Part 18

“France would do the world an immense service by openly reverting to the war aims proclaimed by herself and her allies. Far from endangering, she would thus strengthen her traditional influence in the East; she would thus do more than by risky military operations to smother the ambitions and rebellions that might set on fire again the Balkan States, Anatolia, and even Mesopotamia.

“After five years of sacrifices that have brought us victory, to start on a would-be crusade against the Arabs and Turks in a remote country, in the middle of summer, would imply for France as well as for England, Italy, Greece, and Serbia, the beginning of a new war that might last for ever, to the benefit of anarchy.

“At any rate I ask that the intended treaty of peace with Turkey, which has not been signed yet, should not be presented to the French Parliament as an irremediable fact.”

After a long debate on Eastern affairs and on the questions raised by M. Millerand’s communications, the Commission for Foreign Affairs, seeing things were taking a bad turn, and the situation of France in Syria, Cilicia, and Constantinople was getting alarming, decided on June 15 to send a delegation to the East to make an inquiry on the spot.

At the first sitting of the French Chamber on June 25, 1920, M. Briand, who three months before had made a speech in favour of the 1916 agreements which were being threatened by English ambition, though he considered the Turkish bands “went too far,” and our policy “played too much into their hands,” felt it incumbent on him to say:

“When we leave a nation like Turkey, after a long war, for over a year, under what might be called a Scotch douche, telling her now ‘Thou shalt live,’ now ‘Thou shalt not live,’ we strain its nerves to the extreme, we create within it a patriotic excitement, a patriotic exasperation, which now becomes manifest in the shape of armed bands. We call them bands of robbers; in our own country we should call them ‘bands of patriots.’”

In the course of the general discussion of the Budget, during a debate which took place on July 28 in the Senate, an amendment was brought in by M. Victor Bérard and some of his colleagues calling for a reduction of 30 million francs on the sums asked for by the Government, which already amounted, as a beginning, to 185 million francs.

M. d’Estournelles de Constant then expressed his fear that this Eastern expedition might cause France to make sacrifices out of proportion to her resources in men and money, and asked how the Government expected to recuperate the expenditure incurred in Syria.

M. Victor Bérard, in his turn, sharply criticised our Eastern policy.

M. Bompard, too, expressed his fears concerning our Syrian policy, and M. Doumergue asked the Government to consent to a reduction of the credits “to show it intended to act cautiously in Syria.”

But after M. Millerand’s energetic answer, and after M. Doumer, chairman of the Commission, had called upon the Senate to accept the figures proposed by the Government and the Commission, these figures were adopted by 205 votes against 84.

M. Romanos, interviewed by the _Matin_,[31] and soon after M. Venizelos, at the Lympne Conference, maintained that the treaty could be fully carried out, and the Greeks felt quite able to enforce it themselves.

As the Allied troops were not sufficient to take decisive action, and as a large part of the Ottoman Empire had been assigned to Greece, England herself soon asked why the latter should not be called upon to pay for the operation if she insisted upon carrying it out.

About June 20 the situation of the British troops became rather serious, as General Milne did not seem to have foreseen the events and was certainly unable to control them.

The Nationalist troops, which met with but little resistance, continued to gain ground, and after marching past Ismid occupied Guebze. The Government forces were retreating towards Alemdagh.

By this time the Nationalists occupied the whole of Anatolia, and the English held but a few square miles near the Dardanelles. The Nationalists, who had easy access to both coasts of the Gulf of Ismid, attempted to blow up the bridges on the Haïdar-Pasha-Ismid railway line. Though the English were on the lookout, four Turkish aeroplanes started from the park of Maltepe, bound for Anatolia. One of them was piloted by the famous Fazil Bey, who had attacked English aeroplanes during their last flight over Constantinople a few days before the armistice in October, 1918.

Indeed, the Government forces only consisted of 15,000 specialised soldiers, artillerymen or engineers, with 6 light batteries of 77 guns and 2 Skoda batteries; in addition to which 20,000 rifles had been given to local recruits. The Nationalists, on the contrary, opposed them with 35,000 well-equipped men commanded by trained officers. Besides, there was but little unity of command among the Government forces. Anzavour Pasha, who had been sent with some cavalry, had refused to submit to headquarters, and at the last moment, when ordered to outflank the enemy and thus protect the retreat of the Government forces, he had flatly refused to do so, declaring he was not going to be ordered about by anybody.

So, considering how critical the situation of the British troops was in the zone of the Straits, England immediately made preparations to remedy it and dispatched reinforcements. The 2nd battalion of the Essex Regiment was held in readiness at Malta, and the light cruiser _Carlisle_ kept ready to set off at a few minutes’ notice. All available destroyers had already left Malta for the Eastern Mediterranean, where the first and fourth squadrons had already repaired. Besides, the cruiser _Ceres_, which had left Marseilles for Malta, received orders on the way to steam straight on to the Ægean Sea. All the Mediterranean fleet was concentrated in the East, while in the Gulf of Ismid the English warships, which were already there, carefully watched the movements of the Turkish Nationalist forces.

Such a state of things naturally brought about some anxiety in London, which somewhat influenced Mr. Lloyd George’s decisions.

During the Hythe Conference, after some conversations on the previous days with Mr. Lloyd George, Lord Curzon, and Mr. Philip Kerr, in which he had offered to put the Greek Army at the disposal of the Allies, M. Venizelos, accompanied by Sir John Stavridi, a rich Greek merchant of London, who had been his intimate adviser for several years, went on Saturday evening, June 18, to the Imperial Hotel at Hythe, where were met all the representatives and experts whom Sir Philip Sassoon had not been able to accommodate at his mansion at Belcair, to plead the cause of Greek intervention with them.

M. Venizelos, on the other hand, in order to win over the British Government to his views, had secured the most valuable help of Sir Basil Zaharoff, who owns most of the shares in the shipbuilding yards of Vickers and Co. and who, thanks to the huge fortune he made in business, subsidises several organs of the British Press. He, too, has been a confidential adviser of M. Venizelos, and has a great influence over Mr. Lloyd George, owing to services rendered to him in election time. So it has been said with reason that M. Venizelos’ eloquence and Sir Basil Zaharoff’s wealth have done Turkey the greatest harm, for they have influenced Mr. Lloyd George and English public opinion against her.

According to M. Venizelos’ scheme, which he meant to expound before the Conference, the Turkish Nationalist army, concentrated in the Smyrna area, could be routed by a quick advance of the Greek forces, numbering 90,000 fully equipped and well-trained men, who would capture the railway station of Afium-Karahissar. This station, being at the junction of the railway line from Smyrna and the Adana-Ismid line, via Konia, the only line of lateral communication Mustafa Kemal disposed of, would thus be cut off, and the Nationalist leader would have to withdraw towards the interior. His resistance would thus break down, and the British forces on the southern coast of the Sea of Marmora that M. Venizelos offered to reinforce by sending a Greek division would be at once freed from the pressure brought to bear on them, which, at the present moment, they could hardly resist.

The next day the Allies decided to accept M. Venizelos’ offer, as the Greek troops were on the spot and no other force could arrive soon enough to relieve the British forces, which were seriously threatened.

Mr. Lloyd George declared that the British Government was sending to the spot all the ships it had at its disposal, but that this naval intervention could not affect the situation much without the help of the Greek Army.

“Without the Greek help,” he said, “we may be driven to an ignominious evacuation of that region of Asia Minor before Kemal’s forces, which would certainly have a terrible repercussion throughout the East and would pave the way to endless possibilities.”

This was also the view held by Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Marshal Foch, too, was asked his advice about the Greek co-operation. He had already declared at San Remo, in agreement with Marshal Wilson, that an army of 300,000 or 400,000 well-equipped men would be needed to conquer Asia Minor. Now, after making full reserves in regard to the political side of the question, he merely remarked that from a strictly military point of view, Greek co-operation might be a decisive element of success; moreover, in a report he had drawn up a few months before, he had pointed out the advantage that an active co-operation of the Greek Army was sure to bring, from a military point of view.

M. Millerand, while admitting these advantages, is said to have raised some serious objections to the scheme.

Finally, as the question could not be solved definitely without Italy’s consent, it was adjourned till the Boulogne Conference met.

Mr. Lloyd George accepted this solution the more readily as he only seemed to look upon M. Venizelos’ scheme as an experiment; and he wanted to gain time, in order to know whether he was to pursue it, till facts had proved that M. Venizelos was right and the Turkish Nationalists’ resistance could be overcome in a short time. If after some time things did not turn out as he expected, he would merely resort to another policy, as is usual with him. But England, meanwhile, was in an awkward situation, since, while accepting the help of an ally, she hinted at the same time that she would not stand by the latter if things turned out wrong. On the other hand, it was surprising that the Supreme Council should take such decisions before receiving Turkey’s answer and knowing whether she would sign the treaty.

When the decisions taken at Hythe in regard to the part to be entrusted to Greece were made known on June 21 at the Boulogne Conference, they brought forth some remarks on the part of Count Sforza, who refused to engage Italy’s responsibility in the policy that was being recommended. He thought it his duty to make reservations in regard to the timeliness of these decisions and the consequences that might ensue, referring to the technical advice given at San Remo by Marshal Foch and Marshal Wilson as to the huge forces they thought would be needed to enforce the treaty against the Nationalists’ wish.

Soon after—on July 13—M. Scialoja, in the long speech he delivered before the Senate to defend the attitude of Italy in the Peace Congress, declared that Italy could not be held responsible for the serious condition of things now prevailing in Asia Minor and the East, for she had attempted, but in vain, to secure a more lenient treatment for Turkey. Finally, in spite of all the objections raised against the treaty, and the difficulties that would probably ensue, it was decided at the few sittings of the Boulogne Conference that the Ottoman delegation should be refused any further delay in giving their answer, which averted any possibility of revision of the treaty. The Powers represented in the Conference gave a free hand to Greece in Asia Minor, because they had not enough soldiers there themselves—let us add that none of them, not even England probably, cared to rush into a new Eastern adventure. The Greeks had none but themselves to blame; their landing at Smyrna had started the Nationalist movement, and now they bore the brunt of the fight.

This new decision implied the giving up of the policy of conciliation which might have been expected after the three weeks’ armistice concluded on May 30 between the French Staff and the Nationalists, which seemed to imply that the French military authorities intended to evacuate the whole of Cilicia, left by the treaty to Turkey. Owing to the serious consequences and infinite repercussions it might have through the Moslem world, the new decision heralded a period of endless difficulties.

Even the Catholic Press did not much appreciate the treaty, and had been badly impressed by recent events. The Vatican, which has always sought to prevent Constantinople from falling into the hands of an Orthodox Power, might well dread the treaty would give the Phanar a paramount influence in the East, if Greece became the ruling Power both at Stambul and Jerusalem. In the first days of the war, when at the time of the Gallipoli expedition Constantinople seemed doomed to fall, the Holy See saw with some anxiety that the Allies intended to assign Constantinople to Russia, and it then asked that at least Saint Sophia, turned into a mosque by the Turks, should be given back to the Catholic creed. This fear may even have been one of the reasons which then induced the Holy See to favour the Central States. M. René Johannet, who was carrying on a campaign in the newspaper _La Croix_[32] for the revision of the treaty, wrote as follows:

“But then, if Asia Minor is deprived of Smyrna and thus loses at least half her resources, we ask with anxiety where France, the chief creditor of Turkey, will find adequate financial guarantees? To give Smyrna to Greece is to rob France. If the Turks are stripped of everything, they will give us nothing.

“Lastly, the fate of our innumerable religious missions, of which Smyrna is the nucleus, is to us a cause of great anxiety. After the precedents of Salonika and Uskub, we have everything to fear. The Orthodox Governments hate Catholicism. Our religious schools—that is to say, the best, the soundest part of our national influence—will soon come to nothing if they are constantly worried by the new lords of the land. How can we allow this?”

According to the account given by the Anatolian newspapers of the sittings of the Parliament summoned by Mustafa Kemal to discuss the conditions of peace, very bitter speeches had been delivered. The Assembly had passed motions denouncing the whole of the treaty, and declaring the Nationalists were determined to oppose its being carried out, supposing it were signed by Damad Ferid Pasha, or any venal slave of the foreigner, and to fight to the bitter end.

Mustafa Kemal was said to have declared, in a conversation, that he had not enough soldiers to make war, but he would manage to prevent any European Power establishing dominion in Asia Minor. And he is reported to have added: “I don’t care much if the Supreme Council ejects the Turks from Europe, but in this case the Asiatic territories must remain Turkish.”

The Greek Army, which, according to the decisions of the Conference, had started an offensive on the Smyrna front, after driving back the Nationalists concentrated at Akhissar, occupied the offices of the captainship of the port of Smyrna and the Ottoman post-office.

On June 20, at Chekmeje, west of Constantinople on the European coast of the Marmora, a steamer had landed a detachment of Kemalist troops, which the British warships had immediately bombarded at a range of eight miles.

On June 21 and 22 two battalions, one English and the other Indian, landed on the Asiatic coast and blew up the eighty guns scattered all along the Straits, on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles.

On June 23 the 13th Greek division attacked Salikili and occupied it. A column of cavalry advanced towards Kula.

On June 24 the Greek troops carried on their advance in four directions and the Nationalists withdrew, fighting stoutly all the time.

On June 25 the Greeks overcame their resistance and captured Alashehr, formerly called Philadelphia, an important town on the Smyrna-Konia line, about 100 miles from Smyrna, took some prisoners and captured material.

On July 1 the Greeks occupied Balikesri, an important station on the Smyrna-Panderma line, nearly fifty miles to the north of Soma, in spite of the Nationalists’ energetic resistance.

On July 3 a landing of Greek troops hastened the fall of Panderma. Some detachments which had landed under the protection of the fleet marched southwards, and met the enemy outposts at Omerkeui, fifteen miles to the north-west of Balikesri.

Then on July 7 M. Venizelos stated at the Spa Conference that the Greek offensive against Mustafa Kemal’s forces which had begun on June 22 and whose chief objective was the capture of the Magnesia-Akhissar-Soma-Balikesri-Panderma line, had ended victoriously on July 2, when the forces coming from the south and those landed at Panderma had effected a junction, and that the scheme of military operations drawn up at Boulogne, which was to be carried out in two weeks, according to General Paraskevopoulos’ forecast, had been brought to a successful end in eleven days.

On July 8 Brusa was occupied by the Greek army, and Mudania and Geumlek by British naval forces. Before the Greek advance began every wealthy Turk had fled to the interior with what remained of the 56th Turkish division, which had evacuated Brusa on July 2. Brusa had been occupied by the Greeks without any bloodshed. A good number of railway carriages and a few steam-engines belonging to a French company had been left undamaged by the Turks on the Mudania line. The British naval authorities, under the pretext that some shots had been fired from the railway station, had had it shelled, together with the French manager’s house, and all that was in these two buildings had been looted by British sailors and the Greek population of Mudania.

Some misleading articles in the Greek and English Press, which were clearly unreliable, extolled the correct attitude of the Greek troops towards the inhabitants during their advance in Asia Minor. According to the Greek communiqué of July 17, “the Nationalists, now deprived of any prestige, were being disarmed by the Moslem population which earnestly asked to be protected by the Greek posts,” and “the Turks, tired of the vexatious measures and the crushing taxes enforced by the Kemalists, everywhere expressed their confidence and gratitude towards the Greek soldiers, whom they welcomed as friends and protectors.”

At the same time political circles in Athens openly declared that the Greek operations in Asia Minor had now come to an end, and that Adrianople and Eastern Thrace would soon be occupied—this occupation being quite urgent as the Turks already evinced signs of resistance, and the Bulgarians were assuming a threatening attitude. Moreover, as might have been foreseen, the Greeks already began to speak of territorial compensations after their operations in Asia Minor and of setting up a new State.

General Milne, whose forces had been reinforced by Greek elements, also undertook to clear all the area lying between Constantinople and Ismid from the irregular Turkish troops that had made their way into it.

On July 7 it was officially notified by the British Headquarters that “military movements were going to take place in the direction of Ismid, and so the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus was considered as a war zone.” Accordingly troops quartered in that district, and soldiers employed in the various services, were to be recalled to the European shore at once, and the next day any Turkish soldier found within that zone would be treated as an enemy.

The great Selimie barracks, at Skutari, were therefore evacuated by the Turks, who thus had no troops left on the Asiatic shore of the Straits.

At Pasha Bagtche Chiboukli, on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus, Greek soldiers helped to disarm the population, and searched everybody who landed at that village.

At Stambul, on the great bridge of Karakeui, British agents halted all officers and soldiers wearing the Turkish uniform, and directed them to the buildings of the English gendarmerie to be examined.

The Alemdagh district was occupied, and General Milne had all the Government troops disarmed, on the pretext of their questionable attitude and the weakness of the Turkish Government. Yet the latter had, of its own accord, broken up the Constantinople army corps, and replaced it by one division that was to be dissolved, in its turn, after the signature of the Peace Treaty, as according to the terms of peace only 700 Turkish soldiers had a right to reside in Constantinople as the Sultan’s guard.

In an article of _Le Matin_, July 7, 1920, under the title, “A New Phase of the Eclipse of French Influence in the East,” M. André Fribourg pointed out the encroachment of the British Commander in Constantinople.

* * * * *

The decision taken by the Allies at Boulogne not to grant any further delay had placed the Turks in a difficult situation. The Grand Vizier, who had come to Paris in the hope of negotiating, handed his answer on the 25th, in order to keep within the appointed time.

The Supreme Council examined this answer on Wednesday, July 7, at Spa. After hearing the English experts, who advised that any modification should be rejected, the Council refused to make any concessions on all the chief points mentioned in the Turkish answer, and only admitted a few subsidiary requests as open to discussion. It deputed a Commission of political experts to draw up an answer in collaboration with the military experts.

Meanwhile the Minister of the Interior, Reshid Bey, chairman of the Ottoman delegation, who had left Constantinople on the 25th, and had arrived in Paris with Jemil Pasha only at the beginning of July, sent a note to the Secretary of the Peace Conference to be forwarded to M. Millerand at Spa. This note, which came to hand on July 11, completed the first answer. It included the decisions taken in Constantinople during Damad Ferid’s stay at Versailles.

The remarks offered by the Ottoman delegation about the peace conditions presented by the Allies made up a little book of forty pages with some appendices, which was handed to the Conference on the 25th. The answer, which had been revised in Constantinople, and consisted of forty-seven pages, was delivered a few days after; it differed but little from the first.

This document began with the following protest against the conditions enforced on Turkey:

“It was only fair—and it was also a right recognised by all nations nowadays—that Turkey should be set on an equal footing with her former allies. The flagrant inequality proffered by the draft of the treaty will be bitterly resented not only by 12 million Turks, but throughout the Moslem world.

“Nothing, indeed, can equal the rigour of the draft of the Turkish treaty. As a matter of fact, it is a dismemberment.