkara, look upon Sûtra 29 as embodying a refutation of the pûrvapaksha and thus implicitly acknowledging the doctrine that the individual soul is all-pervading. Now I think there can be no doubt that /S/a@nkara's interpretation of the Sûtra is exceedingly forced. Literally translated (and leaving out the non-essential word 'prâj/ñ/avat') the Sûtra runs as follows: 'But on account of that quality (or "those qualities;" or else "on account of the quality--or qualities--of that") being the essence, (there is) that designation (or "the designation of that").' This /S/a@nkara maintains to mean, 'Because the qualities of the buddhi are the essence of the soul in the sa/m/sâra state, therefore the soul itself is sometimes spoken of as a/n/u.' Now, in the first place, nothing in the context warrants the explanation of the first 'tat' by buddhi. And--which is more important--in the second place, it is more than doubtful whether on /S/a@nkara's own system the qualities of the buddhi--such as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, &c.--can with any propriety be said to constitute the essence of the soul even in the sa/m/sâra state. The essence of the soul in whatever state, according to /S/a@nkara's system, is knowledge or intelligence; whatever is due to its association with the buddhi is non-essential or, more strictly, unreal, false.

There are no similar difficulties in the way of Râmânuja's interpretation of the adhikara/n/a. He agrees with /S/a@nkara in the explanation of Sûtras 19-35, with this difference that he views them as setting forth, not the pûrvapaksha, but the siddhânta. Sûtras 26-28 also are interpreted in a manner not very different from /S/a@nkara's, special stress being laid on the distinction made by Scripture between knowledge as a mere quality and the soul as a knowing agent, the substratum of knowledge. This discussion naturally gives rise to the question how it is that Scripture in some places makes use of the term vij/ñ/âna when meaning the individual soul. The answer is given in Sûtra 29, 'The soul is designated as knowledge because it has that quality for its essence,' i.e. because knowledge is the essential characteristic quality of the soul, therefore the term 'knowledge' is employed here and there to denote the soul itself. This latter interpretation gives rise to no doubt whatever. It closely follows the wording of the text and does not necessitate any forced supplementation. The 'tu' of the Sûtra which, according to /S/a@nkara, is meant to discard the pûrvapaksha, serves on Râmânuja's view to set aside a previously-raised objection; an altogether legitimate assumption.

Of the three remaining Sûtras of the adhikara/n/a (30-32), 30 explains, according to /S/a@nkara, that the soul may be called a/n/u, since, as long as it exists in the sa/m/sâra condition, it is connected with the buddhi. According to Râmânuja the Sûtra teaches that the soul may be called vij/ñ/âna because the latter constitutes its essential quality as long as it exists.--Sûtra 31 intimates, according to /S/a@nkara, that in the states of deep sleep, and so on, the soul is potentially connected with the buddhi, while in the waking state that connexion becomes actually manifest. The same Sûtra, according to Râmânuja, teaches that j/ñ/ât/ri/tva is properly said to constitute the soul's essential nature, although it is actually manifested in some states of the soul only.--In Sûtra 32, finally, /S/a@nkara sees a statement of the doctrine that, unless the soul had the buddhi for its limiting adjunct, it would either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing; while, according to Râmânuja, the Sûtra means that the soul would either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing, if it were pure knowledge and all-pervading (instead of being /jñ/ât/ri/ and a/n/u, as it is in reality).--The three Sûtras can be made to fit in with either interpretation, although it must be noted that none of them explicitly refers to the soul's connexion with the buddhi.

Adhik. XIV and XV (33-39; 40) refer to the kart/ri/tva of the jîva, i.e. the question whether the soul is an agent. Sûtras 33-39 clearly say that it is such. But as, according to /S/a@nkara's system, this cannot be the final view,--the soul being essentially non-active, and all action belonging to the world of upâdhis,--he looks upon the next following Sûtra (40) as constituting an adhikara/n/a by itself, and teaching that the soul is an agent when connected with the instruments of action, buddhi, &c., while it ceases to be so when dissociated from them, 'just as the carpenter acts in both ways,' i.e. just as the carpenter works as long as he wields his instruments, and rests after having laid them aside.--Râmânuja, perhaps more naturally, does not separate Sûtra 40 from the preceding Sûtras, but interprets it as follows: Activity is indeed an essential attribute of the soul; but therefrom it does not follow that the soul is always actually active, just as the carpenter, even when furnished with the requisite instruments, may either work or not work, just as he pleases.

Adhik. XVI (41, 42) teaches that the soul in its activity is dependent on the Lord who impels it with a view to its former actions.

Adhik. XVII (43-53) treats of the relation of the individual soul to Brahman. Sûtra 43 declares that the individual soul is a part (a/ms/a) of Brahman, and the following Sûtras show how that relation does not involve either that Brahman is affected by the imperfections, sufferings, &c. of the souls, or that one soul has to participate in the experiences of other souls. The two commentators of course take entirely different views of the doctrine that the soul is a part of Brahman. According to Râmânuja the souls are in reality parts of Brahman[14]; according to Sa@nkara the 'a/ms/a' of the Sûtra must be understood to mean 'a/ms/a iva,' 'a part as it were;' the one universal indivisible Brahman having no real parts, but appearing to be divided owing to its limiting adjuncts.--One Sûtra (50) in this adhikara/n/a calls for special notice. According to Sa@nkara the words 'âbhâsa eva /k/a' mean '(the soul is) a mere reflection,' which, as the commentators remark, is a statement of the so-called pratibimbavâda, i.e. the doctrine that the so-called individual soul is nothing but the reflection of the Self in the buddhi; while Sûtra 43 had propounded the so-called ava/kkh/edavâda, i.e. the doctrine that the soul is the highest Self in so far as limited by its adjuncts.--According to Râmânuja the âbhâsa of the Sûtra has to be taken in the sense of hetvâbhâsa, a fallacious argument, and the Sûtra is explained as being directed against the reasoning of those Vedântins according to whom the soul is Brahman in so far as limited by non-real adjuncts[15].

PÂDA IV.

Adhik. I, II, III (1-4; 5-6; 7) teach that the prâ/n/as (by which generic name are denoted the buddhîndriyas, karmen-driyas, and the manas) spring from Brahman; are eleven in number; and are of minute size (a/n/u).

Adhik. IV, V, VI (8; 9-12; 13) inform us also that the mukhya prâ/n/a, i.e. the vital air, is produced from Brahman; that it is a principle distinct from air in general and from the prâ/n/as discussed above; and that it is minute (a/n/u).

Adhik. VII and VIII (14-16; 17-19) teach that the prâ/n/as are superintended and guided in their activity by special divinities, and that they are independent principles, not mere modifications of the mukhya prâ/n/a.

Adhik. IX (20-22) declares that the evolution of names and forms (the nâmarûpavyâkara/n/a) is the work, not of the individual soul, but of the Lord.

Notes:

[Footnote 13: Lokavat, Yathâ loke râja/s/âsanânuvartinâ/m/ /k/a râjânugrahanigrahak/ri/takhadukhayoges'pi na sa/s/arîraîvamâtre/n/a sâsake râjany api /s/âsanânuv/ri/ttyauv/ri/ttinimittasukhadukhayor bhokt/ri/vaprasa@nga/h/. Yathâha Drami/d/abhâshyakâra/h/ yathâ loke râjâ pra/k/uradanda/s/ûke ghores'narthasa/m/ka/t/es'pi prade/s/e vartamânoszpi vyajanâdyavadhûtadeho doshair na sprisyate abhipretâ/ms/ /k/a lokân paripipâlayishati bhogâ/ms/ /k/a gandhâdîn avi/s/vajanopabhogyân dhârayati tathâsau loke/s/varo bhramatsvasâmait/h/ya/k/amato doshair na sp/ris/yate rakshati /k/a lokân brahmalokâdi/ms/ /k/âvi/s/vajanopabhogyân dhârayatîti.]

[Footnote 14: Gîvasya kart/ri/tva/m/ paramapurushâyattam ity uktam. Idânîm kim aya/m/ gîva/h/ parasmâd atyantabhinna/h/ uta param eva brahma bhrântam uta brahmaivopâdhyava/kkh/innam atha brahmâ/ms/a iti sa/m/sayyate /s/rutivipraticpatte/h/ sa/m/saya/h/. Nanu tadananyam ârambha/n/a/s/abdâdibhya/h/ adhika/m/ tu bhedanirdesâd ity atraivâyam aitho nir/n/îta/h/ Satya/m/ sa eva nânâtvaikatva/s/rutivipratipattyâ skshipya jîvasya brahmâ/ms/atvopapâdanena vi/s/eshato nir/n/îyate. Yâvad dhi jîvasya brahmâ/m/satva/m/ na nir/n/îtam tâvaj jîvasya brahmanosnanyatva/m/ brahma/n/as tasmâd adhikatvâ/m/ /k/a na pratitish/th/ati. Ki/m/ tâvat prâptam. Atyanta/m/ bhinna iti. Kuta/h/. J/ñ/âj/ñ/nau dvâv ityâdibhedanirde/s/ât. J/ñ/âj/ñ/ayor abheda/s/rutayas tv agninâ si/ñk/ed itivad viruddhârthapratipâdanâd aupa/k/ârikya/h/, Brahma/n/os/ms/o jîva ity api na sâdhîya/h/, ekavastvekade/s/avâ/k/î hy a/ms/a/s/sabda/h/, jîvasya brahmaikade/s/atve tadgatâ doshâ brahma/n/i bhaveyu/h/. Na /k/a brahmakha/nd/o jîva ity a/ms/atvopapatti/h/ kha/nd/anânarhatvâd brahma/n/a/h/ prâguktadoshaprasa@ngâ/k/ /k/a, tasmâd atyantabhinnasya tada/ms/atva/m/ durupapâdam. Yadvâ bhrânta/m/ brahmaiva jîva/h/. Kuta/h/. Tat tvam asi ayam âtmâ brahmetyâdibrahmâtmabhâvopade/s/ât, nânâtmatvavâdinyas tu pratyakshâdisiddhârthânuvâditvâd ananyathâsiddhâdvaitopade/s/aparâbhi/h/ /s/rutibhi/h/ pratyakshâdaya/s/ /k/a avidyântargata/h/ khyâpyante.--Athavâ brahmaivânâdyupâdhyava/kkh/inna/m/ jîva/h/. Kuta/h/. Tata eva brahmâtmabhâvopade/s/at. Na /k/âyam upâdhir bhrântiparikalpita ita vaktu/m/ sakya/m/ bandhamokshâdivyavasthânupapatter. Ity eva/m/ prâtptesbhidhîyate. Brahmâ/ms/a iti. Kuta/h/. Nânâvyapade/s/âd anyathâ /k/aikatvena vyapade/s/âd ubhayathâ hi vyapade/s/o d/ris/yate. Nâvâvyapade/s/as tâvat srash/tri/tva/rig/yatva--niyant/ri/tvaniyâmyatva--sarvaj/ñ/atvâj/ñ/atva-- svâdhînatvaparâdhînatva--/s/uddhatvâ/s/uddhatva-- kalyâ/n/agu/n/âkaratvaviparîtatva--patitva/s/eshatvâdibhir d/ris/yate. Anyathâ /k/âbhedena vyapade/s/os pi tat tvam asi ayam âtmâ brahmetyâdibhir d/ris/yate. Api dâ/s/akitavâditvam apy adhîyate eke, brahma dâsâ brahma dâsâ brahmeme kitavâ ity âtharva/n/ikâ brahma/n/o dâ/s/akitavâditvam apy adhîyate, tata/s/ /k/a sarvajîvavyâpitvena abhedo vyapadi/s/yata it artha/h/. Evam ubhayavyapade/s/amukhyatvasiddhaye jîvosya/m/ brahma/n/os/ms/a ity abhyupagantavya/h/.]

[Footnote 15: Nanu bhrântabrahmajîvavâdeszpy avidyâk/ri/topâdhibhedâd bhogavyavasthâdaya upapadyanta ata âha, âbhâsa eva /k/a. Akha/nd/aikarasaprakâ/s/amâtratvarûpasya svarûpatirodhânapûrvakopâdhibhedopapâdanahetur âbhâsa eva. Prakâ/s/aikasvarûpasya prakâ/s/atirodhâna/m/ prakâ/s/anâ/s/a eveti prâg evopapâditam. Âbhâsâ eveti vâ pâ/th/a/h/, tathâ sati hetava âbhâsâ/h/.]

THIRD ADHYÂYA. PÂDA I.

Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the soul, when passing out of the body at the time of death, remains invested with the subtle material elements (bhûtasûkshma) which serve as an abode to the prâ/n/as attached to the soul.

Adhik. II (8-11) shows that, when the souls of those who had enjoyed the reward of their good works in the moon descend to the earth in order to undergo a new embodiment, there cleaves to them a remainder (anu/s/aya) of their former deeds which determines the nature of the new embodiment.

Adhik. III (12-21) discusses the fate after death of those whom their good works do not entitle to pass up to the moon.

Adhik. IV, V, VI (22; 23; 24-27) teach that the subtle bodies of the souls descending from the moon through the ether, air, &c., do not become identical with ether, air, &c., but only like them; that the entire descent occupies a short time only; and that, when the souls finally enter into plants and so on, they do not participate in the life of the latter, but are merely in external contact with them.

PÂDA II.

Adhik. I (1-6) treats of the soul in the dreaming state. According to /S/a@nkara the three first Sûtras discuss the question whether the creative activity ascribed to the soul in some scriptural passages produces things as real as those by which the waking soul is surrounded, or not; Sûtra 3 settles the point by declaring that the creations of the dreaming soul are mere 'Mâyâ,' since they do not fully manifest the character of real objects. Sûtra 4 adds that dreams, although mere Mâyâ, yet have a prophetic quality. Sûtras 5 and 6 finally reply to the question why the soul, which after all is a part of the Lord and as such participates in his excellencies, should not be able to produce in its dreams a real creation, by the remark that the soul's knowledge and power are obscured by its connexion with the gross body.