Part 29

“Soon will the prophecy be fulfilled and the fateful time come! And in regenerated Byzantium the ancient vaults of St. Sophia will shelter Christ’s altar again. Kneel down before that altar, thou Russian Tsar, and rise, thou Tsar of all the Slavs.”

The manœuvres in which Great Britain and Russia indulged during the first Balkan crisis in regard to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina are another striking proof of the rivalry between these two nations concerning the Straits, for they plainly show that their possession was still the chief ambition of Russia, and that Great Britain, on the other hand, was still determined to control the Straits directly or indirectly, as she could not possibly seize them openly.

At the time of that annexation, the Western Powers and Russia had proposed that a conference should be summoned to decide the fate of that country. But this proposal did not please Germany, who, though she had a right to be angry with Austria, who had neither consulted nor warned her, yet wanted to reconcile the patronising attitude she had assumed towards Turkey with her obligations as an ally of the Dual Monarchy. So Russia was obliged to submit to the annexation, and the idea of a conference was given up after Prince von Bülow had stated that Germany would back Austria, but that in regard to the indemnity claimed by Turkey as a compensation for the loss of her suzerainty over Bosnia-Herzegovina she would support Turkey. Meanwhile, M. de Tschirschkly, German ambassador at Vienna, did his best both to isolate Austria and to bring her to rely more and more on German friendship by striving to disturb the traditional friendly intercourse between London and Vienna; and he took advantage of the disappointment caused in Austria by the breaking off of the negotiations with Turkey to make England responsible for their failure and embitter the enmity already prevailing between Austria and Russia.

Now at this juncture Russia is reported to have declared her willingness to support Turkey, in return for which she wanted her to open up the Straits to her ships. This secret understanding was revealed to the British Government by Kiamil Pasha, a friend of England, who, at the suggestion of the British embassy, asked Russia whether, in case war should break out, she would take up arms in favour of Turkey. At the same time England hinted to the St. Petersburg Cabinet that she was aware it had opened negotiations, and that, should these negotiations bring about an understanding between Turkey and Russia, the relations between their two countries would be severely strained, and the situation would become critical. And so it turned out that Turkey too submitted to the annexation, and did not insist upon the meeting of the Conference.

Meanwhile Russia had no thought of giving up her designs on Constantinople, as is proved by the revelations made in the Memoirs of Count Witte, the well-known Russian diplomatist and ex-Prime Minister, which were published in the _Daily Telegraph_ in January, 1921. In one of his articles, concerning Nicholas II’s character, we read that a Russo-Turkish war had been planned at the suggestion of M. de Nelidov, at that time Russian ambassador to Turkey.

“In the latter period of the year 1896, writes Count Witte, there was a massacre of Armenians in Constantinople, preceded by a similar massacre in Asia Minor. In October, His Majesty returned from abroad, and Nelidov, our ambassador to Turkey, came to St. Petersburg. His arrival gave rise to rumours about various measures which were going to be taken against Turkey. These rumours forced me to submit to His Majesty a memorandum, in which I stated my views on Turkey, and advised against the use of force. On November 21 (December 3) I received a secret memoir drafted by Nelidov. The ambassador spoke in vague terms about the alarming situation in Turkey, and suggested that we should foment incidents which would create the legal right and the physical possibility of seizing the Upper Bosphorus. Nelidov’s suggestion was discussed by a special conference presided over by His Majesty. The ambassador insisted that a far-reaching upheaval was bound to occur in the near future in the Ottoman Empire, and that to safeguard our interests we must occupy the Upper Bosphorus. He was naturally supported by the War Minister and the Chief of Staff, General Oberouchev, for whom the occupation of the Bosphorus and, if possible, of Constantinople, was a veritable _idée fixe_. The other Ministers refrained from expressing their opinion on the subject, so that it fell to my lot to oppose this disastrous project, which I did with vigour and determination. I pointed out that the plan under consideration would eventually precipitate a general European war, and shatter the brilliant political and financial position in which Emperor Alexander III left Russia.

“The Emperor at first confined himself to questioning the members of the Conference. When the discussion was closed he declared that he shared the ambassador’s view. Thus the matter was settled, at least in principle—namely, it was decided to bring about such events in Constantinople as would furnish us with a serious pretext for landing troops and occupying the Upper Bosphorus. The military authorities at Odessa and Sebastopol were instructed immediately to start the necessary preparations for the landing of troops in Turkey. It was also agreed that at the moment which Nelidov considered opportune for the landing he would give the signal by sending a telegram to our financial agent in London, requesting him to purchase a stated amount of grain. The dispatch was to be immediately transmitted to the Director of the Imperial Bank and also to the Minister of the Navy.”

M. de Nelidov went back to Constantinople to carry out this plan, and war seemed so imminent that one of the secretaries of the director of the Imperial Bank “kept vigil all night long, ready to receive the fateful telegram,” and was instructed to transmit it to the director.

“Fearing the consequences of the act, I could not refrain from sharing my apprehensions with several persons very intimate with the Emperor, notably Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich and Pobiedonostzev.... I do not know whether it was the influence of these men or the influence of that Power which rules the whole world and which we call God, but His Majesty changed his mind and instructed Nelidov, soon after the latter’s departure for Constantinople, to give up his designs.”

After the attack by the Turkish ships on October 29 and 30, the Emperor Nicholas, on November, 1914, issued a manifesto to his people, which, though sibylline in tone, plainly asserted Russia’s designs on Constantinople and showed that she meant to avail herself of circumstances to carry them out.

“The Turkish fleet, led by Germans, has dared treacherously to attack our Black Sea coast. We, with all the peoples of Russia, feel quite confident that Turkey’s rash intervention will only hurry on her doom, and open to Russia the way to the solution of the historical problem bequeathed to us by our forefathers on the shores of the Black Sea.”[50]

In the course of an audience which Nicholas II granted to M. Maurice Paléologue, French ambassador, at Tsarkoie-Selo on November 21, 1914, and in the course of which he laid down the main lines of the peace which he thought should be dictated to the Central Powers, he considered how the settlement of the war would affect the other nations, and declared:

“In Asia Minor I shall have naturally to take care of the Armenians; I could not possibly replace them under the Turkish yoke. Shall I have to annex Armenia? I will annex it only if the Armenians expressly ask me to do so. Otherwise, I will grant them an autonomous régime. Lastly, I shall have to ensure for my Empire the free passage of the Straits....

“I have not quite made up my mind on many points; these are such fateful times! Yet I have arrived at two definite conclusions: first, that the Turks must be driven out of Europe; secondly, that Constantinople should henceforth be a neutral town, under an international régime. Of course, the Mussulmans would have every guarantee for the protection of their sanctuaries and shrines. Northern Thrace, up to the Enos-Midia line, would fall to Bulgaria. The rest of the country, between this line and the coast, with the exception of the Constantinople area, would be assigned to Russia.”[51]

About the end of 1914, according to M. Maurice Paléologue, public opinion in Russia was unanimous on this point, that—

“The possession of the Straits is of vital interest to the Empire and far exceeds in importance all the territorial advantages Russia might obtain at the expense of Germany and Austria.... The neutralisation of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles would be an unsatisfactory, mongrel compromise, pregnant with dangers for the future.... Constantinople must be a Russian town.... The Black Sea must become a Russian lake.”[52]

In the formal statement of the Government policy read on February 9, 1915, at the opening of the Duma, after mention had been made of the victories gained by the Russian armies over Turkey, the following sentence occurred: “Brighter and brighter does the radiant future of Russia shine before us in yonder place, on the shores of the sea which washes the battlements of Constantinople.”

Sazonov only hinted at the question of the Straits in the speech which followed, but he declared: “The day is drawing near when the economic and political problems arising from the necessity for Russia to have free access to the open sea will be solved.”

Evgraf Kovalevsky, deputy of Moscow, stated in his turn: “The Straits are the key of our house, so they must be handed over to us, together with the Straits area.”

Then, M. Miliukov, after thanking M. Sazonov for his declaration, concluded his speech in these terms:

“We are happy to hear that our national task will soon be completed. We now feel confident that the possession of Constantinople and the Straits will be ensured in due time, through diplomatic and military channels.”

The question of Constantinople captivated public opinion at that time, and in February, 1915, it engrossed the minds of all prominent men in Russia. Public feeling agreed with the declarations we have just read, that a victorious peace must give Constantinople to Russia.

At the beginning of March, M. Sazonov could not refrain from raising this question with the ambassadors of France and Great Britain, and asked them to give him an assurance that the Governments of London and Paris would consent after the war to the annexation of Constantinople by Russia.[53]

On March 3, at the dinner given in honour of General Pau, Nicholas II talked on the same subject to M. Paléologue. The Emperor, after recalling the conversation he had had with him in November of the previous year, in the course of which he had said France could rely upon Russia, and telling him he had not altered his mind, said:

“There is a point, however, about which recent events compel me to say a few words; I mean Constantinople. The question of the Straits engrosses the Russian mind more and more every day. I consider I have no right to impose on my people the dreadful sacrifices of the present war without granting as a reward the fulfilment of their age-long aspirations. So I have made up my mind, sir. I do not want half-measures to solve the problem of Constantinople and the Straits. The solution I pointed out to you in November last is the only possible one, the only practical one. The city of Constantinople and Southern Thrace must be incorporated into my Empire; yet I have no objection, as far as the administration of the city is concerned, to a special régime making allowance for foreign interests. You know that England has already sent me her approval. If any minor difficulties should arise, I rely on your Government to help me to smooth them.”[54]

On March 8, M. Paléologue told M. Sazonov that he had just received a telegram from M. Delcassé, and was in a position to give him the assurance that he could rely on the French Government’s friendly offices in settling the questions of Constantinople and the Straits according to the wishes of Russia. M. Sazonov thanked him very warmly, and added these significant words: “Your Government has done the Alliance a priceless service ... a service the extent of which perhaps you do not realise.”[55] On the 15th the French Government, having examined the conditions of peace which the Allies meant to impose on Turkey, informed the Russian Government of the compensations France required in Syria.

On March 16, after being received by the Emperor at the General Headquarters at Baranovitchi, the Grand Duke Nicholas, speaking as commander-in-chief of the Russian armies, had a formal conversation with M. Paléologue, speaking as French ambassador, and requested him to inform his Government that he considered the immediate military co-operation of Rumania and Italy as an imperative necessity. The French ambassador suggested that the Russian claims on Constantinople and the Straits would, perhaps, prevent Rumania and Italy joining the Allies. Upon which the Grand Duke answered: “That’s the business of diplomacy. I won’t have anything to do with it.”[56]

Finally, the following letter of M. Koudashev to M. Sazonov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, printed in the collection of secret documents of the Russian Foreign Office published in December, 1917,[57] shows how deeply the leaders of Russia and the Russian people had this question at heart, that it commanded all their foreign policy, and that they were determined to use any means, to resort to any artifice, in order to solve it in conformity with their wishes. No wonder, then, as we pointed out at the beginning of this book, that Turkey, being fully aware of the Russian enmity, should have consented to stand by the side of Germany in a war in which her very existence was at stake.

IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS, _February_ 5, 1916 (o.s.).

“Most honoured Serguey Dmitrievich,—At the request of General Alexiev, I waited on him to discuss how the capture of Erzerum could be best exploited.

“Such an event obviously points to a certain state of mind in Turkey which we should turn to account. If a separate peace with Turkey was to be contemplated, it should be borne in mind that such favourable circumstances are not likely to occur again within a long time. It would undoubtedly be our advantage to start the negotiations after a victory which the enemy rightly or wrongly fears will be attended with a new catastrophe.

“Considering that our forces on the secondary front of Caucasus are insignificant and it is impossible to take away one soldier from the chief centre of operations, it would be most difficult, in General Alexiev’s opinion, to derive full profit from the glorious success of our Caucasian army in a strictly military sense.

“Though he does not wish to advocate an immediate peace with Turkey, the general desires me to bring to your knowledge some of his views concerning this eventuality that the situation created by our recent success may be carefully considered and fully utilised.

“According to him, it would be most important to specify the war aims of Russia. Though the brigadier-general is fully aware this is a question to be settled by the Government, yet he thinks his opinion might be of some weight.

“In the course of our conversation, we have come to the following conclusions:

“Whatever may have been our prospects at the time when Turkey entered into the war, of securing compensations at the cost of the latter country when peace is concluded, we must own that our expectations will not be fulfilled during the present war. The longer the war lasts, the more difficult it will be for us to secure the possession of the Straits. General Alexiev and General Danilov agree on this point. I refer you to my letters of December, 1914, and January, 1915, as to Danilov’s opinion.

“The defeat of the chief enemy and the restoration of the parts of the Empire we have lost should be our chief war aim. Our most important enemy is Germany, for there cannot be any question that at the present time it is more important for us to recover the Baltic Provinces than take possession of the Straits. We must by all means defeat Germany. It is a difficult task, which will require great efforts and sacrifices. The temporary abandonment of some of our hopes should be one of these sacrifices.

“Considering the advantages a separate peace with Turkey would bring us, we might offer it to her without injuring our real ‘interests’—the occupation of the Straits being merely postponed—on the basis of the _status quo ante bellum_, including the restoration of the Capitulations and the other rights acquired by the treaties. We should also demand the dismissal of the Germans, with a promise on our side to defend Turkey in case of German reprisals. If a separate peace could be concluded with Turkey on such a basis, all our Caucasian army would be available. We could send it to Bessarabia and thus—who knows?—bring Rumania to our side, or, if Turkey asks for it, send it to defend Constantinople. England would heave a sigh of relief when the dangers of the Egyptian campaign and of the Muslim movement thus vanished. She would then be able to send her Egyptian army—nine divisions—to Salonika and Kavala, bar the way definitely to the Bulgarians and liberate Serbia with the help of the French, the Italians, and the reconstituted Serbian Army. If Turkey were no longer our enemy, the situation in the Balkans would be quite altered, and we should be able to keep in touch with our Allies by clearing the southern route of Europe. In short, the advantages of a separate peace with Turkey are innumerable. The chief result would be the defeat of Germany, the only common war aim of all the Allies. No doubt, we all—they as well as we—will have to waive some of our cherished schemes. But we are not bound to give them up for ever. If we carry on the war with Turkey, we delude ourselves with the hope our ideal can be fulfilled. If we interrupt the war with that country, we postpone for a time the fulfilment of our wishes. But in return for this, we shall defeat Germany, the only thing which can secure a lasting peace for all the Allies and a political, military, and moral superiority for Russia. If a victory over Germany gives us back the paramount situation we enjoyed after the Napoleonic wars, why could not the glorious period of the treaties of Adrianople and Hunkiar-i-Skelessi occur again? In concluding that treaty we should have only to take care not to offend the Western Powers, and yet meet the requirements of Russia.

“Perhaps I have stated General Alexiev’s opinions too unreservedly, as I wished to give this report a definite form. Though the brigadier-general does not wish to be the advocate or promoter of the idea of a separate peace with Turkey, I am sure he looks upon this as a highly profitable scheme.

“Of course, many difficulties will have to be overcome in the conclusion of such a peace; but is not every matter of importance attended with difficulties? Public opinion should be warned that we cannot possibly secure the fulfilment of all our wishes at once, that it is impossible for us to shake off German hegemony, reconquer the shores of the Baltic, and the other provinces now in the hands of the enemy, and at the same time take Constantinople. The conquest of Tsarigrad in the present circumstances must necessarily raise many a political and moral question. The Turks, too, will have to be convinced. But they may be influenced both by logical and pecuniary arguments. If once the question of the loss of their capital is waived, it will be pretty easy for us to convince them that the Germans merely want their help for selfish purposes without any risk to themselves. If some of them turned a deaf ear to logical arguments, we might resort to more substantial arguments, as has always been the way with Turkey.

“But the discussion of such details is still premature. For the present, the important points are:

“1. Plainly to define our real war aim.

“2. To decide, in connection with this aim, whether a separate peace with Turkey should not be contemplated at once.

“3. To prepare public opinion—the Duma is to meet tomorrow—and our Allies for such a turn of events.

“I want to conclude this long letter by stating that General Alexiev and I share the feelings of all Russians in regard to Constantinople, that we do not disregard the ‘historical call of Russia,’ in the solution of the Eastern question, but that we are actuated by the sincere wish to clarify the situation by distinguishing what is possible at the present time from those aspirations whose fulfilment is momentarily—only momentarily—impossible.”

It is obvious that if, at the beginning of the war, General Kuropatkine maintained that it was a military necessity to occupy part of Turkey, it was because the only aim of Russia in entering into the conflict was the conquest of Constantinople.

In an article entitled “_La Neutralisation des Dardanelles et du Bosphore_,” which was written at the beginning of the war, M. Miliukov confirmed the Russian designs on the Black Sea and consequently on all the part of Europe and Asia Minor contiguous to it. He recalled that, by the former treaties concluded with Russia before the European nations had interfered in the Eastern question—those of 1798, 1805, and 1833—the Porte had granted Russian warships the free passage of the Straits, though the Black Sea was still closed to the warships of any other Power, and that when the treaties of 1841, 1856, and 1871 had laid down the principle of the closure of the Straits, Russia had always preferred this state of things to the opening of the Black Sea to the warships of all nations. This article throws a light on the policy pursued by Russia and the propaganda she is still carrying on in the hope of bringing about the annihilation of the Ottoman Empire. So the writer recognised that it was the duty of Russia to oppose the dispossession of Turkey and that, if the Straits passed under Russian sovereignty, they ought not to be neutralised.

Taking up this question again in an interview with a correspondent of _Le Temps_ in April, 1917, M. Miliukov stated that the map of Eastern Europe, as it ought to be drawn up by the Allies, involved “the liquidation of the Turkish possessions in Europe, the liberation of the peoples living in Asia Minor, the independence of Arabia, Armenia, and Syria, and finally, the necessity of recognising Turkey’s right to the possession of the Straits.” Nobody knows what was to become of the Turks in such a solution, or rather it is only too plain that “the liquidation of the Turkish possessions in Europe” meant that Russia would take possession of the Straits and rule over the Turkish territories in Asia Minor.

Though both the Conservatives and the Bolshevists in Russia were plainly drawing nearer to Germany, M. Miliukov, who seemed to forget the pro-German leaning of Tsardom and the tendency he himself openly displayed, came to this conclusion: