Part 9

“Sir Arthur Lawley, who has just been appointed governor of Madras, after devoting many years to the administration of the Transvaal, gave frank utterance the other day, before his departure from South Africa for India, to his conviction that ere long a great rising of the blacks against the whites will take place, extending all over the British colonies from the Cape to the Zambesi. Sir Arthur, who is recognized as an authority on all problems connected with the subject of native races, besides being a singularly level-headed man, spoke with profound earnestness when he explained in the course of the farewell address: ‘See to this question. For it is the greatest problem you have to face.’ And the solemn character of his valedictory warning was rendered additionally impressive in the knowledge that it was based upon information beyond all question.”

It is certain that the affairs in the Congo Free State have produced neither restlessness nor concerted action in British Africa. Why is it that on both sides of Southern Africa there have been recent outbreaks of turbulence? The natives, indeed, seem ungrateful for the benefits of English rule. Sir Arthur Lawley looks for a rising over the whole of British Africa, from the Cape to the Zambesi. In what way can the misgovernment of the Congo by its ruler have produced a condition so threatening? Both these gentlemen have reason, perhaps, for their fears of an outbreak, but as I have said, there is neither logic nor candor in attributing the present agitation in Southern Africa to King Leopold.

What really is the motive underlying the assault upon the Congo? What has maintained an agitation and a propaganda with apparently such disinterested aims? Personally, although I began my consideration of the question with a different belief, I consider it entirely political and selfish. Sir Harry Johnston naïvely says: “When I first visited the western regions of the Congo it was in the days of imperialism, when most young Britishers abroad could conceive of no better fate for an undeveloped country than to come under the British flag. The outcome of Stanley’s work seemed to me clear; it should be eventually the Britannicising of much of the Congo basin, perhaps in friendly agreement and partition of interests with France and Portugal.”

Unquestionably this notion of the proper solution of the question took possession of many minds in Great Britain at the same time. And England was never satisfied with the foundation of the Congo Free State as an independent nation.

A little further on, Sir Harry states that the British missionaries of that time were against such solution; they did not wish the taking over of the district by Great Britain. And why? “They anticipated troubles and bloodshed arising from any attempt on the part of Great Britain to subdue the vast and unknown regions of the Congo, even then clearly threatened by Arabs.” In other words, Britons at home would have been glad to have absorbed the Congo; Britons on the ground feared the trouble and bloodshed necessary. But now that the Belgians have borne the trouble and the bloodshed and paid the bills, Britain does not despise the plum. Indeed, Britain’s ambitions in Africa are magnificent. Why should she not absorb the entire continent? She has Egypt—temporarily—and shows no sign of relinquishing it; she has the Transvaal and the Orange Free State; how she picked a quarrel and how she seized them we all know. Now she could conveniently annex the Congo.

The missionaries in the Congo Free State are no doubt honest in saying, what they say on every possible occasion, that they do not wish England to take over the country; that they would prefer to have it stay in Belgian hands; that, however, they would have the Belgian government itself responsible instead of a single person. I believe them honest when they say this, but I think them self-deceived; I feel convinced that if the question was placed directly to them, “Shall England or Belgium govern the Congo?” and they knew that their answer would be decisive, their vote would be exceedingly one-sided and produce a change of masters. But the missionaries are not the British government; they do not shape the policies of the empire; their agitation may be useful to the scheming politician and may bring about results which they themselves had not intended. It is always the scheme of rulers and of parties to take advantage of the generous outbursts of sympathy and feeling of the masses for their selfish ends.

The missionaries and many of the prominent agitators in the propaganda against the Free State have said they would be satisfied if Belgium takes over the government. This statement never has seemed to me honest or candid. The agitators will not be suited if Belgium takes the Congo; I have said this all the time, and the incidents of the last few days have demonstrated the justness of my opinion. Already hostility to Belgian ownership is evident. It will increase. When the king really turns the Congo Free State government into Belgium’s hands the agitation will continue, complaints still will be made, and conditions will be much as formerly.

Great Britain never has been the friend of the Congo Free State; its birth thwarted her plans; its continuance threatens her commerce and interferes with expansion and with the carrying out of grand enterprises. In the earlier edition of his little book entitled “The Colonization of Africa,” Sir Harry Johnston spoke in high terms of the Congo Free State and the work which it was doing. In the later editions of the same book he retracts his words of praise; he quotes the atrocities and maladministration of the country. My quotation is not verbal, as for the moment I have not the book at hand, but he ends by saying something of this sort: “Belgium should rule the Congo Free State; it may safely be allowed to govern the greater portion of that territory.”

“The greater portion of the territory”—and what portion is it that Belgium perhaps cannot well govern? Of course, that district through which the Cape-to-Cairo Railroad would find its most convenient roadbed. If Great Britain can get that, we shall hear no more of Congo atrocities. There are two ways possible in which this district may be gained. If England can enlist our sympathy, our aid, our influence, she may bid defiance to Germany and France and seize from Leopold or from little Belgium so much of the Congo Free State as she considers necessary for her purpose, leaving the rest to the king or to his country.

If we are not to be inveigled into such assistance, she may, in time and by good diplomacy, come to an understanding with France and Germany for the partition of the Free State. Of course, in such event France would take that section which adjoins her territory, Germany would take the whole Kasai, which was first explored and visited by German travelers, and England would take the eastern portion, touching on Uganda and furnishing the best site for her desired railroad.

The same steamer which took me to the Congo carried a newly appointed British vice-consul to that country. On one occasion he detailed to a missionary friend his instructions as laid down in his commission. I was seated close by those in conversation, and no attempt was made on my part to overhear or on their part toward secrecy. His statement indicated that the prime object of his appointment was to make a careful examination of the Aruwimi River, to see whether its valley could be utilized for a railroad. The second of the four objects of his appointment was to secure as large a volume as possible of complaints from British subjects (blacks) resident in the Congo Free State. The third was to accumulate all possible information regarding atrocities upon the natives. These three, out of four, objects of his appointment seem to be most interesting and suggestive.

On a later occasion I was in company with this same gentleman. A missionary present had expressed anxiety that the report of the commission of inquiry and investigation should appear. It will be remembered that a considerable time elapsed between the return of the commission to Europe and the publishing of its report. After the missionary had expressed his anxiety for its appearance and to know its contents, the vice-consul remarked: “It makes no difference when the report appears; it makes no difference if it never appears; the British government has decided upon its course of action, and it will not be influenced by whatever the commission’s report may contain.” Comment upon this observation is superfluous.

Upon the Atlantic steamer which brought us from Antwerp to New York City there was a young Canadian returning from three years abroad. He knew that we had been in the Congo Free State, and on several occasions conversed with me about my journey. We had never referred to atrocities, nor conditions, nor politics. One day, with no particular reason in the preceding conversation for the statement, he said: “Of course, the Belgians will lose the Congo. We have got to have it. We must build the Cape-to-Cairo road. You know, we wanted the Transvaal. We found a way to get it; we have it. So we will find some way to get the Congo.”

Of course, this was the remark of a very young man. But the remarks of young men, wild and foolish though they often sound, usually voice the feelings and thoughts which older men cherish, but dare not speak.

XV.

February 3, 1907.

OUGHT we to interfere? In this whole discussion I have looked at the question solely from the humanitarian standpoint. I assume that Secretary Root’s first presentation of the matter was carefully prepared. He insisted that we had no grounds for interference, insofar as the Berlin conference was concerned. It is only, then, from the point of view of interest in the natives, the desire to save them from suffering and from atrocity, that we can join with England in calling a new conference of the world’s powers to consider Congo matters. Ought we to pursue such a course? We ought not, and that for several reasons.

First—We should not interfere in Congo matters from philanthropic reasons, unless we are ready to undertake the policing of the whole of Africa. If the atrocities in the Congo are sufficient to involve us in difficulty with Belgium or with Belgium’s king, the atrocities and cruelty practiced in the French Congo, throughout German Africa, in the Portuguese possessions, and even in the English colonies, must also attract our notice. If we really intervene to save the African black man from white oppression, we must do this job thoroughly and on a large scale.

Second—We should not interfere with the conditions in Congo unless we desire strained relations with France and Germany. No possible agitation will bring about a second meeting of all the powers that participated in the Berlin conference. Turkey alone, so far, has signified her willingness to act with England. The only other nation in which there seems to be the slightest trend toward participation is Italy. No Scandinavian country—Sweden, Norway, Denmark—will join in the movement. The many Scandinavians who, in one capacity or another, have labored in the Congo Free State are, on the whole, well satisfied with the conditions. Though there is a vigorous and aggressive Swedish mission in the country, it is significant that its members have never joined in the agitation. Nor is Holland, which has sent a large number of individuals into the Congo State as employés of government and concession companies, likely to favor an agitation. Austria, for various reasons, stands aloof. France has a definite understanding whereby in case of the dissolution of the Congo Free State she becomes heir to all the district. Germany, responsible for the foundation of the Congo Free State, has, on the whole, always favored its existence, and would certainly oppose interference in its affairs. In case of the partition of the Congo, Germany would be willing enough to take her share, but it is really more to her interest both at home and abroad to maintain its independence. All these European countries speak quite freely in regard to England’s design. France and Germany would seriously oppose any demonstration by England and the United States.

Third—We ought not to interfere unless we are really willing to play the undignified part of pulling England’s chestnuts from the fire. What would we, nationally, gain by the partition of the Congo? Our repeated declarations about not wishing new territory in distant regions are, of course, looked upon as twaddle by other nations. If we really mean them, we must avoid the very appearance of evil. What will the natives gain by partition? They will still have their oppressors, only they will be divided around among three instead of being exploited by one. Suppose the redistribution did take place. Suppose France, Germany, and England divided the Congo between them; suppose—as would be certain—that oppression and atrocity continued in the divided territory. Would we still continue our noble effort in behalf of the suffering black millions?

Fourth—We should not interfere, unless we wish to present a glaring example of national inconsistency. Distance lends enchantment to the view. We are solicitous about the Bantu in their home under the rule of Leopold II.; we have 12,000,000 or more of them within our own United States. The Bantu in the Congo we love. We suffer when he is whipped, shudder when he is put upon a chain-gang, shriek when he is murdered. Yet, here he may be whipped, put on the chain-gang, murdered, and if any raise an outcry he is a sentimentalist. Our negro problem is a serious and difficult one. We do not know how to treat it. But it is at our door, and we can study it and strike out some mode of treatment. But the years pass, and we do nothing. So complicated is it and so united together and interdependent its issues and its elements, that any course of action is dangerous, because we frequently cannot foresee the outcome of well-meant effort. With this example constantly before us, one would suppose that we would hesitate in meddling with the equally complicated problem, regarding conditions of which we know little or nothing, on the other side of the globe.

Fifth—We ought not to interfere, unless we come with clean hands. We have an even closer parallel to Congo conditions than our negro problem in the South. In the Philippines we found a people to be elevated; an inscrutable Providence—so we say—thrust the Philippine Islands, with their millions, upon us. A few years ago we heard much of benevolent assimilation. Benevolent assimilation is the most dreadful of all forms of cannibalism. Our Congo reformers emphasize the fact that the Congo State was founded with many philanthropic assertions and with high-sounding promises of improving and elevating the native population. The parallel is close. We took the Philippines and Filipinos for their good. So we said. Of course, we took them just as the European nations have taken Africa—for exploitation. Had there been no hope of mines, of timber, of cheap land for speculation, of railroads to be built, and other enterprises to be undertaken and financed, we should never have had such a tender interest in the advancement of the Filipinos. And how has our benevolent assimilation proceeded? Just exactly as it always proceeds everywhere in tropic lands with “lower peoples.” Torture, punitive expeditions, betrayal of confidence and friendship, depopulation—these have been the agencies through which we have attempted to elevate a race.

You will tell me that what I am about to quote is ancient history and has lost its force. It is no more ancient than the bulk of the atrocities and cruelties within the Congo. We quote a newspaper of April 12, 1902:

“From the Philippines authentic news is now at hand tending to confirm the charges of barbarity on the part of American army officers, which have hitherto been strenuously and sweepingly denied. This news comes in Associated Press dispatches reporting the court-martial trial of Major Waller, now in progress at Manila. This officer led an expedition last winter into the interior of the island of Samar. After being given up for dead, he and his party returned to camp January 28th, delirious from privation. Major Waller was next heard of in this connection in a dispatch of March 6th from Manila. He had been subjected to court-martial proceedings, on charges of having, while on this ill-fated expedition, executed natives of the island of Samar without trial. One of the specifications alleged that in one instance the accused had caused a native to be tied to a tree, and on one day to be shot in the thigh, on the next in the arm, on the third in the body, and on the fourth to be killed. Friends of Major Waller attributed his horrible action to delirium caused by privation; but Major Waller himself refused to make this defense, insisting that he had acted under superior authority.”

This sounds like an indictment of the Belgians in the Congo put forth by the Congo Reform Association. It is revolting; it is horrible; it probably is true. Personally, I believe that Major Waller must have suffered from the physical, the mental, the moral disintegration which the tropics so constantly produce in white men. It is unlikely that he was by nature a man of exceptional cruelty. He became what he was—either permanently or for a time—through the environment in which he lived. He had excuse; so have the Belgians. There is another respect in which this quotation sounds Congo-like. Major Waller insisted that he had “acted under superior authority.”

This phrase, he “acted under superior authority,” is constantly harped upon by Morel and others of the Congo agitators. Much is made of it, and we are constantly asked to trace home the order which issued from superior authority From whom came Major Waller’s orders? In his trial, February 8th, 1902, he disclosed the startling nature of General Smith’s orders, as he had understood them. He swore that General Smith had said: “I wish you to kill and burn. The more you kill, the more you will please me. The interior of Samar must be made a howling wilderness. Kill every native over ten years old.”

When serious complaints of maladministration are brought before the Belgian authorities of the Congo, investigation and trial are usually ordered. The Congo agitators lay great stress upon the fact that in the Congo these trials are farces; that the accused is rarely sentenced to punishment; that sometimes after his acquittal he is lionized, made a hero of, advanced in office. This is an unpardonable crime when committed by the Belgians. Lothaire—and really Lothaire was as bad as any—was thus treated. One would imagine from the chorus of complaint along this line that every English or American officer accused of cruelty, misgovernment or maladministration was promptly and severely punished.

Major Waller received the verdict that he had acted “in accordance with the rules of war, the orders of his superior, and the military exigencies of the situation.” This, again, can hardly be improved upon in all the cases put forward joyously by the reformers. When complaint is made it is never treated honestly. There is always whitewashing. Why howl over Belgian failure to punish? Waller’s verdict shows that we do precisely the same thing in the same circumstances. But look at what was done with General Smith, the man who ordered that down to ten years of age the natives should be killed. He, too, was ordered to undergo court-martial. From a newspaper of May 3d, 1902, we quote: “At the opening, Colonel Woodruff announced his willingness to simplify the proceedings by admitting that most of the accusations were true. He said he was willing, in behalf of General Smith, to admit that inasmuch as the country was hostile, General Smith did not want any prisoners, and that he had issued orders to Major Waller to kill all persons capable of bearing arms, fixing the age limit at ten years, because many boys of that age had borne arms against the American troops, and that he had ordered Major Waller also to burn the homes of the people and to make Samar a howling wilderness.”

What was done with General Smith? His court-martial began on April 25. Its result was, of course, a whitewash; it always is, whether the person tried is American, French, German, or Belgian. It is curious, however, to observe how others were affected by this case. There was one man who knew better than any other all the facts relating to the Philippines. His utterance, which we shall quote, was expressed, indeed, before this trial, but it was expressed with full knowledge of similar facts. That man, on March 5th, made the assertion: “It is not the fact that the warfare in the Philippines has been conducted with marked severity; on the contrary, the warfare has been conducted with marked humanity and magnanimity on the part of the United States army.” What a pity that we are less ready to talk of marked humanity and magnanimity of others! Can Waller’s crime be surpassed by anything from Congo; can any order be more cruel than General Smith’s?

I have said that this would be called ancient history. At Leopoldville I asked about atrocities; the response was that at present there was nothing serious to complain of in that region beyond the kwanga tax; when I reached Ikoko, where undoubtedly many cruel things have taken place, they told me that at present such things did not occur there, that to find them I must go to the A. B. I. R.; that the fish tax was too heavy, but that of cruelties, atrocities and mutilations there had been none for years. At Bolobo I heard precisely the same story—the most frightful things had taken place at Lake Leopold II.—that recently nothing serious had happened at Bolobo itself. I presume that there are outrages and cruelties of recent date in the A. B. I. R. and the Antwerp Concession. But here, again, the parallel between the Congo and the Philippines is close. While the Waller and Smith incident is ancient, there is plenty doing at the present time. We quote a paper August 18, 1906: “The Pulajanes—wild tribesmen of the Philippine island of Leyte—continue their fighting. Five Americans, including a lieutenant and a surgeon, were killed in a hand-to-hand encounter in the town of Burauen on the 9th. It was reported on the 14th that Governor-General Ide has determined to exterminate the Pulajanes, even if it should take every American soldier on the islands to do it.”

This sounds like depopulation. And why is depopulation worse in Africa than in the Philippines? Why should a President who views the latter with complacency—and I may say with commendation—feel so keenly with reference to the former? A special message of commendation was promptly sent to an American leader for his killing of hundreds of men, women, and children; depopulation on a large scale and of the same kind as he reprobates when done by Leopold’s soldiers. Our friends of the Congo Reform Association are strangely silent in regard to such letters of commendation; they are much grieved because Lothaire was lionized, but they hurrah over the accumulating honors of a Funston.