Chapter 54

[Footnote 392: Ânanda Giri and Go. Ânanda explain: Â/s/râya/s/rayibhûteshv iti bhokt/ri/vi/s/esha/n/am ad/ri/sh/t/â/s/rayeshv ity artha/h/.--The Brahrma-vidyâbhara/n/a says: Nityeshv â/s/râya/s/rayibhûteshv a/n/ushv abhyupagamyamâneshu bhokt/ri/shu /k/a satsv ity anvaya/h/. Â/s/râya/s/rayibhûteshv ity asyopakâryopakârakabhâvaprâpteshv ity artha/h/.--And with regard to the subsequent â/s/rayâ/s/rayi/s/ûnyeshu: â/s/rayâ/s/rayitva/s/ûnyeshu, aya/m/ bhâva/h/, sthireshu paramâ/n/ushu yadanvaye paramâ/n/ûnâ/m/ sa/m/ghâtâpatti/h/ yadvyatireke /k/a na tad upakârakam upakâryâ/h/ paramâ/n/ava/h/ yena tatk/ri/to bhoga/h/ prârthyate sa tatra karteti grahîtu/m/ /s/akyate, ksha/n/ikeshu tu param/n/ushu anvayavyatirekagrahasyânekaksha/n/asâdhyasyâsa/m/bhavân nopakâryopakârakabhâvo nirdhârayitu/m/ /s/akya/h/.--Ananda Giri remarks on the latter: Ad/ri/sh/t/â/s/rayakârt/ri/râhityam âhâ/s/rayeti. Another reading appears to be â/s/ayâ/s/raya/s/ûnyeshu.]

[Footnote 393: Bauddhânâ/m/ ksha/n/apadena gha/t/âdir eva padârtho vyavahriyate na tu tadatinkta/h/ ka/sk/it ksha/n/o nâma hâlosti. Brahmâvidyâbh.]

[Footnote 394: And whereupon then could be established the difference of mere efficient causes such as the potter's staff, &c., and material causes such as clay, &c.?]

[Footnote 395: These four causes are the so-called defining cause (adhipati-pratyaya), the auxiliary cause (sahakâripratyaya), the immediate cause (samanantarapratyaya), and the substantial cause (âlambanapratyaya).--I extract the explanation from the Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a: Adhipatir indriya/m/ tad dhi /k/akshurádirûpam utpannasya j/ñ/ânasya rûpâdivishayatâ/m/ niya/kkh/ati niyâmaka/s/ /k/a lokedhipatir ity u/k/yate. Sahakârî âloka/h/. Samanantarapratyaya/h/pûrvaj/ñ/ânam, bauddhamate hi ksha/n/ikaj/ñ/anasa/m/tatau pûrvaj/ñ/ânam uttaraj/ñ/âsya kârana/m/ tad eva /k/a mana ity u/k/yate. Âlambana/m/ gha/t/âdi/h/. Etân hetûn pratîya prâpya /k/akshurâdijanyam ity âdi.]

[Footnote 396: Sa/m/skâra iti, tanmate pûrvaksha/n/a eva hetubhûta/h/ sa/m/skâro vâsaneti /k/a vyavahriyate kârya/m/ tu tadvishayatayâ karmavyutpattyâ sa/m/skâra/h/, tathâ /k/a kâryakâra/n/âtmaka/m/ sarva/m/ bhâvarûpa/m/ ksha/n/ikam iti pratij/ñ/ârtha/h/. Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a.]

[Footnote 397: As when a man smashes a jar having previously formed the intention of doing so.]

[Footnote 398: I.e. the insensible continual decay of things.--Viparîta iti pratiksha/n/a/m/ gha/t/âdînâ/m/ yuktyâ sâdhyamânoku/s/alair avagantum a/s/akya/h/ sûkshmo vinâ/s/opratisa/m/khyânirodha/h/. Brahmâv.]

[Footnote 399: A series of momentary existences constituting a chain of causes and effects can never be entirely stopped; for the last momentary existence must be supposed either to produce its effect or not to produce it. In the former case the series is continued; the latter alternative would imply that the last link does not really exist, since the Bauddhas define the sattâ of a thing as its causal efficiency (cp. Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha). And the non-existence of the last link would retrogressively lead to the non-existence of the whole series.]

[Footnote 400: Thus clay is recognised as such whether it appears in the form of a jar, or of the potsherds into which the jar is broken, or of the powder into which the potsherds are ground.--Analogously we infer that even things which seem to vanish altogether, such as a drop of water which has fallen on heated iron, yet continue to exist in some form.]

[Footnote 401: The knowledge that everything is transitory, pain, &c.]

[Footnote 402: What does enable us to declare that there is âvara/n/âbhâva in one place and not in another? Space; which therefore is something real.]

[Footnote 403: If the cause were able, without having undergone any change, to produce effects, it would at the same moment produce all the effects of which it is capable.--Cp. on this point the Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.]

[Footnote 404: This is added to obviate the remark that it is not a general rule that effects are of the same nature as their causes, and that therefore, after all, existent things may spring from non-existence.]

[Footnote 405: According to the vij/ñ/ânavâdin the cognition specialised by its various contents, such as, for instance, the idea of blue colour is the object of knowledge; the cognition in so far as it is consciousness (avabhâsa) is the result of knowledge; the cognition in so far as it is power is mâna, knowledge; in so far as it is the abode of that power it is pramât/ri/, knowing subject.]

[Footnote 406: If they are said to be different from the atoms they can no longer be considered as composed of atoms; if they are non-different from atoms they cannot be the cause of the mental representations of gross non-atomic bodies.]

[Footnote 407: Avayavâvayavirûpo vâhyosrtho nâsti /k/en mâ bhûd jâtivyaktyâdirûpas tu syâd ity â/s/rankyâha evam iti. Jâtyâdînâ/m/ vyaktyâdînâm /k/âtyantabhinnatve svâtantryaprasa@ngâd atyantâbhinnatve tadvadevâtadbhâvâd bhinnâbhinnatvasya viruddhatvâd avayavâvayavibhedavaj gâtivyaktyâdibhedosxpi nâstîty artha/h/.]

[Footnote 408: Vâsanâ, above translated by mental impression, strictly means any member of the infinite series of ideas which precedes the present actual idea.]

[Footnote 409: For all these doctrines depend on the comparison of ideas which is not possible unless there be a permanent knowing subject in addition to the transitory ideas.]

[Footnote 410: The vij/ñ/ânaskandha comprises vij/ñ/ânas of two different kinds, the âlayavij/ñ/âna and the prav/ri/ttivij/ñ/âna. The âlayavij/ñ/âna comprises the series of cognitions or ideas which refer to the ego; the prav/ri/ttivij/ñ/âna comprises those ideas which refer to apparently external objects, such as colour and the like. The ideas of the latter class are due to the mental impressions left by the antecedent ideas of the former class.]

[Footnote 411: Viz. in the present case the principle that what presents itself to consciousness is not non-existent.]

[Footnote 412: Soul and non-soul are the enjoying souls and the objects of their enjoyment; âsrava is the forward movement of the senses towards their objects; sa/m/vara is the restraint of the activity of the senses; nirjara is self-mortification by which sin is destroyed; the works constitute bondage; and release is the ascending of the soul, after bondage has ceased, to the highest regions.--For the details, see Professor Cowell's translation of the Ârhata chapter of the Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.]

[Footnote 413: Cp. translation of Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha, p. 59.]

[Footnote 414: And so impugn the doctrine of the one eternal Brahman.]

[Footnote 415: Cp. Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha translation, p. 58.]

[Footnote 416: The inference being that the initial and intervening sizes of the soul must be permanent because they are sizes of the soul, like its final size.]

[Footnote 417: The special nature of the connexion between the Lord and the pradhâna and the souls cannot be ascertained from the world considered as the effect of the pradhâna acted upon by the Lord; for that the world is the effect of the pradhâna is a point which the Vedântins do not accept as proved.]

[Footnote 418: I.e. a high one, but not an indefinite one; since the omniscient Lord knows its measure.]