Part 34

In the sixth prapâ/th/aka of the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka there is given, in reply to the question, 'Who is that Self?' a lengthy exposition of the nature of the Self, 'He who is within the heart, among the prâ/n/as, the person of light, consisting of knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 7). Here the doubt arises, whether the passage merely aims at making an additional statement about the nature of the transmigrating soul (known already from other sources), or at establishing the nature of the non-transmigrating Self.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that the passage is concerned with the nature of the transmigrating soul, on account of the introductory and concluding statements. For the introductory statement, 'He among the prâ/n/as who consists of knowledge,' contains marks indicatory of the embodied soul, and so likewise the concluding passage, 'And that great unborn Self is he who consists of cognition,' &c. (IV, 4, 22). We must therefore adhere to the same subject-matter in the intermediate passages also, and look on them as setting forth the same embodied Self, represented in its different states, viz. the waking state, and so on.

In reply to this, we maintain that the passage aims only at giving information about the highest Lord, not at making additional statements about the embodied soul.--Why?--On account of the highest Lord being designated as different from the embodied soul, in the states of deep sleep and of departing from the body. His difference from the embodied soul in the state of deep sleep is declared in the following passage, 'This person embraced by the intelligent (prâj/ñ/a) Self knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within.' Here the term, 'the person,' must mean the embodied soul; for of him it is possible to deny that he knows, because he, as being the knower, may know what is within and without. The 'intelligent Self,' on the other hand, is the highest Lord, because he is never dissociated from intelligence, i.e.--in his case--all-embracing knowledge.--Similarly, the passage treating of departure, i.e. death ('this bodily Self mounted by the intelligent Self moves along groaning'), refers to the highest Lord as different from the individual Self. There also we have to understand by the 'embodied one' the individual soul which is the Lord of the body, while the 'intelligent one' is again the Lord. We thus understand that 'on account of his being designated as something different, in the states of deep sleep and departure,' the highest Lord forms the subject of the passage.--With reference to the pûrvapakshin's assertion that the entire chapter refers to the embodied Self, because indicatory marks of the latter are found in its beginning, middle, and end, we remark that in the first place the introductory passage ('He among the prâ/n/as who consists of cognition') does not aim at setting forth the character of the transmigrating Self, but rather, while merely referring to the nature of the transmigrating Self as something already known, aims at declaring its identity with the highest Brahman; for it is manifest that the immediately subsequent passage, 'as if thinking, as if moving'[227], aims at discarding the attributes of the transmigrating Self. The concluding passage again is analogous to the initial one; for the words, 'And that great unborn Self is he who,' &c., mean: We have shown that that same cognitional Self, which is observed among the prâ/n/as, is the great unborn Self, i.e. the highest Lord--He, again, who imagines that the passages intervening (between the two quoted) aim at setting forth the nature of the transmigrating Self by representing it in the waking state, and so on, is like a man who setting out towards the east, wants to set out at the same time towards the west. For in representing the states of waking, and so on, the passage does not aim at describing the soul as subject to different states or transmigration, but rather as free from all particular conditions and transmigration. This is evident from the circumstance that on Janaka's question, which is repeated in every section, 'Speak on for the sake of emancipation,' Yaj/ñ/avalkya replies each time, 'By all that he is not affected, for that person is not attached to anything' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 14-16). And later on he says (IV, 3, 22), 'He is not followed by good, not followed by evil, for he has then overcome all the sorrows of the heart.' We have, therefore, to conclude that the chapter exclusively aims at setting forth the nature of the non-transmigrating Self.

43. And on account of such words as Lord, &c.

That the chapter aims at setting forth the nature of the non-transmigrating Self, we have to conclude from that circumstance also that there occur in it terms such as Lord and so on, intimating the nature of the non-transmigrating Self, and others excluding the nature of the transmigrating Self. To the first class belongs, for instance, 'He is the lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things.' To the latter class belongs the passage, 'He does not become greater by good works, nor smaller by evil works.'--From all which we conclude that the chapter refers to the non-transmigrating highest Lord.

Notes:

[Footnote 164: From passages of which nature we may infer that in the passage under discussion also the 'abode' is Brahman.]

[Footnote 165: From which circumstance we may conclude that the passage under discussion also refers to Brahman.]

[Footnote 166: Yat sarvam avidyâropita/m/ tat sarva/m/ paramârthato brahma na tu yad brahma tat sarvam ity artha/h/. Bhâmatî.]

[Footnote 167: So that the passage would have to be translated, 'That, viz. knowledge, &c. is the bridge of the Immortal.']

[Footnote 168: Bhogyasya bhokt/ris/eshatvât tasyâyatanatvam uktam â/s/a@nkyâha na /k/eti, jîvasyâd/ri/sh/t/advârâ dyubhvâdinimittatvezpi na sâkshât tadâyatanatvam aupâdhikatvenâvibhutvâd ity artha/h/. Ânanda Giri.]

[Footnote 169: It would not have been requisite to introduce a special Sûtra for the individual soul--which, like the air, is already excluded by the preceding Sûtra--if it were not for the new argument brought forward in the following Sûtra which applies to the individual soul only.]

[Footnote 170: If the individual soul were meant by the abode of heaven, earth, &c., the statement regarding Î/s/vara made in the passage about the two birds would be altogether abrupt, and on that ground objectionable. The same difficulty does not present itself with regard to the abrupt mention of the individual soul which is well known to everybody, and to which therefore casual allusions may be made.--I subjoin Ânanda Giri's commentary on the entire passage: Jîvasyopâdhyaikyenâvivakshitatvât tadj/ñ/ânezpi sarvaj/ñ/ânasiddhes tasyâyatanatvâdyabhâve hetvantara/m/ vâ/k/yam ity â/s/a@nkya sûtre/n/a pariharati kuta/sk/etyâdinâ. Tad vyâ/k/ash/t/e dyubhvâdîti. Nirde/s/am eva dar/s/ayati tayor iti. Vibhaktyartham âha tâbhyâ/m/ /k/eti. Sthitye/s/varasyâdanâj jîvasa/m/grahezpi katham î/s/varasyaiva vi/s/vâyatanatva/m/ tadâha yadîti. Î/s/varasyâyanatvenâprak/ri/tatve jîvap/ri/thakkathanânupapattir ity uktam eva vyatirekadvârâha anyatheti. Jîvasyâyatanatvenâprak/ri/tatve tulyânupapattir iti /s/a@nkate nanviti. Tasyaikyârtha/m/ lokasiddhasyânuvâdatvân naivam ity âha neti. Jîvasyâpûrvatvâbhâvenâpratipâdyatvam eva praka/t/ayati kshetraj/ñ/o hîti. Î/s/varasyâpi lokavâdisiddhatvâd apratipâdyatety â/s/a@nkyâha î/s/varas tv iti.]

[Footnote 171: As might be the primâ facie conclusion from the particle 'but' introducing the sentence 'but he in reality,' &c.]

[Footnote 172: It being maintained that the passage referred to is to be viewed in connexion with the general subject-matter of the preceding past of the chapter.]

[Footnote 173: And would thus involve a violation of a fundamental principle of the Mîmâ/m/sâ.]

[Footnote 174: A remark directed against the possible attempt to explain the passage last quoted as referring to the embodied soul.]

[Footnote 175: Pi/nd/a/h/ sthûlo deha/h/, prâ/n/a/h/ sûtrâtmâ. Ânanda Giri.-The lower Brahman (hira/n/yagarbha on sûtrâtman) is the vital principle (prâ/n/a) in all creatures.]

[Footnote 176: Sa/m/yagdar/s/ana, i.e. complete seeing or intuition; the same term which in other places--where it is not requisite to insist on the idea of 'seeing' in contradistinction from 'reflecting' or 'meditating'--is rendered by perfect knowledge.]

[Footnote 177: Translated above by 'of the shape of the individual soul.']

[Footnote 178: Pa/n/ini III, 3, 77, 'mûrtta/m/ ghana/h/.']

[Footnote 179: So that the interpretation of the pûrvapakshin cannot be objected to on the ground of its involving the comparison of a thing to itself.]

[Footnote 180: So that no objection can be raised on the ground that heaven and earth cannot be contained in the small ether of the heart.]

[Footnote 181: Viz. of that which is within it. Ânanda Giri proposes two explanations: na /k/eti, paravi/s/esha/n/atvenety atra paro daharâkâ/s/a upâdânât tasminn iti saptamyanta-ta/kkh/abdasyeti /s/esha/h/. Yadvâ para/s/abdo s nta/h/sthavastuvishayas tadvi/s/esha/n/alvena tasminn iti daharâkâ/s/asyokter ity artha/h/. Ta/kkh/abdasya samnik/ri/sh/t/ânvayayoge viprak/ri/sh/t/ânvayasya jaghanyatvâd âkâ/s/ântargata/m/ dhyeyam iti bhâva/h/.]

[Footnote 182: A vâkyabheda--split of the sentence--takes place according to the Mîmâm/s/â when one and the same sentence contains two new statements which are different.]

[Footnote 183: While the explanation of Brahman by jîva would compel us to assume that the word Brahman secondarily denotes the individual soul.]

[Footnote 184: Upalabdher adhish/th/ânam brahma/n/a deha ishyate. Tenâsâdhâra/n/atvena deho brahmapuram bhavet. Bhâmatî.]

[Footnote 185: I.e. Brahmâ, the lower Brahman.]

[Footnote 186: The masculine 'âvirbhûtasvarûpa/h/' qualifies the substantive jîva/h/ which has to be supplied. Properly speaking the jîva whose true nature has become manifest, i.e. which has become Brahman, is no longer jîva; hence the explanatory statement that the term jîva is used with reference to what the jîva was before it became Brahman.]

[Footnote 187: To state another reason showing that the first and second chapters of Prajâpati's instruction refer to the same subject.]

[Footnote 188: I.e. of whom cognition is not a mere attribute.]

[Footnote 189: Although in reality there is no such thing as an individual soul.]

[Footnote 190: Nanu jîvabrahma/n/or aikyam na kvâpi sûtrakâro mukhato vadati kim tu sarvatra bhedam eva, ato naikyam ish/t/am tatrâha pratipâdyam tv iti.]

[Footnote 191: This last sentence is directed against the possible objection that '/s/abda,' which the Sûtra brings forward as an argument in favour of the highest Lord being meant, has the sense of 'sentence' (vâkya), and is therefore of less force than li@nga, i.e. indicatory or inferential mark which is represented in our passage by the a@ngush/th/amâtratâ of the purusha, and favours the jîva interpretation. /S/abda, the text remarks, here means /s/ruti, i.e. direct enunciation, and /s/ruti ranks, as a means of proof, higher than li@nga.]

[Footnote 192: I.e. men belonging to the three upper castes.]

[Footnote 193: The first reason excludes animals, gods, and /ri/shis. Gods cannot themselves perform sacrifices, the essential feature of which is the parting, on the part of the sacrificer, with an offering meant for the gods. /Ri/shis cannot perform sacrifices in the course of whose performance the ancestral /ri/shis of the sacrificer are invoked.--The second reason excludes those men whose only desire is emancipation and who therefore do not care for the perishable fruits of sacrifices.--The third and fourth reasons exclude the /S/ûdras who are indirectly disqualified for /s/âstric works because the Veda in different places gives rules for the three higher castes only, and for whom the ceremony of the upanayana--indispensable for all who wish to study the Veda--is not prescribed.--Cp. Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ Sûtras VI, 1.]

[Footnote 194: The reference is to Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ Sûtras I, 1, 5 (not to I, 2, 21, as stated in Muir's Sanskrit Texts, III, p. 69).]

[Footnote 195: In which classes of beings all the gods are comprised.]

[Footnote 196: Which shows that together with the non-eternality of the thing denoted there goes the non-eternality of the denoting word.]

[Footnote 197: Âk/ri/ti, best translated by [Greek: eidos].]

[Footnote 198: The pûrvapakshin, i.e. here the grammarian maintains, for the reasons specified further on, that there exists in the case of words a supersensuous entity called spho/t/a which is manifested by the letters of the word, and, if apprehended by the mind, itself manifests the sense of the word. The term spho/t/a may, according as it is viewed in either of these lights, be explained as the manifestor or that which is manifested.--The spho/t/a is a grammatical fiction, the word in so far as it is apprehended by us as a whole. That we cannot identify it with the 'notion' (as Deussen seems inclined to do, p. 80) follows from its being distinctly called vâ/k/aka or abhidhâyaka, and its being represented as that which causes the conception of the sense of a word (arthadhîhetu).]

[Footnote 199: For that each letter by itself expresses the sense is not observed; and if it did so, the other letters of the word would have to be declared useless.]

[Footnote 200: In order to enable us to apprehend the sense from the word, there is required the actual consciousness of the last letter plus the impressions of the preceding letters; just as smoke enables us to infer the existence of fire only if we are actually conscious of the smoke. But that actual consciousness does not take place because the impressions are not objects of perceptive consciousness.]

[Footnote 201: 'How should it be so?' i.e. it cannot be so; and on that account the differences apprehended do not belong to the letters themselves, but to the external conditions mentioned above.]

[Footnote 202: With 'or else' begins the exposition of the finally accepted theory as to the cause why the same letters are apprehended as different. Hitherto the cause had been found in the variety of the upâdhis of the letters. Now a new distinction is made between articulated letters and non-articulated tone.]

[Footnote 203: I.e. it is not directly one idea, for it has for its object more than one letter; but it may be called one in a secondary sense because it is based on the determinative knowledge that the letters, although more than one, express one sense only.]

[Footnote 204: Which circumstance proves that exalted knowledge appertains not only to Hira/n/yagarbha, but to many beings.]

[Footnote 205: Viz. naraka, the commentaries say.]

[Footnote 206: Asmin kalpe sarveshâm prâ/n/inâm dâhapâkaprakâ/s/akârî yozyam agnir d/ris/yate sozyam agni/h/ pûrvasmin kalpe manushya/h/ san devatvapadaprâpaka/m/ karmânush/th/âyâsmin kalpa etaj janma labdhavân ata/h/ pûrvasmin kalpe sa manushyo bhâvinî/m/ sa/m/j/ñ/âm â/sri/tyâgnir iti vyapadi/s/yate.--Sâya/n/a on the quoted passage.]

[Footnote 207: As, for instance, 'So long as Âditya rises in the east and sets in the west' (Ch. Up. III, 6, 4).]

[Footnote 208: Whence it follows that the devas are not personal beings, and therefore not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.]

[Footnote 209: Yama, for instance, being ordinarily represented as a person with a staff in his hand, Varu/n/a with a noose, Indra with a thunderbolt, &c. &c.]

[Footnote 210: On the proper function of arthavâda and mantra according to the Mîmâ/m/sâ, cp. Arthasa/m/graha, Introduction.]

[Footnote 211: See above, p. 197.]

[Footnote 212: Which can be offered by kshattriyas only.]

[Footnote 213: /S/rautali@ngenânumânabâdha/m/ dar/s/ayitvâ smârtenâpi tadbâdha/m/ dar/s/âyati smârtam iti. Ki/m/ atra brahma am/ri/tam ki/m/ svid vedyam anuttamam, /k/intayet tatra vai gatvâ gandharvo mâm ap/rikkh/ata, Vi/s/vâvasus tato râjan vedântaj/ñ/ânakovida iti mokshadharme janakayâj/ñ/avalkyasa/m/vâdât prahlâdâjagarasa/m/vadâ/k/ /k/oktânumânâsiddhir ity artha/h/.]

[Footnote 214: As opposed to an action to be accomplished.]

[Footnote 215: Of this nature is, for instance, the arthavâda, 'Fire is a remedy for cold.']

[Footnote 216: Of this nature is, for instance, the passage 'the sacrificial post is the sun' (i.e. possesses the qualities of the sun, luminousness, &c.; a statement contradicted by perception).]

[Footnote 217: And therefore to suppose that a divinity is nothing but a certain word forming part of a mantra.]

[Footnote 218: The râjasûya-sacrifice is to be offered by a prince who wishes to become the ruler of the whole earth.]

[Footnote 219: In one of whose stages the being desirous of final emancipation becomes a deva.]

[Footnote 220: The commentaries explain 'therefore' by 'on account of his being devoid of the three sacred fires.' This explanation does not, however, agree with the context of the Taitt. Sa/m/h.]

[Footnote 221: The /S/ûdra not having acquired a knowledge of Vedic matters in the legitimate way, i.e. through the study of the Veda under the guidance of a guru, is unfit for sacrifices as well as for vidyâ.]

[Footnote 222: The li@nga contained in the word '/S/ûdra' has no proving power as it occurs in an arthavâda-passage which has no authority if not connected with a corresponding injunctive passage. In our case the li@nga in the arthavâda-passage is even directly contradicted by those injunctions which militate against the /S/ûdras' qualification for Vedic matters.]

[Footnote 223: Ha/m/savâkyâd âtmanoznâdara/m/ /s/rutvâ jâna/s/rute/h/ /s/ug utpannety etad eva katha/m/ gamyate yenâsau /s/ûdra/s/abdena sâ/k/yate tatrâha sp/ris/yate /k/eti. Ânanda Giri.]

[Footnote 224: I translate this passage as I find it in all MSS. of /S/a@nkara consulted by me (noting, however, that some MSS. read /k/aitrarathinâmaika/h/). Ânanda Giri expressly explains tasmâd by /k/aitrarathad ity artha/h/.--The text of the Tâ/nd/ya Br. runs: tasmâ/k/ /k/aitrarathînâm eka/h/ kshatrapatir gâyate, and the commentary explains: tasmât kâra/n/âd adyâpi /k/itrava/ms/otpannânâ/m/ madhye eka eva râjâ kshatrapatir balâdhipatir bhavati.--Grammar does not authorise the form /k/ahraratha used in the Sûtra.]

[Footnote 225: The king A/s/vapati receives some Brâhma/n/as as his pupils without insisting on the upanayana. This express statement of the upanayana having been omitted in a certain case shows it to be the general rule.]

[Footnote 226: As the words stand in the original they might be translated as follows (and are so translated by the pûrvapakshin), 'Whatever there is, the whole world trembles in the prâ/n/a, there goes forth (from it) a great terror, viz. the raised thunderbolt.']

[Footnote 227: The stress lies here on the 'as if.' which intimate that the Self does not really think or move.]

FOURTH PÂDA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!

1. If it be said that some (mention) that which is based on inference (i.e. the pradhâna); we deny this, because (the term alluded to) refers to what is contained in the simile of the body (i.e. the body itself); and (that the text) shows.

In the preceding part of this work--as whose topic there has been set forth an enquiry into Brahman--we have at first defined Brahman (I, 1, 2); we have thereupon refuted the objection that that definition applies to the pradhâna also, by showing that there is no scriptural authority for the latter (I, 1, 5), and we have shown in detail that the common purport of all Vedânta-texts is to set forth the doctrine that Brahman, and not the pradhâ/n/a, is the cause of the world. Here, however, the Sâ@nkhya again raises an objection which he considers not to have been finally disposed of.

It has not, he says, been satisfactorily proved that there is no scriptural authority for the pradhâna; for some /s/âkhâs contain expressions which seem to convey the idea of the pradhâna. From this it follows that Kapila and other supreme /ri/shis maintain the doctrine of the pradhâna being the general cause only because it is based on the Veda.--As long therefore as it has not been proved that those passages to which the Sâ@nkhyas refer have a different meaning (i.e. do not allude to the pradhâna), all our previous argumentation as to the omniscient Brahman being the cause of the world must be considered as unsettled. We therefore now begin a new chapter which aims at proving that those passages actually have a different meaning.

The Sâ@nkhyas maintain that that also which is based on inference, i.e. the pradhâna, is perceived in the text of some /s/âkhâs. We read, for instance, they say, in the Kâ/th/aka (I, 3, 11), 'Beyond the Great there is the Undeveloped, beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person.' There we recognise, named by the same names and enumerated in the same order, the three entities with which we are acquainted from the Sâ@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, viz. the great principle, the Undeveloped (the pradhâna), and the soul[228]. That by the Undeveloped is meant the pradhâna is to be concluded from the common use of Sm/ri/ti and from the etymological interpretation of which the word admits, the pradhâna being called undeveloped because it is devoid of sound and other qualities. It cannot therefore be asserted that there is no scriptural authority for the pradhâna. And this pradhâna vouched for by Scripture we declare to be the cause of the world, on the ground of Scripture, Sm/ri/ti, and ratiocination.