Chapter 2

There are five counts in the indictment charging, in various ways, the publishing by the traverser of sundry libels with intent to create sedition and excite insurrection among the slaves and free blacks. The first count in the indictment charges the publication of a certain libel, not otherwise described or set out in the count, than by selecting certain paragraphs in the supposed libellous pamphlet, and setting them out severally in the count. To this count only and to the libellous matter charged thereon has any evidence of publication been given. The Attorney for the United States has moved the court to be permitted to give in evidence to the jury other printed pamphlets of the same character and on the same subject, and which the traverser acknowledged to represent his sentiments, as evidence of malice on the part of the traverser in the publication of the libel in the first count; the libel in the first count being one of those which, with the others now asked to be given in evidence, the traverser acknowledged contained his sentiments.

That is, that it is competent to prove malice in the publication of one libel by others found in the possession of the traverser on the same subject, of which no proof of publication has been offered. The motion to admit the said alleged libellous pamphlets in evidence has been supported by no precedent or adjudged case, but from analogies drawn from proceedings in other cases, and from the expediency or necessity of punishing the enormous crime of which the defendant stands accused; enormous, we all admit the crime to be, if substantiated, but which judges cannot punish but under the rules and principles of law. Enormous as the offence is, it is questionable whether from public considerations it is not better that the accused should escape punishment, than that the law should be perverted to obtain his conviction.

There being no authorities cited to sustain the motion of the Attorney for the United States, we have no other guide to enlighten and direct us than the established principles and rules of law in criminal proceedings. I take it to be well settled, that in indictments for libels, publication is the gist and essence of the crime; that having in one's possession one or more seditious or libellous writings, whether written or printed, if their contents be not communicated or made known to one or more persons, then the possessor is not criminal in a legal point of view. It is true that Hawkins was cited to prove that having in one's possession a known published libel is _prima facie_ evidence of publication against such possessors; admitting this authority, it seems not to touch the case before us, unless those libels were published within this District. They purport on the face of them to have been printed in _New York_, and there published, so far as sending them abroad, within that state, from the printing office, and putting them into the hands of others amounts to a publication within this District; and no evidence has been offered that the traverser ever distributed a single copy or imparted their contents to any person within this District saving the one charged in the first count. Hawkins surely did not mean that having a copy of a libel published in a foreign country in one's possession, was evidence of publication in another state or country where the possessor of such copy may be found: for example, a libel against the British government printed and published in France would be no publication in England, to charge a person found in England with one or more copies of such libels in his possession, with the guilt of publishing such libel against the laws of England. It is true, in times of great excitement in England, when the rebellious principles of France were gaining ground and endangering the very existence of the government, the Scottish courts did condemn and send to Botany bay, Muir and Palmer for having in their possession a printed copy of Thomas Paine's Rights of Man. It is very long since I read the case; indeed shortly after we first obtained the information of their trial, and shortly indeed after the trial; but I have never heard the judgment of the court in their case spoken of but with reprobation. I cannot remember the particulars of the case. The evidence was, that the book had been reprinted and published in Great Britain. If so, that case is stronger than that of having a printed copy in possession of a libel published only in a foreign country; and so far, if such be the fact, it is sustained by the dictum in Hawkins, but this dictum is not itself sustained, as far as I could judge from the authorities cited at the bar, from Hawkins himself, nor by any adjudged case. I think I may boldly assert, then, that the merely having in possession a libel printed and published in a foreign country only, is not an indictable offence here, and publication of the same libel here.

Let us then examine how far these alleged libels, which, although not subjects of criminal prosecution here, can be made use of to sustain the publication, or prove, or aid in proving, the criminal intent or malice in the publication of another libel charged in the first count, and of the publication of which some evidence has been offered to the jury. Now the libels in the first count, of which evidence of publication has been given to the jury, is of itself libellous, or it is not; if it be libellous and published, the law deduces the criminal intent from the libellous matter itself, and therefore requires no aid from other libellous writings to sustain it: if it be not libellous, it cannot be made so by showing other libellous writings of the traverser, of which he is not accused or charged in the indictment. I mean the libellous matter itself in the libel is, in the eye of the law, proof of criminal intent, if it be published, unless the traverser can rebut this inference of law by proving his innocence of any criminal intent, by some sufficient excuse, as that some person stole the copy from him and published it without his knowledge or consent. But the Attorney for the United States urged that these pamphlets, indicating the one charged in the first count, contained or expressed opinions which coincided with his sentiments on the subject matter of them; and this was urged as a reason for admitting them in evidence. This, in my view, amounts to nothing more than that he appropriated to himself and adopted the thoughts of others. What proof could this appropriation or adoption afford of a malicious intent in their publication? Every man has an unquestionable right to his own moral or religious sentiments: there is no crime in this: it would be criminal to restrain any man in this country in his own, or in adopting the moral or religious opinions of others, if he please; it is criminal only when he attempts to propagate them, and only when they have a tendency to disturb the peace of society--to invade the general rights of property--and are most essentially criminal, if they have a tendency to produce the dreadful results charged in the indictment. But bad as the tendency of those writings may be, and unquestionably are, if truly portrayed in the indictment, I know not how much less danger would result, if, led away by our feelings, we bend the rules and principles of law from expediency, or the supposed political necessity of convicting the accused. The present crisis may pass without leaving any dangerous consequences behind it. The good sense and virtue of the people, and the fear of punishment in transgressors, will check the progress of these alarming doctrines; but if we invade the panoply which the law has provided for the protection of the accused against arbitrary or vindictive judgments, we establish precedents, the evil consequences of which cannot be calculated. The criminal intent, then, does not consist in the writing or possession of a written or printed libel, but in the publishing it. It is not easy to conceive how the criminal intent of publishing one libel, can be proved by the having in possession other libels not published, any more than you would be permitted to prove a man guilty of stealing one horse, because you might prove that he had a propensity to horse-stealing. But you would not be allowed to introduce such proof. The _quo animo_ with which a horse is taken, is as necessary in an indictment for horse stealing, as for publishing a libel. Now, as I observed before, if the matter of the pamphlet charged in the first count in the indictment is libellous, does not the acknowledgment of the traverser that the sentiment in the several pamphlets coincided with his own, embrace in it the sentiments in the pamphlets charged in the first count, and of which evidence has been offered of publication? If so, does not this libel of itself afford sufficient evidence of malice, without resorting to the matter of other pamphlets not charged? Then why resort to them? The traverser was not apprised from this first count, that he was responsible for any libel or libellous matter, except what was contained in the libel set out in said count. If you are permitted in order to prove malice in publishing the libel in the first count, to read to the jury the libellous matter of other alleged libels, what will be the consequence? The matter in those other libels may be of a more aggravated or inflammatory character than in that set out in the first count. Is it not evident, if such be the case, that the jury may be influenced to convict the traverser, not by the matter of the libel with which he is charged, but from that of other libels with which he is not charged? Surely, if malice in the publication of a libel be an inference of law, that inference must be drawn only from the libel charged and published, not from other writings which are not libellous because not published. As I observed before, if the paper charged in the first count be of itself libellous, the criminal intent of publication is to be inferred from the confession of the traverser that he approved of the sentiments contained in it. If such inference can be drawn from such confession it can as well be sustained from the matter of this libel, as from that of any number of others, and there is no need to resort to them for such inference; if the matter of such papers be not libellous, no number of other libels found in the traverser's possession, however coinciding with his own opinions, can sustain the libel charged.

Again: if the matter of those pamphlets, which the Attorney for the United States has moved the court to be permitted to lay before the jury, be libellous, may not the traverser be hereafter arraigned upon them if proof shall be had of their publication? This is possible; almost probable, if his zeal in the cause be so great as has been attempted to be proved. Then might he not be convicted by their instrumentality in the present prosecution, and again in a subsequent prosecution for publishing those very libels? I thought the court had decided this point in a former opinion in this case, where they said they could not be evidence if _they were of themselves indictable writings_.

Again: if the proof of malice in the publication of the charged libel be not complete, can it be made so by the production of other pamphlets or libels not published? Is it an inference of law, that having such libels in the traverser's possession furnishes any proof of malice in the publication of the charged libel? I question the legal logic of such an argument. It was almost as easy to publish by distributing fifty pamphlets as one. Now if but one of fifty was given out, is it not as probable that he did not desire to publish them, as that he did? Now an inference from facts, or acts, is matter of law, and I should hesitate to tell the jury that the traverser having in his possession fifty other libels, or any lesser or greater number, which he might have published with the same ease as he published one, is proof of malice in publishing that one. An inference to be drawn from proved facts or circumstances is something like a corollary drawn from a previously demonstrated theorem in mathematics.

I wish it was as certain and clear. An inference deduced from a proved theorem in geometry is unquestionable. Every body will agree to it. An inference drawn by law from previously proved facts or circumstances, is doubtful at best. Two discreet judges may and often do disagree in regard to it. Do we not hear every day, in this court, of the most wise and able judges--of the venerated Hale himself--admonishing courts and juries not to lend a willing ear to them; at least against circumstantial evidence, which is the same thing. How many almost irresistable cases of inferences drawn from pregnant facts have been shown, in which time proved the fallacy of such inferences, and that many an innocent man has been consigned to an ignominious death by circumstantial or (which is the same thing) inferential evidence, and still so strong were the facts and circumstances in the very cases cited by them, (where time proved the innocence of the accused who had suffered the penalty of the law), that under the same circumstances I should permit the same evidence to go to the jury--but in the case before the court those admonitions are well worth considering. We are asked to admit certain pamphlets said to be of similar libellous tendency, and proved by the confession of the traverser to coincide with his opinions, as the one charged in the indictment, and of the publication of which evidence has been offered to the jury, although such pamphlets were never out of the possession of the traverser nor shown to any one, to prove malice in the traverser in the publication of another pamphlet charged to have been published by him in the first count in the indictment. I do not distinctly see the legal inference of malice in having in his possession those unpublished pamphlets. He could have published them, if this malice was in his heart. Why did he not? Is it not in evidence that when he permitted one of those pamphlets to be taken from his counter and read by Mr. King, that he did it with reluctance, and that he was warned of the danger of bringing such writings so far South? Is it unreasonable to suppose that he was deterred by the warning? Taking then the whole evidence together, although it proved great indiscretion in the traverser, and great guilt had he propagated his writings--and that he would have deserved the most condign punishment had he had the temerity to have published them--yet, if I am to take the whole of the testimony in the case, I should be compelled to say, that in withholding the other pamphlets from the view of others, or of any other, he was influenced by the counsel he had received, and was afraid to publish them; and that, under the circumstances in which he permitted the first pamphlet to be taken from his counter and published, if such permission be a publication, that he then was aware of the danger he was in, and that under such circumstances the having in his possession other pamphlets of a similar character, (if the publication by permitting the pamphlets charged in the first count to be taken from his counter and read by Mr. King, be not taking the contents of the pamphlet into view of itself a malicious publication), it cannot be made so by having other pamphlets of similar tendency in his possession, which he did not publish nor attempt to publish.

It was contended, among the reasons assigned by the Attorney for the United States for the admission of those pamphlets in evidence to the jury, that some three or four of them were endorsed with the words "read this and circulate," in the handwriting of the traverser, and this was evidence of malice in the publication of the pamphlet charged in the first count, and of which evidence of the publication has been offered to the jury. But this pamphlet last spoken of had also the same words written on it: whatever evidence of malice may be inferred from these words, is furnished by the said pamphlet itself, and therefore it is not necessary to resort to other sources for such evidence. It is true that a multiplication of the same inscriptions on other pamphlets may, and do, manifest greater zeal, and more intense interest in the subject matter of the writings, and indicate an intention on the part of the writer of such inscriptions to publish them. The malice which the law denounces is in the publication, not in the writing or composition: a man may express his thoughts or opinions in writing with impunity, and is as innocent in the eye of the law (provided he keeps such writings or compositions locked up from the public eye) as if they were locked up in his own mind. Is not an indication or manifestation of an intention to publish certain writings or printed compositions, and the withholding the execution of such intention as strong evidence of change of purpose from fear of the consequences or for other reasons, as of malice in the publication of one of them in the way, and under the circumstances, in which the one charged to have been published in the first count was published? It is very clear, it seems to me, that if there were no other evidence of any other publication of any of the pamphlets in question, than the inscription on the corner "read this and circulate," that the indictment could not be sustained, because such inscriptions, if the pamphlets are never shown to any other person, is in the eye of the law harmless. If, then, we are asked to admit such inscriptions or pamphlets never shown to, or seen by any other person within this District, because there is evidence that one such pamphlet was permitted to be seen and partly read by another, must we not look at the evidence which proves such exhibition of such pamphlets, and connect that with such inscriptions on other pamphlets not published, to see how far such inscriptions go to fortify and strengthen the evidence of malice as to the published pamphlets? In other words, to see what legal inferences of additional evidence such inscriptions afford? If this were a case of ordinary importance, I should say without much hesitation, that they afford no such inferences. It is for the jury to draw inferences of guilt or malice from circumstances; they are fully competent to do so in the present case from the evidence now before them; but it is often and almost always a nice point for a court to instruct a jury from what circumstances or facts inferences of guilt or malice may be drawn. It is saying, Gentlemen of the jury, such and such a circumstance, if proved to your satisfaction, is evidence from which you may and ought to find against the traverser. It satisfies our minds and ought to satisfy yours. But juries ought and will judge for themselves in criminal cases; and I have always thought it a delicate matter in criminal cases, to give such instructions to juries. Here we are not asked to give an instruction; but we are asked to permit evidence to go the jury, which, if allowed, carries with it the opinion of the court that such evidence affords inference of malice. I must see such inference pretty clear myself, before I give my sanction to the jury to draw such inference themselves. It is true the law denounces any published writing having a tendency to produce a breach of peace, or insurrection, or to jeopardize the general rights of property, whether the intent of the writer was wicked or innocent, as libellous. The writing itself being of a libellous character, is of itself evidence of malice in the publication, and it would be no excuse for the publisher to say, I meant no harm, I thought I was doing good. In the eye of the law he is as guilty as if this intention was really wicked. This is called implied malice, in the absence of any other proof of malice than what is offered by the internal evidence of the writing itself. Now the object of the motion to lay before the jury other libellous papers, can be for no other purpose than to prove express malice; for the published libel charged in the first count, if it contain libellous matter, and was published, is of itself, sufficient proof of implied malice, and if it be not libellous, no other libellous writing can be introduced to make it so. Then, if it be libellous itself, it implies malice; and if other similar writings be introduced to prove malice, what does it amount to but proving the implied malice of one libel by the implied malice of other libels? Or, if it be said that some evidence of express malice has been laid before the jury, can you make this evidence more strong or clear by evidence of implied malice, contained in other similar writings not published? Upon the whole, I do not distinctly see, under all the circumstances of this case, how the unpublished writings can be admitted to prove the implied malice to be gathered from them if they had been published, the implied malice in the libel charged and allowed to have been published, or how such evidence of implied malice in them, can be brought to prove express malice in the publication of the charged libel in the first count. I am against the motion.

_Mr. Key_, for the United States, then offered to prove the publication by the defendant of the libels stated in the first, second, and third counts, _by proving the following facts_, viz: that a large collection of libels, and among them several copies of those charged in those counts, with the words "_read and circulate_" in his handwriting, were found upon the traverser--that he undertook to account for their being in his possession, and gave untrue and contradictory accounts--that he acknowledged that he had brought here those then shown to him, being the same now in court, and that they comprehended all he brought here, except about a dozen; and that prior to the traverser's arrest sundry similar publications had been privately sent to various persons in this District by some unknown person or persons in this District.

After arguments which occupied nearly the whole of Saturday, in which the counsel on both sides displayed great learning and ingenuity,

_The Court_ delivered the opinion that the Attorney for the United States may give evidence of the publication, in this District, of any copies of the libels charged in the first and second counts of the indictment. That if he shall have given any evidence tending to show such a publication here, he will be permitted to show that other copies of the same libels were found in the possession of the defendant. He may then give evidence that a certain number of papers or pamphlets were found in the possession of the defendant, together with the copies of the libels charged, and of the publication of which in this District, he shall have given evidence; but he will not be permitted to give in evidence to the jury the contents of any of the papers other than those charged as libels in this indictment, unless such other papers have relation to the libels charged in the indictment, and would not in themselves be substantive ground of prosecution. He may then give evidence to the jury of any confessions or acknowledgments made by the defendant in relation to any of the matters charged in the indictment.

_The District Attorney_ then put in evidence as follows, to show that the prisoner had many similar libels in his possession, and that others were distributed throughout the District.