Part 3

Owing to the effects of their former actions the individual souls are implicated in the sa/m/sâra, the endless cycle of birth, action, and death, final escape from which is to be obtained only through the study of the j/ñ/ânakâ/nd/a of the Veda. Compliance with the injunctions of the karmakâ/nd/a does not lead outside the sa/m/sâra; but he who, assisted by the grace of the Lord, cognizes--and meditates on--him in the way prescribed by the Upanishads reaches at his death final emancipation, i.e. he passes through the different stages of the path of the gods up to the world of Brahman and there enjoys an everlasting blissful existence from which there is no return into the sphere of transmigration. The characteristics of the released soul are similar to those of Brahman; it participates in all the latter's glorious qualities and powers, excepting only Brahman's power to emit, rule, and retract the entire world.

The chief points in which the two systems sketched above agree on the one hand and diverge on the other may be shortly stated as follows.--Both systems teach advaita, i.e. non-duality or monism. There exist not several fundamentally distinct principles, such as the prak/r/iti and the purushas of the Sâ@nkhyas, but there exists only one all-embracing being. While, however, the advaita taught by /S/a@nkara is a rigorous, absolute one, Râmânuja's doctrine has to be characterised as visish/t/a advaita, i.e. qualified non-duality, non-duality with a difference. According to Sankara, whatever is, is Brahman, and Brahman itself is absolutely homogeneous, so that all difference and plurality must be illusory. According to Râmânuja also, whatever is, is Brahman; but Brahman is not of a homogeneous nature, but contains within itself elements of plurality owing to which it truly manifests itself in a diversified world. The world with its variety of material forms of existence and individual souls is not unreal Mâyâ, but a real part of Brahman's nature, the body investing the universal Self. The Brahman of /S/a@nkara is in itself impersonal, a homogeneous mass of objectless thought, transcending all attributes; a personal God it becomes only through its association with the unreal principle of Mâyâ, so that--strictly speaking--/S/a@nkara's personal God, his Î/s/vara, is himself something unreal. Râmânuja's Brahman, on the other hand, is essentially a personal God, the all-powerful and all-wise ruler of a real world permeated and animated by his spirit. There is thus no room for the distinction between a param nirgu/n/am and an apara/m/ sagu/n/am brahma, between Brahman and Î/s/vara.--/S/a@nkara's individual soul is Brahman in so far as limited by the unreal upâdhis due to Mâyâ. The individual soul of Râmânuja, on the other hand, is really individual; it has indeed sprung from Brahman and is never outside Brahman, but nevertheless it enjoys a separate personal existence and will remain a personality for ever--The release from sa/m/sâra means, according to /S/a@nkara, the absolute merging of the individual soul in Brahman, due to the dismissal of the erroneous notion that the soul is distinct from Brahman; according to Râmânuja it only means the soul's passing from the troubles of earthly life into a kind of heaven or paradise where it will remain for ever in undisturbed personal bliss.--As Râmânuja does not distinguish a higher and lower Brahman, the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge is likewise not valid for him; the teaching of the Upanishads is not twofold but essentially one, and leads the enlightened devotee to one result only [1].

I now proceed to give a conspectus of the contents of the Vedânta-sûtras according to /S/a@nkara in which at the same time all the more important points concerning which Râmânuja disagrees will be noted. We shall here have to enter into details which to many may appear tedious. But it is only on a broad substratum of accurately stated details that we can hope to establish any definite conclusions regarding the comparative value of the different modes of interpretation which have been applied to the Sûtras. The line of investigation is an entirely new one, and for the present nothing can be taken for granted or known.--In stating the different heads of discussion (the so-called adhikara/n/as), each of which comprises one or more Sûtras, I shall follow the subdivision into adhikara/n/as adopted in the Vyâsâdhika-ra/n/amâlâ, the text of which is printed in the second volume of the Bibliotheca Indica edition of the Sûtras.

FIRST ADHYÂYA. PÂDA I.

The first five adhikara/n/as lay down the fundamental positions with regard to Brahman. Adhik. I (1) [2] treats of what the study of the Vedânta presupposes. Adhik. II (2) defines Brahman as that whence the world originates, and so on. Adhik. III (3) declares that Brahman is the source of the Veda. Adhik. IV (4) proves Brahman to be the uniform topic of all Vedânta-texts. Adhik. V (5-11) is engaged in proving by various arguments that the Brahman, which the Vedânta-texts represent as the cause of the world, is an intelligent principle, and cannot be identified with the non-intelligent pradhâna from which the world springs according to the Sâ@nkhyas.

With the next adhikara/n/a there begins a series of discussions of essentially similar character, extending up to the end of the first adhyâya. The question is throughout whether certain terms met with in the Upanishads denote Brahman or some other being, in most cases the jîva, the individual soul. /S/a@nkara remarks at the outset that, as the preceding ten Sûtras had settled the all-important point that all the Vedânta-texts refer to Brahman, the question now arises why the enquiry should be continued any further, and thereupon proceeds to explain that the acknowledged distinction of a higher Brahman devoid of all qualities and a lower Brahman characterised by qualities necessitates an investigation whether certain Vedic texts of primâ facie doubtful import set forth the lower Brahman as the object of devout meditation, or the higher Brahman as the object of true knowledge. But that such an investigation is actually carried on in the remaining portion of the first adhyâya, appears neither from the wording of the Sûtras nor even from /S/a@nkara's own treatment of the Vedic texts referred to in the Sûtras. In I, 1, 20, for instance, the question is raised whether the golden man within the sphere of the sun, with golden hair and beard and lotus-coloured eyes--of whom the Chândogya Upanishad speaks in 1, 6, 6--is an individual soul abiding within the sun or the highest Lord. /S/a@nkara's answer is that the passage refers to the Lord, who, for the gratification of his worshippers, manifests himself in a bodily shape made of Mâyâ. So that according to /S/a@nkara himself the alternative lies between the sagu/n/a Brahman and some particular individual soul, not between the sagu/n/a Brahman and the nirgu/n/a Brahman.

Adhik. VI (12-19) raises the question whether the ânandamaya, mentioned in Taittirîya Upanishad II, 5, is merely a transmigrating individual soul or the highest Self. /S/a@nkara begins by explaining the Sûtras on the latter supposition--and the text of the Sûtras is certainly in favour of that interpretation--gives, however, finally the preference to a different and exceedingly forced explanation according to which the Sûtras teach that the ânandamaya is not Brahman, since the Upanishad expressly says that Brahman is the tail or support of the ânandamaya[3].--Râmânuja's interpretation of Adhikara/n/a VI, although not agreeing in all particulars with the former explanation of /S/a@nkara, yet is at one with it in the chief point, viz. that the ânandamaya is Brahman. It further deserves notice that, while /S/a@nkara looks on Adhik. VI as the first of a series of interpretatory discussions, all of which treat the question whether certain Vedic passages refer to Brahman or not, Râmânuja separates the adhikara/n/a from the subsequent part of the pâda and connects it with what had preceded. In Adhik. V it had been shown that Brahman cannot be identified with the pradhâna; Adhik. VI shows that it is different from the individual soul, and the proof of the fundamental position of the system is thereby completed[4].--Adhik. VII (20, 21) demonstrates that the golden person seen within the sun and the person seen within the eye, mentioned in Ch. Up. I, 6, are not some individual soul of high eminence, but the supreme Brahman.--Adhik. VIII (22) teaches that by the ether from which, according to Ch. Up. I, 9, all beings originate, not the elemental ether has to be understood but the highest Brahman.--Adhik. IX (23). The prâ/n/a also mentioned in Ch. Up. I, ii, 5 denotes the highest Brahman[5]--Adhik. X (24-27) teaches that the light spoken of in Ch. Up. III, 13, 7 is not the ordinary physical light but the highest Brahman[6].--Adhik. XI (28-31) decides that the prâ/n/a mentioned in Kau. Up. III, 2 is Brahman.

PÂDA II.

Adhik. I (1-8) shows that the being which consists of mind, whose body is breath, &c., mentioned in Ch. Up. III, 14, is not the individual soul, but Brahman. The Sûtras of this adhikara/n/a emphatically dwell on the difference of the individual soul and the highest Self, whence /S/a@nkara is obliged to add an explanation--in his comment on Sûtra 6--to the effect that that difference is to be understood as not real, but as due to the false limiting adjuncts of the highest Self.--The comment of Râmânuja throughout closely follows the words of the Sûtras; on Sûtra 6 it simply remarks that the difference of the highest Self from the individual soul rests thereon that the former as free from all evil is not subject to the effects of works in the same way as the soul is [7].--Adhik. II (9, 10) decides that he to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but food (Ka/th/a. Up. I, 2, 25) is the highest Self.--Adhik. III (11, 12) shows that the two entered into the cave (Ka/th/a Up. I, 3, 1) are Brahman and the individual soul[8].--Adhik. IV (13-17) shows that the person within the eye mentioned in Ch. Up. IV, 15, 1 is Brahman.--Adhik. V (18-20) shows that the ruler within (antarâymin) described in B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 3 is Brahman. Sûtra 20 clearly enounces the difference of the individual soul and the Lord; hence /S/a@nkara is obliged to remark that that difference is not real.--Adhik. VI (21-23) proves that that which cannot be seen, &c, mentioned in Mu/nd/aka Up. I, 1, 3 is Brahman.--Adhik. VII (24-32) shows that the âtman vai/s/vânara of Ch. Up. V, 11, 6 is Brahman.

PÂDA III.

Adhik. I (1-7) proves that that within which the heaven, the earth, &c. are woven (Mu/nd/. Up. II, 2, 5) is Brahman.--Adhik. II (8, 9) shows that the bhûman referred to in Ch. Up. VII, 23 is Brahman.--Adhik. III (10-12) teaches that the Imperishable in which, according to B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8, the ether is woven is Brahman.--Adhik. IV (13) decides that the highest person who is to be meditated upon with the syllable Om, according to Pra/s/na Up. V, 5, is not the lower but the higher Brahman.--According to Râmânuja the two alternatives are Brahman and Brahmâ (jîvasamash/t/irûpoz/nd/âdhipatis /k/aturmukha/h/).--Adhik. V and VI (comprising, according to /S/a@nkara, Sûtras l4-2l) discuss the question whether the small ether within the lotus of the heart mentioned in Ch. Up. VIII, 1 is the elemental ether or the individual soul or Brahman; the last alternative being finally adopted. In favour of the second alternative the pûrvapakshin pleads the two passages Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 4 and VIII, 12, 3, about the serene being (samprasâda); for by the latter the individual soul only can be understood, and in the chapter, of which the latter passage forms part, there are ascribed to it the same qualities (viz. freeness from sin, old age, death, &c.) that were predicated in VIII, 1, of the small ether within the heart.--But the reply to this is, that the second passage refers not to the (ordinary) individual soul but to the soul in that state where its true nature has become manifest, i.e. in which it is Brahman; so that the subject of the passage is in reality not the so-called individual soul but Brahman. And in the former of the two passages the soul is mentioned not on its own account, but merely for the purpose of intimating that the highest Self is the cause through which the individual soul manifests itself in its true nature.--What Râmânuja understands by the âvirbhâva of the soul will appear from the remarks on IV, 4.

The two next Sûtras (22, 23) constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, a new adhikara/n/a (VII), proving that he 'after whom everything shines, by whose light all this is lighted' (Ka/th/a Up. II, 5, 15) is not some material luminous body, but Brahman itself.--According to Râmânuja the two Sûtras do not start a new topic, but merely furnish some further arguments strengthening the conclusion arrived at in the preceding Sûtras.[9]

Adhik. VIII (24, 25) decides that the person of the size of a thumb mentioned in Ka/th/a Up. II, 4, 12 is not the individual soul but Brahman.

The two next adhikara/n/as are of the nature of a digression. The passage about the a@ngush/th/amâtra was explained on the ground that the human heart is of the size of a span; the question may then be asked whether also such individuals as belong to other classes than mankind, more particularly the Gods, are capable of the knowledge of Brahman: a question finally answered in the affirmative.--This discussion leads in its turn to several other digressions, among which the most important one refers to the problem in what relation the different species of beings stand to the words denoting them (Sûtra 28). In connexion herewith /S/a@nkara treats of the nature of words (/s/abda), opposing the opinion of the Mîmâ/m/saka Upavarsha, according to whom the word is nothing but the aggregate of its constitutive letters, to the view of the grammarians who teach that over and above the aggregate of the letters there exists a super-sensuous entity called 'spho/t/a,' which is the direct cause of the apprehension of the sense of a word (Adhik. IX; Sûtras 26-33).

Adhik. X (34-38) explains that /S/ûdras are altogether disqualified for Brahmavidyâ.

Sûtra 39 constitutes, according to /S/a@nkara, a new adhikara/n/a (XI), proving that the prâ/n/a in which everything trembles, according to /K/a/th/a Up. II, 6, 2, is Brahman.--According to Râmânuja the Sûtra does not introduce a new topic but merely furnishes an additional reason for the decision arrived at under Sûtras 24, 25, viz. that the a@ngus/th/amâtra is Brahman. On this supposition, Sûtras 24-39 form one adhikara/n/a in which 26-38 constitute a mere digression led up to by the mention made of the heart in 25.--The a@ngus/th/mâtra is referred to twice in the Ka/th/a Upanishad, once in the passage discussed (II, 4, 12), and once in II, 6, 17 ('the Person not larger than a thumb'). To determine what is meant by the a@ngus/th/mâtra, Râmânuja says, we are enabled by the passage II, 6, 2, 3, which is intermediate between the two passages concerning the a@ngus/th/mâtra, and which clearly refers to the highest Brahman, of which alone everything can be said to stand in awe.

The next Sûtra (40) gives rise to a similar difference of opinion. According to /S/a@nkara it constitutes by itself a new adhikara/n/a (XII), proving that the 'light' (jyotis) mentioned in Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3 is the highest Brahman.--According to Râmânuja the Sûtra continues the preceding adhikara/n/a, and strengthens the conclusion arrived at by a further argument, referring to Ka/th/a Up. II, 5, 15--a passage intermediate between the two passages about the a@ngush/th/amâtra--which speaks of a primary light that cannot mean anything but Brahman. The Sûtra has in that case to be translated as follows: '(The a@ngush/th/amâtra is Brahman) because (in a passage intervening between the two) a light is seen to be mentioned (which can be Brahman only).'

The three last Sûtras of the pâda are, according to /S/a@nkara, to be divided into two adhikara/n/as (XIII and XIV), Sûtra 41 deciding that the ether which reveals names and forms (Ch. Up. VIII, 14) is not the elemental ether but Brahman; and 42, 43 teaching that the vij/ñ/ânamaya, 'he who consists of knowledge,' of B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 7 is not the individual soul but Brahman.--According to Râmânuja the three Sûtras make up one single adhikara/n/a discussing whether the Chandogya Upanishad passage about the ether refers to Brahman or to the individual soul in the state of release; the latter of these two alternatives being suggested by the circumstance that the released soul is the subject of the passage immediately preceding ('Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes off his hair,' &c.). Sûtra 41 decides that 'the ether (is Brahman) because the passage designates the nature of something else,' &c. (i.e. of something other than the individual soul; other because to the soul the revealing of names and forms cannot be ascribed, &c.)--But, an objection is raised, does not more than one scriptural passage show that the released soul and Brahman are identical, and is not therefore the ether which reveals names and forms the soul as well as Brahman?--(The two, Sûtra 42 replies, are different) 'because in the states of deep sleep and departing (the highest Self) is designated as different' (from the soul)--which point is proved by the same scriptural passages which /S/a@nkara adduces;--and 'because such terms as Lord and the like' cannot be applied to the individual soul (43). Reference is made to IV, 4, 14, where all jagadvyâpâra is said to belong to the Lord only, not to the soul even when in the state of release.

PÂDA IV.

The last pâda of the first adhyâya is specially directed against the Sâ@nkhyas.

The first adhikara/n/a (1-7) discusses the passage Ka/th/a Up. I, 3, 10; 11, where mention is made of the Great and the Undeveloped--both of them terms used with a special technical sense in the Sâ@nkhya-/s/âstra, avyakta being a synonym for pradhâna.--/S/a@nkara shows by an exhaustive review of the topics of the Ka/th/a Upanishad that the term avyakta has not the special meaning which the Sâ@nkhyas attribute to it, but denotes the body, more strictly the subtle body (sûkshma /s/arîra), but at the same time the gross body also, in so far as it is viewed as an effect of the subtle one.

Adhik. II (8-10) demonstrates, according to /S/a@nkara, that the tricoloured ajâ spoken of in /S/ve. Up. IV, 5 is not the pradhâna of the Sânkhyas, but either that power of the Lord from which the world springs, or else the primary causal matter first produced by that power.--What Râmânuja in contradistinction from /S/a@nkara understands by the primary causal matter, follows from the short sketch given above of the two systems.

Adhik. III (11-13) shows that the pa/ñk/a pa/ñk/ajanâ/h/ mentioned in B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 17 are not the twenty-five principles of the Sâ@nkhyas.--Adhik. IV (14, 15) proves that Scripture does not contradict itself on the all-important point of Brahman, i.e. a being whose essence is intelligence, being the cause of the world.

Adhik. V (16-18) is, according to /S/a@nkara, meant to prove that 'he who is the maker of those persons, of whom this is the work,' mentioned in Kau. Up. IV, 19, is not either the vital air or the individual soul, but Brahman.--The subject of the adhikara/n/a is essentially the same in Râmânuja's view; greater stress is, however, laid on the adhikara/n/a being polemical against the Sâ@nkhyas, who wish to turn the passage into an argument for the pradhâna doctrine.

The same partial difference of view is observable with regard to the next adhikara/n/a (VI; Sûtras 19-22) which decides that the 'Self to be seen, to be heard,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5) is the highest Self, not the individual soul. This latter passage also is, according to Râmânuja, made the subject of discussion in order to rebut the Sâ@nkhya who is anxious to prove that what is there inculcated as the object of knowledge is not a universal Self but merely the Sâ@nkhya purusha.

Adhik. VII (23-27) teaches that Brahman is not only the efficient or operative cause (nimitta) of the world, but its material cause as well. The world springs from Brahman by way of modification (pari/n/âma; Sûtra 26).--Râmânuja views this adhikara/n/a as specially directed against the Se/s/vara-sâ@nkhyas who indeed admit the existence of a highest Lord, but postulate in addition an independent pradhâna on which the Lord acts as an operative cause merely.

Adhik. VIII (28) remarks that the refutation of the Sâ@nkhya views is applicable to other theories also, such as the doctrine of the world having originated from atoms.

After this rapid survey of the contents of the first adhyâya and the succinct indication of the most important points in which the views of /S/a@nkara and Râmânuja diverge, we turn to a short consideration of two questions which here naturally present themselves, viz., firstly, which is the principle on which the Vedic passages referred to in the Sûtras have been selected and arranged; and, secondly, if, where /S/a@nkara and Râmânuja disagree as to the subdivision of the Sûtras into Adhikara/n/as, and the determination of the Vedic passages discussed in the Sûtras, there are to be met with any indications enabling us to determine which of the two commentators is right. (The more general question as to how far the Sûtras favour either /S/a@nkara's or Râmânuja's general views cannot be considered at present.)

The Hindu commentators here and there attempt to point out the reason why the discussion of a certain Vedic passage is immediately followed by the consideration of a certain other one. Their explanations--which have occasionally been referred to in the notes to the translation--rest on the assumption that the Sûtrakâra in arranging the texts to be commented upon was guided by technicalities of the Mîmâ/m/sâ-system, especially by a regard for the various so-called means of proof which the Mîmâ/m/saka employs for the purpose of determining the proper meaning and position of scriptural passages. But that this was the guiding principle, is rendered altogether improbable by a simple tabular statement of the Vedic passages referred to in the first adhyâya, such as given by Deussen on page 130; for from the latter it appears that the order in which the Sûtras exhibit the scriptural passages follows the order in which those passages themselves occur in the Upanishads, and it would certainly be a most strange coincidence if that order enabled us at the same time to exemplify the various pramâ/n/as of the Mîmâ/m/sâ in their due systematic succession.