Chapter 4

But, our adversary objects, as mere Being is the object of consciousness, it is different therefrom (and thus there exists after all 'difference' or 'plurality').--Not so, we reply. That there is no such thing as 'difference,' we have already shown above on the grounds that it is not the object of perception, and moreover incapable of definition. It cannot therefore be proved that 'Being' is the object of consciousness. Hence Consciousness itself is 'Being'--that which is.--This consciousness is self-proved, just because it is consciousness. Were it proved through something else, it would follow that like jars and similar things it is not consciousness. Nor can there be assumed, for consciousness, the need of another act of consciousness (through which its knowledge would be established); for it shines forth (prakâsate) through its own being. While it exists, consciousness--differing therein from jars and the like--is never observed not to shine forth, and it cannot therefore be held to depend, in its shining forth, on something else.--You (who object to the above reasoning) perhaps hold the following view:--even when consciousness has arisen, it is the object only which shines forth--a fact expressed in sentences such as: the jar is perceived. When a person forms the judgment 'This is a jar,' he is not at the time conscious of a consciousness which is not an object and is not of a definite character. Hence the existence of consciousness is the reason which brings about the 'shining forth' of jars and other objects, and thus has a similar office as the approximation of the object to the eye or the other organs of sense (which is another condition of perceptive consciousness). After this the existence of consciousness is inferred on the ground that the shining forth of the object is (not permanent, but) occasional only [FOOTNOTE 34:1]. And should this argumentation be objected to on the ground of its implying that consciousness--which is essentially of the nature of intelligence-- is something non-intelligent like material things, we ask you to define this negation of non-intelligence (which you declare to be characteristic of consciousness). Have we, perhaps, to understand by it the invariable concomitance of existence and shining forth? If so, we point out that this invariable concomitance is also found in the case of pleasure and similar affections; for when pleasure and so on exist at all, they never are non-perceived (i.e. they exist in so far only as we are conscious of them). It is thus clear that we have no consciousness of consciousness itself--just as the tip of a finger, although touching other things, is incapable of touching itself.

All this reasoning, we reply, is entirely spun out of your own fancy, without any due consideration of the power of consciousness. The fact is, that in perceiving colour and other qualities of things, we are not aware of a 'shining forth' as an attribute of those things, and as something different from consciousness; nor can the assumption of an attribute of things called 'light,' or 'shining forth,' be proved in any way, since the entire empirical world itself can be proved only through consciousness, the existence of which we both admit. Consciousness, therefore, is not something which is inferred or proved through some other act of knowledge; but while proving everything else it is proved by itself. This may be expressed in technical form as follows-- Consciousness is, with regard to its attributes and to the empirical judgments concerning it, independent of any other thing, because through its connexion with other things it is the cause of their attributes and the empirical judgments concerning them. For it is a general principle that of two things that which through its connexion with the other is the cause of the attributes of--and the empirical judgments about--the latter, is itself independent of that other as to those two points. We see e.g. that colour, through its conjunction with earth and the like, produces in them the quality of visibility, but does not itself depend for its visibility on conjunction with colour. Hence consciousness is itself the cause of its own 'shining forth,' as well as of the empirically observed shining forth of objects such as jars and the like.

Consciousness is eternal and incapable of change.

This self-luminous consciousness, further, is eternal, for it is not capable of any form of non-existence--whether so--called antecedent non-existence or any other form. This follows from its being self-established. For the antecedent non-existence of self-established consciousness cannot be apprehended either through consciousness or anything else. If consciousness itself gave rise to the apprehension of its own non-existence, it could not do so in so far as 'being,' for that would contradict its being; if it is, i.e. if its non-existence is not, how can it give rise to the idea of its non-existence? Nor can it do so if not being; for if consciousness itself is not, how can it furnish a proof for its own non-existence? Nor can the non-existence of consciousness be apprehended through anything else; for consciousness cannot be the object of anything else. Any instrument of knowledge proving the non-existence of consciousness, could do so only by making consciousness its object--'this is consciousness'; but consciousness, as being self-established, does not admit of that objectivation which is implied in the word 'this,' and hence its previous non-existence cannot be proved by anything lying outside itself.

As consciousness thus does not admit of antecedent non-existence, it further cannot be held to originate, and hence also all those other states of being which depend on origination cannot be predicated of it.

As consciousness is beginningless, it further does not admit of any plurality within itself; for we observe in this case the presence of something which is contrary to what invariably accompanies plurality (this something being 'beginninglessness' which is contrary to the quality of having a beginning--which quality invariably accompanies plurality). For we never observe a thing characterised by plurality to be without a beginning.--And moreover difference, origination, &c., are objects of consciousness, like colour and other qualities, and hence cannot be attributes of consciousness. Therefore, consciousness being essentially consciousness only, nothing else that is an object of consciousness can be its attribute. The conclusion is that consciousness is free from difference of any kind.

The apparent difference between Consciousness and the conscious subject is due to the unreal ahamkâra.

From this it further follows that there is no substrate of consciousness--different from consciousness itself--such as people ordinarily mean when speaking of a 'knower.' It is self-luminous consciousness itself which constitutes the so-called 'knower.' This follows therefrom also that consciousness is not non-intelligent (jada); for non-intelligence invariably accompanies absence of Selfhood (anâtmatva); hence, non-intelligence being absent in consciousness, consciousness is not non-Self, that means, it is the Self.

But, our adversary again objects, the consciousness which expresses itself in the judgment 'I know,' proves that the quality of being a 'knower' belongs to consciousness!--By no means, we reply. The attribution to consciousness of this quality rests on error, no less than the attribution, to the shell, of the quality of being silver. Consciousness cannot stand in the relation of an agent toward itself: the attribute of being a knowing agent is erroneously imputed to it--an error analogous to that expressed in the judgment 'I am a man,' which identifies the Self of a person with the outward aggregate of matter that bears the external characteristics of humanity. To be a 'knower' means to be the agent in the action of knowing; and this is something essentially changeful and non-intelligent (jada), having its abode in the ahamkâra, which is itself a thing subject to change. How, on the other hand, could such agency possibly belong to the changeless 'witness' (of all change, i.e. consciousness) whose nature is pure Being? That agency cannot be an attribute of the Self follows therefrom also that, like colour and other qualities, agency depends, for its own proof, on seeing, i.e. consciousness.

That the Self does not fall within the sphere (is not an object of), the idea of 'I' is proved thereby also that in deep sleep, swoon, and similar states, the idea of the 'I' is absent, while the consciousness of the Self persists. Moreover, if the Self were admitted to be an agent and an object of the idea of 'I,' it would be difficult to avoid the conclusion that like the body it is non-intelligent, something merely outward ('being for others only, not for itself') and destitute of Selfhood. That from the body, which is the object of the idea of 'I,' and known to be an agent, there is different that Self which enjoys the results of the body's actions, viz. the heavenly word, and so on, is acknowledged by all who admit the validity of the instruments of knowledge; analogously, therefore, we must admit that different from the knower whom we understand by the term 'I,' is the 'witnessing' inward Self. The non-intelligent ahamkâra thus merely serves to manifest the nature of non-changing consciousness, and it effects this by being its abode; for it is the proper quality of manifesting agents to manifest the objects manifested, in so far as the latter abide in them. A mirror, e.g., or a sheet of water, or a certain mass of matter, manifests a face or the disc of the moon (reflected in the mirror or water) or the generic character of a cow (impressed on the mass of matter) in so far as all those things abide in them.--In this way, then, there arises the erroneous view that finds expression in the judgment 'I know.'--Nor must you, in the way of objection, raise the question how self-luminous consciousness is to be manifested by the non-intelligent ahamkâra, which rather is itself manifested by consciousness; for we observe that the surface of the hand, which itself is manifested by the rays of sunlight falling on it, at the same time manifests those rays. This is clearly seen in the case of rays passing through the interstices of network; the light of those rays is intensified by the hand on which they fall, and which at the same time is itself manifested by the rays.

It thus appears that the 'knowing agent,' who is denoted by the 'I,' in the judgment 'I know,' constitutes no real attribute of the Self, the nature of which is pure intelligence. This is also the reason why the consciousness of Egoity does not persist in the states of deep sleep and final release: in those states this special form of consciousness passes away, and the Self appears in its true nature, i.e. as pure consciousness. Hence a person who has risen from deep, dreamless sleep reflects, 'Just now I was unconscious of myself.'

Summing up of the pûrvapaksha view.

As the outcome of all this, we sum up our view as follows.--Eternal, absolutely non-changing consciousness, whose nature is pure non-differenced intelligence, free from all distinction whatever, owing to error illusorily manifests itself (vivarttate) as broken up into manifold distinctions--knowing subjects, objects of knowledge, acts of knowledge. And the purpose for which we enter on the consideration of the Vedânta-texts is utterly to destroy what is the root of that error, i.e. Nescience, and thus to obtain a firm knowledge of the oneness of Brahman, whose nature is mere intelligence--free, pure, eternal.

[FOOTNOTE 22:1. In agreement with the use made of this passage by the Pûrvapakshin, vijñâna must here be understood in the sense of avidyâ. Vijñânasabdena vividham jñâyate-neneti karanavyutpattyâ-vidyâ-bhidhiyate. Sru. Pra.]

[FOOTNOTE 25:1. The distinction is illustrated by the different views Perception and Inference cause us to take of the nature of the flame of the lamp. To Perception the flame, as long as it burns, seems one and the same: but on the ground of the observation that the different particles of the wick and the oil are consumed in succession, we infer that there are many distinct flames succeeding one another. And we accept the Inference as valid, and as sublating or refuting the immediate perception, because the perceived oneness of the flame admits of being accounted for 'otherwise,' viz. on the ground of the many distinct flames originating in such rapid succession that the eye mistakes them for one. The inference on the other hand does not admit of being explained in another way.]

[FOOTNOTE 26:1. The reference is to the point discussed Pû. Mî. Sû. VI, 5, 54 (Jaim. Nyâ. Mâlâ Vistara, p. 285).]

[FOOTNOTE 27:1. The texts which deny all qualities of Brahman are later in order than the texts which refer to Brahman as qualified, because denial presupposes that which is to be denied.]

[FOOTNOTE 27:2. The unity of purport of the sentence is inferred from its constituent words having the same case-ending.]

[FOOTNOTE 30:1. The theory here referred to is held by some of the Mîmâmsakas. The imperative forms of the verb have their primary meaning, i.e. the power of originating action, only in Vedic sentences which enjoin the performance of certain actions for the bringing about of certain ends: no other means of knowledge but the Veda informing us that such ends can be accomplished by such actions. Nobody, e.g. would offer a soma sacrifice in order to obtain the heavenly world, were he not told by the Veda to do so. In ordinary life, on the other hand, no imperative possesses this entirely unique originative force, since any action which may be performed in consequence of a command may be prompted by other motives as well: it is, in technical Indian language, established already, apart from the command, by other means of knowledge. The man who, e.g. is told to milk a cow might have proceeded to do so, apart from the command, for reasons of his own. Imperatives in ordinary speech are therefore held not to have their primary meaning, and this conclusion is extended, somewhat unwarrantably one should say, to all the words entering into an imperative clause.]

[FOOTNOTE 34:1. Being not permanent but occasional, it is an effect only, and as such must have a cause.]

THE GREAT SIDDHÂNTA.

This entire theory rests on a fictitious foundation of altogether hollow and vicious arguments, incapable of being stated in definite logical alternatives, and devised by men who are destitute of those particular qualities which cause individuals to be chosen by the Supreme Person revealed in the Upanishads; whose intellects are darkened by the impression of beginningless evil; and who thus have no insight into the nature of words and sentences, into the real purport conveyed by them, and into the procedure of sound argumentation, with all its methods depending on perception and the other instruments of right knowledge. The theory therefore must needs be rejected by all those who, through texts, perception and the other means of knowledge--assisted by sound reasoning--have an insight into the true nature of things.

There is no proof of non-differenced substance.

To enter into details.--Those who maintain the doctrine of a substance devoid of all difference have no right to assert that this or that is a proof of such a substance; for all means of right knowledge have for their object things affected with difference.--Should any one taking his stand on the received views of his sect, assert that the theory of a substance free from all difference (does not require any further means of proof but) is immediately established by one's own consciousness; we reply that he also is refuted by the fact, warranted by the witness of the Self, that all consciousness implies difference: all states of consciousness have for their object something that is marked by some difference, as appears in the case of judgments like 'I saw this.' And should a state of consciousness--although directly apprehended as implying difference--be determined by some fallacious reasoning to be devoid of difference, this determination could be effected only by means of some special attributes additional to the quality of mere Being; and owing to these special qualities on which the determination depends, that state of consciousness would clearly again be characterised by difference. The meaning of the mentioned determination could thus only be that of a thing affected with certain differences some other differences are denied; but manifestly this would not prove the existence of a thing free from all difference. To thought there at any rate belongs the quality of being thought and self-illuminatedness, for the knowing principle is observed to have for its essential nature the illumining (making to shine forth) of objects. And that also in the states of deep sleep, swoon, &c., consciousness is affected with difference we shall prove, in its proper place, in greater detail. Moreover you yourself admit that to consciousness there actually belong different attributes such as permanency (oneness, self-luminousness, &c. ), and of these it cannot be shown that they are only Being in general. And even if the latter point were admitted, we observe that there takes place a discussion of different views, and you yourself attempt to prove your theory by means of the differences between those views and your own. It therefore must be admitted that reality is affected with difference well established by valid means of proof.

Sabda proves difference.

As to sound (speech; sabda) it is specially apparent that it possesses the power of denoting only such things as are affected with difference. Speech operates with words and sentences. Now a word (pada) originates from the combination of a radical element and a suffix, and as these two elements have different meanings it necessarily follows that the word itself can convey only a sense affected with difference. And further, the plurality of words is based on plurality of meanings; the sentence therefore which is an aggregate of words expresses some special combination of things (meanings of words), and hence has no power to denote a thing devoid of all difference.--The conclusion is that sound cannot be a means of knowledge for a thing devoid of all difference.

Pratyaksha--even of the nirvikalpaka kind--proves difference.

Perception in the next place--with its two subdivisions of non-determinate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka) perception--also cannot be a means of knowledge for things devoid of difference. Determinate perception clearly has for its object things affected with difference; for it relates to that which is distinguished by generic difference and so on. But also non-determinate perception has for its object only what is marked with difference; for it is on the basis of non-determinate perception that the object distinguished by generic character and so on is recognised in the act of determinate perception. Non-determinate perception is the apprehension of the object in so far as destitute of some differences but not of all difference. Apprehension of the latter kind is in the first place not observed ever to take place, and is in the second place impossible: for all apprehension by consciousness takes place by means of some distinction 'This is such and such.' Nothing can be apprehended apart from some special feature of make or structure, as e.g. the triangularly shaped dewlap in the case of cows. The true distinction between non-determinate and determinate perception is that the former is the apprehension of the first individual among a number of things belonging to the same class, while the latter is the apprehension of the second, third, and so on, individuals. On the apprehension of the first individual cow the perceiving person is not conscious of the fact that the special shape which constitutes the generic character of the class 'cows' extends to the present individual also; while this special consciousness arises in the case of the perception of the second and third cow. The perception of the second individual thus is 'determinate' in so far as it is determined by a special attribute, viz. the extension, to the perception, of the generic character of a class--manifested in a certain outward shape--which connects this act of perception with the earlier perception (of the first individual); such determination being ascertained only on the apprehension of the second individual. Such extension or continuance of a certain generic character is, on the other hand, not apprehended on the apprehension of the first individual, and perception of the latter kind thence is 'non-determinate.' That it is such is not due to non-apprehension of structure, colour, generic character and so on, for all these attributes are equally objects of sensuous perception (and hence perceived as belonging to the first individual also). Moreover that which possesses structure cannot be perceived apart from the structure, and hence in the case of the apprehension of the first individual there is already perception of structure, giving rise to the judgment 'The thing is such and such.' In the case of the second, third, &c., individuals, on the other hand, we apprehend, in addition to the thing possessing structure and to the structure itself, the special attribute of the persistence of the generic character, and hence the perception is 'determinate.' From all this it follows that perception never has for its object that which is devoid of all difference.

The bhedâbheda view is untenable.

The same arguments tend to refute the view that there is difference and absence of difference at the same time (the so-called bhedâbheda view). Take the judgment 'This is such and such'; how can we realise here the non-difference of 'being this' and 'being such and such'? The 'such and such' denotes a peculiar make characterised, e.g. by a dewlap, the 'this' denotes the thing distinguished by that peculiar make; the non-difference of these two is thus contradicted by immediate consciousness. At the outset the thing perceived is perceived as separate from all other things, and this separation is founded on the fact that the thing is distinguished by a special constitution, let us say the generic characteristics of a cow, expressed by the term 'such and such.' In general, wherever we cognise the relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished thereby, the two clearly present themselves to our mind as absolutely different. Somethings--e.g. staffs and bracelets--appear sometimes as having a separate, independent existence of their own; at other times they present themselves as distinguishing attributes of other things or beings (i.e. of the persons carrying staffs or wearing bracelets). Other entities--e.g. the generic character of cows--have a being only in so far as they constitute the form of substances, and thus always present themselves as distinguishing attributes of those substances. In both cases there is the same relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished thereby, and these two are apprehended as absolutely different. The difference between the two classes of entities is only that staffs, bracelets, and similar things are capable of being apprehended in separation from other things, while the generic characteristics of a species are absolutely incapable thereof. The assertion, therefore, that the difference of things is refuted by immediate consciousness, is based on the plain denial of a certain form of consciousness, the one namely--admitted by every one--which is expressed in the judgment 'This thing is such and such.'--This same point is clearly expounded by the Sûtrakâra in II, 2, 33.

Inference also teaches difference.