Chapter 31

But how do we know that the instruction as to 'the True' is in addition to, and refers to something different from, the being called Prâna?--The text, after having declared that he who knows the Prâna is an ativâdin, goes on, 'But really that one is an ativâdin who makes a supreme declaration by means of the True.' The 'but' here clearly separates him who is an ativâdin by means of the True from the previous ativâdin, and the clause thus does not cause us to recognise him who is ativâdin by means of Prâna; hence 'the True' which is the cause of the latter ativâdin being what he is must be something different from the Prâna which is the cause of the former ativâdin's quality.--But we have maintained above that the text enjoins the speaking of 'the True' merely as an auxiliary duty for him who knows Prâna; and that hence the Prâna continues to be the general subject-matter!--This contention is untenable, we reply. The conjunction 'but' shows that the section gives instruction about a new ativâdin, and does not merely declare that the ativâdin previously mentioned has to speak the truth. It is different with texts such as 'But that one indeed is an Agnihotrin who speaks the truth'; there we have no knowledge of any further Agnihotrin, and therefore must interpret the text as enjoining truthfulness as an obligation incumbent on the ordinary Agnihotrin. In the text under discussion, on the other hand, we have the term 'the True', which makes us apprehend that there is a further ativâdin different from the preceding one; and we know that that term is used to denote the highest Brahman, as e.g. in the text, 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman.' The ativâdin who takes his stand on this Brahman, therefore, must be viewed as different from the preceding ativâdin; and a difference thus established on the basis of the meaning and connexion of the different sentences cannot be set aside. An ativâdin ('one who in his declaration goes beyond') is one who maintains, as object of his devotion, something which, as being more beneficial to man, surpasses other objects of devotion. The text at first declares that he who knows Prâna, i.e. the individual soul, is an ativâdin, in so far as the object of his devout meditation surpasses the objects from name up to hope; and then goes on to say that, as that object also is not of _supreme_ benefit to man, an ativâdin in the full sense of the term is he only who proclaims as the object of his devotion the highest Brahman, which alone is of supreme unsurpassable benefit to man. 'He who is an ativâdin by the True,' i.e. he who is an ativâdin characterised by the highest Brahman as the object of his meditation. For the same reason the pupil entreats, 'Sir, may I be an ativâdin with the True!' and the teacher replies, 'But we must desire to know the True!'--Moreover, the text, VII, 26, I, 'Prâna springs from the Self,' declares the origination from the Self of the being called Prâna; and from this we infer that the Self which is introduced as the general subject-matter of the section, in the clause 'He who knows the Self passes beyond death,' is different from the being called Prâna.--The contention that, because there is no question and answer as to something greater than Prâna, the instruction about the Self must be supposed to come to an end with the instruction about Prâna, is by no means legitimate. For that a new subject is introduced is proved, not only by those questions and answers; it may be proved by other means also, and we have already explained such means. The following is the reason why the pupil does not ask the question whether there is anything greater than Prâna. With regard to the non- sentient objects extending from name to hope--each of which surpasses the preceding one in so far as it is more beneficial to man--the teacher does not declare that he who knows them is an ativâdin; when, however, he comes to the individual soul, there called Prâna, the knowledge of whose true nature he considers highly beneficial, he expressly says that 'he who sees this, notes this, understands this is an ativâdin' (VII, 15, 4). The pupil therefore imagines that the instruction about the Self is now completed, and hence asks no further question. The teacher on the other hand, holding that even that knowledge is not the highest, spontaneously continues his teaching, and tells the pupil that truly he only is an ativâdin who proclaims the supremely and absolutely beneficial being which is called 'the True,' i.e. the highest Brahman. On this suggestion of the highest Brahman the pupil, desirous to learn its true nature and true worship, entreats the teacher, 'Sir, may I become an ativâdin by the True!' Thereupon the teacher--in order to help the pupil to become an ativâdin,--a position which requires previous intuition of Brahman--enjoins on him meditation on Brahman which is the means to attain intuition ('You must desire to know the True!'); next recommends to him reflection (manana) which is the means towards meditation ('You must desire to understand reflection'); then--taking it for granted that the injunction of reflection implies the injunction of 'hearing' the sacred texts which is the preliminary for reflecting-- advises him to cherish faith in Brahman which is the preliminary means towards hearing ('You must desire to understand faith'); after that tells him to practise, as a preliminary towards faith, reliance on Brahman ('You must desire to understand reliance'); next admonishes him, to apply himself to 'action,' i.e. to make the effort which is a preliminary requisite for all the activities enumerated ('You must desire to understand action'). Finally, in order to encourage the pupil to enter on all this, the teacher tells him to recognise that bliss constitutes the nature of that Brahman which is the aim of all his effort ('You must desire to understand bliss'); and bids him to realise that the bliss which constitutes Brahman's nature is supremely large and full ('You must endeavour to understand the "bhûman," i.e. the supreme fulness of bliss'). And of this Brahman, whose nature is absolute bliss, a definition is then given as follows,' Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, knows nothing else, that is bhûman.' This means-- when the meditating devotee realises the intuition of this Brahman, which consists of absolute bliss, he does not see anything apart from it, since the whole aggregate of things is contained within the essence and outward manifestation (vibhûti) of Brahman. He, therefore, who has an intuitive knowledge of Brahman as qualified by its attributes and its vibhûti--which also is called aisvarya, i.e. lordly power--and consisting of supreme bliss, sees nothing else since there _is_ nothing apart from Brahman; and sees, i.e. feels no pain since all possible objects of perception and feeling are of the nature of bliss or pleasure; for pleasure is just that which, being experienced, is agreeable to man's nature.--But an objection is raised, it is an actual fact that this very world is perceived as something different from Brahman, and as being of the nature of pain, or at the best, limited pleasure; how then can it be perceived as being a manifestation of Brahman, as having Brahman for its Self, and hence consisting of bliss?--The individual souls, we reply, which are under the influence of karman, are conscious of this world as different from Brahman, and, according to their individual karman, as either made up of pain or limited pleasure. But as this view depends altogether on karman, to him who has freed himself from Nescience in the form of karman, this same world presents itself as lying within the intuition of Brahman, together with its qualities and vibhûti, and hence as essentially blissful. To a man troubled with excess of bile the water he drinks has a taste either downright unpleasant or moderately pleasant, according to the degree to which his health is affected; while the same water has an unmixedly pleasant taste for a man in good health. As long as a boy is not aware that some plaything is meant to amuse him, he does not care for it; when on the other hand he apprehends it as meant to give him delight, the thing becomes very dear to him. In the same way the world becomes an object of supreme love to him who recognises it as having Brahman for its Self, and being a mere plaything of Brahman--of Brahman, whose essential nature is supreme bliss, and which is a treasure-house, as it were, of numberless auspicious qualities of supreme excellence. He who has reached such intuition of Brahman, sees nothing apart from it and feels no pain. This the concluding passages of the text set forth in detail, 'He who sees, perceives and understands this, loves the Self, delights in the Self, revels in the Self, rejoices in the Self; he becomes a Self ruler, he moves and rules in all worlds according to his pleasure. But those who have a different knowledge from this, they are ruled by others, they live in perishable worlds, they do not move in all the worlds according to their liking.' 'They are ruled by others,' means 'they are in the power of karman.' And further on, 'He who sees this does not see death, nor illness, nor pain; he who sees this sees everything and obtains everything everywhere.'

That Brahman is of the nature of supreme bliss has been shown in detail under I, 1, 12 ff.--The conclusion from all this is that, as the text applies the term 'bhûman' to what was previously called the Real or True, and which is different from the individual soul there called Prâna, the bhûman is the highest Brahman.

8. And on account of the suitability of the attributes.

The attributes also which the text ascribes to the bhûman suit the highest Self only. So immortality ('The Bhûman is immortal,' VII, 24, 1); not being based on something else ('it rests in its own greatness'); being the Self of all ('the bhûman is below,' &c., 'it is all this'); being that which produces all ('from the Self there springs breath,' &c. ). All these attributes can be reconciled with the highest Self only.-- The Pûrvapakshin has pointed to the text which declares the 'I' to be the Self of all (VII, 25, 1); but what that text really teaches is meditation on Brahman under the aspect of the 'I.' This appears from the introductory clause 'Now follows the instruction with regard to the I.' That of the 'I,' i.e. the individual Self, also the highest Self is the true Self, scripture declares in several places, so e.g. in the text about the inward Ruler (Bri. Up. III, 7). As therefore the individual soul finds its completion in the highest Self only, the word 'I' also extends in its connotation up to the highest Self; and the instruction about the 'I' which is given in the text has thus for its object meditation on the highest Self in so far as having the individual Self for its body. As the highest Self has all beings for its body and thus is the Self of all, it is the Self of the individual soul also; and this the text declares in the passage beginning 'Now follows the instruction about the Self,' and ending 'Self is all this.' In order to prove this the text declares that everything originates from the highest Self which forms the Self of the individual soul also, viz. in the passage 'From the Self of him who sees this, perceives this, knows this, there springs breath,' &c.--that means: breath and all other beings spring from the highest Self which abides within the Self of the meditating devotee as its inner ruler. Hence, the text means to intimate, meditation should be performed on the 'I,' in order thus firmly to establish the cognition that the highest Self has the 'I,' i.e. the individual soul for its body.

It is thus an established conclusion that the bhûman is the highest Self. Here terminates the adhikarana of 'fulness.'

9. The Imperishable (is Brahman), on account of its supporting that which is the end of ether.

The Vâjasaneyins, in the chapter recording the questions asked by Gârgî, read as follows: 'He said, O Gârgî, the Brâhmanas call that the Imperishable. It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long, it is not red, not fluid, it is without a shadow,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8). A doubt here arises whether that Imperishable be the Pradhâna, or the individual soul, or the highest Self.--The Pradhâna, it may be maintained in the first place. For we see that in passages such as 'higher than that which is higher than the Imperishable' the term 'Imperishable' actually denotes the Pradhâna; and moreover the qualities enumerated, viz. not being either coarse or fine, &c., are characteristic of the Pradhâna.--But, an objection is raised, in texts such as 'That knowledge by which the Imperishable is apprehended' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5), the word 'Imperishable' is seen to denote the highest Brahman!--In cases, we reply, where the meaning of a word may be determined on the basis either of some other means of proof or of Scripture, the former meaning presents itself to the mind first, and hence there is no reason why such meaning should not be accepted.--But how do you know that the ether of the text is not ether in the ordinary sense?--From the description, we reply, given of it in the text, 'That above the heavens,' &c. There it is said that all created things past, present and future rest on ether as their basis; ether cannot therefore be taken as that elementary substance which itself is comprised in the sphere of things created. We therefore must understand by 'ether' matter in its subtle state, i.e. the Pradhâna; and the Imperishable which thereupon is declared to be the support of that Pradhâna, hence cannot itself be the Pradhâna.--Nor is there any force in the argument that a sense established by some other means of proof presents itself to the mind more immediately than a sense established by Scripture; for as the word 'akshara' (i.e. the non-perishable) intimates its sense directly through the meaning of its constituent elements other means of proof need not be regarded at all.

Moreover Yâjñavalkya had said previously that the ether is the cause and abode of all things past, present and future, and when Gârgî thereupon asks him in what that ether 'is woven,' i.e. what is the causal substance and abode of ether, he replies 'the Imperishable.' Now this also proves that by the 'Imperishable' we have to understand the Pradhâna which from other sources is known to be the causal substance, and hence the abode, of all effected things whatsoever.

This primâ facie view is set aside by the Sûtra. The 'Imperishable' is the highest Brahman, because the text declares it to support that which is the end, i. e. that which lies beyond ether, viz. unevolved matter (avyâkritam). The ether referred to in Gârgî's question is not ether in the ordinary sense, but what lies beyond ether, viz. unevolved matter, and hence the 'Imperishable' which is said to be the support of that 'unevolved' cannot itself be the 'unevolved,' i.e. cannot be the Pradhâna. Let us, then, the Pûrvapakshin resumes, understand by the 'Imperishable,' the individual soul; for this may be viewed as the support of the entire aggregate of non-sentient matter, inclusive of the elements in their subtle condition; and the qualities of non-coarseness, &c., are characteristic of that soul also. Moreover there are several texts in which the term 'Imperishable' is actually seen to denote the individual soul; so e.g. 'the non-evolved' is merged in the 'Imperishable'; 'That of which the non-evolved is the body; that of which the Imperishable is the body'; 'All the creatures are the Perishable, the non-changing Self is called the Imperishable' (Bha. GÎ. XV, 16).

To this alternative primâ facie view the next Sûtra replies.

10. And this (supporting) (springs) from command.

The text declares that this supporting of ether and all other things proceeds from command. 'In the command of that Imperishable sun and moon stand, held apart; in the command of that Imperishable heaven and earth stand, held apart,' &c. Now such supreme command, through which all things in the universe are held apart, cannot possibly belong to the individual soul in the state either of bondage or of release. The commanding 'Imperishable' therefore is none other than the supreme Person.

11. And on account of the exclusion of (what is of) another nature (than Brahman).

Another nature, i. e. the nature of the Pradhâna, and so on. A supplementary passage excludes difference on the part of the Imperishable from the supreme Person. 'That Imperishable, O Gârgî, is unseen but seeing; unheard but hearing; unthought but thinking; unknown but knowing. There is nothing that sees but it, nothing that hears but it, nothing that thinks but it, nothing that knows but it. In that Imperishable, O Gârgî, the ether is woven, warp and woof.' Here the declaration as to the Imperishable being what sees, hears, &c. excludes the non-intelligent Pradhâna; and the declaration as to its being all- seeing, &c. while not seen by any one excludes the individual soul. This exclusion of what has a nature other than that of the highest Self thus confirms the view of that Self being meant.--Or else the Sûtra may be explained in a different way, viz. 'On account of the exclusion of the existence of another.' On this alternative the text 'There is nothing that sees but it,' &c., is to be understood as follows: 'while this Imperishable, not seen by others but seeing all others, forms the basis of all things different from itself; there is no other principle which, unseen by the Imperishable but seeing it, could form _its_ basis,' i.e. the text would exclude the existence of any other thing but the Imperishable, and thus implicitly deny that the Imperishable is either the Pradhâna or the individual Self.--Moreover the text 'By the command of that Imperishable men praise those who give, the gods follow the Sacrficer, the fathers the Darvî-offering,' declares the Imperishable to be that on the command of which there proceed all works enjoined by Scripture and Smriti. such as sacrificing, giving, &c., and this again shows that the Imperishable must be Brahman, the supreme Person. Again, the subsequent _passus_, 'Whosoever without knowing that Imperishable,' &c., declares that ignorance of the Imperishable leads to the Samsâra, while knowledge of it helps to reach Immortality: this also proves that the Imperishable is the highest Brahman.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the Imperishable.'

12. On account of his being designated as the object of seeing, he (i.e. the highest Self) (is that object).

The followers of the Atharva-veda, in the section containing the question asked by Satyakâma, read as follows: 'He again who meditates with this syllable Aum of three Mâtrâs on the highest Person, he comes to light and to the sun. As a snake frees itself from its skin, so he frees himself from evil. He is led up by the Sâman verses to the Brahma- world; he sees the person dwelling in the castle who is higher than the individual souls concreted with bodies and higher (than those)' (Pra. Up. V, 2). Here the terms 'he meditates' and 'he sees' have the same sense, 'seeing' being the result of devout meditation; for according to the principle expressed in the text (Ch. Up. III, 14) 'According as man's thought is in this world,' what is reached by the devotee is the object of meditation; and moreover the text exhibits the same object, viz. 'the highest Person' in connexion with both verbs.

The doubt here presents itself whether the highest Person in this text be the so-called four-faced Brahmâ, the Lord of the mundane egg who represents the individual souls in their collective aspect, or the supreme Person who is the Lord of all.--The Pûrvapakshin maintains the former view. For, he argues, on the introductory question, 'He who here among men should meditate until death on the syllable Om, what would he obtain by it?' The text first declares that he who meditates on that syllable as having one Mâtrâ, obtains the world of men; and next, that he who meditates on it as having two Mâtrâs obtains the world of the atmosphere. Hence the Brahma-world, which the text after that represents as the object reached by him who meditates on Om as having three syllables, must be the world of Brahmâ Katurmukha who is constituted by the aggregate of the individual souls. What the soul having reached that world sees, therefore is the same Brahmâ Katurmukha; and thus only the attribute 'etasmâj' jîvaghanât parât param' is suitable; for the collective soul, i. e. Brahmâ Katurmukha, residing in the Brahma-world is higher (para) than the distributive or discrete soul (jîva) which is concreted (ghanî-bhûta) with the body and sense-organs, and at the same time is higher (para) than these. The highest Person mentioned in the text, therefore, is Brahmâa Katurmukha; and the qualities mentioned further on, such as absence of decay, &c., must be taken in such a way as to agree with that Brahmâ.

To this primâ facie view the Sûtra replies that the object of seeing is He, i.e. the highest Self, on account of designation. The text clearly designates the object of seeing as the highest Self. For the concluding sloka, which refers to that object of seeing, declares that 'by means of the Omkâra he who knows reaches that which is tranquil, free from decay, immortal, fearless, the highest'--all which attributes properly belong to the highest Self only, as we know from texts such as 'that is the Immortal, that is the fearless, that is Brahman' (Ch. Up. IV, 15, i). The qualification expressed in the clause 'etasmâj_ _jîva.--ghanât,' &c. may also refer to the highest Self only, not to Brahmâ Katurmukha; for the latter is himself comprehended by the term 'jîvaghana.' For that term denotes all souls which are embodied owing to karman; and that Katurmukha is one of those we know from texts such as 'He who first creates Brahmâ' (Svet. Up. VI, 18). Nor is there any strength in the argument that, since the Brahma-world mentioned in the text is known to be the world of Katurmukha, as it follows next on the world of the atmosphere, the being abiding there must needs be Katurmukha. We rather argue as follows--as from the concluding clause 'that which is tranquil, free from decay,' &c., we ascertain that the object of intuition is the highest Brahman, the Brahma-world spoken of as the abode of the seeing devotee cannot be the perishable world of Brahmâ Katurmukha. A further reason for this conclusion is supplied by what the text says about 'him who is freed from all evil being led up by the Sâman verses to the world of Brahman'; for the place reached by him who is freed from all evil cannot be the mere abode of Katurmukha. Hence also the concluding sloka says with reference to that Brahma-world 'that which the wise teach': what the wise see and teach is the abode of the highest, of Vishnu; cp. the text 'the wise ever see that highest abode of Vishnu.' Nor is it even strictly true that the world of Brahmâ follows on the atmosphere, for the svarga-world and several others lie between the two.