Part 16

As therefore the application of the conception of the Ego to the body on the part of those who affirm the existence of a Self different from the body is simply false, not figurative, it follows that the embodiedness of the Self is (not real but) caused by wrong conception, and hence that the person who has reached true knowledge is free from his body even while still alive. The same is declared in the /S/ruti passages concerning him who knows Brahman: 'And as the slough of a snake lies on an ant-hill, dead and cast away, thus lies this body; but that disembodied immortal spirit is Brahman only, is only light' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 7); and 'With eyes he is without eyes as it were, with ears without ears as it were, with speech without speech as it were, with a mind without mind as it were, with vital airs without vital airs as it were.' Sm/ri/ti also, in the passage where the characteristic marks are enumerated of one whose mind is steady (Bha. Gîtâ II, 54), declares that he who knows is no longer connected with action of any kind. Therefore the man who has once comprehended Brahman to be the Self, does not belong to this transmigratory world as he did before. He, on the other hand, who still belongs to this transmigratory world as before, has not comprehended Brahman to be the Self. Thus there remain no unsolved contradictions.

With reference again to the assertion that Brahman is not fully determined in its own nature, but stands in a complementary relation to injunctions, because the hearing about Brahman is to be followed by consideration and reflection, we remark that consideration and reflection are themselves merely subservient to the comprehension of Brahman. If Brahman, after having been comprehended, stood in a subordinate relation to some injunctions, it might be said to be merely supplementary. But this is not the case, since consideration and reflection no less than hearing are subservient to comprehension. It follows that the /S/âstra cannot be the means of knowing Brahman only in so far as it is connected with injunctions, and the doctrine that on account of the uniform meaning of the Vedânta-texts, an independent Brahman is to be admitted, is thereby fully established. Hence there is room for beginning the new /S/âstra indicated in the first Sûtra, 'Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.' If, on the other hand, the Vedânta-texts were connected with injunctions, a new /S/âstra would either not be begun at all, since the /S/âstra concerned with injunctions has already been introduced by means of the first Sûtra of the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ, 'Then therefore the enquiry into duty;' or if it were begun it would be introduced as follows: 'Then therefore the enquiry into the remaining duties;' just as a new portion of the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ Sûtras is introduced with the words, 'Then therefore the enquiry into what subserves the purpose of the sacrifice, and what subserves the purpose of man' (Pû. Mî. Sû. IV, 1, 1). But as the comprehension of the unity of Brahman and the Self has not been propounded (in the previous /S/âstra), it is quite appropriate that a new /S/âstra, whose subject is Brahman, should be entered upon. Hence all injunctions and all other means of knowledge end with the cognition expressed in the words, 'I am Brahman;' for as soon as there supervenes the comprehension of the non-dual Self, which is not either something to be eschewed or something to be appropriated, all objects and knowing agents vanish, and hence there can no longer be means of proof. In accordance with this, they (i.e. men knowing Brahman) have made the following declaration:--'When there has arisen (in a man's mind) the knowledge, "I am that which is, Brahman is my Self," and when, owing to the sublation of the conceptions of body, relatives, and the like, the (imagination of) the figurative and the false Self has come to an end[87]; how should then the effect[88] (of that wrong imagination) exist any longer? As long as the knowledge of the Self, which Scripture tells us to search after, has not arisen, so long the Self is knowing subject; but that same subject is that which is searched after, viz. (the highest Self) free from all evil and blemish. Just as the idea of the Self being the body is assumed as valid (in ordinary life), so all the ordinary sources of knowledge (perception and the like) are valid only until the one Self is ascertained.'

(Herewith the section comprising the four Sûtras is finished[89].)

So far it has been declared that the Vedânta-passages, whose purport is the comprehension of Brahman being the Self, and which have their object therein, refer exclusively to Brahman without any reference to actions. And it has further been shown that Brahman is the omniscient omnipotent cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world. But now the Sâ@nkhyas and others being of opinion that an existent substance is to be known through other means of proof (not through the Veda) infer different causes, such as the pradhâna and the like, and thereupon interpret the Vedânta-passages as referring to the latter. All the Vedânta-passages, they maintain, which treat of the creation of the world distinctly point out that the cause (of the world) has to be concluded from the effect by inference; and the cause which is to be inferred is the connexion of the pradhâna with the souls (purusha). The followers of Ka/n/âda again infer from the very same passages that the Lord is the efficient cause of the world while the atoms are its material cause. And thus other argumentators also taking their stand on passages apparently favouring their views and on fallacious arguments raise various objections. For this reason the teacher (Vyâsa)--thoroughly acquainted as he is with words, passages, and means of proof--proceeds to state as primâ facie views, and afterwards to refute, all those opinions founded on deceptive passages and fallacious arguments. Thereby he at the same time proves indirectly that what the Vedânta-texts aim at is the comprehension of Brahman.

The Sâ@nkhyas who opine that the non-intelligent pradhâna consisting of three constituent elements (gu/n/a) is the cause of the world argue as follows. The Vedânta-passages which you have declared to intimate that the all-knowing all-powerful Brahman is the cause of the world can be consistently interpreted also on the doctrine of the pradhâna being the general cause. Omnipotence (more literally: the possession of all powers) can be ascribed to the pradhâna in so far as it has all its effects for its objects. All-knowingness also can be ascribed to it, viz. in the following manner. What you think to be knowledge is in reality an attribute of the gu/n/a of Goodness[90], according to the Sm/ri/ti passage 'from Goodness springs knowledge' (Bha. Gîtâ XIV, 17). By means of this attribute of Goodness, viz. knowledge, certain men endowed with organs which are effects (of the pradhâna) are known as all-knowing Yogins; for omniscience is acknowledged to be connected with the very highest degree of 'Goodness.' Now to the soul (purusha) which is isolated, destitute of effected organs, consisting of pure (undifferenced) intelligence it is quite impossible to ascribe either all-knowingness or limited knowledge; the pradhâna, on the other hand, because consisting of the three gu/n/as, comprises also in its pradhâna state the element of Goodness which is the cause of all-knowingness. The Vedânta-passages therefore in a derived (figurative) sense ascribe all-knowingness to the pradhâna, although it is in itself non-intelligent. Moreover you (the Vedântin) also who assume an all-knowing Brahman can ascribe to it all-knowingness in so far only as that term means capacity for all knowledge. For Brahman cannot always be actually engaged in the cognition of everything; for from this there would follow the absolute permanency of his cognition, and this would involve a want of independence on Brahman's part with regard to the activity of knowing. And if you should propose to consider Brahman's cognition as non-permanent it would follow that with the cessation of the cognition Brahman itself would cease. Therefore all-knowingness is possible only in the sense of capacity for all knowledge. Moreover you assume that previously to the origination of the world Brahman is without any instruments of action. But without the body, the senses, &c. which are the instruments of knowledge, cognition cannot take place in any being. And further it must be noted that the pradhâna, as consisting of various elements, is capable of undergoing modifications, and may therefore act as a (material) cause like clay and other substances; while the uncompounded homogeneous Brahman is unable to do so.

To these conclusions he (Vyâsa) replies in the following Sûtra.

5. On account of seeing (i.e. thinking being attributed in the Upanishads to the cause of the world; the pradhâna) is not (to be identified with the cause indicated by the Upanishads; for) it is not founded on Scripture.

It is impossible to find room in the Vedânta-texts for the non-intelligent pradhâna, the fiction of the Sâ@nkhyas; because it is not founded on Scripture. How so? Because the quality of seeing, i.e. thinking, is in Scripture ascribed to the cause. For the passage, Ch. Up. VI, 2, (which begins: 'Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning, one only, without a second,' and goes on, 'It thought (saw), may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire,') declares that this world differentiated by name and form, which is there denoted by the word 'this,' was before its origination identical with the Self of that which is and that the principle denoted by the term 'the being' (or 'that which is') sent forth fire and the other elements after having thought. The following passage also ('Verily in the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these worlds,' Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 2) declares the creation to have had thought for its antecedent. In another passage also (Pr. Up. VI, 3) it is said of the person of sixteen parts, 'He thought, &c. He sent forth Prâ/n/a.' By 'seeing' (i.e. the verb 'seeing' exhibited in the Sûtra) is not meant that particular verb only, but any verbs which have a cognate sense; just as the verb 'to sacrifice' is used to denote any kind of offering. Therefore other passages also whose purport it is to intimate that an all-knowing Lord is the cause of the world are to be quoted here, as, for instance, Mu. Up. I, 1, 9, 'From him who perceives all and who knows all, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is born that Brahman, name and form and food.'

The argumentation of the Sâ@nkhyas that the pradhâna may be called all-knowing on account of knowledge constituting an attribute of the gu/n/a Goodness is inadmissible. For as in the pradhâna-condition the three gu/n/as are in a state of equipoise, knowledge which is a quality of Goodness only is not possible[91]. Nor can we admit the explanation that the pradhâna is all-knowing because endowed with the capacity for all knowledge. For if, in the condition of equipoise of the gu/n/as, we term the pradhâna all-knowing with reference to the power of knowledge residing in Goodness, we must likewise term it little-knowing, with reference to the power impeding knowledge which resides in Passion and Darkness.

Moreover a modification of Goodness which is not connected with a witnessing (observing) principle (sâkshin) is not called knowledge, and the non-intelligent pradhâna is destitute of such a principle. It is therefore impossible to ascribe to the pradhâna all-knowingness. The case of the Yogins finally does not apply to the point under consideration; for as they possess intelligence, they may, owing to an excess of Goodness in their nature, rise to omniscience[92].--Well then (say those Sâ@nkhyas who believe in the existence of a Lord) let us assume that the pradhâna possesses the quality of knowledge owing to the witnessing principle (the Lord), just as the quality of burning is imparted to an iron ball by fire.--No, we reply; for if this were so, it would be more reasonable to assume that that which is the cause of the pradhâna having the quality of thought i.e. the all-knowing primary Brahman itself is the cause of the world.

The objection that to Brahman also all-knowingness in its primary sense cannot be ascribed because, if the activity of cognition were permanent, Brahman could not be considered as independent with regard to it, we refute as follows. In what way, we ask the Sâ@nkhya, is Brahman's all-knowingness interfered with by a permanent cognitional activity? To maintain that he, who possesses eternal knowledge capable to throw light on all objects, is not all-knowing, is contradictory. If his knowledge were considered non-permanent, he would know sometimes, and sometimes he would not know; from which it would follow indeed that he is not all-knowing. This fault is however avoided if we admit Brahman's knowledge to be permanent.--But, it may be objected, on this latter alternative the knower cannot be designated as independent with reference to the act of knowing.--Why not? we reply; the sun also, although his heat and light are permanent, is nevertheless designated as independent when we say, 'he burns, he gives light[93].'--But, it will again be objected, we say that the sun burns or gives light when he stands in relation to some object to be heated or illuminated; Brahman, on the other hand, stands, before the creation of the world, in no relation to any object of knowledge. The cases are therefore not parallel.--This objection too, we reply, is not valid; for as a matter of fact we speak of the Sun as an agent, saying 'the sun shines' even without reference to any object illuminated by him, and hence Brahman also may be spoken of as an agent, in such passages as 'it thought,' &c., even without reference to any object of knowledge. If, however, an object is supposed to be required ('knowing' being a transitive verb while 'shining' is intransitive), the texts ascribing thought to Brahman will fit all the better.--What then is that object to which the knowledge of the Lord can refer previously to the origin of the world?--Name and form, we reply, which can be defined neither as being identical with Brahman nor as different from it, unevolved but about to be evolved. For if, as the adherents of the Yoga-/s/âstra assume, the Yogins have a perceptive knowledge of the past and the future through the favour of the Lord; in what terms shall we have to speak of the eternal cognition of the ever pure Lord himself, whose objects are the creation, subsistence, and dissolution of the world! The objection that Brahman, previously to the origin of the world, is not able to think because it is not connected with a body, &c. does not apply; for Brahman, whose nature is eternal cognition--as the sun's nature is eternal luminousness--can impossibly stand in need of any instruments of knowledge. The transmigrating soul (sa/m/sârin) indeed, which is under the sway of Nescience, &c., may require a body in order that knowledge may arise in it; but not so the Lord, who is free from all impediments of knowledge. The two following Mantras also declare that the Lord does not require a body, and that his knowledge is without any obstructions. 'There is no effect and no instrument known of him, no one is seen like unto him or better; his high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as knowledge and force.' 'Grasping without hands, hasting without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears. He knows what can be known, but no one knows him; they call him the first, the great person' (/S/v. Up. VI, 8; III, 19).

But, to raise a new objection, there exists no transmigrating soul different from the Lord and obstructed by impediments of knowledge; for /S/ruti expressly declares that 'there is no other seer but he; there is no other knower but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23). How then can it be said that the origination of knowledge in the transmigrating soul depends on a body, while it does not do so in the case of the Lord?--True, we reply. There is in reality no transmigrating soul different from the Lord. Still the connexion (of the Lord) with limiting adjuncts, consisting of bodies and so on, is assumed, just as we assume the ether to enter into connexion with divers limiting adjuncts such as jars, pots, caves, and the like. And just as in consequence of connexion of the latter kind such conceptions and terms as 'the hollow (space) of a jar,' &c. are generally current, although the space inside a jar is not really different from universal space, and just as in consequence thereof there generally prevails the false notion that there are different spaces such as the space of a jar and so on; so there prevails likewise the false notion that the Lord and the transmigrating soul are different; a notion due to the non-discrimination of the (unreal) connexion of the soul with the limiting conditions, consisting of the body and so on. That the Self, although in reality the only existence, imparts the quality of Selfhood to bodies and the like which are Not-Self is a matter of observation, and is due to mere wrong conception, which depends in its turn on antecedent wrong conception. And the consequence of the soul thus involving itself in the transmigratory state is that its thought depends on a body and the like.

The averment that the pradhâna, because consisting of several elements, can, like clay and similar substances, occupy the place of a cause while the uncompounded Brahman cannot do so, is refuted by the fact of the pradhâna not basing on Scripture. That, moreover, it is possible to establish by argumentation the causality of Brahman, but not of the pradhâna and similar principles, the Sûtrakâra will set forth in the second Adhyâya (II, 1, 4, &c.).

Here the Sâ@nkhya comes forward with a new objection. The difficulty stated by you, he says, viz. that the non-intelligent pradhâna cannot be the cause of the world, because thought is ascribed to the latter in the sacred texts, can be got over in another way also, viz. on the ground that non-intelligent things are sometimes figuratively spoken of as intelligent beings. We observe, for instance, that people say of a river-bank about to fall, 'the bank is inclined to fall (pipatishati),' and thus speak of a non-intelligent bank as if it possessed intelligence. So the pradhâna also, although non-intelligent, may, when about to create, be figuratively spoken of as thinking. Just as in ordinary life some intelligent person after having bathed, and dined, and formed the purpose of driving in the afternoon to his village, necessarily acts according to his purpose, so the pradhâna also acts by the necessity of its own nature, when transforming itself into the so-called great principle and the subsequent forms of evolution; it may therefore figuratively be spoken of as intelligent.--But what reason have you for setting aside the primary meaning of the word 'thought' and for taking it in a figurative sense?--The observation, the Sâ@nkhya replies, that fire and water also are figuratively spoken of as intelligent beings in the two following scriptural passages, 'That fire thought; that water thought' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3; 4). We therefrom conclude that thought is to be taken in a figurative sense there also where Being (Sat) is the agent, because it is mentioned in a chapter where (thought) is generally taken in a figurative sense[94].

To this argumentation of the Sâdkhya the next Sûtra replies:

6. If it is said that (the word 'seeing') has a figurative meaning, we deny that, on account of the word Self (being applied to the cause of the world).

Your assertion that the term 'Being' denotes the non-intelligent pradhâna, and that thought is ascribed to it in a figurative sense only, as it is to fire and water, is untenable. Why so? On account of the term 'Self.' For the passage Ch. Up. VI, 2, which begins 'Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning,' after having related the creation of fire, water, and earth ('it thought,' &c.; 'it sent forth fire,' &c.), goes on--denoting the thinking principle of which the whole chapter treats, and likewise fire, water, and earth, by the term--'divinities'--as follows, 'That divinity thought: Let me now enter those three divinities with this living Self (jîva. âtman) and evolve names and forms.' If we assumed that in this passage the non-intelligent pradhâna is figuratively spoken of as thinking, we should also have to assume that the same pradhâna--as once constituting the subject-matter of the chapter--is referred to by the term 'that divinity.' But in that case the divinity would not speak of the jîva as 'Self.' For by the term 'Jîva' we must understand, according to the received meaning and the etymology of the word, the intelligent (principle) which rules over the body and sustains the vital airs. How could such a principle be the Self of the non-intelligent pradhâna? By 'Self' we understand (a being's) own nature, and it is clear that the intelligent Jîva cannot constitute the nature of the non-intelligent pradhâna. If, on the other hand, we refer the whole chapter to the intelligent Brahman, to which thought in its primary sense belongs, the use of the word 'Self' with reference to the Jîva is quite adequate. Then again there is the other passage, 'That which is that subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the true. It is the Self. That art thou, O /S/vetaketu' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7, &c.). Here the clause 'It is the Self' designates the Being of which the entire chapter treats, viz. the subtle Self, by the word 'Self,' and the concluding clause, 'that art thou, O /S/vetaketu,' declares the intelligent /S/vetaketu to be of the nature of the Self. Fire and water, on the other hand, are non-intelligent, since they are objects (of the mind), and since they are declared to be implicated in the evolution of names and forms. And as at the same time there is no reason for ascribing to them thought in its primary sense--while the employment of the word 'Self' furnishes such a reason with reference to the Sat--the thought attributed to them must be explained in a figurative sense, like the inclination of the river-bank. Moreover, the thinking on the part of fire and water is to be understood as dependent on their being ruled over by the Sat. On the other hand, the thought of the Sat is, on account of the word 'Self,' not to be understood in a figurative sense.[95]

Here the Sâ@nkhya comes forward with a new objection. The word 'Self,' he says, may be applied to the pradhâna, although unintelligent, because it is sometimes figuratively used in the sense of 'that which effects all purposes of another;' as, for instance, a king applies the word 'Self' to some servant who carries out all the king's intentions, 'Bhadrasena is my (other) Self.' For the pradhâna, which effects the enjoyment and the emancipation of the soul, serves the latter in the same way as a minister serves his king in the affairs of peace and war. Or else, it may be said, the one word 'Self' may refer to non-intelligent things as well as to intelligent beings, as we see that such expressions as 'the Self of the elements,' 'the Self of the senses,' are made use of, and as the one word 'light' (jyotis) denotes a certain sacrifice (the jyotish/t/oma) as well as a flame. How then does it follow from the word 'Self' that the thinking (ascribed to the cause of the world) is not to be taken in a figurative sense?

To this last argumentation the Sûtrakâra replies:

7. (The pradhâna cannot be designated by the term 'Self') because release is taught of him who takes his stand on that (the Sat).