CHAPTER XXI.

THE AUTUMN OF 1918--LAST BATTLE WITH THE TURKS--CLOSE OF THE WAR IN MESOPOTAMIA.

The summer of 1918 having come to an end, the British army in Mesopotamia prepared for another advance.

The general aspect of the Great War had by that time undergone a sudden and promising change, for the Germans had failed in their fierce offensive against the Allies on the Western Front, Austria had shattered herself against their lines in Northern Italy, and Bulgaria was firmly held by the Salonika force, while in Asia the exhaustion of the Turks was now very evident. They had completely failed to stop General Allenby’s victorious advance in Palestine and Syria, and were hastily withdrawing troops from the Persian frontier and the Caucasus. In Mesopotamia they were still trying to show a bold front, but it seemed clear that they were no longer in strength sufficient to withstand a determined attack by the large and eager British army opposed to them.

“This, then,” says General Marshall, “seemed the moment to take the offensive against the Turkish 6th Army, covering the approaches to Mosul, and it was with great pleasure that on the 7th October I received orders to carry out this movement.”

The main body of the enemy’s troops, now reduced from long fighting and other causes to about 9000 men with 59 guns, held a formidable position astride the Tigris, at the Fatha Gorge--some thirty-five miles above the British railhead at Tekrit. The position had been thoroughly prepared for defence during the past eighteen months, and was of great natural strength. The Turkish right flank rested securely on two ranges of rugged hills which projected into the waterless desert, and therefore could not be turned by slow-moving Infantry. Their left extended for about five miles along the crest of the Jebel Hamrin, and was strongly entrenched.

To attack such a position by direct advance up the Tigris was a difficult matter, and General Marshall would have preferred to move his main force by way of Kirkuk in the north-east, but this was impossible. A large part of his transport had been taken away by the operations in Northern Persia and the necessity for collecting the harvest, so that there was not enough to subsist a large body of troops at such a distance from the railway. The only available route for the main force, therefore, was the line of the Tigris, by which supplies could be pushed up, and this was perforce the one selected. Even so there was only transport enough to make mobile his Cavalry and half his Infantry.

The plan adopted was to work up the eastern bank of the river and turn or force the enemy’s left. If that could be done, the intention was to cut his line of retreat on Mosul by means of Cavalry working round his left, and light-armoured motor-cars moving round his right through the desert. A small column was sent up towards Kirkuk under Brigadier-General Lewin to keep off any attack upon the British right.

But the reduction of the Turkish position proved to be an easier task than any one had expected. On the night of the 23rd October, when all was ready for the general attack on the Fatha Gorge, a British column pushed along the crest of the Jebel Hamrin against the enemy’s left, while the 7th Cavalry Brigade, to which the Thirteenth had now returned, moved round the north of the range. “The vigorous action of these two columns,” says General Marshall, “caused the Turks to abandon the very strong Fatha position before daylight,” and to retreat up-stream.

Then followed some days of manœuvring and fighting, the Infantry pressing steadily upon the retreating Turks in spite of great difficulties, for the enemy had destroyed the road through the hills on both banks of the river, and a Brigade of Cavalry under General Cassels trying to work round into the enemy’s rear. In this attempt the Cavalry were successful. Moving wide of the Tigris, they rode right round the enemy’s left, and on the 26th October, coming back to the river, they struck a ford opposite Hadraniya, fifteen miles above Shergat, the point where the Turks intended to make their real stand. This movement was masked by the other Brigade, the 7th, under Brigadier-General Norton, who demonstrated on the line of the Tigris.

The Hadraniya ford was a bad one, for it crossed three channels of the river, one of which was nearly five feet deep, with a strong current; but Cassels got his regiments over, and, directly he had done so, sent one of them at a gallop to seize an important gorge five miles down stream, between him and the Turks, who were retreating upon him. By the morning of the 27th October the bulk of the Brigade had taken up a strong position blocking the road to Mosul, and it had been joined by the light motor-cars, which had got round through the desert.

It was a daring move, for Cassels had only three weak regiments of Cavalry and a battery of Horse Artillery, while below him was the retreating Turkish force, and above him to the north an unknown number of Turkish reinforcements from Mosul coming down to join it. But this was the one chance of capturing the main body of the enemy, and the Brigade meant to hold its position at all costs until supported.

For the next two days, the 27th and 28th October, Cassels was in serious danger, for though to conceal his weakness he boldly attacked, he was soon attacked himself from the south by a very superior force of Infantry and guns, which made repeated attempts to break through, while the Turkish reinforcements from Mosul moved against his rear. But though hard pressed he managed to hold his ground, and on the afternoon and evening of the second day support began to arrive. First came a battalion of Infantry which had made a forced march of thirty-three miles from the eastward, and then after dark the 7th Cavalry Brigade, which after a march of forty-three miles crossed the Tigris by the difficult Hadraniya Ford. In doing so they lost several men and horses drowned, but their arrival made all the difference. Cassels was now too strong to be easily overwhelmed.

Still the position was critical, for the main body of the Turks, though retreating, had not been beaten, and the British troops were nearly worn out. The Infantry “had been marching and fighting for four days under most arduous conditions,” while Cassels and his own Cavalry Brigade had been continuously in action for seventy-two hours, and all the force now at his disposal had made long marches. But if the Turkish force was to be held, there must be no rest for the troops, in spite of exhaustion and darkness, for the enemy saw that he was trapped, and would be sure to fight desperately for freedom.

He certainly did so. During the night of the 28th he tried again and again to break out northwards, and though he did not succeed, he fought on all through the 29th, and all through the night that followed; and some of his counter-attacks against the British Infantry who were pressing him from the south were by no means easily stopped. It was a splendid defence, and rightly called forth the admiration of his assailants.

The end of the battle may best be told in General Marshall’s words:--

“Meanwhile a serious threat from Turkish reinforcements (5th Division troops) moving down from the Mosul direction developed against Cassels’ right flank. These troops established themselves with guns and machine-guns on the high bluffs near Hadraniya, but were promptly dealt with by the 7th Cavalry Brigade. The Thirteenth Hussars galloped across the open, dismounted under the bluffs, and, led by their Colonel, carried the position by assault, many Turks being accounted for with the bayonet.

“Mounted pursuit by the remainder of the 7th Cavalry Brigade cleared away further menace from the north, and resulted in the capture of 1000 prisoners, with 2 guns and 12 machine-guns.

“The enemy’s avenues of escape northwards were now effectively blocked, thanks to the skilful and resolute handling of his detachment by General Cassels, and the firm determination of his troops, who repulsed every attempt by the enemy to break through.

“Gripped as in a vice, with his men packed in ravines which were raked by our guns from across the Tigris, Ismail Hakki, the Turkish Commander, found himself in a hopeless position. All attempts to break through had failed, communication with the Turkish Commander-in-Chief at Mosul had been rendered impossible, and no relief was in sight. At dawn on October 30th, just as our troops were about to renew the attack, white flags appeared all along the Turkish lines, and later on Ismail Hakki surrendered in person.”

So ended the last battle fought in the Great War by a Turkish army. It had been gallantly contested, but the victory was as complete as a victory could be. The Turkish 6th Army had been not only defeated but captured.

Immediately after the surrender, the 7th Cavalry Brigade and armoured cars pushed rapidly along the Mosul road and made a considerable addition to the number of prisoners. The 14th (Indian) Lancers, charging with the lance, captured a convoy and 500 men, while the 13th Lancers captured a Turkish battalion. Altogether the Turks lost on the 30th October over 11,000 prisoners and 51 guns, besides great quantities of machine-guns, animals, and military material of all kinds.

By the first of November both Cavalry Brigades had got within twelve miles of Mosul, when they were met by a flag of truce informing them that an armistice had been concluded between Great Britain and Turkey. Hostilities ceased, and the long campaign in Mesopotamia had closed with a dramatic success.

At Shergat, as elsewhere, the bulk of the close fighting had of course been done by the Infantry, but General Marshall reported that “the daring and brilliant leadership of the Cavalry Brigades under Brigadier-Generals Cassels and Norton contributed largely to the final result,” and it may safely be affirmed that no Regiment in those Brigades had more right to be proud of its share in the work than the Thirteenth Hussars.

The extracts appended give details of its movements during the last period of the campaign, and especially of the affair at “Richardson’s Bluff,” as the scene of the fight at Hadraniya came to be called.

_Account by General Norton, commanding 7th Brigade._

“The Brigade left Fathah at one o’clock on the night of the 27th-28th October, crossed the Lesser Zab at about 8 A.M., and reached the Hadrani-Yah Ford over the Tigris at 4.30 P.M. on the 28th, having marched about 50 miles since 1 A.M., the last 30 under a very hot sun, and about 70 miles in the last 36 hours.

“The leading Regiment (13th Lancers) immediately commenced to cross to the right bank, and got over without accident, but as the ford was a difficult one, there was considerable delay, and, by the time it came to the turn of the 13th Hussars, it was practically dark. The ford, which had been difficult in daylight, became positively dangerous after dusk, and a number of men, particularly those leading pack-horses, got into difficulties, and were carried down-stream. Hampered as they were by their ammunition and other equipment, their situation was a very precarious one, but most of them fortunately managed to scramble out on one bank or the other.

“When the roll was eventually called, it was found that three men, viz.:--

No. 8267, Lance-Corpl. Bartlett, 9196, Private Donoghue, 31571, Private Newman,

and two horses, were missing. With the exception of Private Newman, whose dead body was found by the Infantry several days later some distance down-stream, no trace of these men has ever been found.

“In the whole Brigade, 21 men were carried away by the strong current, and drowned while crossing this ford.

“Only three squadrons of the Regiment crossed on this night, the remaining squadron (‘A’ Squadron, under Lieutenant H. C. D. FitzGibbon, M.C.) being ordered to remain on the left bank as escort to the Battery, which could not be got across in the dark.

“The Brigade, less the battery, this squadron, and the 13th D.C. Lancers, bivouacked on the river bank; the 13th Lancers, as soon as they were across, had been sent forward to support the right of the 11th Brigade, which was occupying a ridge of hills S.W. of the ford, parallel to the river, and about 3000 yards away from it.

“The night passed without incident, although there was a considerable amount of firing from the position occupied by the 11th Brigade and the 13th D.C. Lancers.

“Before daybreak on the 29th, the Brigade was moved into a covered position under the river bank, and orders were issued for the battery and the remaining squadron of the 13th Hussars to cross to the right bank as soon as there was sufficient daylight.

“The moment the squadron commenced to cross, the Turks shelled the ford heavily and accurately from 2 guns on high ground about 3000 yards to the N.W.

“The squadron managed to get across, fortunately without casualties, but it was obviously impossible for the battery to do so until the hostile fire had been subdued.

“About 7 A.M., V Battery, R.H.A., came into action on the left bank, and the Turks shortly afterwards withdrew their guns.

“About this time a squadron of the 13th D.C. Lancers, which had been ordered to push up the Mosul road at daybreak, encountered heavy shell and M.G. fire, and was compelled to fall back to the Cemetery, where it held its own with difficulty.

“It was clear now that the enemy were holding the high ground to the N.W. in considerable force, and did not consist, as reported by aero reconnaissances, of merely a few scattered groups of Infantry.

“Their position was on a range of hills approximately parallel to the river, and at about 3000 yards from it. At the southern extremity of this range was a high bluff, which will be referred to as Hadraniyah Bluff. Farther to the south again was the range held by the 11th Brigade and 13th D.C. Lancers, and between Hadraniyah Bluff and the river, and some 1000 yards to the S.E. of the former, was a fair-sized isolated hill on which was a Mahomedan cemetery.

“After a personal reconnaissance of the position, so far as was possible, the Brigadier at 8.15 A.M. issued orders for the 13th Hussars, supported by the 24th Jat Lancers, and covered by the fire of V Battery, R.H.A., from across the river, and the Vickers guns, a subsection of which was now in action on the Cemetery Hill, to gallop across the open from their covered position near the river, dismount under the Bluff, and carry the position by a dismounted attack.

“It should be explained that the contour of the hill made it obvious, that unless the Turks came out of their trenches, which were none too well sited, and advanced a short distance down the hill, there must be a considerable amount of dead ground at the foot of the slope, which would give cover to the horses, and enable the troops to form for the dismounted attack. It was hoped that the gun-fire would make it impossible for the Turks to leave their trenches for the purpose of covering this dead ground.

“On debouching from their covered position on the river bank, in accordance with the above orders, the leading squadron at once came under a hot fire from the Turkish machine-guns on the hill, and the squadron leader (Captain Evans, 21st Lancers) fell severely wounded.

“This caused the squadron to lose its direction: it inclined slightly to its left, and halted under the cover of Cemetery Hill.

“The remaining squadrons followed it, and eventually the whole Regiment was concentrated behind this hill.

“By this time, it was clear that the guns had not yet succeeded in subduing the Turkish fire, and the further prosecution of the attack was held up to allow a further artillery preparation.

“Brigade Headquarters was now on Cemetery Hill, and the F.O.O. of the Battery was also established there with his signallers.

“About this time--viz., 10 A.M.--a Field Battery, No. A/33, R.F.A., having crossed the ford, was placed at the disposal of the Brigadier, and came into action some 2000 yards to the S.E. of Cemetery Hill.

“At 12.30 P.M. the Brigadier personally gave orders to Lieut.-Colonel Richardson to renew the attack on the Bluff at 1.20 P.M., and detailed arrangements were made for the attack to be closely supported by both Batteries and all available Vickers guns.

“In accordance with these orders, the Regiment, in column of wings with extended files, debouched from under cover of Cemetery Hill, and galloped straight for the Bluff. The ground was flat and open, the only obstacle being a rather deep dry nullah about half-way, which caused a little crowding and delay. The moment the leading squadron debouched, the Turks opened a heavy fire with all their machine-guns, but the accurate fire of our two batteries and the Vickers guns made it impossible for them to leave their trenches, and the squadrons soon got into the dead ground under the Bluff.

“During this phase of the attack, although these galloping squadrons were absolutely exposed for at least 500 yards to the fire of 12 machine-guns and 1000 Infantry, at ranges from 1500 to 500 yards, not a single man was hit, and only one or two horses.

“Had the Turks put down a machine-gun barrage on some point, such as the afore-mentioned nullah, and kept it there, our casualties must have been considerable; but they were evidently disconcerted by the heavy shelling, and there appeared to be no central control, each machine-gunner firing as he pleased.

“Having reached the foot of the Bluff, the Hussars lost no time in dismounting and forming for attack. Having fixed bayonets, they swarmed up the almost precipitous hill, gallantly led by their Commanding Officer.

“All this time, both batteries, using ‘gun-fire,’ were bursting their shells with beautiful accuracy along the crest of the Hill, and the Vickers guns were also keeping up a heavy fire on the trenches.

“This barrage did not lift until the Hussars were within a few yards of the crest, and there is no doubt that the splendid accuracy and rapidity of fire of these guns was a most important factor in making the attack the success it was.

“From Brigade Headquarters on Cemetery Hill, it was clear that the Turks in the trenches, having seen the squadrons moving towards them at a gallop, and being unable to see what was happening at the foot of the hill, were becoming anxious. Individual men and small parties could be seen getting out of the advanced trenches and moving to the rear, many being caught by the barrage as they did so.

“As the barrage lifted, the Hussars, still led by their Colonel, charged over the crest, shot or bayoneted such Turks as still confronted them in the trenches, and then rapidly forming line to the right, swept along the crest to deal with the Turks who were still holding their position at the north end of the hill.

“As soon as the Hussars’ attack had gained the crest, the 13th D.C. and 14th Jat Lancers quickly mounted, and galloped round to the west and north, captured the enemy’s two guns, and cut off the retreat of the Infantry retiring before the attack of the 13th Hussars.

“Seeing their retreat entirely cut off, the whole Turkish force surrendered.

“In this successful operation, 2 mountain-guns, 12 machine-guns, and 982 unwounded prisoners were taken, and there was a considerable number of Turkish dead and wounded on the hill.

“This enemy force consisted of the whole of the 13th Regiment which had been sent from the 5th Division in Persia to reinforce the army of Haqi Bey.”

_Extract from Colonel Richardson’s letter to Sir R. S. Baden-Powell._

”7TH CAVALRY BRIGADE, IN CAMP OUTSIDE MOSUL, _4th Nov. 1918_.

”MY DEAR GENERAL,--I must send you a line to tell you of another fine performance by the Regiment--a performance which our Brigadier (Gen. Charles Norton), the Commanding Officers of the other Regiments of the Brigade, and other eye-witnesses describe to me as the finest thing they have ever seen. I myself agree that not only as a spectacle but in its complete and immediate success it is the finest performance put up by the Regiment during the war, but as a test of discipline and tenacity I would place Lajj first: there we were on the verge of annihilation, and yet managed to put up a fighting front to the enemy; here it is true we were foiled in our first attempt, but the sqdns. reached cover in perfect order, and the failure of the early morning only made them the keener to score in the afternoon. I enclose a copy of the dry sober account of the day, which I made in my note-book two days after the occurrence, so I will only give you here a brief outline of the events which led up to our being where we were, and of the few days after the 29th which led us to the occupation of Mosul.

“Since an armistice, in the nature of a complete military surrender by Turkey, has been arranged and signed, I hardly suppose that the censor will seriously object to numbers of Brigades and Divisions being given, but I will not risk more deletion than is necessary for the tale.

“Well, the original objective was the reduction of the Fathah position--a very strong natural position formed by the passage of the Tigris through the range of hills known on the left bank as the Jebel Hamrin and on the right bank as Jebel Makhul--about thirty miles N. of Tekrit, held on both banks by some 3000 rifles and 40 guns. Two Cavalry Bgds., ours and Cassels’, had made a long turning movement over the Hamrin, and were in position to the N. and N.E. of the Turkish position by dawn of day, and our feelings were rather mixed when we learnt about 8 A.M. that Johnny Turk had evacuated the position a day or two earlier, and retired mostly along the main road to Mosul on the right bank, which ran through a series of strong natural defensive positions against which the Infantry could make only slow progress against the Turk, who is a past-master in the art of rearguard fighting: so obstinate was he in holding on to a position opposite the confluence of the Lesser Zab river with the Tigris that we were hurried one night to the Fathah Gorge, which we bridged with a pontoon, to go up the right bank and create a diversion in favour of our Infantry; on arriving at Fathah, however, the position had changed--the Turk had retired, and we were no longer required on the right bank; but in the meantime Cassels’ Bgde. had crossed the Tigris some twenty-five miles north of the Lesser Zab, and had taken up a position astride the line of retreat of the Turks, and reinforcements to the latter were said to be closing on Cassels’ rear, so after a few hours’ halt we were hurried back to the Zab and beyond it to the ford, which we reached at dusk on the 28th, having covered 40 miles since 1 A.M. that day. The ford was deep and unmarked; I was riding my biggest horse, and the water was over my knees; on many men it was up to the waist, and we were unfortunate in losing three men, of whom no trace could be found in the dark.

“The events of the 29th I have described in the attached account. The Bgde. that night (29th) bivouacked on its fighting ground, and next morning moved S.W. to a position on Cassels’ right, where about 10 a.m. we learnt that the Turks caught between the Infantry and Cassels had surrendered: we therefore turned our heads northward, and about 2.30 P.M. came up with the Turkish rearguard, who surrendered after a few rounds from the battery, and the 13th Lancers pursuing brought back a lot more, making the total captures of the Bgde. up to about 2500 for the two days.

“Next day we continued our advance northward toward Mosul, but about 11 A.M. met Turkish envoys in a car, who came to tell us that an armistice had been signed.

“We have been on half rations or less for many days, and hardly get a scrap of outside news, but these days must be fraught with intense interest and excitement at home, and these details must in comparison fade into insignificance; but, hereafter, they will be of interest to all concerned with the Regiment, so I will not labour at further excuses for writing.”

_Enclosure in Colonel Richardson’s letter to Sir R. S. Baden-Powell, of the 4th November 1918._

“THE STORMING OF THE CLIFF AND PLATEAU NEAR HADRANIYAH, AFTERWARDS CALLED (IN BRIGADE ORDERS) RICHARDSON’S BLUFF, BY THE THIRTEENTH HUSSARS, ON THE 29TH OCTOBER 1918.

“The night of the 28th-29th passed rather cheerlessly, most of the men having got wet to the waist, and in many cases their blankets and warm coats also having been soaked in fording the river the previous evening, and before dawn we moved down under cover of the river bank, where we were practically immune from the shell-fire which was opened on us soon after daylight and continued until about 7 A.M. About this time I received orders to gallop the Regiment and get a footing on a plateau rising almost sheer from the plain, on which several emplacements could be seen. I asked for and got the co-operation of V Battery, which put a strong barrage on the plateau from 8 A.M. to 8.15 A.M., at which hour we emerged from the river bank, supported on either flank by a subsection of 18 M.G.’s, commanded respectively by Lt. Noel and Lt. Foley. The following is a rough sketch showing disposition of Regiment and ground to be covered.

“As the Regiment reached the open, the four squadrons took up a diamond formation--‘B’ Squadron under Capt. Evans, 21st Lancers, leading, ‘C’ on left flank, ‘D’ on right flank, and ‘A’ Squadron (Lt. Fitzgibbon) bringing up the rear. I rode in the centre, and on either flank were the Hotchkiss guns of two squadrons co-operating with the subsection of machine-guns--_i.e._, ‘B’ and ‘D’ on right, under Lt. Parkes, and ‘A’ and ‘C’ on left, under Lt. Hartigan, M.C.

“As soon as the Regiment came into sight in the open a very hot fire from M.G.’s, rifles, and camel guns (9-pounders) was opened on it, and when about 1000 yds. from its objective, Capt. Evans was very seriously wounded, and the troop leaders of the Leading Squadron led their troops to the cover of the Cemetery Hill, where the remainder of the Regiment quickly concentrated. I quite agreed with their action at the time, and looking back two days afterwards with the knowledge gained since, I am convinced that it was the right course to take. The crest of the plateau was very much more strongly held than had ever been anticipated, and sufficient time had not been allowed for the artillery barrage.

“We occupied the Cemetery Hill and tried to gain ground to the west, but the glacis was quite bare and exposed to M.G. fire from the plateau and from trenches to the west. The Brigadier visited us about 11.30 A.M., and I suggested to him that we should try again to get the hill if the artillery would plaster the plateau and the known trenches until we had gained a footing on the crest. This they did with great effect at intervals until 1.30 P.M., at which time I led the Regiment from the cover of Cemetery Hill in two waves, ‘A’ and ‘D’ Squadrons (Mr Fitzgibbon and Capt. Jeffrey, M.C.) in the first, and ‘C’ (Mr Norton) and ‘B’ (Capt. Howey) in the second under Capt. Godfree.

“The first wave reached the foot of the bluff with only one casualty, a man whose horse fell in jumping a deepish nullah which lay across part of our course--dismounted to climb the almost precipitous cliff-side, the footing on which was made the worse by the loose rolling gravel surface; how the men scaled that cliff carrying their Hotchkiss guns and ammunition-bags will always remain a marvel to me.

“Meantime the second wave had reached the hill, also without casualties, and taken position on the right of the first. As we appeared on the crest fire broke on us from all sides, but the _moral_ of the Turks had been so severely shaken by the Artillery that our casualties were very slight, and by bringing our right forward we were soon able to bring enfilade fire on the trenches to our front, and about 1.45 the first white flag was hoisted. The other trenches did not take long to follow their example, and in less than half an hour after leaving Cemetery Hill we were in complete possession of the plateau, and prisoners, whose numbers eventually mounted to 722, were being marched in batches from every side to a central spot. A few undoubtedly escaped, but the Indian Cavalry Regiments took up the pursuit and brought back 200 or 300 and a camel gun. The booty in arms was very large, at least 20 machine-guns and several thousands of rounds being taken.

“Our casualties were one, Sergt. Holloway, killed, and the following N.C.O.’s and men wounded--viz., Sergt. Barnard, Cpls. Vinall and Hill, Ptes. Little, Patrick, and Tranter (Cpl. Vinall has since died of wounds).

“Sergt. Leeman had been killed with the following wounded whilst we were on Cemetery Hill: 2nd Lt. Russell, Ptes. Powell, Gerrard, and Winter.

“Pte. Harvey was wounded by shell-fire at the ford early in the morning, and the following were drowned whilst crossing the river on the previous evening--viz., L.-Cpl. Bartlett, Ptes. Newman and Donoghue.

“It transpired later that the Turkish troops opposed to us on the Bluff were the three Battns. of the 13th Regiment who had recently come down from Lake Urmia to reinforce the troops on the Fathah position, and that they were preparing to attack the ford at 4 P.M. that afternoon, when our assault destroyed their plans.

“The fight was short and sharp and the victory complete; we owed our almost complete immunity from loss to the excellent shooting of V Battery and A 337, and it was, I must admit, some consolation to know that the troops which brought off the coup were all British.”

_Letter from Colonel Richardson to Sir R. S. Baden-Powell, dated Mosul, 12th November 1918._

”MY DEAR GENERAL,--Herewith the sketch (from memory) of the position assaulted by the Regiment on October 29th and the numbers of the Regiment taking part in the assault; these were omitted from my letter of last week; I hope before we leave these parts to get a proper surveyed sketch of the position,--for the purposes of history.

“We heard to-day that the Armistice with the Huns had been signed and commenced yesterday, as we take it that this is tantamount to a surrender which is practically unconditional on their part. I hope it may not be long before we say good-bye to this God-forgotten country.--Yours sincerely,

(Signed) J. J. RICHARDSON.

“The numbers of the squadrons:--

Officers. N.C.O.’s and Men. Hotchkiss guns. A 4 64 4 B 3 52 4 C 6[60] 63 4 D 4 60 4 --- --- --- 17 239 16”

_Letter from Colonel Richardson to Sir R. S. Baden-Powell, dated Zacho, 75 miles N. of Mosul, 30th November 1918._

”MY DEAR GENERAL,--Just a line in continuation of my letter of the 12th to tell you that we have been given the following Immediate Rewards in recognition of our work on the 29th October, viz.:--

Myself a bar to the D.S.O. Capt. D. W. Godfree . . M.C. Lieut. G. H. Parkes . . M.C. Corporal Vinall (since died of wounds) . . D.C.M. Corporal Raynor . . . D.C.M. Lance-Corporal Viner . M.M. Corporal Aukett M.M. Corporal Whitington M.M. Private Humphrey M.M.

“A batch of honours of which any Regiment may well be proud, as I think you will agree; and indeed we are all very proud of them, and myself not the least proud!

“We were pushed off here with 2 guns of V Battery and a subsection of M.G. at short notice on Monday last to stop reported rioting by retiring Turks and to see them over the border, which is only some 7 or 8 miles from here, and we did the 75 miles in 31 hours. The Turks had heard of our coming and quitted--very wisely; we are well in the hills here in a pretty valley, and snow-covered hills are less than 50 miles away. Rather a change from the Baghdad temperature of July!

“On the 26th we heard that the M.M. had been awarded to Sergt. W. H. Burgess and L.-Cpl. Lomas: these I gather are the outcome of the last despatch.--With all good wishes, yours sincerely,

(Signed) J. J. RICHARDSON.”

_Letter from Lance-Corporal George Costello (56799) of 15th Squadron M.G.C., 7th Cavalry Brigade, to Mr and Mrs Wallace--parents of James Wallace._

M.E.F., _14th November 1918_.

”DEAR MR AND MRS WALLACE,--It is with a sad heart, and with the deepest sympathy, that I write to you of Jim’s presumed death. Jim and I were staunch friends together ever since we were in France, and shared one another’s hardships and joys all the way through. Some time back ‘A’ Section was split up; Jim went to ‘C’ and I to ‘B,’ so at the actual time of crossing the river (Tigris) we were apart, as my section was about one hundred yards in front. From 12 midnight the night previous to crossing, we had been marching, and crossed at 6.30 P.M. the following evening, and during that period we had covered a distance of 57 miles, which was a pretty stiff march, and men and horses were feeling a bit done up. When we got in the water some of the horses were restless and started plunging and rearing. This is what happened to Jim: I learnt it from men who were near him at the time. His horse reared and Jim came off. The current of the river was very swift at the time, and it was also dark. We have lost four men in the squadron in the same way, and nothing has been heard of any of them since. The next morning we got into action! The 13th Hussars formed line and charged up a hill at the Turks. The hill was too steep to get up, so when they got half-way up they did a dismounted action, and within a quarter of an hour the Turks on the top of the hill showed the white flag, and over one thousand surrendered; by late in the afternoon the 7th Cavalry Brigade had beat the whole of that force, capturing nearly three thousand prisoners. The finest piece of work the Brigade has done during the war. I am sure poor Jim would have delighted in it. We then proceeded on towards Mosul, and came in contact with, and captured, two hundred and fifty reinforcements with 7 machine-guns and some big guns. Towards the evening, with one Regiment of Indians (14th Lancers) and one section of 16th Squadron M.G.C., we overtook and captured between two and three miles of convoy and thirteen hundred prisoners. We are now in Mosul. When about 20 miles from Mosul an aeroplane dropped a message which said that the Turks had surrendered Mosul, and that hostilities with Turkey had ceased. Jim has left behind him a memory which one can never forget. Loved and respected by all who knew him, as he was always ready to offer his help and sympathy to any one in trouble. And you have cause to be proud of having had a son who kept up the traditions of a Britisher to its highest level, and was a true and noble soldier to the core. You might please write to Mr Justice Eve and let him know, as I am sure that Jim would wish it, as he held his late squadron leader, Capt. Eve, 13th Hussars, in the highest esteem, and I know that a short time ago Jim wrote to Mr Justice Eve thanking him for the photo. I hope that Jim’s brother who was wounded has quite recovered by now. Well, bear up, and try and look on it for the best, as I know that all your trouble has come in a heap lately. I unfortunately lost my mother in an air-raid since I have been out here.--From Jim’s old Chum, 56799, GEORGE COSTELLO.

”_P.S._--If I should gather any information I will write and let you know at once.

“56799 L.-Cpl. COSTELLO, 15th Squadron M.G.C., 7th Cav. Brigade, Mesopotamia.”

_Extracts from letter from Private E. Cleary (6759 “B” Squadron) to Miss E. FitzPatrick of Accrington, Lancashire._

”MESOPOTAMIA, _25th November 1918_.

”DEAR LIZZIE,--I don’t know how to start answering your letters--I have received that many from you for the last 4 days; they all came of a rush, the reason of it was they were in the country, and could not reach us on account of the shortage of transport....

“Well, we had some hard fighting for about a fortnight, but we managed to get round them and capture the lot; we were very lucky, for they nearly captured us instead, but we managed to get a good mounted charge in on them, and that was the turning-point of our last battle out here. Our Regt. alone captured 1300 prisoners, but it was a good job they did surrender to us, for they could have wiped out every man of us if we fought on, because our Regt. was not near up to strength: we lost a good many. It was hard lines on them, for it was our last fight; they surrendered Mosul to us the next day, and a good job too, for we were about done; we went 2 and 3 days at a time with no rations except a pound of dry flour per man, and you may know what a big feed one can get out of a pound of flour (I don’t think), and that flour was ground barley. You would laugh to see us cooking it: we used to get a bit of tin, make a fire under it, then mix the flour up with some water into a dough, then roll it out into little flat cakes and put it on a tin and bake it, so you may know what nice bread it was (I don’t think), but still I was glad of it; they kept us going all right, and even now, although we are in Mosul, all we are living on is what we buy off the inhabitants, but of course everything will come right again as soon as we get settled down a bit. We were within 15 miles of Mosul when word came through that they had surrendered the place, so we stopped where we were until next day, and then news came through that Turkey had packed up altogether; it was taken very quietly, every one was that fed up, not even a cheer was given. Then we marched into the City and took over all that was there: they had plenty of stuff--food, guns, and men: it seemed so strange we were fighting them a few hours before, and then all that was to be seen was our officers and their officers shaking hands and making much of one another; but it wasn’t so in the case of the men--if our fellows had their way they would have been scrapping them, for we haven’t forgotten some of the tricks they done to our fellows; but still, thank God! it is all over. Well, we had been in Mosul for about a week when the news came through of Germany packing up: even that was taken very quietly, for it was raining as hard as it could, and we didn’t have a bit of shelter, so the only remarks that were passed was, it’s a bloody good job it’s over; so that is how we enjoyed the good news: of course every one was delighted but didn’t show it. Well, Lizzie, you will think I have gone mad on the war, so I will change the subject. I don’t know if you have heard much about Mosul or not; well, it is supposed to be one of the great Sacred Cities out here--they say it’s mentioned several times in the Bible (but as I don’t know much about the Bible I cannot say); it is much the same as Baghdad, but a little more up to date: there is a couple of Catholic Chapels here; of course all Armenians are Catholics, and besides, there is some French here too, but give me one corner of Accrington and they can keep all this country. Just outside Mosul is the ruins of Ninevah, the great city in olden days that was swallowed up by the great earthquake: it is a big mound now, but there is big holes made in it that a man can crawl through, and you can see the ruins of the City beneath: I have been in them many a time, for we find Guards on it every day; so that is how we pass the time away going through it. If you ask one of the Priests they may be able to tell you about it (but I shall be glad to see the back of it). The climate up here is just like England--in fact it feels colder to me: it has rained ever since we’ve been here, and I can tell you it’s none too comfortable, for all we’ve got is one blanket and no other shelter of any kind. Well, Lizzie, it’s time now I came to thank you for all the trouble I have put you to; first of all, I don’t know how to thank you for getting me that Roll of Honour, as you say it is a nice thing, but the reason I wanted it mostly was because I had a good few mates who were on there. God rest them! Mr Rolfe was my Troop Officer, he led us in the charge, and the Turk that killed him was also killed by one of our fellows, so that was one consolation; if you look on there you will see Private Stones’ name; he came from Whally. Pte. M‘Nulty came from Birkenhead, Pte. Cole from Halifax, and Tpr. Spicer from Dublin: he was only about 18 years old. I shall tell you all about them when I go to see you at No. 41. It was very kind of Mr Eve for writing such a nice letter; his son was a nice fellow and a fine leader. I seen him get killed, he was shot right through the head. It was good of you getting them framed. Again I thank you from the bottom of my heart. Now I must thank you for sending Xmas card, and above all, I was most delighted at getting poor Dan’s Memory Card. God rest his soul. It’s the only thing that grieves me, is he did not live so as to have the pleasure of meeting him again. I was always looking forward to having a good time with him if both of us had the luck, but as you say God knows best.”

_Extracts from letter from Captain H. C. D. FitzGibbon, Thirteenth Hussars._

”FIELD.

”MY DEAR OLIVE,--Well, my goodness, a lot of things have happened since my last letter to you. Peace! what an extraordinary word: it is hard to believe the whole thing is over. I will try and tell you all since my last letter.

“The Brigade was in its summer camp, just a few miles north of Baghdad, when I got back from leave. You remember I sent you a word saying we were going out once more. The idea was to take the Fahta position. The Turkish forces were then holding the gorge where the Tigris runs through the Jebel Hamrin. It was supposed, and is, a very strong position, with a desert on one side and a range of hills on the other. He, however, did not hold all the passes, enabling us (the Cavalry) to get over and behind his position. We night-marched round, and at dawn attacked, but to find he did not like the look of the thing and had gone in the night. We next met him on a rather strong position he had taken up on the Lesser Zab. He held us up there for about three days, and started to retreat on Mosul. We, or rather Cassels and his Brigade (with the 7th Hussars) were rather too quick for him, and had got between him and Mosul, dug themselves in, and held them up. A most gallant performance. We were then hurried up to reinforce him as he was not strong enough for the job, and would undoubtedly have failed had we not come up. Two days after we had the lot prisoners, about 10,000. My Regiment had rather a fine chance. About 900 Turks were holding a fairly strong position on some hills with a very large field of fire in front of them. We got Archies to clear up that position. The only way to do it was mounted at the gallop over the open and dismount under the crest of the hills. We formed up in two lines, Jeffrey’s and my squadrons in the first line and the other two in the rear, and off we went. Those who saw it said it was as fine a show as they had ever seen. The line was as good as on parade. We crossed the open at full gallop, dismounted under the crest, fixed bayonets, and before you could say knife had a good footing on the crest. The whole thing was so quick that the Turk was rather taken unawares, and we had cleared up the whole position and taken the lot in no time. My squadron at the time, the same as the others, was only sixty strong--that is to say, about 40 dismounted men. The Colonel led the first line himself, and got a bar to his D.S.O. for it--not bad!!!

“After that we were hurried up the Mosul road. We took another 1800 prisoners, reached a place called Hammam Ali about 15 miles south of Mosul, and for the first time heard of the Turkish Armistice. I then had a rather interesting time, as I went into Mosul with General Cassels to interview the Turkish Commander. It was rather a unique experience, the whole thing in French. To cut a long story short, they were obliged by the terms to evacuate the Mosul Villayat. We marched into the town, a very dirty but rather interesting place. A lot of people speak French. We were camped outside with very few tents and a very wet and cold climate, and no warm clothes to put on. The Regiment was then detailed to send a squadron up to a place on the border called Zakho, about 80 miles north of Mosul, to keep order, and here I am Lord and Master of my little Kingdom.

“It is rather funny being so far away from everybody, but rather nice in a way. I have got two officers with me, Stirling and Hartigan. The first you know of, and the other, also, is one of the best. We are living for the first time for 2½ years in a house, not a bad one at all, and even my men have got them into a large building, so on the whole we are rather comfy. It is very pretty; the village is in a beautifully fertile valley, with high snow-capped mountains in front of me. Plenty to eat and lovely _water_ to drink, and so good for one!!! and I am the Lord and Master of the district. We are well out of Mesopot, and well into Kurdistan. Kurdish is an extraordinary language, but quite a lot of people speak French. Their dress is quite pretty, in a way rather like the Dutch with big trousers. The day before I left Mosul, news came in that Germany had thrown in. It was early in the morning, we were in a very small tent; I was shaving at the time: it was received with great calm and indifference. News came in later the same day that owing to the rain carts could not get up to us, and we were put on half rations. Less indifference was shown to this bit of news.

“I can’t send this letter for a day or two, so will go on with it to-morrow. Me voila encore une fois!...

“It is extraordinary to think war is over! though I am afraid it will be a long time before they let us all go. What a lot of mothers and wives must be thankful. I suppose the sights at home must have been wonderful.

“I had a very interesting time yesterday. The mine only just started is full of coal, and if worked with method I should say worth any amount of money. The tribes in the hills are the most extraordinary thing in the world: they know no law, and obey no master but the chief of their tribe. Every man is armed with a rifle, and a modern one at that. Their villages are in such places that only a goat can get at them, so they can laugh at the whole world in general. The chief I had lunch with is a well-known brigand who robs everybody who passes anywhere near him.

“I had rather a funny complaint last night: A man came round most beautifully dressed, started off with a long-winded speech about the British and how just they were, &c., ending up by saying that the headman’s servants had found his wife in the bazaar and soundly beaten her, and did the British allow that sort of thing?”

_The Thirteenth Hussars’ Charge at Hadraniyah, by an Eye-Witness._

“It can be given to few to watch from a vantage-point, in near vicinity, a spirited cavalry charge. All cavalrymen live for the day when they may take part in this most exhilarating of all the movements of war, and next to being a participator is the privilege of seeing a charge take place.

“At midday on October 29th, 1918, the situation near Hadraniyah was critical--to the south, Cassels’ Brigade was still engaged delaying the retreat of Haqui Bey’s Army; linked with him 2½ miles to the north, Norton’s Brigade had, since dawn, been opposing the advance of the reinforcements that were hurrying to the Turkish Commander’s assistance.

“Almost due west of Hadraniyah Ford, in crossing which at nightfall on the 28th the Brigade had lost twenty men drowned, stands ‘Richardson’s Bluff.’ This Bluff is the culminating point of the ridge which forms the old bank of the Tigris; it lies some 2000 yards from the present river bank, and rises almost precipitously from the plain to the height of some 150 feet. Just to the south of the Bluff there is a re-entrant in the ridge, sweeping round which the latter continues to the south, at first at a lower elevation, but gradually rising till it reaches Huwaish Gorge, along the edge of which was Cassels’ position. The plain between the Bluff and the river is as flat as the palm of the hand, save for two mounds to the south and south-east, on the nearer of which, some 900 yards distant, is a Mahommedan cemetery. At dawn the reconnoitring squadron of the 13th Lancers had been driven back by gun and machine-gun fire from the Bluff, and had taken cover on Cemetery Hill.

“At 8.15 A.M. the Thirteenth Hussars had endeavoured to gallop the Bluff, but owing to the leading Squadron Commander, Captain Evans, having fallen severely wounded, his squadron had lost direction and, inclining to the left, had arrived at Cemetery Hill and relieved the squadron of the 13th Lancers, and there it was joined by the remainder of the Regiment.

“Shortly after this the left was prolonged by the 14th Lancers, who were disposed so as to intercept a junction between the enemy that were opposing the 7th Brigade and those that were engaged with Cassels.

“In support, in rear of the centre of our position, the 13th Lancers were placed, while on the farther bank of the river, 3000 yards to the east, was V Battery, R.H.A., in action against the enemy guns. At 10 A.M., having forded the river, 337 A Battery, R.F.A., came into action in our support, from about 2000 yards to the south of Cemetery Hill. The combined fire of the two batteries soon silenced the enemy guns, and General Norton, realising that the Bluff was the vital point, decided to make a further attempt to wrest it from the enemy.

“It was evident by this time that the hostile force on the Bluff was considerably stronger than had been previously reported. Our position on the lower ground was very precarious, and a successful decisive attack by the Turks would have driven us into the open, rolled up Cassels’ flank, and taken him in the rear. The terrain prevented an accurate reconnaissance of the enemy’s position being made. It remained for General Norton to take the responsibility of ordering a direct attack to be made on the Bluff, supported by the guns.

“Orders were issued, the Thirteenth Hussars concentrated on their right, while both batteries heavily shelled the enemy’s position.

“The concentration of the Thirteenth Hussars was evidently seen by the enemy, and occasioned a heavy outburst of fire, which revealed the fact that they were in possession of more machine-guns than up to then had been calculated. In consequence of this General Norton ordered the attack to be postponed while further artillery preparation took place.

“At 12.45 P.M. the General decided that further delay would be dangerous, and that the effort must be made. Our helio winked a message to the batteries that the Thirteenth Hussars were to attack at 1.20 P.M.; and that they were to increase their rates of fire. Both batteries redoubled their efforts--admirably directed by Lt. Sutton (V Battery, R.H.A.), both ranging and fuses being beautifully accurate; they plastered the Bluff with H.E. and shrapnel. A slight delay in the arrangements made it impossible for the attack to take place till 1.30 P.M. In the interval the Thirteenth Hussars quietly formed up in column of wings under cover of Cemetery Hill.

“As the zero time approached urgent messages came from Major Greenshields, commanding V Battery, that his ammunition was running low. It was an anxious moment: on the crest of Cemetery Hill the Brigade Headquarters Staff lay, taking what cover they could behind the gravestones--down below the Hussars were quietly falling in, resolute but serious, as all knew that much depended on the coming assault, while its result was in the hands of the gods--on our left the 13th and 14th Lancers were ready to ‘Mount’ and ‘Pursue,’ if the attack was successful, or extricate their comrades if it was a reverse.

“On the Bluff was a veritable inferno--the H.E. bursting in black clouds, the shrapnel in fleece-like puffs, both hurling death on the doomed Turks--one continuous and awful roar swept the threatened area.

“Deafened by the noise and rendered dizzy by the concussion, Turks in the advanced trenches on the crest of the hill could be seen getting up and running in a drunken manner to the rear; some caught by bullets while _en route_, fell; others disappeared in the burst of an H.E. shell, and nothing remained when the black cloud cleared away.

“And then the Hussars advanced; it was a glorious sight--the first line led by their gallant Colonel, in perfect order, as if one on a drill parade, swept round the edge of Cemetery Hill--the pace increased--on they went with a loud inspiring cheer. Then equally steady followed the second line.

“The enemy’s machine-guns rattled furiously--ours replied viciously--on, on went the Hussars--then to our horror we saw a check, and we realised that, straight across the front of the Hussars, between them and the Bluff, ran a nullah.

“What is going to happen? Is it too wide? Can they cross it? Another Omdurman or Shabkadr? were among the agonising thoughts that flashed through our minds.

“A little crowding--a horse down--then a cheer rose to our lips as we saw the Colonel thread his way across, and then, on his heels, scrambling, hustling, thrusting, scarcely checking, the first line crossed and went on.

“By this time the onlookers on the Cemetery Hill were mad with excitement, and quite oblivious of the bullets still whistling over them, they were standing up wildly cheering on the gallant Hussars. Now they had reached the foot of the Bluff--so close was it to us that we could distinguish individuals.

“Off they get--fix bayonets--up the hill they scrambled, with their Colonel still at their head; the barrage lifts beautifully in time--and the Hussars clear the crest and, spreading like a fan, on they go. A machine-gun is rushed--then a Hussar was seen to fall--bayonet work begins....

”‘By God, they are counter-attacking!’ bursts from the Brigade Major’s lips, as a party of Turks drive back a troop of the Hussars; but, steady as rocks, the Hussars meet the new attack--a few shots, and then the bayonet. On our left there is a thunder of hoofs--a host of lance-pennons dotted o’er the countryside shows the 13th and 14th Lancers are hurrying forward in support, lance in rest ready for the pursuit. This is the final act in the drama, and then all sobriety is forgotten; our helmets fly in the air as we cheer and cheer again, as on all sides white flags of surrender are raised by the defeated Turks.

“From every direction, in a few minutes, small bodies of the enemy, marshalled by the gallant Hussars, can be seen marching in--and the affair was over.

“It was with a choke in the throat that, a few minutes later, we shook hands with the gallant ‘Jimmy,’ and congratulated him on his splendid success, and ourselves on having been privileged to watch and in some way partake of it.”

_Transport fording the Tigris, 1918. Major A. Cooke, Q.M._

“On October 31st, the transport, which had been left at Huwaish on the left bank of the river Tigris, received orders to march at 6 A.M. and join the Brigade at Quayirah.

“After marching about 4 miles the ford was reached--apparently the one described in Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Marshall’s despatch of 11th April 1919, by which the 11th Cavalry Brigade, under Br.-General R. A. Cassels, C.B., D.S.O., had crossed.

“Two channels of the river had to be crossed before reaching the main stream. Entering the latter, the ford followed a narrow ledge in mid-river (the water here was about 4½ feet deep) which ran for a distance of about 500 yards up-stream; it then turned to the left through fairly shallow water to the right bank. To the right of the ledge the water was at least 5½ feet deep, to the left flowed the rapid and deep main stream of the Tigris.

“If a vehicle got off the ledge into the deeper water on the right, it was extremely difficult to get the animals to start again; but if they got off to the left there was little or no hope of recovery.

“The crossing was commenced, taking about 15 yards interval between vehicles. Soon there came a check; the animals of one waggon, tired of pulling against the rush of ice-cold water, came to a standstill. The next waggon tried to pass to the right, but got into the deeper water, and stayed there until extra animals could be hitched in--this, in itself, proving a most difficult task.

“The column was again got moving, but several similar stops occurred, until a limbered waggon and a water-cart of the 14th Lancers got off the ledge to the left and were lost, two of the four drivers and all the mules being drowned.

“All the transport of the Regiment, except the mess-carts, crossed without trouble; these, being very light, had great difficulty in stemming the swift current, and one was carried off the ledge and swept down-stream.

“The driver of this cart was Pte. Harding, a good old soldier who was mentioned in despatches during the South African War for great gallantry (‘Regimental History,’ volume ii. pp. 129 and 207). He was accompanied in the cart by an Indian cook.

“Every one who saw them carried away thought they were certainly lost. Harding, however, kept his head, and, whilst being floated down the river at a great pace, sat and handled his reins as though he were driving along a hard road. The horse swam with the stream, the well-laden cart floated evenly on the water, and the whole lot went down-stream for about 800 yards before coming to a standstill. While in deep water, Harding gradually steered towards the bank, and at length guided the horse to where he could just scrape his feet along the shingly bottom, and come to a halt, standing.

“The horse was dead-beat, and it was feared that they would again be carried away by the rush of water, when an Indian Artillery driver rode into the river and reached the cart-horse’s head. By seizing the rein and assisting and encouraging the horse, he eventually got it to shallower water, where aid was forthcoming to get the cart ashore.

“It was a most daring and gallant feat on the part of the Indian driver, and his conduct was brought to the notice of the Army Commander. Private Harding received the cheers and congratulations of all assembled there, and was recommended for a reward.

“This may not appear very exciting in print, but when it is remembered that the Tigris is about 300 yards wide, with such a volume of water rushing down that no communication by shouting is possible, except at very short distances, and that men and animals were struggling and drowning at the time, the writer thinks that all who read this account will agree that fording the Tigris with the transport afforded not the least of the many thrilling incidents of the closing days of the war.”