Chapter 22

[Footnote 68: The so-called sâkshâtkâra of Brahman. The &c. comprises inference and so on.]

[Footnote 69: So, for instance, the passage 'he carves the sacrificial post and makes it eight-cornered,' has a purpose only as being supplementary to the injunction 'he ties the victim to the sacrificial post.']

[Footnote 70: If the fruits of the two /s/âstras were not of a different nature, there would be no reason for the distinction of two /s/âstras; if they are of a different nature, it cannot be said that the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined for the purpose of final release, in the same way as sacrifices are enjoined for the purpose of obtaining the heavenly world and the like.]

[Footnote 71: The first passage shows that the Self is not joined to the gross body; the second that it is not joined to the subtle body; the third that is independent of either.]

[Footnote 72: Ânanda Giri omits 'ata/h/.' His comment is: p/ri/thagjij/ñ/âsâvishayatvâ/k/ /k/a dharmâdyasp/ri/sh/t/atva/m/ brahma/n/o yuktam ityâha; tad iti; ata/h/ /s/abdapâ/th/e dharmâdyasparse karmaphalavailaksba/n/ya/m/ hetûk/ri/tam.--The above translation follows Govindânanda's first explanation. Tat kaivalyam brahmaiva karmaphalavilaksha/n/atvâd ity artha/h/.]

[Footnote 73: Sampat. Sampan nâmâlpe vastuny âlambane sâmânyena kena/k/in mahato vastuna/h/ sampâdanam. Ânanda Giri.]

[Footnote 74: In which passage the mind, which may be called endless on account of the infinite number of modifications it undergoes, is identified with the Vi/s/vedevas, which thereby constitute the chief object of the meditation; the fruit of the meditation being immortality. The identity of the Self with Brahman, on the other hand, is real, not only meditatively imagined, on account of the attribute of intelligence being common to both.]

[Footnote 75: Adhyâsa/h/ /s/âstratoitasmi/m/s taddhî/h/. Sampadi sampâdyamânasya prâdhânyenânudhyânam, adhyâse tu âlambanasyeti vi/s/esha/h/. Ânanda Giri.]

[Footnote 76: Air and breath each absorb certain things, and are, therefore, designated by the same term 'absorber.' Seya/m/ sa/m/vargad/ri/sh/t/ir vâyau prâ/n/e /k/a da/s/â/s/âgata/m/ jagad dar/s/ayati yathâ jîvâtmani b/rim/ha/n/akriyayâ brahmad/ri/sh/t/iram/ri/tatvâyaphalâyakalpata iti. Bhâmati.]

[Footnote 77: The butter used in the upâ/ms/uyâja is ceremonially purified by the wife of the sacrificer looking at it; so, it might be said, the Self of him who meditates on Brahman (and who as kart/ri/--agent--stands in a subordinate anga-relation to the karman of meditation) is merely purified by the cognition of its being one with Brahman.]

[Footnote 78: An hypothesis which might be proposed for the purpose of obviating the imputation to moksha of non-eternality which results from the two preceding hypotheses.]

[Footnote 79: Viz. things to be originated (for instance, gha/t/a/m/ karoti), things to be obtained (grâma/m/ ga/kkh/ati), things to be modified (suvar/n/a/m/ ku/nd/ala/m/ karoti), and things to be ceremonially purified (vrîhîn prokshati).]

[Footnote 80: Whence it follows that it is not something to be avoided like transitory things.]

[Footnote 81: That, for instance, in the passage 'he is to sacrifice with Soma,' the word 'soma,' which does not denote an action, is devoid of sense.]

[Footnote 82: I.e. for the purpose of showing that the passages conveying information about Brahman as such are justified. You have (the objector maintains) proved hitherto only that passages containing information about existent things are admissible, if those things have a purpose; but how does all this apply to the information about Brahman of which no purpose has been established?]

[Footnote 83: It is 'naturally established' because it has natural motives--not dependent on the injunctions of the Veda, viz. passion and the like.]

[Footnote 84: Elsewhere, i.e. outside the Veda.]

[Footnote 85: The above discussion of the prohibitory passages of the Veda is of a very scholastic nature, and various clauses in it are differently interpreted by the different commentators. /S/a@nkara endeavours to fortify his doctrine, that not all parts of the Veda refer to action by an appeal to prohibitory passages which do not enjoin action but abstinence from action. The legitimacy of this appeal might be contested on the ground that a prohibitory passage also, (as, for instance, 'a Brâhma/n/a is not to be killed,') can be explained as enjoining a positive action, viz. some action opposed in nature to the one forbidden, so that the quoted passage might be interpreted to mean 'a determination, &c. of not killing a Brâhma/n/a is to be formed;' just as we understand something positive by the expression 'a non-Brâhma/n/a,' viz. some man who is a kshattriya or something else. To this the answer is that, wherever we can, we must attribute to the word 'not' its primary sense which is the absolute negation of the word to which it is joined; so that passages where it is joined to words denoting action must be considered to have for their purport the entire absence of action. Special cases only are excepted, as the one alluded to in the text where certain prohibited actions are enumerated under the heading of vows; for as a vow is considered as something positive, the non-doing of some particular action must there be understood as intimating the performance of some action of an opposite nature. The question as to the various meanings of the particle 'not' is discussed in all treatises on the Pûrvâ Mîmâ/m/sâ; see, for instance, Arthasamgraha, translation, p. 39 ff.]

[Footnote 86: The Self is the agent in a sacrifice, &c. only in so far as it imagines itself to be joined to a body; which imagination is finally removed by the cognition of Brahman.]

[Footnote 87: The figurative Self, i.e. the imagination that wife, children, possessions, and the like are a man's Self; the false Self, i.e. the imagination that the Self acts, suffers, enjoys, &c.]

[Footnote 88: I.e. the apparent world with all its distinctions.]

[Footnote 89: The words in parentheses are not found in the best manuscripts.]

[Footnote 90: The most exalted of the three constituent elements whose state of equipoise constitutes the pradhâna.]

[Footnote 91: Knowledge can arise only where Goodness is predominant, not where the three qualities mutually counterbalance one another.]

[Footnote 92: The excess of Sattva in the Yogin would not enable him to rise to omniscience if he did not possess an intelligent principle independent of Sattva.]

[Footnote 93: Ananda Giri comments as follows: paroktânupapatlim nirasitum p/rikkh/ati idam iti. Prak/ri/tyarthâbhâvât pratyayârthâbhâvâd vâ brahma/n/o sarvaj/ñ/ateti pra/s/nam eva praka/t/ayati katham iti. Prathama/m/ pratyâha yasyeti. Ukta/m/ vyatirckadvârâ viyz/rin/oti anityatve hîti. Dvitiya/m/ /s/a@nkate j/ñ/âneti. Svato nityasyâpi j/ñ/ânasya tattadarthâva/kkh/innasya kâryatvât tatra svâtantryam pratyayârtho brahma/n/a/h/ sidhyatîty âha.--The knowledge of Brahman is eternal, and in so far Brahman is not independent with regard to it, but it is independent with regard to each particular act of knowledge; the verbal affix in 'jânâti' indicating the particularity of the act.]

[Footnote 94: In the second Kha/nd/a of the sixth Prapâ/th/aka of the Ch. Up. 'aikshata' is twice used in a figurative sense (with regard to fire and water); it is therefore to be understood figuratively in the third passage also where it occurs.]

[Footnote 95: So that, on this latter explanation, it is unnecessary to assume a figurative sense of the word 'thinking' in any of the three passages.]

[Footnote 96: A wicked man meets in a forest a blind person who has lost his way, and implores him to lead him to his village; instead of doing so the wicked man persuades the blind one to catch hold of the tail of an ox, which he promises would lead him to his place. The consequence is that the blind man is, owing to his trustfulness, led even farther astray, and injured by the bushes, &c., through which the ox drags him.]

[Footnote 97: Cp. above, p. 30.]

[Footnote 98: So according to the commentators, not to accept whose guidance in the translation of scholastic definitions is rather hazardous. A simpler translation of the clause might however be given.]

[Footnote 99: With reference to Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2.]

[Footnote 100: The wise one, i.e. the highest Self; which as jîvâtman is conversant with the names and forms of individual things.]

[Footnote 101: I.e. it is looked upon as the object of the devotion of the individual souls; while in reality all those souls and Brahman are one.]

[Footnote 102: Qualities, i.e. the attributes under which the Self is meditated on; limiting conditions, i.e. the localities--such as the heart and the like--which in pious meditation are ascribed to the Self.]

[Footnote 103: Ânanda Giri reads âvish/t/asya for âvishk/ri/tasya.]

[Footnote 104: Cp. the entire passage. All things are manifestations of the highest Self under certain limiting conditions, but occupying different places in an ascending scale. In unsentient things, stones, &c. only the sattâ, the quality of being manifests itself; in plants, animals, and men the Self manifests itself through the vital sap; in animals and men there is understanding; higher thought in man alone.]

[Footnote 105: Ânanda Giri on the preceding passage beginning from 'thus here also:' na kevala/m/ dvaividhyam brahma/n/a/h/ /s/rutism/ri/tyor eva siddha/m/ ki/m/ tu sûtrak/ri/to api matam ity âha, evam iti, /s/rutism/ri/tyor iva prak/ri/te pi /s/âstre dvairûpyam brahma/n/o bhavati; tatra sopâdhikabrahmavishayam antastaddharmâdhikara/n/am udâharati âdityeti; uktanyâya/m/ tulyade/s/eshu prasârayati evam iti; sopâdhikopade/s/avan nirupâdhikopade/s/a/m/ dar/s/ayati evam ityâdinâ, âtmaj/ñ/@ana/m/ nir/n/etavyam iti sambandha/h/; ayaprasa@ngam âha pareti; annamayâdyupâdhidvârokasya katham paravidyâvishayatva/m/ tatrâha upâdhîti; nir/n/ayakramam âha vâkyeti, uktârtham adhikara/n/a/m/ kvâstîty âsa@nkyokta/m/ yatheti.]

[Footnote 106: After which no other Self is mentioned.]

[Footnote 107: The previous proofs were founded on li@nga; the argument which is now propounded is founded on prakara/n/a.]

[Footnote 108: While, in the case of the Selfs consisting of food and so on, a further inner Self is duly mentioned each time. It cannot, therefore, be concluded that the Selfs consisting of food, &c., are likewise identical with the highest Self referred to in the mantra.]

[Footnote 109: Yadi labdhâ na labdhavya/h/ katha/m/ tarhi paramâtmano vastutobhinnena jîvâtmanâ paramâtmâ labhyata ity artha/h/. Bhâmatî.]

[Footnote 110: Yathâ paramesvarâd bhinno jîvâtmâ drash/t/â na bhavaty evam gîvâtmanozpi drash/t/ur na bhinna/h/ parame/s/vara iti, jîvasyânirvâ/k/yarve parame/s/varozpy anirvâ/k/ya/h/ syâd ity ata âha parame/s/varas tv avidyâkalpitâd iti. Ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 111: The explanation of the ânandamaya given hitherto is here recalled, and a different one given. The previous explanation is attributed by Go. Ân. to the v/ri/ttikâra.]

[Footnote 112: In which sense, as shown above, the word ânandamaya must be taken if understood to denote Brahman.]

[Footnote 113: I.e. the word translated hitherto by abundance.]

[Footnote 114: See I, 1, 15-19. ]

[Footnote 115: The preceding adhikara/n/a had shown that the five Selfs (consisting of food, mind, and so on), which the Taitt. Up. enumerates, are introduced merely for the purpose of facilitating the cognition of Brahman considered as devoid of all qualities; while that Brahman itself is the real object of knowledge. The present adhikara/n/a undertakes to show that the passage about the golden person represents the savi/s/esha Brahman as the object of devout meditation.]

[Footnote 116: So that the real giver of the gifts bestowed by princes on poets and singers is Brahman.]

[Footnote 117: Or else 'that which is within forms and names.']

[Footnote 118: Viz. as intimating it. Thus Ân. Gi. and Go. Ân. against the accent of /rik/á/h/. Sâya/n/a explains /rik/á/h/ as genitive.]

[Footnote 119: O/m/kârasya pratîkatvena vâ/k/akatvena lakshakatvena vâ brahmatvam uktam, om iti, ka/m/ sukha/m/ tasyârthendriyayogajatva/m/ vârayitu/m/ kham iti, tasya bhûtâka/s/atva/m/ vyâseddhum purâ/n/am ity uktam. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 120: The doubt about the meaning of a word is preferably to be decided by means of a reference to preceding passages; where that is not possible (the doubtful word occurring at the beginning of some new chapter) complementary, i.e. subsequent passages have to be taken into consideration.]

[Footnote 121: The v/ri/ttikâra, the commentators say.]

[Footnote 122: I.e. which has not been mixed with water and earth, according to Ch. Up. VI, 3, 3. Before that mixture took place light was entriely separated from the other elements, and therefore bounded by the latter.]

[Footnote 123: So as to justify the assumption that such a thing as non-tripartite light exists at all.]

[Footnote 124: Brahma/n/o vyava/kkh/idya teja/h/samarpakatva/m/ vi/s/eshakatvam, tadabhâvozvi/s/eshakatvam. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 125: If we strictly follow the order of words in the original.]

[Footnote 126: Svasâmarthyena sarvanâmna/h/ sannihitaparâmar/s/itvava/s/ena.]

[Footnote 127: The v/ri/ttikâra according to Go. Ân. in his /t/îkâ on the bhâshya to the next Sûtra.]

[Footnote 128: Concerning the difficulty involved in this interpretation, cp. Deussen, p. 183, note.]

[Footnote 129: The text runs, 'astitve /k/a prâ/n/ânâ/m/ ni/hs/reyasam,' and Go. Ân. explains 'astitve prâ/n/asthitau prâ/n/ânâ/m/ indriyâ/n/âm sthitir ity arthata/h/ /s/rutim âha.' He as well as Ân. Gi. quotes as the text of the scriptural passage referred to 'athâto ni/hs/reyasâdânam ity âdi.' But if instead of 'astitve /k/a' we read 'asti tv eva,' we get the concluding clause of Kau. Up. III, 2, as given in Cowell's edition.].

[Footnote 130: Whence we know that the interior Self referred to in the Kau. Up. is Brahman.]

[Footnote 131: I.e. spontaneous intuition of supersensible truth, rendered possible through the knowledge acquired in former existences.]

[Footnote 132: Ima/m/ /s/arîram instead of ida/m/ /s/arîram.]

[Footnote 133: Pa/ñk/a /s/abdâdaya/h/ pa/ñk/a p/ri/thivyâdaya/s/ /k/a da/s/a bhûtamâtrâ/h/ pa/ñk/a buddhîndriyâ/n/i pa/ñk/a buddhaya iti da/s/a praj/ñ/âmâtrâ/h/. Yadvâ j/ñ/ânendriyârthâ/h/ pa/ñk/a karzmendriyârthâ/s/ /ka/ pa/ñk/eti da/s/a bhûtamâtrâ/h/ dvividhânîndriyâ/n/i praj/ñ/âmâtrâ da/s/eti bhâva/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 134: Viz. by the v/ri/ttikâra.]

[Footnote 135: Ihâpi tad yujyate explaining the 'iha tadyogât' of the Sûtra.]

SECOND PÂDA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!

In the first pâda Brahman has been shown to be the cause of the origin, subsistence, and reabsorption of the entire world, comprising the ether and the other elements. Moreover, of this Brahman, which is the cause of the entire world, certain qualities have (implicitly) been declared, such as all-pervadingness, eternity, omniscience, its being the Self of all, and so on. Further, by producing reasons showing that some words which are generally used in a different sense denote Brahman also, we have been able to determine that some passages about whose sense doubts are entertained refer to Brahman. Now certain other passages present themselves which because containing only obscure indications of Brahman give rise to the doubt whether they refer to the highest Self or to something else. We therefore begin the second and third pâdas in order to settle those doubtful points.

1. (That which consists of mind is Brahman) because there is taught what is known from everywhere.

Scripture says, 'All this indeed is Brahman, beginning, ending, and breathing in it; thus knowing let a man meditate with calm mind. Now man is made of determination (kratu); according to what his determination is in this world so will he be when he has departed this life. Let him therefore form this determination: he who consists of mind, whose body is breath (the subtle body),' &c. (Ch. Up. III, 14). Concerning this passage the doubt presents itself whether what is pointed out as the object of meditation, by means of attributes such as consisting of mind, &c., is the embodied (individual) soul or the highest Brahman.

The embodied Self, the pûrvapakshin says.--Why?--Because the embodied Self as the ruler of the organs of action is well known to be connected with the mind and so on, while the highest Brahman is not, as is declared in several scriptural passages, so, for instance (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2), 'He is without breath, without mind, pure.'--But, it may be objected, the passage, 'All this indeed is Brahman,' mentions Brahman directly; how then can you suppose that the embodied Self forms the object of meditation?--This objection does not apply, the pûrvapakshin rejoins, because the passage does not aim at enjoining meditation on Brahman, but rather at enjoining calmness of mind, the sense being: because Brahman is all this, tajjalân, let a man meditate with a calm mind. That is to say: because all this aggregate of effects is Brahman only, springing from it, ending in it, and breathing in it; and because, as everything constitutes one Self only, there is no room for passion; therefore a man is to meditate with a calm mind. And since the sentence aims at enjoining calmness of mind, it cannot at the same time enjoin meditation on Brahman[136]; but meditation is separately enjoined in the clause, 'Let him form the determination, i.e. reflection.' And thereupon the subsequent passage, 'He who consists of mind, whose body is breath,' &c. states the object of the meditation in words indicatory of the individual soul. For this reason we maintain that the meditation spoken of has the individual soul for its object. The other attributes also subsequently stated in the text, 'He to whom all works, all desires belong,' &c. may rightly be held to refer to the individual soul. The attributes, finally, of being what abides in the heart and of being extremely minute which are mentioned in the passage, 'He is my Self within the heart, smaller than a corn of rice, smaller than a corn of barley,' may be ascribed to the individual soul which has the size of the point of a goad, but not to the unlimited Brahman. If it be objected that the immediately following passage, 'greater than the earth,' &c., cannot refer to something limited, we reply that smallness and greatness which are mutually opposite cannot indeed be ascribed to one and the same thing; and that, if one attribute only is to be ascribed to the subject of the passage, smallness is preferable because it is mentioned first; while the greatness mentioned later on may be attributed to the soul in so far as it is one with Brahman. If it is once settled that the whole passage refers to the individual soul, it follows that the declaration of Brahman also, contained in the passage, 'That is Brahman' (III, 14, 4), refers to the individual soul[137], as it is clearly connected with the general topic. Therefore the individual soul is the object of meditation indicated by the qualities of consisting of mind and so on.

To all this we reply: The highest Brahman only is what is to be meditated upon as distinguished by the attributes of consisting of mind and so on.--Why?--'On account of there being taught here what is known from everywhere.' What is known from all Vedânta-passages to be the sense of the word Brahman, viz. the cause of the world, and what is mentioned here in the beginning words of the passage, ('all this indeed is Brahman,') the same we must assume to be taught here as distinguished by certain qualities, viz. consisting of mind and so on. Thus we avoid the fault of dropping the subject-matter under discussion and needlessly introducing a new topic.--But, it may be said, it has been shown that Brahman is, in the beginning of the passage, introduced merely for the purpose of intimating the injunction of calmness of mind, not for the purpose of intimating Brahman itself.--True, we reply; but the fact nevertheless remains that, where the qualities of consisting of mind, &c. are spoken of, Brahman only is proximate (i.e. mentioned not far off so that it may be concluded to be the thing referred to), while the individual soul is neither proximate nor intimated by any word directly pointing to it. The cases of Brahman and the individual soul are therefore not equal.

2. And because the qualities desired to be expressed are possible (in Brahman; therefore the passage refers to Brahman).

Although in the Veda which is not the work of man no wish in the strict sense can be expressed[138], there being no speaker, still such phrases as 'desired to be expressed,' may be figuratively used on account of the result, viz. (mental) comprehension. For just as in ordinary language we speak of something which is intimated by a word and is to be received (by the hearer as the meaning of the word), as 'desired to be expressed;' so in the Veda also whatever is denoted as that which is to be received is 'desired to be expressed,' everything else 'not desired to be expressed.' What is to be received as the meaning of a Vedic sentence, and what not, is inferred from the general purport of the passage. Those qualities which are here desired to be expressed, i.e. intimated as qualities to be dwelt on in meditation, viz. the qualities of having true purposes, &c. are possible in the highest Brahman; for the quality of having true purposes may be ascribed to the highest Self which possesses unimpeded power over the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of this world. Similarly the qualities of having true desires and true purposes are attributed to the highest Self in another passage, viz. the one beginning, 'The Self which is free from sin' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1). The clause, 'He whose Self is the ether,' means 'he whose Self is like the ether;' for Brahman may be said to be like the ether on account of its omnipresence and other qualities. This is also expressed by the clause, 'Greater than the earth.' And the other explanation also, according to which the passage means 'he whose Self is the ether' is possible, since Brahman which as the cause of the whole world is the Self of everything is also the Self of the ether. For the same reasons he is called 'he to whom all works belong, and so on.' Thus the qualities here intimated as topics of meditation agree with the nature of Brahman. We further maintain that the terms 'consisting of mind,' and 'having breath for its body,' which the pûrvapakshin asserts cannot refer to Brahman, may refer to it. For as Brahman is the Self of everything, qualities such as consisting of mind and the like, which belong to the individual soul, belong to Brahman also. Accordingly /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti say of Brahman, 'Thou art woman, thou art man; thou art youth, thou art maiden; thou as an old man totterest along on thy staff; thou art born with thy face turned everywhere' (/S/ve. Up. IV, 3), and 'its hands and feet are everywhere, its eyes and head are everywhere, its ears are everywhere, it stands encompassing all in the world' (Bha. Gîtâ III, 13).

The passage (quoted above against our view), 'Without breath, without mind, pure,' refers to the pure (unrelated) Brahman. The terms 'consisting of mind; having breath for its body,' on the other hand, refer to Brahman as distinguished by qualities. Hence, as the qualities mentioned are possible in Brahman, we conclude that the highest Brahman only is represented as the object of meditation.

3. On the other hand, as (those qualities) are not possible (in it), the embodied (soul is) not (denoted by manomaya, &c.).