Part 67

Bâdarâyana is of opinion that, in the same way as the condition of householdership, those other conditions of life also are obligatory; since in the section beginning 'there are three branches of sacred duty' all the three conditions of life are equally referred to, with a view to glorifying him who is firmly grounded in Brahman. The reference there made to the condition of the householder necessarily presupposes that condition to be already established and obligatory, and the same reasoning then holds good with regard to the other conditions mentioned. Nor must it be said that the special duties mentioned at the beginning of the section--sacrifice, study, charity, austerity, Brahmakarya--all of them belong to the state of the householder (in which case the text would contain no reference to the other conditions of life); for on that supposition the definite reference to a threefold division of duties, 'Sacrifice, &c. are the first, austerity the second, Brahmakarya the third,' would be unmeaning. The proper explanation is to take the words' sacrifice, study, and charity' as descriptive of the condition of the householder; the word 'austerity' as descriptive of the duties of the Vaikhânasa and the wandering mendicant, who both practise mortification; and the word 'Brahmakarya' as referring to the duties of the Brahmakarin. The term 'Brahmasamstha' finally, in the concluding clause, refers to all the three conditions of life, as men belonging to all those conditions may be founded on Brahman. Those, the text means to say, who are destitute of this foundation on Brahman and only perform the special duties of their condition of life, obtain the worlds of the blessed; while he only who at the same time founds himself on Brahman attains to immortality.--In the text 'and those who in the forest,' &c. the mention made of the forest shows that the statement as to the path of the gods has for its presupposition the fact that that stage of life which is especially connected with the forest is one generally recognised.--So far it has been shown that the other stages of life are no less obligatory than that of the householder, whether we take the text under discussion as containing merely a reference to those stages (as established by independent means of proof) or as directly enjoining them. The next Sûtra is meant to show that the latter view is after all the right one.

20. Or an injunction, as in the case of the carrying.

As the second part of the text 'Let him approach carrying the firewood below the ladle; for above he carries it for the gods' (which refers to a certain form of the Agnihotra), although having the form of an anuvâda, yet must be interpreted as an injunction, since the carrying of firewood above is not established by any other injunction; so the text under discussion also must be taken as an injunction of the different stages of life (which are not formally enjoined elsewhere). No account being taken of the text of the Jâbâlas, 'Having completed his studentship he is to become a householder,' &c., it is thus a settled conclusion that the texts discussed, although primarily concerned with other topics, must at the same time be viewed as proving the validity of the several conditions of life. From this it follows that the text enjoining the performance of the Agnihotra up to the end of life, and similar texts, are not universally binding, but concern those only who do not retire from worldly life.--The final conclusion therefore is that as the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined on those who lead a life of austerity (which does not require the performance of sacrifices and the like), it is not subordinate to works, but is in itself beneficial to man.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'benefit to man.'

21. If it be said that they are mere glorification, on account of their reference; not so, on account of the newness.

The following point is next enquired into. Are texts such as 'That Udgîtha is the best of all essences, the highest, holding the supreme place, the eighth' (Ch. Up. I, 1, 3) meant to glorify the Udgîtha as a constituent element of the sacrifice, or to enjoin a meditation on the Udgîtha as the best of all essences, and so on? The Pûrvapakshin holds the former view, on the ground that the text declares the Udgîtha to be the best of all essences in so far as being a constituent element of the sacrifice. The case is analogous to that of texts such as 'the ladle is this earth, the âhavanîya is the heavenly world,' which are merely meant to glorify the ladle and the rest as constituent members of the sacrifice.--This view the latter part of the Sûtra sets aside 'on account of newness.' Texts, as the one referring to the Udgîtha, cannot be mere glorifications; for the fact of the Udgîtha being the best of essences is not established by any other means of proof, and the text under discussion cannot therefore be understood as a mere anuvâda, meant for glorification. Nor is there, in proximity, any injunction of the Udgîtha on account of connexion with which the clause declaring the Udgîtha to be the best of all essences could naturally be taken as an anuvâda (glorifying the thing previously enjoined in the injunctive text); while there is such an injunction in connexion with the (anuvâda) text 'The ladle is this earth,' and so on. We thus cannot but arrive at the conclusion that the text is meant to enjoin a meditation on the Udgîtha as being the best of all essences, and so on--the fruit of such meditation being an increase of vigour and efficacy on the part of the sacrifice.

22. And on account of the words denoting becoming.

That the texts under discussion have an injunctive purport also follows from the fact that they contain verbal forms denoting becoming or origination--'he is to meditate' and the like; for all such forms have injunctive force. All these texts therefore are meant to enjoin special forms of meditation.--Here terminates the adhikarana of mere glorification.'

23. Should it be said that (the stories told in the Upanishads) are for the purpose of the Pâriplava; not so, since (certain stories) are specified.

We meet in the Vedânta-texts with certain stories such as 'Pratardana the son of Divodâsa came to the beloved abode of Indra,' &c., and similar ones. The question here arises whether the stories are merely meant to be recited at the Asvamedha sacrifice or to convey knowledge of a special kind.--The Pûrvapakshin maintains that as the text' they tell the stories' declares the special connexion of those stories with the so- called pâriplava performance, they cannot be assumed to be mainly concerned with knowledge.--This view the Sûtra negatives, on the ground that not all stories of that kind are specially connected with the pâriplava. The texts rather single out special stories only as suitable for that performance; on the general injunction quoted above there follows an injunction defining _which_ stories are to be told, 'King Manu, the son of Vivasvat,' &c. The stories told in the Vedânta-texts do not therefore form parts of the pâriplava performance, but are connected with injunctions of meditations.

24. This follows also from the textual connexion (of those stories with injunctions).

That those stories subserve injunctions of meditation is proved thereby also that they are exhibited in textual connexion with injunctions such as 'the Self is to be seen,' and so on. Their position therefore is analogous to that of other stories told in the texts, which somehow subserve injunctions of works, and are not merely meant for purposes of recitation.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the pâriplava.'

25. For this very reason there is no need of the lighting of the fire and so on.

The Sûtras return, from their digression into the discussion of two special points, to the question as to those whose condition of life involves chastity. The above Sûtra declares that as persons of that class are referred to by Scripture as specially concerned with meditation ('He who is founded on Brahman reaches immortality;' 'those who in the forest,' &c.), their meditation does not presuppose a knowledge of the kindling of fire and so on, i.e. a knowledge of the Agnihotra, the Darsapûrnamâsa, and all those other sacrifices which require the preliminary establishnlent of the sacred fires, but a knowledge of those works only which are enjoined for their special condition of life.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the kindling of the fire.'

26. And there is need of all (works), on account of the scriptural statement of sacrifices and the rest; as in the case of the horse.

If knowledge (meditation), without any reference to sacrifices and the like, is able to bring about immortality, it must be capable of accomplishing this in the case of householders also; and the mention made of sacrifices and the rest in texts such as 'Brâhmanas seek to know him by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22), does not prove sacrifices and so on to be auxiliary to knowledge, since the stress there lies (not on the sacrifices and so on, but) on the desire of knowledge.--Of this view the Sûtra disposes. In the case of householders, for whom the Agnihotra and so on are obligatory, knowledge presupposes all those works, since scriptural texts such as the one quoted directly state that sacrifices and the like are auxiliary to knowledge. 'They seek to know by means of sacrifices' can be said only if sacrifices are understood to be a means through which knowledge is brought about; just as one can say 'he desires to slay with a sword,' because the sword is admitted to be an instrument wherewith one can kill. What we have to understand by knowledge in this connexion has been repeatedly explained, viz. a mental energy different in character from the mere cognition of the sense of texts, and more specifically denoted by such terms as dhyâna or upâsana, i.e. meditation; which is of the nature of remembrance (i.e. representative thought), but in intuitive clearness is not inferior to the clearest presentative thought (pratyaksha); which by constant daily practice becomes ever more perfect, and being duly continued up to death secures final Release. Such meditation is originated in the mind through the grace of the Supreme Person, who is pleased and conciliated by the different kinds of acts of sacrifice and worship duly performed by the Devotee day after day. This is what the text 'they seek to know through the sacrifice' really means. The conclusion therefore is that in the case of householders knowledge has for its pre-requisite all sacrifices and other works of permanent and occasional obligation. 'As a horse.' As the horse, which is a means of locomotion for man, requires attendants, grooming, &c., so knowledge, although itself the means of Release, demands the co-operation of the different works. Thus the Lord himself says, 'The work of sacrifice, giving, and austerities is not to be relinquished, but is indeed to be performed; for sacrifices, gifts, and austerities are purifying to the thoughtful.' 'He from whom all beings proceed and by whom all this is pervaded-worshipping Him with the proper works man attains to perfection' (Bha. Gî. XVIII, 5; 46).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the need of all.'

27. But all the same he must be possessed of calmness, subjection of the senses, &c., since those are enjoined as auxiliaries to that, and must necessarily be accomplished.

The question is whether the householder also must practise calmness and so on, or not. The Pûrvapakshin says he must not, since the performance of works implies the activity of the outer and inner organs of action, and since calmness and so on are of an exactly opposite nature.--This view the Sûtra sets aside. The householder also, although engaged in outward activity, must, in so far as he possesses knowledge, practise calmness of mind and the rest also; for these qualities or states are by Scripture enjoined as auxiliaries to knowledge, 'Therefore he who knows this, having become calm, subdued, satisfied, patient, and collected, should see the Self in Self (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23). As calmness of mind and the rest are seen, in so far as implying composure and concentration of mind, to promote the origination of knowledge, they also must necessarily be aimed at and practised. Nor can it be said that between works on the one side and calmness and so on on the other, there is an absolute antagonism; for the two have different spheres of application. Activity of the organs of action is the proper thing in the case of works enjoined; quiescence in the case of works not enjoined and such as have no definite purpose. Nor also can it be objected that in the case of works implying the activity of organs, calmness of mind and so on are impossible, the mind then being necessarily engrossed by the impressions of the present work and its surroundings; for works enjoined by Scripture have the power of pleasing the Supreme Person, and hence, through his grace, to cause the destruction of all mental impressions obstructive of calmness and concentration of mind. Hence calmness of mind and the rest are to be aimed at and practised by householders also.-- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'calmness' and so on.

28. And there is permission of all food in the case of danger of life; on account of this being seen.

In the meditation on prâna, according to the Vâjasaneyins and the Chândogas, there is a statement as to all food being allowed to him who knows the prâna. 'By him there is nothing eaten that is not food' (Bri. Up. VI, 1, 14; and so on). A doubt here arises whether this permission of all food is valid for him who possesses the knowledge of prâna, in all circumstances, or only in the case of life being in danger.--The Pûrvapakshin holds the former view, on account of no special conditions being stated in the text.--This the Sûtra sets aside 'in the case of danger to life'; for the reason that, as the text shows, the eating of food of all kinds is permitted even for those who know Brahman itself-- the knowledge of which of course is higher than that of prâna--only when their life is in danger. The text alluded to is the one telling how Ushasta Kâkrâyana, who was well versed in the knowledge of Brahman, once, when in great distress, ate unlawful food. We therefore conclude that what the text says as to all food being lawful for him who knows prâna, can refer only to occasions when food of any kind must be eaten in order to preserve life.

29. And on account of non-sublation.

The conclusion above arrived at is confirmed by the consideration that thus only those texts are not stultified which enjoin, for those who know Brahman, purity in matters of food with a view to the origination of knowledge of Brahman. Cp.' when the food is pure the mind becomes pure' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2).

30. This is said in Smriti also.

That for those as well who know Brahman, as for others, the eating of food of any kind is lawful only in case of extreme need, Smriti also declares, 'He who being in danger of his life eats food from anywhere is stained by sin no more than the lotus leaf by water.'

31. And hence also a scriptural passage as to non-proceeding according to liking.

The above conclusion is further confirmed by a scriptural passage prohibiting licence of conduct on the part of any one. The text meant is a passage in the Samhitâ of the Kathas, 'Therefore a Brahmawa does not drink spirituous liquor, thinking "may I not be stained by sin."'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the allowance of all food.'

32. The works of the âsramas also, on account of their being enjoined.

It has been said that sacrifices and other works are auxiliary to the knowledge of Brahman. The doubt now arises whether those works are to be performed by him also who merely wishes to fulfil the duties of his âsrama, without aiming at final Release, or not. They are not, the Pûrvapakshin holds, for that things auxiliary to knowledge should stand in subordinate relation to a certain state of life would imply the contradiction of permanent and non-permanent obligation.--Of this view the Sûtra disposes, 'The works of the âsramas also.' The works belonging to each âsrama have to be performed by those also who do not aim at more than to live according to the âsrama; for they are specifically enjoined by texts such as as long as life lasts he is to offer the Agnihotra'; this implies a permanent obligation dependent on life. And that the same works are also to be performed as being auxiliary to knowledge appears from the texts enjoining them in that aspect, 'Him they seek to know by the study of the Veda' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22); this the next Sûtra declares.

33. And on account of co-operativeness.

These works are to be performed also on account of their being co- operative towards knowledge in so far, namely, as they give rise to the desire of knowledge; and their thus being enjoined for a double purpose does not imply contradiction any more than the double injunctions of the Agnihotra, which one text connects with the life of the sacrificer and another text with his desire to reach the heavenly world.--Nor does this imply a difference of works--this the next Sûtra declares.

34. In any case they are the same, on account of twofold inferential signs.

There is no radical difference of works; but in any case, i.e. whether they be viewed as duties incumbent on the âsrama or as auxiliary to knowledge, sacrifices and other works are one and the same. For Scripture, in enjoining them in both these aspects, makes use of the same terms, so that we recognise the same acts, and there is no means of proof to establish difference of works.

35. And Scripture also declares (knowledge) not to be overpowered.

Texts such as 'By works of sacred duty he drives away evil' declare that sacrifices and similar works have the effect of knowledge 'not being overpowered,' i.e. of the origination of knowledge not being obstructed by evil works. Sacrifices and similar works being performed day after day have the effect of purifying the mind, and owing to this, knowledge arises in the mind with ever increasing brightness. This proves that the works are the same in either case.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the being enjoined' (of sacrifices, and so on).

36. Also in the case of those outside, as this is seen.

It has been declared that the members of the four âsramas have a claim to the knowledge of Brahman, and that the duties connected with each âsrarna promote knowledge. A doubt now arises whether those men also who, on account of poverty and so on, stand outside the âsramas are qualified for the knowledge of Brahman, or rtot.--They are not, the Pûrvapakshin holds, since such knowledge is to be attained in a way dependent on the special duties of each âsrama; while those who do not belong to an âsrama are not concerned with âsrama duties.--This view the Sûtra rejects. Those also who do not stand within any âsrama are qualified for knowledge, 'because that is seen,' i.e. because the texts declare that men such as Raikva, Bhîshma, Samvarta and others who did not belong to âsrama were well grounded in the knowledge of Brahman. It can by no means be maintained that it is âsrama duties only that promote knowledge; for the text 'by gifts, by penance, by fasting, and so on' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22) distinctly declares that charity also and other practices, which are not confined to the âsramas, are helpful towards knowledge. In the same way as in the case of those bound to chastity--who, as the texts show, may possess the knowledge of Brahman--knowledge is promoted by practices other than the Agnihotra and the like, so--it is concluded--in the case of those also who do not belong to any abrama knowledge may be promoted by certain practices not exclusively connected with any âsrama, such as prayer, fasting, charity, propitiation of the divinity, and so on.

37. Smriti also states this.

Smriti also declares that men not belonging to an âsrama grow in knowledge through prayer and the like. 'Through prayer also a Brâhmana may become perfect. May he perform other works or not, one who befriends all creatures is called a Brâhmana' (Manu Smri. II, 17).

38. And there is the promotion (of knowledge) through special acts (of duty).

The above conclusion is founded not only on Reasoning and Smriti; but Scripture even directly states that knowledge is benefited by practices not exclusively prescribed for the âsramas, 'By penance, abstinence, faith, and knowledge he is to seek the Self (Pr. Up. I, 10).

39. But better than that is the other also on account of an inferential mark.

Better than to be outside the âsramas is the condition of standing within an âsrama. The latter state may be due to misfortune; but he who can should be within an âsrama, which state is the more holy and beneficial one. This follows from inference only, i.e. Smriti; for Smriti says, 'A Brâhmana is to remain outside the âsramas not even for one day.' For one who has passed beyond the stage of Brahmakarya, or whose wife has died, the impossibility to procure a wife constitutes the misfortune (which prevents him from belonging to an âsrama).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'widowers.'

40. But of him who has become that there is no becoming not that, according to Jaimini also, on account of (Scripture) restraining from the absence of the forms of that.

The doubt here arises whether those also who have fallen from the state of life of a Naishthika, Vaikhânasa or Pârivrâjaka are qualified for the knowledge of Brahman or not.--They are so, since in their case, no less than in that of widowers and the like, the growth of knowledge may be assisted by charity and other practices not confined to âsramas.--This primâ facie view the Sûtra sets aside. 'He who has become that,' i.e. he who has entered on the condition of a Naishthika or the like 'cannot become not that,' i.e. may not live in a non-âsrama condition; since scriptural texts restrain men who once have entered the Naishthika, &c., state 'from the absence of the forms of that,' i.e. from the discontinuance of the special duties of their âsrama. Compare texts such as 'He is to go into the forest, and is not to return from thence'; 'Having renounced the world he is not to return.' And hence persons who have lapsed from their âsrama are not qualified for meditation on Brahman. This view of his the Sûtrakâra strengthens by a reference to the opinion of Jaimini.--But cannot a Naishthika who, through some sin, has lapsed from his duties and position, make up for his transgression by some expiatory act and thus again become fit for meditation on Brahman?--To this point the next Sûtra refers.

41. Nor the (expiatory performance) described in the chapter treating of qualification; that being impossible on account of the Smriti referring to such lapse.

Those expiatory performances which are described in the chapter treating of qualification (Pû. Mî. Sû. VI) are not possible in the case of him who has lapsed from the condition of a Naishthika; since such expiations do not apply to him, as is shown by a Smriti text referring to such lapse, viz. 'He who having once entered on the duties of a Naishthika lapses from them, for such a slayer of the Self I do not see any expiatory work by which he might become clean.' The expiatory ceremony referred to in the Pûrva Mimâmsâ therefore applies to the case of other Brahmakârins only.

42. A minor one, thus some; (and hence they hold) the existence (of expiation), as in the case of eating. This has been explained.