Chapter 39

The pûrvapakshin maintains that Brahman evidently is the operative cause of the world only, because Scripture declares his creative energy to be preceded by reflection. Compare, for instance, Pra. Up. VI, 3; 4: 'He reflected, he created prâ/n/a.' For observation shows that the action of operative causes only, such as potters and the like, is preceded by reflection, and moreover that the result of some activity is brought about by the concurrence of several factors[251]. It is therefore appropriate that we should view the prime creator in the same light. The circumstance of his being known as 'the Lord' furnishes another argument. For lords such as kings and the son of Vivasvat are known only as operative causes, and the highest Lord also must on that account be viewed as an operative cause only.--Further, the effect of the creator's activity, viz. this world, is seen to consist of parts, to be non-intelligent and impure; we therefore must assume that its cause also is of the same nature; for it is a matter of general observation that cause and effect are alike in kind. But that Brahman does not resemble the world in nature, we know from many scriptural passages, such as 'It is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint' (/Sv/e. Up. VI, 19). Hence there remains no other alternative but to admit that in addition to Brahman there exists a material cause of the world of impure nature, such as is known from Sm/ri/ti[252], and to limit the causality of Brahman, as declared by Scripture, to operative causality.

To this we make the following reply.--Brahman is to be acknowledged as the material cause as well as the operative cause; because this latter view does not conflict with the promissory statements and the illustrative instances. The promissory statement chiefly meant is the following one, 'Have you ever asked for that instruction by which that which is not heard becomes heard; that which is not perceived, perceived; that which is not known, known?' (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 3.) This passage intimates that through the cognition of one thing everything else, even if (previously) unknown, becomes known. Now the knowledge of everything is possible through the cognition of the material cause, since the effect is non-different from the material cause. On the other hand, effects are not non-different from their operative causes; for we know from ordinary experience that the carpenter, for instance, is different from the house he has built.--The illustrative example referred to is the one mentioned (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4), 'My dear, as by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e. the effect) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely;' which passage again has reference to the material cause. The text adds a few more illustrative instances of similar nature, 'As by one nugget of gold all that is made of gold is known; as by one pair of nail-scissors all that is made of iron is known.'--Similar promissory statements are made in other places also, for instance, 'What is that through which if it is known everything else becomes known?' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 3.) An illustrative instance also is given in the same place, 'As plants grow on the earth' (I, 1, 7).--Compare also the promissory statement in B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 6, 'When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this is known;' and the illustrative instance quoted (IV, 5, 8), 'Now as the sounds of a drum if beaten cannot be seized externally, but the sound is seized when the drum is seized or the beater of the drum.'--Similar promissory statements and illustrative instances which are to be found in all Vedânta-texts are to be viewed as proving, more or less, that Brahman is also the material cause of the world. The ablative case also in the passage, 'That from whence (yata/h/) these beings are born,' has to be considered as indicating the material cause of the beings, according to the grammatical rule, Pâ/n/. I, 4, 30.--That Brahman is at the same time the operative cause of the world, we have to conclude from the circumstance that there is no other guiding being. Ordinarily material causes, indeed, such as lumps of clay and pieces of gold, are dependent, in order to shape themselves into vessels and ornaments, on extraneous operative causes such as potters and goldsmiths; but outside Brahman as material cause there is no other operative cause to which the material cause could look; for Scripture says that previously to creation Brahman was one without a second.--The absence of a guiding principle other than the material cause can moreover be established by means of the argument made use of in the Sûtra, viz. accordance with the promissory statements and the illustrative examples. If there were admitted a guiding principle different from the material cause, it would follow that everything cannot be known through one thing, and thereby the promissory statements as well as the illustrative instances would be stultified.--The Self is thus the operative cause, because there is no other ruling principle, and the material cause because there is no other substance from which the world could originate.

24. And on account of the statement of reflection (on the part of the Self).

The fact of the sacred texts declaring that the Self reflected likewise shows that it is the operative as well as the material cause. Passages like 'He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth,' and 'He thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' show, in the first place, that the Self is the agent in the independent activity which is preceded by the Self's reflection; and, in the second place, that it is the material cause also, since the words 'May I be many' intimate that the reflective desire of multiplying itself has the inward Self for its object.

25. And on account of both (i.e. the origin and the dissolution of the world) being directly declared (to have Brahman for their material cause).

This Sûtra supplies a further argument for Brahman's being the general material cause.--Brahman is the material cause of the world for that reason also that the origination as well as the dissolution of the world is directly spoken of in the sacred texts as having Brahman for their material cause, 'All these beings take their rise from the ether and return into the ether' (Ch. Up. I, 9, 1). That that from which some other thing springs and into which it returns is the material cause of that other thing is well known. Thus the earth, for instance, is the material cause of rice, barley, and the like.--The word 'directly' (in the Sûtra) notifies that there is no other material cause, but that all this sprang from the ether only.--Observation further teaches that effects are not re-absorbed into anything else but their material causes.

26. (Brahman is the material cause) on account of (the Self) making itself; (which is possible) owing to modification.

Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that Scripture--in the passage, 'That made itself its Self' (Taitt. Up. II, 7)--represents the Self as the object of action as well as the agent.--But how can the Self which as agent was in full existence previously to the action be made out to be at the same time that which is effected by the action?--Owing to modification, we reply. The Self, although in full existence previously to the action, modifies itself into something special, viz. the Self of the effect. Thus we see that causal substances, such as clay and the like, are, by undergoing the process of modification, changed into their products.--The word 'itself' in the passage quoted intimates the absence of any other operative cause but the Self.

The word 'pari/n/âmât' (in the Sûtra) may also be taken as constituting a separate Sûtra by itself, the sense of which would be: Brahman is the material cause of the world for that reason also, that the sacred text speaks of Brahman and its modification into the Self of its effect as co-ordinated, viz. in the passage, 'It became sat and tyat, defined and undefined' (Taitt. Up. II, 6).

27. And because Brahman is called the source.

Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that it is spoken of in the sacred texts as the source (yoni); compare, for instance, 'The maker, the Lord, the person who has his source in Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3); and 'That which the wise regard as the source of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 6). For that the word 'source' denotes the material cause is well known from the use of ordinary language; the earth, for instance, is called the yoni of trees and herbs. In some places indeed the word yoni means not source, but merely place; so, for instance, in the mantra, 'A yoni, O Indra, was made for you to sit down upon' (/Ri/k. Sa/m/h. I, 104, 1). But that in the passage quoted it means 'source' follows from a complementary passage, 'As the spider sends forth and draws in its threads,' &c.--It is thus proved that Brahman is the material cause of the world.--Of the objection, finally, that in ordinary life the activity of operative causal agents only, such as potters and the like, is preceded by reflection, we dispose by the remark that, as the matter in hand is not one which can be known through inferential reasoning, ordinary experience cannot be used to settle it. For the knowledge of that matter we rather depend on Scripture altogether, and hence Scripture only has to be appealed to. And that Scripture teaches that the Lord who reflects before creation is at the same time the material cause, we have already explained. The subject will, moreover, be discussed more fully later on.

28. Hereby all (the doctrines concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedânta) are explained, are explained.

The doctrine according to which the pradhâna is the cause of the world has, in the Sûtras beginning with I, 1, 5, been again and again brought forward and refuted. The chief reason for the special attention given to that doctrine is that the Vedânta-texts contain some passages which, to people deficient in mental penetration, may appear to contain inferential marks pointing to it. The doctrine, moreover, stands somewhat near to the Vedânta doctrine since, like the latter, it admits the non-difference of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma-sûtras, such as Devala, and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute the pradhâna doctrine, without paying much attention to the atomic and other theories. These latter theories, however, must likewise be refuted, as they also are opposed to the doctrine of Brahman being the general cause, and as slow-minded people might think that they also are referred to in some Vedic passages. Hence the Sûtrakâra formally extends, in the above Sûtra, the refutation already accomplished of the pradhâna doctrine to all similar doctrines which need not be demolished in detail after their great protagonist, the pradhâna doctrine, has been so completely disposed of. They also are, firstly, not founded on any scriptural authority; and are, secondly, directly contradicted by various Vedic passages.--The repetition of the phrase 'are explained' is meant to intimate that the end of the adhyâya has been reached.

Notes:

[Footnote 228: The Great one is the technical Sâ@nkhya-term for buddhi, avyakta is a common designation of pradhâna or prak/ri/ti, and purusha is the technical name of the soul. Compare, for instance, Sâ@nkhya Kâr. 2, 3.]

[Footnote 229: Sa/m/kalpavikalparûpamanana/s/aktyâ haira/n/yagarbhî buddhir manas tasyâ/h/ vyash/t/imana/h/su samash/t/itayâ vyâptim âha mahân iti. Sa/m/kalpâdi/s/ktitayâ tarhi sa/m/dehâtmatva/m/ tatrâha matir iti. Mahatvam upapâdayati brahmeti. Bhogyajâtâdhâratvam âha pûr iti. Ni/sk/ayâtmakatvam âha buddhir iti. Kîrti/s/aktimattvam âha khyâtir iti. Niyamana/s/aktimatvam aha î/s/vara iti. Loke yat prak/ri/sh/t/a/m/ j/ñ/ânam tatosnatirekam âha praj/ñ/eti. Tatphalam api tato nârthântaravishayam ity âha sa/m/vid iti. /K/itpradhânatvam âha /k/itir iti. J/ñ/atasarvârtbânusa/m/dhâna/s/aktim âha sm/ri/tis /k/eti. Ânanda Giri.]

[Footnote 230: Nanu na bîja/s/aktir vidyayâ dahyate vastutvâd âtmavan nety âha avidyeti. Ke/k/it tu pratijîvam avidya/s/aktibhedam i/kkh/anti tan na avyaktâvyâk/ri/tâdi/s/abdâyâs tasyâ bhedakâbhâvâd ekatvexpi sva/s/aktyâ vi/k/itrakâryakaratvâd ity âha avyakteti. Na /k/a tasyâ jîvâ/s/rayatva/m/ jîva/s/abdavâ/k/yasya kalpitatvâd avidyârûpatvât ta/kkh/abdalakshyasya brahmâvyatirekâd ity âha parame/s/vareti. Mâyâvidyayor bhedâd î/s/varasya mâyâ/s/rayatva/m/ jîvânâm avidyâ/s/rayateti vadanta/m/ pratyâha mâyâmayîti. Yathâ mâyâvino mâyâ paratantrâ tathaishâpîty artha/h/. Pratîtau tasyâ/s/ /k/etanâpekshâm âha mahâsuptir iti. Ânanda Giri.]

[Footnote 231: Sûtradvayasya v/ri/ttik/ri/dvyâkhyânam utthâpayati. Go. Ân. Â/k/âryade/s/îyamatam utthâpayati. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 232: The commentators give different explanations of the Sattâmâtra of the text.--Sattâmâtre sattvapradhânaprak/ri/ter âdyapari/n/âme. Go. Ân.--Bhogâpavargapurushârthasya maha/kkh/abditabuddhikâryatvât purushâpekshitaphalakâra/n/a/m/ sad u/k/yate tatra bhâvapratyayos'pi svarûpârtho na sâmânyavâ/k/î kâryânumeya/m/ mahan na pratyaksham iti mâtra/s/abda/h/. Ânanda Giri.]

[Footnote 233: As the meaning of the word ajâ is going to be discussed, and as the author of the Sûtras and /S/a@nkara seem to disagree as to its meaning (see later on), I prefer to leave the word untranslated in this place.--/S/a@nkara reads--and explains,--in the mantra, sarûpâ/h/ (not sarûpâm) and bhuktabhogâm, not bhuktabhogyâm.]

[Footnote 234: Here there seems to be a certain discrepancy between the views of the Sûtra writer and /S/a@nkara. Govindânanda notes that according to the Bhâshyak/ri/t ajâ means simply mâyâ--which interpretation is based on prakara/n/a--while, according to the Sûtra-k/ri/t, who explains ajâ on the ground of the Chândogya-passage treating of the three primary elements, ajâ denotes the aggregate of those three elements constituting an avântaraprak/ri/ti.--On /S/a@nkara's explanation the term ajâ presents no difficulties, for mâyâ is ajâ, i.e. unborn, not produced. On the explanation of the Sûtra writer, however, ajâ cannot mean unborn, since the three primary elements are products. Hence we are thrown back on the rû/dh/i signification of ajâ, according to which it means she-goat. But how can the avântara-prak/ri/ti be called a she-goat? To this question the next Sûtra replies.]

[Footnote 235: Indication (laksha/n/â, which consists in this case in five times five being used instead of twenty-five) is considered as an objectionable mode of expression, and therefore to be assumed in interpretation only where a term can in no way be shown to have a direct meaning.]

[Footnote 236: That pa/ñk/ajanâ/h/ is only one word appears from its having only one accent, viz. the udâtta on the last syllable, which udâtta becomes anudâtta according to the rules laid down in the Bhâshika Sûtra for the accentuation of the /S/atapatha-brâhma/n/a.]

[Footnote 237: So in the Mâdhyandina recension of the Upanishad; the Kâ/n/va recension has not the clause 'the food of food.']

[Footnote 238: This in answer to the Sánkhya who objects to jana when applied to the prâna, &c. being interpreted with the help of laksha/n/â; while if referred to the pradhâna, &c. it may be explained to have a direct meaning, on the ground of yaugika interpretation (the pradhâna being jana because it produces, the mahat &c. being jana because they are produced). The Vedãntin points out that the compound pa/ñk/ajanâ/h/ has its own rû/dh/i-meaning, just as a/s/vakar/n/a, literally horse-ear, which conventionally denotes a certain plant.]

[Footnote 239: We infer that udbhid is the name of a sacrifice because it is mentioned in connexion with the act of sacrificing; we infer that the yûpa is a wooden post because it is said to be cut, and so on.]

[Footnote 240: Option being possible only in the case of things to be accomplished, i.e. actions.]

[Footnote 241: According to Go. Ân. in the passage, 'That made itself its Self' (II, 7); according to Ân. Giri in the passage, 'He created all' (II, 6).]

[Footnote 242: By the Brâhma/n/as being meant all those Brâhma/n/as who are not at the same time wandering mendicants.]

[Footnote 243: The comment of the Bhâmatî on the Sûtra runs as follows: As the sparks issuing from a fire are not absolutely different from the fire, because they participate in the nature of the fire; and, on the other hand, are not absolutely non-different from the fire, because in that case they could be distinguished neither from the fire nor from each other; so the individual souls also--which are effects of Brahman--are neither absolutely different from Brahman, for that would mean that they are not of the nature of intelligence; nor absolutely non-different from Brahman, because in that case they could not be distinguished from each other, and because, if they were identical with Brahman and therefore omniscient, it would be useless to give them any instruction. Hence the individual souls are somehow different from Brahman and somehow non-different.--The technical name of the doctrine here represented by Â/s/marathya is bhedâbhedavâda.]

[Footnote 244: Bhâmatî: The individual soul is absolutely different from the highest Self; it is inquinated by the contact with its different limiting adjuncts. But it is spoken of, in the Upanishad, as non-different from the highest Self because after having purified itself by means of knowledge and meditation it may pass out of the body and become one with the highest Self. The text of the Upanishad thus transfers a future state of non-difference to that time when difference actually exists. Compare the saying of the Pâ/ñk/arâtrikas: 'Up to the moment of emancipation being reached the soul and the highest Self are different. But the emancipated soul is no longer different from the highest Self, since there is no further cause of difference.'--The technical name of the doctrine advocated by Au/d/ulomi is satyabhedavâda.]

[Footnote 245: Compare the note to the same mantra as quoted above under I, 1, 11.]

[Footnote 246: And not the relation of absolute identity.]

[Footnote 247: I.e. upon the state of emancipation and its absence.]

[Footnote 248: Upapâdita/m/ /k/eti, sarvasyâtmamâtratvam iti /s/esha/h/. Upapâdanaprakâra/m/ sû/k/ayati eketi. Sa yathârdrendhanâgner ityâdinaikaprasavatvam, yathâ sarvâsâm apâm ityâdinâ /k/aikapralayatva/m/ sarvasyoktam. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 249: So according to Go. Ân. and Ân. Gi., although their interpretations seem not to account sufficiently for the ekâm of the text.--Kâ/mk/id evaikâm iti jîvasthânâd anyâm ity artha/h/. Go. Ân.--Jîvabhâvena pratibimbâdhârâtiriktâm ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 250: While release, as often remarked, is eternal, it being in fact not different from the eternally unchanging Brahman.]

[Footnote 251: I.e. that the operative cause and the substantial cause are separate things.]

[Footnote 252: Viz. the Sâ@nkhya-sm/ri/ti.]

SECOND ADHYÂYA.

FIRST PÂDA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!

1. If it be objected that (from the doctrine expounded hitherto) there would result the fault of there being no room for (certain) Sm/ri/tis; we do not admit that objection, because (from the rejection of our doctrine) there would result the fault of want of room for other Sm/ri/tis.

It has been shown in the first adhyâya that the omniscient Lord of all is the cause of the origin of this world in the same way as clay is the material cause of jars and gold of golden ornaments; that by his rulership he is the cause of the subsistence of this world once originated, just as the magician is the cause of the subsistence of the magical illusion; and that he, lastly, is the cause of this emitted world being finally reabsorbed into his essence, just as the four classes of creatures are reabsorbed into the earth. It has further been proved, by a demonstration of the connected meaning of all the Vedânta-texts, that the Lord is the Self of all of us. Moreover, the doctrines of the pradhâna, and so on, being the cause of this world have been refuted as not being scriptural.--The purport of the second adhyâya, which we now begin, is to refute the objections (to the doctrine established hitherto) which might be founded on Sm/ri/ti and Reasoning, and to show that the doctrines of the pradhâna, &c. have only fallacious arguments to lean upon, and that the different Vedânta-texts do not contradict one another with regard to the mode of creation and similar topics.--The first point is to refute the objections based on Sm/ri/ti.

Your doctrine (the pûrvapakshin says) that the omniscient Brahman only is the cause of this world cannot be maintained, 'because there results from it the fault of there being no room for (certain) Sm/ri/tis.' Such Sm/ri/tis are the one called Tantra which was composed by a /ri/shi and is accepted by authoritative persons, and other Sm/ri/tis based on it[253]; for all of which there would be no room if your interpretation of the Veda were the true one. For they all teach that the non-intelligent pradhâna is the independent cause of the world. There is indeed room (a raison d'être) for Sm/ri/tis like the Manu-sm/ri/ti, which give information about matters connected with the whole body of religious duty, characterised by injunction[254] and comprising the agnihotra and similar performances. They tell us at what time and with what rites the members of the different castes are to be initiated; how the Veda has to be studied; in what way the cessation of study has to take place; how marriage has to be performed, and so on. They further lay down the manifold religious duties, beneficial to man, of the four castes and â/s/ramas[255]. The Kâpila Sm/ri/ti, on the other hand, and similar books are not concerned with things to be done, but were composed with exclusive reference to perfect knowledge as the means of final release. If then no room were left for them in that connexion also, they would be altogether purposeless; and hence we must explain the Vedânta-texts in such a manner as not to bring them into conflict with the Sm/ri/tis mentioned[256].--But how, somebody may ask the pûrvapakshin, can the eventual fault of there being left no room for certain Sm/ri/tis be used as an objection against that sense of /S/ruti which--from various reasons as detailed under I, 1 and ff.--has been ascertained by us to be the true one, viz. that the omniscient Brahman alone is the cause of the world?--Our objection, the pûrvapakshin replies, will perhaps not appear valid to persons of independent thought; but as most men depend in their reasonings on others, and are unable to ascertain by themselves the sense of /S/ruti, they naturally rely on Sm/ri/tis, composed by celebrated authorities, and try to arrive at the sense of /S/ruti with their assistance; while, owing to their esteem for the authors of the Sm/ri/tis, they have no trust in our explanations. The knowledge of men like Kapila Sm/ri/ti declares to have been /ri/shi-like and unobstructed, and moreover there is the following /S/ruti-passage, 'It is he who, in the beginning, bears in his thoughts the son, the /ri/shi, kapila[257], whom he wishes to look on while he is born' (/S/ve. Up. V, 2). Hence their opinion cannot be assumed to be erroneous, and as they moreover strengthen their position by argumentation, the objection remains valid, and we must therefore attempt to explain the Vedânta-texts in conformity with the Sm/ri/tis.