Chapter 21

An objection is raised against the assertion that prâ/n/a denotes Brahman. The word prâ/n/a, it is said, does not denote the highest Brahman, because the speaker designates himself. The speaker, who is a certain powerful god called Indra, at first says, in order to reveal himself to Pratardana, 'Know me only,' and later on, 'I am prâ/n/a, the intelligent Self.' How, it is asked, can the prâ/n/a, which this latter passage, expressive of personality as it is, represents as the Self of the speaker, be Brahman to which, as we know from Scripture, the attribute of being a speaker cannot be ascribed; compare, for instance, B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8, 'It is without speech, without mind.' Further on, also, the speaker, i.e. Indra, glorifies himself by enumerating a number of attributes, all of which depend on personal existence and can in no way belong to Brahman, 'I slew the three-headed son of Tvash/tri/; I delivered the Arunmukhas, the devotees, to the wolves,' and so on. Indra may be called prâ/n/a on account of his strength. Scripture says, 'Strength indeed is prâ/n/a,' and Indra is known as the god of strength; and of any deed of strength people say, 'It is Indra's work.' The personal Self of a deity may, moreover, be called an intelligent Self; for the gods, people say, possess unobstructed knowledge. It thus being a settled matter that some passages convey information about the personal Self of some deity, the other passages also--as, for instance, the one about what is most beneficial for man--must be interpreted as well as they may with reference to the same deity. Hence prâ/n/a does not denote Brahman.

This objection we refute by the remark that in that chapter there are found a multitude of references to the interior Self. For the passage, 'As long as prâ/n/a dwells in this body so long surely there is life,' declares that that prâ/n/a only which is the intelligent interior Self--and not some particular outward deity--has power to bestow and to take back life. And where the text speaks of the eminence of the prâ/n/as as founded on the existence of the prâ/n/a, it shows that that prâ/n/a is meant which has reference to the Self and is the abode of the sense-organs.[129]

Of the same tendency is the passage, 'Prâ/n/a, the intelligent Self, alone having laid hold of this body makes it rise up;' and the passage (which occurs in the passus, 'Let no man try to find out what speech is,' &c.), 'For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the spokes and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the subjects (the senses) and the subjects on the prâ/n/a. And that prâ/n/a indeed is the Self of prâ/n/a, blessed, imperishable, immortal.' So also the following passage which, referring to this interior Self, forming as it were the centre of the peripherical interaction of the objects and senses, sums up as follows, 'He is my Self, thus let it be known;' a summing up which is appropriate only if prâ/n/a is meant to denote not some outward existence, but the interior Self. And another scriptural passage declares 'this Self is Brahman, omniscient'[130] (B/ri/. Up. II, 5, 19). We therefore arrive at the conclusion that, on account of the multitude of references to the interior Self, the chapter contains information regarding Brahman, not regarding the Self of some deity.--How then can the circumstance of the speaker (Indra) referring to himself be explained?

30. The declaration (made by Indra about himself, viz. that he is one with Brahman) (is possible) through intuition vouched for by Scripture, as in the case of Vâmadeva.

The individual divine Self called Indra perceiving by means of /ri/shi-like intuition[131]--the existence of which is vouched for by Scripture--its own Self to be identical with the supreme Self, instructs Pratardana (about the highest Self) by means of the words 'Know me only.'

By intuition of the same kind the /ri/shi Vâmadeva reached the knowledge expressed in the words, 'I was Manu and Sûrya;' in accordance with the passage, 'Whatever deva was awakened (so as to know Brahman) he indeed became that' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10). The assertion made above (in the pûrvapaksha of the preceding Sûtra) that Indra after saying, 'Know me only,' glorifies himself by enumerating the slaying of Tvash/tri/'s son and other deeds of strength, we refute as follows. The death of Tvash/tri/'s son and similar deeds are referred to, not to the end of glorifying Indra as the object of knowledge--in which case the sense of the passage would be, 'Because I accomplished such and such deeds, therefore know me'--but to the end of glorifying the cognition of the highest Self. For this reason the text, after having referred to the slaying of Tvash/tri/'s son and the like, goes on in the clause next following to exalt knowledge, 'And not one hair of me is harmed there. He who knows me thus by no deed of his is his life harmed.'--(But how does this passage convey praise of knowledge?)--Because, we reply, its meaning is as follows: 'Although I do such cruel deeds, yet not even a hair of mine is harmed because I am one with Brahman; therefore the life of any other person also who knows me thus is not harmed by any deed of his.' And the object of the knowledge (praised by Indra) is nothing else but Brahman which is set forth in a subsequent passage, 'I am prâ/n/a, the intelligent Self.' Therefore the entire chapter refers to Brahman.

31. If it be said (that Brahman is) not (meant), on account of characteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air (being mentioned); we say no, on account of the threefoldness of devout meditation (which would result from your interpretation); on account of (the meaning advocated by us) being accepted (elsewhere); and on account of (characteristic marks of Brahman) being connected (with the passage under discussion).

Although we admit, the pûrvapakshin resumes, that the chapter about the prâ/n/a does not furnish any instruction regarding some outward deity, since it contains a multitude of references to the interior Self; still we deny that it is concerned with Brahman.--For what reason?--Because it mentions characteristic marks of the individual soul on the one hand, and of the chief vital air on the other hand. The passage, 'Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,' mentions a characteristic mark of the individual soul, and must therefore be held to point out as the object of knowledge the individual soul which rules and employs the different organs of action such as speech and so on. On the other hand, we have the passage, 'But prâ/n/a alone, the intelligent Self, having laid hold of this body makes it rise up,' which points to the chief vital air; for the chief attribute of the vital air is that it sustains the body. Similarly, we read in the colloquy of the vital airs (Pra. Up. II, 3), concerning speech and the other vital airs, 'Then prâ/n/a (the chief vital air) as the best said to them: Be not deceived; I alone dividing myself fivefold support this body and keep it.' Those, again, who in the passage quoted above read 'this one (masc.), the body[132]' must give the following explanation, Prâ/n/a having laid hold of this one, viz. either the individual soul or the aggregate of the sense organs, makes the body rise up. The individual soul as well as the chief vital air may justly be designated as the intelligent Self; for the former is of the nature of intelligence, and the latter (although non-intelligent in itself) is the abode of other prâ/n/as, viz. the sense organs, which are the instruments of intelligence. Moreover, if the word prâ/n/a be taken to denote the individual soul as well as the chief vital air, the prâ/n/a and the intelligent Self may be spoken of in two ways, either as being non-different on account of their mutual concomitance, or as being different on account of their (essentially different) individual character; and in these two different ways they are actually spoken of in the two following passages, 'What is prâ/n/a that is praj/ñ/â, what is praj/ñ/â that is prâ/n/a;' and, 'For together do these two live in the body and together do they depart.' If, on the other hand, prâ/n/a denoted Brahman, what then could be different from what? For these reasons prâ/n/a does not denote Brahman, but either the individual soul or the chief vital air or both.

All this argumentation, we reply, is wrong, 'on account of the threefoldness of devout meditation.' Your interpretation would involve the assumption of devout meditation of three different kinds, viz. on the individual soul, on the chief vital air, and on Brahman. But it is inappropriate to assume that a single sentence should enjoin three kinds of devout meditation; and that all the passages about the prâ/n/a really constitute one single sentence (one syntactical whole) appears from the beginning and the concluding part. In the beginning we have the clause 'Know me only,' followed by 'I am prâ/n/a, the intelligent Self, meditate on me as Life, as Immortality;' and in the end we read, 'And that prâ/n/a indeed is the intelligent Self, blessed, imperishable, immortal.' The beginning and the concluding part are thus seen to be similar, and we therefore must conclude that they refer to one and the same matter. Nor can the characteristic mark of Brahman be so turned as to be applied to something else; for the ten objects and the ten subjects (subjective powers)[133] cannot rest on anything but Brahman. Moreover, prâ/n/a must denote Brahman 'on account of (that meaning) being accepted,' i.e. because in the case of other passages where characteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned the word prâ/n/a is taken in the sense of 'Brahman.' And another reason for assuming the passage to refer to Brahman is that here also, i.e. in the passage itself there is 'connexion' with characteristic marks of Brahman, as, for instance, the reference to what is most beneficial for man. The assertion that the passage, 'Having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up,' contains a characteristic mark of the chief vital air, is untrue; for as the function of the vital air also ultimately rests on Brahman it can figuratively be ascribed to the latter. So Scripture also declares, 'No mortal lives by the breath that goes up and by the breath that goes down. We live by another in whom these two repose' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 5). Nor does the indication of the individual soul which you allege to occur in the passage, 'Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,' preclude the view of prâ/n/a denoting Brahman. For, as the passages, 'I am Brahman,' 'That art thou,' and others, prove, there is in reality no such thing as an individual soul absolutely different from Brahman, but Brahman, in so far as it differentiates itself through the mind (buddhi) and other limiting conditions, is called individual soul, agent, enjoyer. Such passages therefore as the one alluded to, (viz. 'let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,') which, by setting aside all the differences due to limiting conditions, aim at directing the mind on the internal Self and thus showing that the individual soul is one with Brahman, are by no means out of place. That the Self which is active in speaking and the like is Brahman appears from another scriptural passage also, viz. Ke. Up. I, 5, 'That which is not expressed by speech and by which speech is expressed that alone know as Brahman, not that which people here adore.' The remark that the statement about the difference of prâ/n/a and praj/ñ/â (contained in the passage, 'Together they dwell in this body, together they depart') does not agree with that interpretation according to which prâ/n/a is Brahman, is without force; for the mind and the vital air which are the respective abodes of the two powers of cognition and action, and constitute the limiting conditions of the internal Self may be spoken of as different. The internal Self, on the other hand, which is limited by those two adjuncts, is in itself non-differentiated, so that the two may be identified, as is done in the passage 'prâ/n/a is praj/ñ/â.'

The second part of the Sûtra is explained in a different manner also[134], as follows: Characteristic marks of the individual soul as well as of the chief vital air are not out of place even in a chapter whose topic is Brahman. How so? 'On account of the threefoldness of devout meditation.' The chapter aims at enjoining three kinds of devout meditation on Brahman, according as Brahman is viewed under the aspect of prâ/n/a, under the aspect of praj/ñ/â, and in itself. The passages, 'Meditate (on me) as life, as immortality. Life is prâ/n/a,' and 'Having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up. Therefore let man worship it alone as uktha,' refer to the prâ/n/a aspect. The introductory passage, 'Now we shall explain how all things become one in that praj/ñ/â,' and the subsequent passages, 'Speech verily milked one portion thereof; the word is its object placed outside;' and, 'Having by praj/ñ/â taken possession of speech he obtains by speech all words &c.,' refer to the praj/ñ/â aspect. The Brahman aspect finally is referred to in the following passage, 'These ten objects have reference to praj/ñ/â, the ten subjects have reference to objects. If there were no objects there would be no subjects; and if there were no subjects there would be no objects. For on either side alone nothing could be achieved. But that is not many. For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the spokes and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the subjects and the subjects on the prâ/n/a.' Thus we see that the one meditation on Brahman is here represented as threefold, according as Brahman is viewed either with reference to two limiting conditions or in itself. In other passages also we find that devout meditation on Brahman is made dependent on Brahman being qualified by limiting adjuncts; so, for instance (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2), 'He who consists of mind, whose body is prâ/n/a.' The hypothesis of Brahman being meditated upon under three aspects perfectly agrees with the prâ/n/a chapter[135]; as, on the one hand, from a comparison of the introductory and the concluding clauses we infer that the subject-matter of the whole chapter is one only, and as, on the other hand, we meet with characteristic marks of prâ/n/a, praj/ñ/â, and Brahman in turns. It therefore remains a settled conclusion that Brahman is the topic of the whole chapter.

Notes:

[Footnote 32: The subject is the universal Self whose nature is intelligence (/k/u); the object comprises whatever is of a non-intelligent nature, viz. bodies with their sense organs, internal organs, and the objects of the senses, i.e. the external material world.]

[Footnote 33: The object is said to have for its sphere the notion of the 'thou' (yushmat), not the notion of the 'this' or 'that' (idam), in order better to mark its absolute opposition to the subject or Ego. Language allows of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and the third person ('It is I,' 'I am he who,' &c.; ete vayam, ame vayam âsmahe), but not of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and second person.]

[Footnote 34: Adhyâsa, literally 'superimposition' in the sense of (mistaken) ascription or imputation, to something, of an essential nature or attributes not belonging to it. See later on.]

[Footnote 35: Natural, i.e. original, beginningless; for the modes of speech and action which characterise transmigratory existence have existed, with the latter, from all eternity.]

[Footnote 36: I.e. the intelligent Self which is the only reality and the non-real objects, viz. body and so on, which are the product of wrong knowledge.]

[Footnote 37: 'The body, &c. is my Self;' 'sickness, death, children, wealth, &c., belong to my Self.']

[Footnote 38: Literally 'in some other place.' The clause 'in the form of remembrance' is added, the Bhâmatî remarks, in order to exclude those cases where something previously observed is recognised in some other thing or place; as when, for instance, the generic character of a cow which was previously observed in a black cow again presents itself to consciousness in a grey cow, or when Devadatta whom we first saw in Pâ/t/aliputra again appears before us in Mâhishmatî. These are cases of recognition where the object previously observed again presents itself to our senses; while in mere remembrance the object previously perceived is not in renewed contact with the senses. Mere remembrance operates in the case of adhyâsa, as when we mistake mother-of-pearl for silver which is at the time not present but remembered only.]

[Footnote 39: The so-called anyathâkhyâtivâdins maintain that in the act of adhyâsa the attributes of one thing, silver for instance, are superimposed on a different thing existing in a different place, mother-of-pearl for instance (if we take for our example of adhyâsa the case of some man mistaking a piece of mother-of-pearl before him for a piece of silver). The âtmakhyâtivâdins maintain that in adhyâsa the modification, in the form of silver, of the internal organ and action which characterise transmigratory existence have existed, with the latter, from all eternity.]

[Footnote 40: This is the definition of the akhyâtivâdins.]

[Footnote 41: Some anyathâkhyâtivâdins and the Mâdhyamikas according to Ânanda Giri.]

[Footnote 42: The pratyagâtman is in reality non-object, for it is svayamprakâ/s/a, self-luminous, i.e. the subjective factor in all cognition. But it becomes the object of the idea of the Ego in so far as it is limited, conditioned by its adjuncts which are the product of Nescience, viz. the internal organ, the senses and the subtle and gross bodies, i.e. in so far as it is jîva, individual or personal soul. Cp. Bhâmatî, pp. 22, 23: '/k/idâtmaiva svayamprakâ/s/oszpi buddhyâdivishayavi/kkh/ura/n/ât katha/mk/id asm upratyayavishayoszha/m/kârâspada/m/ jîva iti /k/a jantur iti /k/a ksheuajña iti /k/âkhyâyate.']

[Footnote 43: Translated according to the Bhâmatî. We deny, the objector says, the possibility of adhyâsa in the case of the Self, not on the ground that it is not an object because self-luminous (for that it may be an object although it is self-luminous you have shown), but on the ground that it is not an object because it is not manifested either by itself or by anything else.--It is known or manifest, the Vedântin replies, on account of its immediate presentation (aparokshatvât), i.e. on account of the intuitional knowledge we have of it. Ânanda Giri construes the above clause in a different way: asmatpratyayâvishayatveszpy aparokshatvâd ekântenâvishayatvâbbâvât tasminn aha@nkârâdyadhyâsa ity artha/h/. Aparokshatvam api kai/sk/id âtmano nesh/t/am ity âsa@nkyâha pratyagâtmeti.]

[Footnote 44: Tatraiva/m/ sati evambhûtavastutattvâvadhâra/n/e sati. Bhâ. Tasminn adhyâse uktarîtyâzvidyâvmake sati. Go. Yatrâtmani buddhyâdau vâ yasya buddhyâder âtmano vâdhyâsa/h/ tena buddhyâdi-nâsztmânâ va k/ri/tenâsz/s/anayâdidoshe/n/a /k/aitanyagu/n/ena /k/âtmânâtmâ vâ vastuto na svalpenâpi yujyate. Ânanda Giri.]

[Footnote 45: Whether they belong to the karmakâ/nd/â, i.e. that part of the Veda which enjoins active religious duty or the j/ñ/ânakâ/nd/a, i.e. that part of the Veda which treats of Brahman.]

[Footnote 46: It being of course the function of the means of right knowledge to determine Truth and Reality.]

[Footnote 47: The Bhâmatî takes adhish/th/ânam in the sense of superintendence, guidance. The senses cannot act unless guided by a superintending principle, i.e. the individual soul.]

[Footnote 48: If activity could proceed from the body itself, non-identified with the Self, it would take place in deep sleep also.]

[Footnote 49: I.e. in the absence of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self and their attributes.]

[Footnote 50: The Mîmâ/m/sâ, i.e. the enquiry whose aim it is to show that the embodied Self, i.e. the individual or personal soul is one with Brahman. This Mîmâ/m/sâ being an enquiry into the meaning of the Vedânta-portions of the Veda, it is also called Vedânta mîmâ/m/sâ.]

[Footnote 51: Nâdhikârârtha iti. Tatra hetur brahmeti. Asyârtha/h/, kám ayam atha/s/abdo brahmaj/ñ/âne/kkh/yâ/h/ kim vântar/n/îtavi/k/ârasya athave/kkh/âvi/s/esha/n/aj/ñ/ânasyârambhârtha/h/. Nâdya/h/ tasyâ mîmâ/m/sâpravartikâyâs tadapravartyatvâd anârabhyatvât tasyâ/s/ /k/ottaratra pratyadhikara/n/am apratipâdanât. Na dvitîyoztha/s/abdenânantaryoktidvârâ vi/s/ish/t/âdhikâryasamarpa/n/e sâdhana/k/atush/t/ayâsampannânâ/m/ brahmadhîtadvi/k/ârayor anarthitvâd vi/k/ârânârambhân na /k/a vi/k/âravidhiva/s/âd adhikârî kalpya/h/ prârambhasyâpi tulyatvâd adhikâri/n/a/s/ /k/a vidhyapekshitopâdhitvân na t/ri/tîya/h/ brahmaj/ñ/ânasyânandasâkshâtkâratvenâdhikâryatve z pyaprâdhânyâd atha/s/abdâsambandhât tasmân nârambhârthateti. Ânanda Giri.]

[Footnote 52: Any relation in which the result, i.e. here the enquiry into Brahman may stand to some antecedent of which it is the effect may be comprised under the relation of ânantarya.]

[Footnote 53: He cuts off from the heart, then from the tongue, then from the breast.]

[Footnote 54: Where one action is subordinate to another as, for instance, the offering of the prayâjas is to the dar/s/apûr/n/amâsa-sacrifice, or where one action qualifies a person for another as, for instance, the offering of the dar/s/apûr/n/amâsa qualifies a man for the performance of the Soma-sacrifice, there is unity of the agent, and consequently an intimation of the order of succession of the actions is in its right place.]

[Footnote 55: The 'means' in addition to /s/ama and dama are discontinuance of religious ceremonies (uparati), patience in suffering (titikshâ), attention and concentration of the mind (samâdhâna), and faith (/s/raddhâ).]

[Footnote 56: According to Pâ/n/ini II, 3, 50 the sixth (genitive) case expresses the relation of one thing being generally supplementary to, or connected with, some other thing.]

[Footnote 57: In the case of other transitive verbs, object and result may be separate; so, for instance, when it is said 'grâma/m/ ga/kkh/ati,' the village is the object of the action of going, and the arrival at the village its result. But in the case of verbs of desiring object and result coincide.]

[Footnote 58: That Brahman exists we know, even before entering on the Brahma-mîmâ/m/sâ, from the occurrence of the word in the Veda, &c., and from the etymology of the word we at once infer Brahman's chief attributes.]

[Footnote 59: The three last opinions are those of the followers of the Nyâya, the Sâ@nkhya, and the Yoga-philosophy respectively. The three opinions mentioned first belong to various materialistic schools; the two subsequent ones to two sects of Bauddha philosophers.]

[Footnote 60: As, for instance, the passages 'this person consists of the essence of food;' 'the eye, &c. spoke;' 'non-existing this was in the beginning,' &c.]

[Footnote 61: So the compound is to be divided according to Ân. Gi. and Go.; the Bhâ. proposes another less plausible division.]

[Footnote 62: According to Nirukta I, 2 the six bhâvavikârâ/h/ are: origination, existence, modification, increase, decrease, destruction.]

[Footnote 63: The pradhâna, called also prak/ri/ti, is the primal causal matter of the world in the /S/â@nkhya-system. It will be fully discussed in later parts of this work. To avoid ambiguities, the term pradhâna has been left untranslated. Cp. Sâ@nkhya Kârikâ 3.]

[Footnote 64: Ke/k/it tu hira/n/yagaroha/m/ sa/m/sâri/n/am evâgamâj jagaddhetum â/k/akshate. Ânanada Giri.]

[Footnote 65: Viz. the Vai/s/eshikas.]

[Footnote 66: Âtmana/h/ /s/ruter ity artha/h/. Ânanda Giri.]

[Footnote 67: Text (or direct statement), suggestive power (linga), syntactical connection (vâkya), &c., being the means of proof made use of in the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ.]