Chapter 37

The Pûrvapakshin maintains the former alternative. For, he points out, the text refers to the non-originatedness of Prakriti, calling her ajâ, i.e. unborn, and further says that she by herself independently produces manifold offspring resembling herself. This view is rejected by the Sûtra, on the ground that there is no intimation of a special circumstance determining the acceptance of the Prakriti as assumed by the Sânkhyas, i.e. independent of Brahman; for that she is ajâ, i. e. not born, is not a sufficiently special characteristic. The case is analogous to that of the 'cup.' In the mantra 'There is a cup having its mouth below and its bottom above' (Bri. Up. II, 2, 3), the word kamasa conveys to us only the idea of some implement used in eating, but we are unable to see what special kind of kamasa is meant; for in the case of words the meaning of which is ascertained on the ground of their derivation (as 'kamasa' from 'kam,' to eat or drink), the special sense of the word in any place cannot be ascertained without the help of considerations of general possibility, general subject-matter, and so on. Now in the case of the cup we are able to ascertain that the cup meant is the head, because there is a complementary passage 'What is called the cup with its mouth below and its bottom above is the head'; but if we look out for a similar help to determine the special meaning of ajâ, we find nothing to convince us that the aja, i. e. the 'unborn' principle, is the Prakriti of the Sânkhyas. Nor is there anything in the text to convey the idea of that ajâ having the power of independent creation; for the clause 'giving birth to manifold offspring' declares only that she creates, not that she creates unaided. The mantra does not therefore tell us about an 'unborn' principle independent of Brahman.-- There moreover is a special reason for understanding by the ajâ something that depends on Brahman. This the following Sûtra states.

[FOOTNOTE 364:1. These quotations are from the Kulikâ-Upanishad (transl. by Deussen, Seventy Upanishads, p. 638 ff.) The translation as given above follows the readings adopted by Râmânuja and explained in the-- Sruta-Prakâsikâ.]

9. But she begins with light; for thus some read in their text.

The 'but' has assertory force. 'Light' in the Sûtra means Brahman, in accordance with the meaning of the term as known from texts such as 'On him the gods meditate, the light of lights' (Bri. Up. X, 4, 16); 'That light which shines beyond heaven' (Ch. Up. III, 13, 7). 'She begins with light' thus means 'she has Brahman for her cause.'--'For thus some read in their text,' i.e. because the members of one Sâkhâ, viz the Taittiriyas read in their text that this 'ajâ' has Brahman for her cause. The Mahânârâyana-Upanishad (of the Taittirîyas) at first refers to Brahman abiding in the hollow of the heart as the object of meditation. 'Smaller than the small, greater than the great, the Self placed in the hollow of this creature'; next declares that all the worlds and Brahma and the other gods originated from that Self; and then says that there sprung from it also this ajâ which is the cause of all 'The one ajâ (goat), red, white and black, which gives birth to numerous offspring of the same shape, one aja (he-goat) loves and lies by her; another one forsakes her after having enjoyed her.' The subject-matter of the entire section evidently is to give instruction as to the whole aggregate of things other than Brahman originating from Brahman and thus having its Self in it; hence we conclude that also the ajâ which gives birth to manifold creatures like her, and is enjoyed by the soul controlled by karman, while she is abandoned by the soul possessing true knowledge is, no less than vital airs, seas, mountains, &c., a creature of Brahman, and hence has its Self in Brahman. We then apply to the interpretation of the Svetâsvatara-text the meaning of the analogous Mahânârayana-text, as determined by the complementary passages, and thus arrive at the conclusion that the ajâ in the former text also is a being having its Self in Brahman. That this is so, moreover, appears from the Svetâsvatara itself. For in the early part of that Upanishad, we have after the introductory question, 'Is Brahman the cause?' the passage 'The sages devoted to meditation and concentration have seen the person whose Self is the divinity, hidden in its own qualities' (I, 1, 3); which evidently refers to the ajâ as being of the nature of a power of the highest Brahman. And as further on also (viz. in the passages 'From that the Mâyin creates all this, and in this the other is bound up through Mâya'; 'Know then Prakriti to be Mâyâ and the Great Lord the ruler of Mâyâ'; and 'he who rules every place of birth,' V, 9-11) the very same being is referred to, there remains not even a shadow of proof for the assertion that the mantra under discussion refers to an independent Prakriti as assumed by the Sânkhyas.

But a further objection is raised, if the Prakriti denoted by ajâ begins with, i.e. is caused by Brahman, how can it be called ajâ, i.e. the non- produced one; or, if it is non-produced, how can it be originated by Brahman? To this the next Sûtra replies.

10. And on account of the teaching of formation (i.e. creation) there is no contradiction; as in the case of the honey.

The 'and' expresses disposal of a doubt that had arisen. There is no contradiction between the Prakriti being ajâ and originating from light. On account of instruction being given about the formation (kalpana), i.e. creation of the world. This interpretation of 'kalpana' is in agreement with the use of the verb klip in the text, 'as formerly the creator made (akalpayat) sun and moon.'

In our text the sloka 'from that the Lord of Mâyâ creates all this' gives instruction about the creation of the world. From that, i.e. from matter in its subtle causal state when it is not yet divided, the Lord of all creates the entire Universe. From this statement about creation we understand that Prakriti exists in a twofold state according as it is either cause or effect. During a pralaya it unites itself with Brahman and abides in its subtle state, without any distinction of names and forms; it then is called the 'Unevolved,' and by other similar names. At the time of creation, on the other hand, there reveal themselves in Prakriti Goodness and the other gunas, it divides itself according to names and forms, and then is called the 'Evolved,' and so on, and, transforming itself into fire, water, and earth, it appears as red, white, and black. In its causal condition it is ajâ, i.e. unborn, in its effected condition it is 'caused by light, i.e. Brahman'; hence there is no contradiction. The case is analogous to that of the 'honey.' The sun in his causal state is one only, but in his effected state the Lord makes him into honey in so far namely as he then, for the purpose of enjoyment on the part of the Vasus and other gods, is the abode of nectar brought about by sacrificial works to be learned from the Rik and the other Vedas; and further makes him to rise and to set. And between these two conditions there is no contradiction. This is declared in the Madhuvidyâ (Ch. Up. III), from 'The sun is indeed the honey of the Devas,' down to 'when from thence he has risen upwards he neither rises nor sets; being one he stands in the centre'--'one' here means 'of one nature.'--The conclusion therefore is that the Svetâsvatara mantra under discussion refers to Prakriti as having her Self in Brahman, not to the Prakriti assumed by the Sânkhyas.

Others, however, are of opinion that the one ajâ of which the mantra speaks has for its characteristics light, water, and earth. To them we address the following questions. Do you mean that by what the text speaks of as an ajâ, consisting of fire, water, and earth, we have to understand those three elements only; or Brahman in the form of those three elements; or some power or principle which is the cause of the three elements? The first alternative is in conflict with the circumstance that, while fire, water, and earth are several things, the text explicitly refers to _one_ Ajâ. Nor may it be urged that fire, water, and earth, although several, become one, by being made tripartite (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 3); for this making them tripartite, does not take away their being several; the text clearly showing that each several element becomes tripartite, 'Let me make each of these three divine beings tripartite.'--The second alternative again divides itself into two alternatives. Is the one ajâ Brahman in so far as having passed over into fire, water, and earth; or Brahman in so far as abiding within itself and not passing over into effects? The former alternative is excluded by the consideration that it does not remove plurality (which cannot be reconciled with the _one_ ajâ). The second alternative is contradicted by the text calling that ajâ red, white, and black; and moreover Brahman viewed as abiding within itself cannot be characterised by fire, water, and earth. On the third alternative it has to be assumed that the text denotes by the term 'ajâ' the three elements, and that on this basis there is imagined a causal condition of these elements; but better than this assumption it evidently is to accept the term 'ajâ' as directly denoting the causal state of those three elements as known from scripture.

Nor can we admit the contention that the term 'ajâ' is meant to teach that Prakriti should metaphorically be viewed as a she-goat; for such a view would be altogether purposeless. Where--in the passage 'Know the Self to be him who drives in the chariot'--the body, and so on, are compared to a chariot, and so on, the object is to set forth the means of attaining Brahman; where the sun is compared to honey, the object is to illustrate the enjoyment of the Vasus and other gods; but what similar object could possibly be attained by directing us to view Prakriti as a goat? Such a metaphorical view would in fact be not merely useless; it would be downright irrational. Prakriti is a non-intelligent principle, the causal substance of the entire material Universe, and constituting the means for the experience of pleasure and pain, and for the final release, of all intelligent souls which are connected with it from all eternity. Now it would be simply contrary to good sense, metaphorically to transfer to Prakriti such as described the nature of a she-goat--which is a sentient being that gives birth to very few creatures only, enters only occasionally into connexion with others, is of small use only, is not the cause of herself being abandoned by others, and is capable of abandoning those connected with her. Nor does it recommend itself to take the word ajâ (understood to mean 'she-goat') in a sense different from that in which we understand the term 'aja' which occurs twice in the same mantra.--Let then all three terms be taken in the same metaphorical sense (aja meaning he-goat).--It would be altogether senseless, we reply, to compare the soul which absolutely dissociates itself from Prakriti ('Another aja leaves her after having enjoyed her') to a he-goat which is able to enter again into connexion with what he has abandoned, or with anything else.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the cup.'

11. Not from the mention of the number even, on account of the diversity and of the excess.

The Vâjasaneyins read in their text 'He in whom the five "five-people" and the ether rest, him alone I believe to be the Self; I, who know, believe him to be Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 17). The doubt here arises whether this text be meant to set forth the categories as established in Kapila's doctrine, or not.--The Pûrvapakshin maintains the former view, on the ground that the word 'five-people,' qualified by the word 'five,' intimates the twenty-five categories of the Sânkhyas. The compound 'five- people' (pañkajanâh) denotes groups of five beings, just as the term pañka-pûlyah denotes aggregates of five bundles of grass. And as we want to know how many such groups there are, the additional qualification 'five' intimates that there are five such groups; just as if it were said 'five five-bundles, i. e. five aggregates consisting of five bundles each.' We thus understand that the 'five five-people' are twenty- five things, and as the mantra in which the term is met with refers to final release, we recognise the twenty-five categories known from the Sânkhya-smriti which are here referred to as objects to be known by persons desirous of release. For the followers of Kapila teach that 'there is the fundamental causal substance which is not an effect. There are seven things, viz. the Mahat, and so on, which are causal substances as well as effects. There are sixteen effects. The soul is neither a causal substance nor an effect' (Sân. Kâ. 3). The mantra therefore is meant to intimate the categories known from the Sânkhya.--To this the Sûtra replies that from the mention of the number twenty-five supposed to be implied in the expression 'the five five-people,' it does not follow that the categories of the Sânkhyas are meant. 'On account of the diversity,' i.e. on account of the five-people further qualified by the number five being different from the categories of the Sânkhyas. For in the text 'in whom the five five-people and the ether rest,' the 'in whom' shows the five-people to have their abode, and hence their Self, in Brahman; and in the continuation of the text, 'him I believe the Self,' the 'him' connecting itself with the preceding 'in whom' is recognised to be Brahman. The five five-people must therefore be different from the categories of the Sânkhya-system. 'And on account of the excess.' Moreover there is, in the text under discussion, an excess over and above the Sânkhya categories, consisting in the Self denoted by the relative pronoun 'in whom,' and in the specially mentioned Ether. What the text designates therefore is the Supreme Person who is the Universal Lord in whom all things abide--such as he is described in the text quoted above, 'Therefore some call him the twenty-sixth, and others the twenty-seventh.' The 'even' in the Sûtra is meant to intimate that the 'five five-people' can in no way mean the twenty-five categories, since there is no pentad of groups consisting of five each. For in the case of the categories of the Sânkhyas there are no generic characteristics or the like which could determine the arrangement of those categories in fives. Nor must it be urged against this that there is a determining reason for such an arrangement in so far as the tattvas of the Sânkhyas form natural groups comprising firstly, the five organs of action; secondly, the five sense-organs; thirdly, the five gross elements; fourthly, the subtle parts of those elements; and fifthly, the five remaining tattvas; for as the text under discussion mentions the ether by itself, the possibility of a group consisting of the five gross elements is precluded. We cannot therefore take the compound 'five people' as denoting a group consisting of five constituent members, but, in agreement with Pân. II, 1, 50, as merely being a special name. There are certain beings the special name of which is 'five-people,' and of these beings the additional word 'pañka' predicates that they are five in number. The expression is thus analogous to the term 'the seven seven- rishis' (where the term 'seven-rishis' is to be understood as the name of a certain class of rishis only).--Who then are the beings called 'five- people?'--To this question the next Sûtra replies.

12. The breath, and so on, on the ground of the complementary passage.

We see from a complementary passage, viz. 'They who know the breath of breath, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the food of food, the mind of mind,' that the 'five-people' are the breath, and eye, and so on, all of which have their abode in Brahman.

But, an objection is raised, while the mantra 'in whom the five five- people,' &c., is common to the Kânvas and the Mâdhyandinas, the complementary passage 'they who know the breath of breath,' &c., in the text of the former makes no mention of food, and hence we have no reason to say that the 'five-people' in their text are the breath, eye, and so on.

To this objection the next Sûtra replies.

13. By light, food not being (mentioned in the text) of some.

In the text of some, viz. the Kânvas, where food is not mentioned, the five-people are recognised to be the five senses, owing to the phrase 'of lights' which is met with in another complementary passage. In the mantra, 'him the gods worship as the light of lights,' which precedes the mantra about the 'five-people,' Brahman is spoken of as the light of lights, and this suggests the idea of certain lights the activity of which depends on Brahman. The mantra leaves it undetermined what these lights are; but from what follows about the 'five-people,' &c., we learn that what is meant are the senses which light up as it were their respective objects. In 'the breath of breath' the second 'breath' (in the genitive case) denotes the sense-organ of touch, as that organ is connected with air, and as the vital breath (which would otherwise suggest itself as the most obvious explanation of prâna) does not harmonise with the metaphorical term 'light.' 'Of the eye' refers to the organ of sight; 'of the ear' to the organ of hearing. 'Of food' comprises the senses of smell and taste together: it denotes the sense of smell on the ground that that sense is connected with earth, which may be 'food,' and the sense of taste in so far as 'anna' may be also explained as that by means of which eating goes on (adyate). 'Of mind' denotes mind, i. e. the so-called internal organ. Taste and smell thus being taken in combination, we have the required number of five, and we thus explain the 'five-people' as the sense-organs which throw light on their objects, together with the internal organ, i.e. mind. The meaning of the clause about the 'five-people' therefore is that the senses-- called 'five-people'--and the elements, represented by the Ether, have their basis in Brahman; and as thus all beings are declared to abide in Brahman, the five 'five-people' can in no way be the twenty-five categories assumed by the Sânkhyas.--The general Conclusion is that the Vedânta-texts, whether referring to numbers or not, nowhere set forth the categories established in Kapila's system.

14. And on account of (Brahman) as described being declared to be the cause with regard to Ether, and so on.

Here the philosopher who holds the Pradhâna to be the general cause comes forward with another objection. The Vedânta-texts, he says, do not teach that creation proceeds from one and the same agent only, and you therefore have no right to hold that Brahman is the sole cause of the world. In one place it is said that our world proceeded from 'Being', 'Being only this was in the beginning' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1). In other places the world is said to have sprung from 'Non-being', 'Non-being indeed this was in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 7, i); and 'Non-being only was this in the beginning; it became Being' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1). As the Vedânta-texts are thus not consequent in their statements regarding the creator, we cannot conclude from them that Brahman is the sole cause of the world. On the other hand, those texts do enable us to conclude that the Pradhâna only is the universal cause. For the text 'Now all this was then undeveloped' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7) teaches that the world was merged in the undeveloped Pradhâna. and the subsequent clause, 'That developed itself by form and name,' that from that Undeveloped there resulted the creation of the world. For the Undeveloped is that which is not distinguished by names and forms, and this is none other than the Pradhâna. And as this Pradhâna is at the same time eternal, as far as its essential nature is concerned, and the substrate of all change, there is nothing contradictory in the different accounts of creation calling it sometimes 'Being' and sometimes 'Non-being'; while, on the other hand, these terms cannot, without contradiction, both be applied to Brahman. The causality of the Undeveloped having thus been ascertained, such expressions as 'it _thought_, may I be many,' must be interpreted as meaning its being about to proceed to creation. The terms 'Self' and 'Brahman' also may be applied to the Pradhâna in so far as it is all-pervading (atman from âpnoti), and preeminently great (brihat). We therefore conclude that the only cause of the world about which the Vedânta-texts give information is the Pradhâna.

This view is set aside by the Sûtra. The word _and_ is used in the sense of _but_. It is possible to ascertain from the Vedânta-texts that the world springs from none other than the highest Brahman, which is all- knowing, lord of all, free from all shadow of imperfection, capable of absolutely realising its purposes, and so on; since scripture declares Brahman as described to be the cause of Ether, and so on. By 'Brahman as described' is meant 'Brahman distinguished by omniscience and other qualities, as described in the Sûtra "that from which the origination, and so on, of the world proceed," and in other places.' That Brahman only is declared by scripture to be the cause of Ether, and so on, i.e. the being which is declared to be the cause in passages such as 'From that Self sprang Ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'that sent forth fire'(Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3), is none other than Brahman possessing omniscience and similar qualities. For the former of these texts follows on the passage 'The True, intelligence, infinite is Brahman; he reaches all desires together with the intelligent Brahman,' which introduces Brahman as the general subject-matter--that Brahman being then referred to by means of the connecting words 'from that.' In the same way the 'that' (in 'that sent forth fire') refers back to the omniscient Brahman introduced in the clause 'that thought, may I be many.' This view is confirmed by a consideration of all the accounts of creation, and we hence conclude that Brahman is the sole cause of the world.--But the text 'Non-being indeed this was in the beginning' calls the general cause 'something that is not'; how then can you say that we infer from the Vedânta-texts as the general cause of the world a Brahman that is all-knowing, absolutely realises its purposes, and so on?--To this question the next Sûtra replies.

15. From connexion.