Chapter 46

37. And because all the qualities (required in the cause of the world) are present (in Brahman).

The teacher has now refuted all the objections, such as difference of character, and the like, which other teachers have brought forward against what he had established as the real sense of the Veda, viz. that the intelligent Brahman is the cause and matter of this world.

Now, before entering on a new chapter, whose chief aim it will be to refute the (positive) opinions held by other teachers, he sums up the foregoing chapter, the purport of which it was to show why his view should be accepted.--Because, if that Brahman is acknowledged as the cause of the world, all attributes required in the cause (of the world) are seen to be present--Brahman being all-knowing, all-powerful, and possessing the great power of Mâyâ,--on that account this our system, founded on the Upanishads, is not open to any objections.

Notes:

[Footnote 253: The Sm/ri/ti called Tantra is the Sâ@nkhya/s/âstra as taught by Kapila; the Sm/ri/ti-writers depending on him are Âsuri, Pa/ñk/a/s/ikha, and others.]

[Footnote 254: Mîmâ/m/sâ Sû. I, 1, 2: /k/odanâlaksha/n/osxrtho dharma/h/. Commentary: /k/odanâ iti kriyâyâ/h/ pravartaka/m/ va/k/anam âhu/h/.]

[Footnote 255: Purushârtha; in opposition to the rules referred to in the preceding sentence which are kratvartha, i.e. the acting according to which secures the proper performance of certain rites.]

[Footnote 256: It having been decided by the Pûrvâ Mîmâ/m/sâ already that Sm/ri/tis contradicted by /S/ruti are to be disregarded.]

[Footnote 257: On the meaning of 'kapila' in the above passage, compare the Introduction to the Upanishads, translated by Max Müller, vol. ii, p. xxxviii ff.--As will be seen later on, /S/a@nkara, in this bhâshya, takes the Kapila referred to to be some /ri/shi.]

[Footnote 258: I.e. religious duty is known only from the injunctive passages of the Veda.]

[Footnote 259: After it has been shown that Kapila the dvaitavâdin is not mentioned in /S/ruti, it is now shown that Manu the sarvâtmavâdin is mentioned there.]

[Footnote 260: In which passage the phrase 'to be meditated upon' (nididhyâsâ) indicates the act of mental concentration characteristic of the Yoga.]

[Footnote 261: The ash/t/akâs (certain oblations to be made on the eighth days after the full moons of the seasons hemanta and /s/i/s/ira) furnish the stock illustration for the doctrine of the Pûrvâ Mim. that Sm/ri/ti is authoritative in so far as it is based on /S/ruti.]

[Footnote 262: But why--it will be asked--do you apply yourself to the refutation of the Sâ@nkhya and Yoga only, and not also to that of other Sm/ri/tis conflicting with the Vedânta views?]

[Footnote 263: I.e. from the fact of these terms being employed in a passage standing close to other passages which refer to Vedic knowledge.]

[Footnote 264: The cognition of Brahman terminates in an act of anubhava; hence as it has been shown that reasoning is more closely connected with anubhava than /S/ruti is, we have the right to apply reasoning to /S/ruti.--Ânanda Giri comments on the passage from anubhavâvasânam as follows: brahmasâkshâtkârasya mokshopâyatayâ prâdhânyât tatra /s/abdâd api parokshago/k/arâd aparokshârthasâdharmyago/k/aras tarkosxntara@ngam iti tasyaiva balavatvam ity artha/h/. Aitihyamâtre/n/a pravâdapâramparyamâtre/n/a parokshatayeti yâvat. Anubhavasya prâdhânye tarkasyoktanyâyena tasminn antara@ngatvâd âgamasya /k/a bahira@ngatvâd antara@ngabahira@ngayor antara@nga/m/ balavad ity nyâyâd ukta/m/ tarkasya balavattvam. Anubhavaprâdhânya/m/ tu nâdyâpi siddham ity â/s/a@nkyâhânubhaveti. Nanu Brahmaj/ñ/âdna/m/ vaidikatvâd dharmavad ad/ri/sh/t/aphalam esh/t/avya/m/ tat kutosxsyânubhavâvasânâvidyânivartakatva/m/ tatrâha moksheti. Adhish/th/ânasâkshâtkârasya /s/uktyâdj/ñ/âne tadavidyâtatkâryanivartakatvad/ri/sh/t/e/h/, brahmaj/ñ/ânasyâpi tarkava/s/âd asambhâvanâdinirâsadvârâ sâkshâtkârâvasâyinas tadavidyâdinivartakatvenaiva muktihetuteti nâd/ri/sh/t/aphalatety artha/h/.]

[Footnote 265: Nirati/s/ayâ/h/, upajanâpâyadharma/s/ûnyatva/m/ nirati/s/ayatvam. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 266: A sentence replying to the possible objection that the world, as being the effect of the intelligent Brahman, might itself be intelligent.]

[Footnote 267: In the case of things commonly considered non-intelligent, intelligence is not influenced by an internal organ, and on that account remains unperceived; samaste jagati satoszpi /k/aitanyasya tatra tatrânta/h/kara/n/apari/n/âmânuparâgâd anupalabdhir aviruddhâ. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 268: On î/s/vara in the above meaning, compare Deussen, p. 69, note 41.]

[Footnote 269: The line 'prak/ri/tibhya/h/ param,' &c. is wanting in all MSS. I have consulted.]

[Footnote 270: Ânanda Giri on the above passage: /s/rutyâkâ@nkshita/m/ tarkam eva mananavidhivishayam udâharati svapnânteti. Svapnajâgaritayor mithovyabhi/k/ârâd âtmana/h/ svabhâvatas tadvattvâbhâvâd avasthâ dvayena tasya svatosxsa/m/p/ri/ktatvam ato jîvasyâvasthâvatvena nâbrahmatvam ity artha/h/. Tathâpi dehâditâdâtmyenâtmano bhâvân na ni/h/prapa/ñk/abrahmatety â/s/a@nkyâha sa/m/prasâde /k/eti. Satâ somya tadâ sa/m/panno bhavatîti /s/rute/h/ sushupte ni/h/prapa/ñk/asadâtmatvâvagamâd âtmanas tathâvidhabrahmatvasiddhir ity artha/h/. Dvaitagrâhipratyakshâdivirodhât katham âtmanosxdvitîyabrahmatvam ity â/s/a@nkya tajjatvâdihetunâ brahmâtiriktavastvabhâvasiddher adhyakshâdînâm atatvâvedakaprâmâ/n/yâd avirodhâd yuktam âtmano xsvitîyabrahmatvam ity âha prapa/ñk/asyeti.]

[Footnote 271: Let us finally assume, merely for argument's sake, that a vailaksha/n/ya of cause and effect is not admissible, and enquire whether that assumption can be reconciled more easily with an intelligent or a non-intelligent cause of the world.]

[Footnote 272: Nanu pralayakâle kâryadharmâ/s/ /k/en nâvatish/th/eran na tarhi kâra/n/adharmâ api tish/th/eyus tayor abhedât tatrâhânanyatveszpîti. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 273: For if they are effects of the pradhâna they must as such be reabsorbed into it at the time of general reabsorption.]

[Footnote 274: And that the Vedânta view is preferable because the nullity of the objections has already been demonstrated in its case.]

[Footnote 275: The whole style of argumentation of the Mîmâ/m/sâ would be impossible, if all reasoning were sound; for then no pûrvapaksha view could be maintained.]

[Footnote 276: The following arthavâda-passage, for instance, 'the sacrificial post is the sun,' is to be taken in a metaphorical sense; because perception renders it impossible for us to take it in its literal meaning.]

[Footnote 277: Which are to be known from the Veda only.]

[Footnote 278: Pari/n/âmavâdam avalambyâpâtato virodha/m/ samadhâya vivartavâdam â/s/ritya paramasamâdhânam âha. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 279: Ânanda Giri construes differently: etad uktam iti, paramârthato vij/ñ/âtam iti sambandha/h/.]

[Footnote 280: D/ri/sh/t/eti kadâ/k/id dr/ri/sh/t/a/m/ punar nash/t/am anityam iti yâvat.--D/ri/sh/t/agraha/n/asû/k/ita/m/ pratîtikâlesxpi sattârâhitya/m/ tatraiva hetvantaram âha svarûpe/n/eti. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 281: In the passage alluded to he is called so by implication, being compared to the 'false-minded' thief who, knowing himself to be guilty, undergoes the ordeal of the heated hatchet.]

[Footnote 282: I.e. ordinary experience does not teach us that real effects spring from unreal causes.]

[Footnote 283: Svapnajâgraddehayor vyabhi/k/ârezpi pratyabhij/ñ/ânât tadanugatâtmaikyasiddhe/s/ /k/aitanyasya /k/a dehadharmatve rûtmano dehadvayâtiredkasiddher dehâtrâtmavâdo na yukta ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 284: As long as the 'vyavahâra' presents itself to our mind, we might feel inclined to assume in Brahman an element of manifoldness whereby to account for the vyavahâra; but as soon as we arrive at true knowledge, the vyavahâra vanishes, and there remains no longer any reason for qualifying in any way the absolute unity of Brahman.]

[Footnote 285: Tatreti, s/ri/sh/t/yâdi/s/rutînâ/m/ svârthe phatavaikalye satîti yâvat. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 286: A Mîmâ/m/sâ principle. A sacrificial act, for instance, is independent when a special result is assigned to it by the sacred texts; an act which is enjoined without such a specification is merely auxiliary to another act.]

[Footnote 287: According to the /S/rutî 'in whatever mode he worships him into that mode he passes himself.']

[Footnote 288: Tattvânyatvâbhyâm iti, na hîsvaratvena te niru/k/yete ja/d/âjadayor abhedâyogât nâpi tatoxnyatvenax niruktim arhata/h/ svâtantrye/n/a sattâsphûrtyasambhavât na hi j/ad/am aga/d/ânapekshya/m/ sattâsphûrtimad upalakshyate ja/d/atvabha@ngaprasa@ngât tasmâd avidyâtmake nâmarûpe ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 289: So that from the instance of the potter and the jar we cannot conclude that the relation of clay and the jar is only that of nimitta and naimittika, not that of non-difference.]

[Footnote 290: For instance, smoke extending in a long line whose base is connected with some object on the surface of the earth.]

[Footnote 291: I.e. (as Ân. Gi. explains) because we assume the relation of cause and effect not merely on the ground of the actual existence of one thing depending on that upon another, but on the additional ground of the mental existence, the consciousness of the one not being possible without the consciousness of the other.--Tadbhâvânuvidhâyibhâvatvam tadbhânânuvidhâyibhânatva/m/ /k/â kâryasya kâra/n/ânanyatve hetur dhûmavi/s/eshasya /k/âgnibhâvânuvidhâyibhâvatvesxpi na tadbhânânuvidhâyibhânatvam agnibhânasya dhûmabhânâdhînatvât.]

[Footnote 292: For simplicity's sake, asat will be translated henceforth by non-existing.]

[Footnote 293: Samavâya, commonly translated by inherence or intimate relation, is, according to the Nyâya, the relation connecting a whole and its parts, substances, and qualities, &c.]

[Footnote 294: Samavâyasya svâtantryapaksha/m/ dûshayati anabhyupagamyamâne/k/eti. Samavâyasya samavâyibhi/h/ sambandho neshyate ki/m/ tu svâtantryam evety atrâvayavâvayavinor dravyagu/n/âdînâ/m/ /k/a. viprakarsha/h/ syât sa/m/nidhâyakâbhâvâd ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 295: A conclusion which is in conflict with the Nyâya tenet that sa/m/yoga, conjunction, as, for instance, of the jar and the ground on which it stands, is a quality (gu/n/a) inherent in the two conjoined substances by means of the samavaya relation.]

[Footnote 296: So that the whole can be apprehended by us as such if we apprehend a certain part only; analogously to our apprehending the whole thread on which a garland of flowers is strung as soon as we apprehend some few of the flowers.]

[Footnote 297: Kalpântaram utthâpayati atheti, tathâ /k/a yathâvayavai/h/ sûtra/m/ kusumâni vyâpnuvat katipayakusumagraha/n/expi g/r/ihyate tathâ katipayavayavagraha/n/expi bhavaty avayavino graha/n/am ity artha/h/. Tatra kim ârambhakâvayavair eva teshv avayavî vartteta ki/m/ vâ tadatiriklâvayavair iti vikalpyâdyam pratyâha tadâpîti. Yatra yad varttate tat tadatiriktâvayavair eva tatra vartamâna/m/ drish/l/am iti d/ri/sh/t/antagarbha/m/ hetum â/k/ash/l/e ko/s/eti. Dvitîyam dûshayati anavastheti. Kalpitânantâvayavavyavahitatayâ prak/ri/tâvayavino dûraviprakarshât tantunish/th/atvam pa/t/asya na syâd iti bhâva/h/. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 298: I.e. a something in which the action inheres; not a causal agent.]

[Footnote 299: Every action, /S/a@nkâra says, requires an agent, i.e. a substrate in which the action takes place. If we deny that the jar exists in the clay even before it is actually originated, we lose the substrate for the action of origination, i.e. entering into existence (for the non-existing jar cannot be the substratum of any action), and have to assume, for that action, other substrates, such as the operative causes of the jar.]

[Footnote 300: Which doctrine will be fully discussed in the second pâda of this adhyâya.]

[Footnote 301: Because it has been shown that cause and effect are identical; hence if the cause is known, the effect is known also.]

[Footnote 302: Which arguments, the commentators say, are hinted at by the 'and' of the Sûtra.]

[Footnote 303: The right reading appears to be 'svayam eva /k/etanâ' as found in some MSS. Other MSS. read /k/etana/h/.]

[Footnote 304: Prak/ri/tibhya iti, pratyakshad/ri/sh/t/apadârthasvabhâvebhyo yat para/m/ vilaksha/n/am â/k/âryâdyupade/s/agamya/m/ tad a/k/intyam ity arta/h/ Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 305: This is the way in which /S/a@nkara divides the Sûtra; Ân. Gi. remarks to 'lokezspo, &c.: âtmani /k/eti vyâkhyâya vi/k/itrâ/s/ /k/a hîti vyâ/k/ash/t/e.']

[Footnote 306: So that if it undergoes modifications it must either change in its entirety, or else--against the assumption--consist of parts.]

[Footnote 307: The last clause precludes the justificatory remark that the stated difficulties can be avoided if we assume the three gu/n/as in combination only to undergo modification; if this were so the inequality of the different effects could not be accounted for.]

[Footnote 308: As an atom has no parts it cannot enter into partial contact with another, and the only way in which the two can combine is entire interpenetration; in consequence of which the compound of two atoms would not occupy more space than one atom.]

[Footnote 309: The Sûtra is concerned with the body only as far as it is an instrument; the case of extraneous instruments having already been disposed of in Sûtra 24.]

[Footnote 310: The nature (svabhàva) of the Lord is, the commentators say, Mâyâ joined with time and karman.]

[Footnote 311: This clause is an answer to the objection that the Lord might remain at rest instead of creating a world useless to himself and the cause of pain to others. For in consequence of his conjunction with Mâyâ the creation is unavoidable. Go. Ân. Avidyâ naturally tends towards effects, without any purpose. Bhâ.

Ân. Gi. remarks: Nanu lîládâv asmadâdînâm akasmâd eva niv/ri/tter api darsanâd î/s/varasyâpi mâyâmayyâm lîlâyâm tathâ-bhâve vinâpi sa/my/agj/ñ/âna/m/ sa/m/sârasamu/kkh/ittir ili tatrâha na /ke/ti. Anirvâ/ky/â khalv avidyâ paras/yes/varasya /k/a. svabhâvo lîleti /kok/yate tatra na prâtîtikasvabhâvâyâm anupapattir avataratîty artha/h/.]

[Footnote 312: From this passage we must not--the commentators say--infer injustice on the part of the Lord; for the previous merit or demerit of a being determines the specific quality of the actions which he performs in his present existence, the Lord acting as the common cause only (as Parjanya does).]

[Footnote 313: Râgadveshamohâ râgadayas le /k/a purusha/m/ dukhâdibhi/h/ kli/s/yantîtá kle/s/âs tesb/âm/ kartneapia/vi/uyanugu/rr/âs tâbhir áksbipta/m/ dharmâdilaksbilaksha/n/a/m/ kurma tadapekshâvidyâ. Ân. Gi.]

SECOND PADA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!

1. That which is inferred (by the Sâ@nkhyas, viz. the pradhâna) cannot be the cause (of the world), on account of the orderly arrangement (of the world) being impossible (on that hypothesis).

Although it is the object of this system to define the true meaning of the Vedânta-texts and not, like the science of Logic, to establish or refute some tenet by mere ratiocination, still it is incumbent on thorough students of the Vedânta to refute the Sâ@nkhya and other systems which are obstacles in the way of perfect knowledge. For this purpose a new chapter is begun. (Nor must it be said that the refutation of the other systems ought to have preceded the establishment of the Vedânta position; for) as the determination of the sense of the Vedânta-passages directly subserves perfect knowledge, we have at first, by means of such a determination, established our own position, since this is a task more important than the refutation of the views entertained by others.

Here an opponent might come forward and say that we are indeed entitled to establish our own position, so as to define perfect knowledge which is the means of release to those desirous of it, but that no use is apparent of a refutation of other opinions, a proceeding productive of nothing but hate and anger.--There is a use, we reply. For there is some danger of men of inferior intelligence looking upon the Sâ@nkhya and similar systems as requisite for perfect knowledge, because those systems have a weighty appearance, have been adopted by authoritative persons, and profess to lead to perfect knowledge. Such people might therefore think that those systems with their abstruse arguments were propounded by omniscient sages, and might on that account have faith in them. For this reason we must endeavour to demonstrate their intrinsic worthlessness.

But, it might be said, the Sâ@nkhya and similar systems have already been impugned in several Sûtras of the first adhyâya (I, 1, 5, 18; I, 4, 28); why, then, controvert them again?--The task--we reply--which we are now about to undertake differs from what we have already accomplished. As the Sâ@nkhyas and other philosophers also quote, in order to establish their own positions, the Vedânta-passages and interpret them in such a manner as to make them agree with their own systems, we have hitherto endeavoured to show that their interpretations are altogether fallacious. Now, however, we are going to refute their arguments in an independent manner, without any reference to the Vedânta-texts.

The Sâ@nkhyas, to make a beginning with them, argue as follows.--Just as jars, dishes, and other products which possess the common quality of consisting of clay are seen to have for their cause clay in general; so we must suppose that all the outward and inward (i.e. inanimate and animate) effects which are endowed with the characteristics of pleasure, pain, and dulness[314] have for their causes pleasure, pain, and dulness in general. Pleasure, pain, and dulness in their generality together constitute the threefold pradhâna. This pradhâna which is non-intelligent evolves itself spontaneously into multiform modifications[315], in order thus to effect the purposes (i.e. enjoyment, release, and so on) of the intelligent soul.--The existence of the pradhâna is to be inferred from other circumstances also, such as the limitation of all effects and the like[316].

Against this doctrine we argue as follows.--If you Sânkhyas base your theory on parallel instances merely, we point out that a non-intelligent thing which, without being guided by an intelligent being, spontaneously produces effects capable of subserving the purposes of some particular person is nowhere observed in the world. We rather observe that houses, palaces, couches, pleasure-grounds, and the like--things which according to circumstances are conducive to the obtainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain--are made by workmen endowed with intelligence. Now look at this entire world which appears, on the one hand, as external (i.e. inanimate) in the form of earth and the other elements enabling (the souls) to enjoy the fruits of their various actions, and, on the other hand, as animate, in the form of bodies which belong to the different classes of beings, possess a definite arrangement of organs, and are therefore capable of constituting the abodes of fruition; look, we say, at this world, of which the most ingenious workmen cannot even form a conception in their minds, and then say if a non-intelligent principle like the pradhâna is able to fashion it! Other non-intelligent things such as stones and clods of earth are certainly not seen to possess analogous powers. We rather must assume that just as clay and similar substances are seen to fashion themselves into various forms, if worked upon by potters and the like, so the pradhâna also (when modifying itself into its effects) is ruled by some intelligent principle. When endeavouring to determine the nature of the primal cause (of the world), there is no need for us to take our stand on those attributes only which form part of the nature of material causes such as clay, &c., and not on those also which belong to extraneous agents such as potters, &c.[317] Nor (if remembering this latter point) do we enter into conflict with any means of right knowledge; we, on the contrary, are in direct agreement with Scripture which teaches that an intelligent cause exists.--For the reason detailed in the above, i.e. on account of the impossibility of the 'orderly arrangement' (of the world), a non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred.--The word 'and' (in the Sûtra) adds other reasons on account of which the pradhâna cannot be inferred, viz. 'on account of the non-possibility of endowment,' &c. For it cannot be maintained[318] that all outward and inward effects are 'endowed' with the nature of pleasure, pain, and dulness, because pleasure, &c. are known as inward (mental) states, while sound, &c. (i.e. the sense-objects) are known as being of a different nature (i.e. as outward things), and moreover as being the operative causes of pleasure, &c.[319] And, further, although the sense-object such as sound and so on is one, yet we observe that owing to the difference of the mental impressions (produced by it) differences exist in the effects it produces, one person being affected by it pleasantly, another painfully, and so on[320].--(Turning to the next Sâ@nkhya argument which infers the existence of the pradhâna from the limitation of all effects), we remark that he who concludes that all inward and outward effects depend on a conjunction of several things, because they are limited (a conclusion based on the observation that some limited effects such as roof and sprout, &c. depend on the conjunction of several things), is driven to the conclusion that the three constituents of the pradhâna, viz. Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, likewise depend on the conjunction of several antecedents[321]; for they also are limited[322].--Further[323], it is impossible to use the relation of cause and effect as a reason for assuming that all effects whatever have a non-intelligent principle for their antecedent; for we have shown already that that relation exists in the case of couches and chairs also, over whose production intelligence presides.

2. And on account of (the impossibility of) activity.

Leaving the arrangement of the world, we now pass on to the activity by which it is produced.--The three gu/n/as, passing out of the state of equipoise and entering into the condition of mutual subordination and superordination, originate activities tending towards the production of particular effects.--Now these activities also cannot be ascribed to a non-intelligent pradhâna left to itself, as no such activity is seen in clay and similar substances, or in chariots and the like. For we observe that clay and the like, and chariots--which are in their own nature non-intelligent--enter on activities tending towards particular effects only when they are acted upon by intelligent beings such as potters, &c. in the one case, and horses and the like in the other case. From what is seen we determine what is not seen. Hence a non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred because, on that hypothesis, the activity without which the world cannot be produced would be impossible.