The Thirteenth Hussars in the Great War
CHAPTER XI.
MARCH TO THE FRONT--MAUDE’S PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.
On the 3rd of November, the 7th Cavalry Brigade marched out of their desert camp and set their faces northward. The Brigade marched in four echelons, of which the Hussars formed the fourth.
There was nothing particularly exciting about the march. It was a pleasant change from the life of a stationary camp, and the Regiment passed some interesting places on the Mesopotamian rivers, among them the alleged site of the Garden of Eden, near the junction of the Tigris and Euphrates--a dreary spot now. “No wonder the Twelve Apostles deserted,” was, according to General MacMunn, a British soldier’s comment on seeing it. Farther up on the bank of the Tigris was Ezra’s tomb. “The most beautiful of all vignettes is the hedge-sparrow dome ... set in a small grove of palms.” Throughout this country, and Persia, the little blue-tiled domes under a cloudless sky are a familiar feature. And all along the line of march were points which had acquired some fame in the recent campaigns, before the Thirteenth joined the Expeditionary Force. Here and there some enterprising sportsmen found a little game, which went to swell the camp pot. But there was no fighting--the Turks being still to the northward and still inactive, awaiting attack, while the Arab natives of the country gave no trouble beyond occasionally trying to steal rifles at night, which made it necessary to keep a careful watch and form specially arranged night camps.
The following extracts from letters give a more personal touch, and show the daily course of affairs on the way up.
_Captain W. H. Eve--November 1, 1916._--“We have finally got our orders.... Each day we march in the morning of course, and we camp on arrival in a square--what is called a perimeter camp. The plan for ours is, [Illustration] AH, BH, CH, DH show the Hotchkiss guns of each squadron. We take over more than 300 remounts to lead up with us as far as Amara. They come here immediately before we start. The squadron gets 80 as its share. It will mean pretty hard work for the unfortunate men. We have got any amount of transport--in fact I hardly know how we shall fill it.... So we shall travel in tremendous comfort, and cart along all our luxuries, such as tables, chairs, &c.... The horses do look well. My own are pictures, and the whole squadron is a pleasure to go round.”
_November 6._--“I have to write to-day to catch the mail from this place, Kurna, where we are just settling down, 1.15 P.M., with a very nice camp in some palm-trees by the river. I am enjoying myself now, though the first couple of days were uncomfortable.... We had taken over a batch of remounts before we started, 80 per squadron--all but half a dozen great cart-horses for gunners. They are very quiet, most of them, but it means nearly double work for the men, and they have all to be led with halters only, and lots of the men are leading two, so you can imagine what it is like. How thankful I shall be when we drop them at Amara.... Those that are not heavy draught are ponies for infantry chargers.
“Saturday was a horrid day, cloudy, strong south wind, and trying to rain, and very sticky; ... yesterday, Sunday, was the same sort of day.... We had a long bridge of boats to cross over the old Euphrates into Kurna, and that took time.... This is far and away the nicest camp we have had, in fact the only nice one, and we are very comfortable here.... We are on the right bank west still, but cross to the other before we get to Amara. The palms end here, and there is corn, &c., on the banks. The new railway is here close beside us, this section apparently about finished, but I don’t know how far. We are getting our soda-waters refilled at the hospital here.”
The new railway was one of the many works undertaken to strengthen the communications of the army, and make it movable and feedable when the time for the advance should come. With a railway behind him, and a fleet of river steamers, the new General was to be in a very different position from his unfortunate predecessors, pressing on with insufficient numbers and supplies in desperate endeavours to relieve the starving garrison of Kut.
_2nd Lieutenant Guy Pedder--Garden of Eden--November 6._--“Just got in and hear there is a mail out at 7 to-morrow, so just a short line to tell you I am very fit. This morning we started at 9 and did not get here till 3.30. I had a bathe, and then went for three or four miles with a gun to see if I could find any partridges or snipe, but saw nothing. This is our fourth day’s march, and we are at last in Mesopotamia proper (_i.e._, land in between the two rivers). It’s awfully pretty here, and we are right on the Tigris. Yesterday Box (Jeffrey) and I got permission to walk from the second camp to the third in the hopes of getting some shooting; we started off one and a half hours before the Regiment, and got in one hour after it, and walked about fifteen miles. I enjoyed it very much, but we saw only four brace of partridges, and got two and a half brace. At the next camp I believe there is some good duck-shooting.
“The march is rather spoilt as we’ve got 300 remounts to lead, and so it just doubles the amount of work for the men; however, we drop the remounts in six days’ time at Amara.
“Yesterday it actually rained, or tried to, for 2 or 3 minutes. I haven’t put up my 80-lb. tent yet this march; it’s perfect sleeping out in the open still, as long as one has three or four blankets on one’s camp-bed, as I do.
“Dinner!
“Later. Perfect night to-night; have been for a stroll on the river promenade; very tired, so must turn in as réveillé is at 5.30 to-morrow. Boiling hot again to-day, very fit but very tired, so night-night.”
_Amara, November 12._--“Just a very hurried line, as post goes at 7 to-morrow, to say I am very fit, after 150 miles; we have been just ten days getting to Amara. I have hardly marched with the Regiment at all, as each day I and one or two others have got leave to shoot independently on to the next camp; to-day, for instance, Twist, Jeffrey, and I left the last camp at eight and shot our way here, getting about fifty head. I got 5 brace of partridges, 4 couple of snipe, 5 sand-grouse, and 1 duck--a great day. We arrived here two hours after the Regiment, whom we never saw once on the way.... This seems a topping place, but we go on another six miles to-morrow and join the Brigade: how long we shall be there no one knows at present. I have enjoyed the march like anything, bar one or two nights when we struck thousands of mosquitoes. Thank goodness we have handed over all the remounts we had to bring up here and which delayed us so. The last two or three days I have been wading about in shorts after duck and snipe. It is very cold at night now, but still very hot between 12 and 3. Had a tremendous dinner to-night--soup, whole partridge and peas, boiled mutton, onion sauce and beans, tinned peaches and rice, a snipe, followed by a cigar and a bowl of cocoa.... The sand-grouse came over to-day in swarms and blackened the whole sky, most of them much too high; must turn in now as I am dead tired.”
_Captain W. H. Eve--Amara--November 12._--... “To-day we have marched fifteen miles to this place and didn’t get in till about 1.30, and then went straight on to the Remount Depot and handed over the remounts--thank goodness! It’s been rather a rotten march so far, spoilt by these remounts, which have made a terrible lot of work and caused us to march very slowly, only at a walk, and it has been very hard indeed on the men and very tiring for all of us.... The flies and mosquitoes at some of our camps have been wicked. I should think this is quite a nice place [Amara], but have hardly had time to see. Our shooting has been spoilt by our being the last lot of four, and now we can only shoot with an escort, which I shall hate, so I don’t suppose we shall do very much. They say there aren’t any pig to be found till the rains, when they all get flooded out into the desert. We have been through all sorts of country, a lot very dreary dry marsh, but some very nice, like moorland, short turf and thick scrub. Hardly any just sandy desert since the first few days.
_November 14._--... “We left the dirty camp at Amara at 8.30 yesterday and marched out here, about 6½ miles up-stream, just on the bend of the river. This is a really nice camp. The country is short heathy turf covered with camel thorn, but all very dry and hard now, and on the opposite bank are gardens and palm groves.... The camp is really as in peace-time, and they have trumpet-calls and all that sort of thing. There are no enemy near except Arab rifle thieves.... I suppose we shall start regular work here very soon, but we shan’t be able to do so much with the horses, as they only get 3 lb. of hay, the rest _bhoosa_ (chopped straw), and only 10 or 11 lb. of grain--uncrushed barley and bran.... I am so cosy and comfortable in my 80-lb. tent--the same as we had in India. We have moved the whole of our tents and the mess right up on to the river bank, where all the officers now are, and we have fixed up one mess-tent with the river side of it up horizontally and open to the river, and it is very nice.... We are under orders to hold ourselves in readiness to move from to-morrow, but no orders have come, so I’m afraid we are not off yet. But a big native boat has been secured for the Brigade in which some of the heavy kit is being carried.”
_November 15._--“Away to the east you can plainly see the Persian foothills about forty miles off.
“We are all right so far for rations ourselves, getting fresh meat quite often, and a full allowance; but our unfortunate horses are now on three-quarter rations of grain only, and that uncrushed barley, and hardly any hay, with a little chopped straw in turn. We hope when the railway is finished this may be put right, but it is bad at present, and means we dare do very little with them. The railway is finished in great parts, and they hoped would be through this month. Let’s only hope so....
“The nights are cold, but the days still hot, much more so than I expected. That’s what makes the climate trying, the tremendous changes during the twenty-four hours. But I think it’s very healthy up here, and we are all very fit and flourishing, and hardly any sickness among the men either. My only anxiety is my poor horses.
“They have got canteens going now both here [and] at the Front, so we can replenish always, and are doing ourselves quite well.”
_Lieutenant Chrystall--November 19._--“We have passed through the Garden of Eden, and a sterile beastly place it looks; and how old Adam existed Heaven only knows, for there is nothing to eat except dates and dust! The next place we passed of interest was the tomb of Ezra, one of the minor prophets? ’Tis a great place of pilgrimage for the Jews. One finds the reading of the Old Testament very interesting, as all the parts round about here are mentioned therein, and also all the customs, &c., and one can see many Abrahams and Ishmaels with the flocks and herds moving over the desert and round the banks of the river.”
_Captain S. O. Robinson--November 19._--“Since I last wrote we have moved up the river some distance.... I believe that we are going up farther in a day or two--_i.e._, if they can supply us. Our horses are on half-rations at present, but the men are well fed.
“I bought a cheap shot-gun in Bombay before we started, and it has been very useful. There are plenty of sand-grouse and partridge about, which make a very useful addition to the pot. The flies are worse than ever.”
_2nd Lieutenant Guy Pedder--November 19._--“This letter ought to reach you just before Christmas, so here are the best wishes for a happy Christmas. I have certainly never written those words before on as hot a day as to-day, ... and though I’ve written to Bombay for a thousand cartridges I don’t know when I shall get them, and I am practically out now, like every one else; it’s a rotten state of affairs, as there are now thousands of ducks, geese, grouse, and the farther one gets up-country naturally the shorter the rations get and game is invaluable.... From the number of troops coming up-country, I should think there ought to be a fairly good show out here, but it is impossible to say. I am very fit, and am sleeping in my tent on the edge of the Tigris, and have a swim when I get up at 7 every morning. I went into the Bazaar at Amara two days ago and tried to find some curios to send home, and am sending a pair of Arab stirrups and perhaps a bed quilt.... Played polo last night and went out shooting this morning, and am going again this evening.... I enjoyed the march up here awfully, and am looking forward to going on. Very fit, no news whatever.”
_November 26._--“A very tiny line to thank you for that ripping waistcoat. I wear it every evening. I am sending home some stirrups, but am keeping the bed quilt as it is so nice and warm.... Yesterday I got a beautiful hare, and we are having it to-night ... in fact, we are pretty well living on game, and have partridges and bacon even for breakfast ... but it will be more difficult to cater when our cartridges are finished. Am very fit, and have got rid of a filthy cold I had for a week, and have handed it on to Eve. The men are very excited, as they think they are at last going to have a show.”
The Regiment marched from Amara on the 28th November and was moving steadily up the river Tigris towards the Front. Captain Eve writes on the 1st December:--
“This march is as nice as the other one was nasty, and I am thoroughly enjoying it, and the men are as cheery as crickets. The General and Foster have gone on in front by boat, so the Colonel is commanding the Brigade and Twist the Regiment. Also having no remounts now to lead, we are able to trot along and march a decent pace, and we go largely across country. It has nearly all so far been heathy country with low thorn-scrub and lots of ditches, and it is excellent for the men and horses.... We camp in a huge square, always the same way.... We usually get in between 11.30 and 12, and then to stables, water, and feed. In the afternoon shooting, &c., but I haven’t been out, for I have only one cartridge left. That is my only grouse.... Of course we have patrols all round the camp at night and no one is allowed outside. Also at 5 every evening we all parade round the edge of the camp in the places we should occupy in case of attack. The only thing to be carefully watched for is Arab rifle thieves. I sleep with my pistol inside my flea-bag with me.... Here we are about as close as we ever get to the Persian hills--about twenty miles--and they are very clear and look so nice when one is in a flat plain, though they look very barren and bare. We aren’t on the river bank here, though quite close. There is generally something to be seen on the river, and the monitors look very workmanlike, and I like seeing them....”
_Arab Village--December 8._--“Here we are at our destination and all well.... Maude, who commands out here, came and saw us march in.... General Headquarters is also here and some other Divisions. The trenches are about 8000 yards forward from here. We had an aeroplane over yesterday--a great shooting but no luck, so I expect they know of our arrival by now. We have two pontoon bridges over the river here, and there are other camps on the north side as well.... A light railway runs up from Sheikh Saad to the trenches.”
At last, therefore, the Thirteenth had reached the real Front. The Regiment was then in excellent health and spirits, and in full numerical strength. The list of officers shows Lieut.-Colonel J. J. Richardson in command, Major E. F. Twist second in command, four Captains, six Lieutenants, and sixteen 2nd Lieutenants--a young lot, but perhaps none the worse for that. At Arab Village the newly-arrived 7th Brigade and the 6th Brigade, which had been in the country over a year, were formed into a Cavalry Division under Brigadier-General Crocker. The 6th Brigade consisted of the Fourteenth Hussars and the 21st and 22nd Indian Cavalry. So, after a lapse of a hundred years, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth, the old Ragged Brigade of the Peninsular War, were again together on service, but some thousands of miles away from Europe.
It has been noted that Lieut.-General Maude, who now commanded the army in Mesopotamia, had met the 7th Brigade as it marched into the camp at Arab Village, and that his own Headquarters were there also.
General Maude had succeeded General Lake some months earlier, and had now made all his preparations for a renewed advance against the Turkish army, which ever since the fall of Kut in April had flaunted its victorious banners in face of the British invaders of Mesopotamia, and not only defied them to retake the place, but threatened to strike out beyond them at Persia and India.
Before giving an account of the memorable campaign that followed, in which the Thirteenth Hussars bore an honourable part, it may be well, at the risk of some repetition, to explain more fully how matters stood when the advance began.
It has been said that the military power of the Turks in Asia was in fact the Eastern wing of the great combination organised by Germany for the conquest of the world. In Europe the Germans, Austrians, and Bulgarians were to overthrow and conquer the main armies of the Allies. In Asia the Turks, aided by German officers and military resources, were to strike out eastward and beat down such forces as the Allies could spare to meet them. Russia was to be attacked in the Caucasus, Russia and England were to be attacked in Persia, which was the highroad to India also, and England was to be attacked in Egypt. The Turkish armies, consisting of several hundred thousand men, securely based upon Asia Minor, were thus to act upon three great Asiatic fronts--the Caucasus on their left, Persia in the centre, Egypt on the right.
Their lines of communication were no doubt long and imperfect, for their railways were not complete; but holding the inner position, the handle of the fan as it were, they were very favourably situated in comparison with the Allies, who had to meet them by acting disconnectedly from outside the semicircle formed by the open fan, while the Turks could strike from inside along the spokes.
In 1914 and 1915 and 1916 there had been fighting on all three fronts of the semicircle--on the Russian frontier towards the Caucasus, the Turkish left; in Persia and Mesopotamia, the Turkish centre; on the frontier of Egypt, the Turkish right. The fighting had fluctuated, but it may be said roughly that on the two wings, towards the Caucasus and towards Egypt, the position was stationary. The Turks had held their own. In the centre they had pushed into Persia and gained some partial success, but as an offset against this, British forces coming from India by sea had landed in the Turkish province contiguous to Persia, and had overrun a considerable part of it. Even here, however, the most recent phase of the war had ended in favour of the Turks. They had repulsed a rash advance on the part of the British, and, shutting up in Kut the force which made it, had beaten off with great slaughter all British attempts at relief, and had finally captured a British Division of 10,000 men. The total loss inflicted upon the British in these operations had been over 30,000. In December 1916, therefore, the prospects of the Turks on their central front were not unpromising. Though they had not conquered Persia, still less succeeded in seriously threatening India, they had made matters very unpleasant for the British in Asia, and inflicted a severe blow upon British prestige. During the hot weather of 1916 both sides had been preparing for a renewal of the conflict upon this front, and the campaign was now about to open.
Judging from a variety of indications, it seems clear that the Turks and their German advisers had decided that the plan of the coming campaign in Asia should be as follows. On their two wings, towards the Caucasus and towards Egypt, the Turks were to content themselves with holding their own, or gaining such success as could be gained without any serious drain on their resources. There was not any vital object to be attained by an advance in force upon these fronts; or at all events a determined advance upon the central front offered a greater chance of decisive results. If Persia could be again invaded, with real success this time, and a Turkish army, or at least a vigorous propaganda, could be pushed on from Persia through Afghanistan to the Indian frontier, the great object of the Asiatic war, which was the overthrow of the British in India, might yet be secured. In comparison with that object nothing else mattered. The Turkish weight, therefore, was to be thrown upon the central front.
But this much being decided, there remained the question how, exactly, the blow was to be struck. Was the British force in Mesopotamia to be destroyed as a preliminary to a further advance into Persia, or were the two operations to be attempted at the same time, or could the British in Mesopotamia be left alone for the moment and an advance into Persia, into their rear, be made without attacking them directly? From the great city of Baghdad, the capital of Turkish Arabia, and the immediate base for operations on the central front, it was possible to avoid the Mesopotamian route, and to strike at Persia by a more northerly line. Which of the three schemes was the best to adopt? The question seems to have been considered in detail.
Eventually it was decided that the third was the most promising. The argument which prevailed with the Turks or their German advisers seems to have been that the British army in Mesopotamia, though lately worsted in its onslaught on prepared positions, was a formidable enemy to attack in the field, and one moreover who was being reinforced from England and India. Such an attack would be a very serious and at best a lengthy operation. It would be better to avoid a direct attack, to make such threats and demonstrations in Mesopotamia as would suffice to keep the British in apprehension of a Turkish offensive, and to leave them facing the positions from which they had suffered so many repulses at the beginning of the year. They would probably be careful about assaulting those positions again, and if in the meantime a Turkish force were to invade Persia, they would probably have to expend their strength in meeting it there. A considerable number of troops was therefore prepared for an advance on the Persian frontier by northerly routes, while the Turks in Mesopotamia were reinforced to such an extent only as seemed sufficient for the maintenance of their main positions on the Tigris, and for threatening demonstrations on the Euphrates.
It must be admitted that this reasoning was strategically not unsound, and that against a timid or over-cautious commander it might well have succeeded. Happily for Great Britain, the new British leader, General Maude, was a man who combined reasonable caution with the knowledge that war cannot be successfully waged without incurring some risks; and happily also, the summer months when active warfare was impossible had been utilised by the British War Office to reinforce and equip his army with such vigour and thoroughness that it had become a much more formidable weapon than the Turks imagined. Not only had additional troops been poured into Mesopotamia from France and elsewhere, until the numerical superiority had passed to the British, but in other respects the force had been completely reorganised. By the end of the summer light railways had been pushed forward, river steamers in great numbers had been collected from various parts of the world, stores of food and supplies of all kinds had been sent up the Tigris and Euphrates, the ports and the rivers themselves had been vastly developed for traffic. By the end of October General Maude had been able to move his headquarters from the base at Basra to the neighbourhood of the Turkish positions, in the knowledge that the difficulties of transport had been overcome, and that he had now under his hand a force of troops superior in numbers to his enemy, and sure for the future of food and all necessary supplies. It had been a great effort, and his own exertions had been incessant, but the worst was over. In a few weeks more, when the weather became fit for campaigning, he would be able to go forward with every hope of success. Early in December, when he brought together his Cavalry Division on the Tigris, the time had almost come.
What General Maude had then to consider, and had doubtless considered very carefully during the three months which had elapsed since he took over command in Mesopotamia, was his own plan of campaign. He knew that the country looked to him to retake Kut and re-establish the reputation of British arms in Asia, which the surrender of a British Division, and the bloody repulses we had suffered in trying to relieve it, had undoubtedly tarnished. That meant a renewed attack upon the Turks in their strong positions on the Tigris, which the army under his command was eager to undertake. And he now knew, or believed he knew, that the enemy intended to advance into Persia in his rear, where the British forces were small and the Russians not much stronger, while the Persians themselves were in very doubtful mood. He could hope for little co-operation on the part of the Russians, either there or on the side of the Caucasus, for Russia was in serious difficulties; nor could he hope for any help from the British forces in Egypt. They apparently had enough on their hands, and in any case they were separated from him by the Arabian desert. On both flanks of their great Asiatic battle-front the Turks were practically safe. For success against them he must depend solely upon the forces under his own command in the centre of Asia. And since the Allies in Europe were barely holding their own, he must have felt as Jervis felt when he sighted the Spanish fleet off St Vincent, that England had great need of a victory at that moment.
It is evident from what General Maude has left on record that he had from the first contemplated the action he eventually took. On this point it is well to let him speak for himself.
_Despatch of April 10, 1917._--“Briefly put,” he says, “the enemy’s plan appeared to be to contain our main forces on the Tigris, whilst a vigorous campaign, which would directly threaten India, was being developed in Persia. There were indications, too, of an impending move down the Euphrates towards Nasariyeh. To disseminate our troops in order to safeguard the various conflicting interests involved would have relegated us to a passive defensive everywhere, and it seemed clear from the outset that the true solution of the problem was a resolute offensive, with concentrated forces, on the Tigris, thus effectively threatening Baghdad, the centre from which the enemy’s columns were operating. Such a stroke pursued with energy and success would, it was felt, automatically relieve the pressure in Persia and on the Euphrates, and preserve quiet in all districts with the security of which we were charged.
“This, then, was the principle which guided the subsequent operations, which may be conveniently grouped into phases as follows:--
“_First._--Preliminary preparations from 28th August to 12th December.”
It would be confusing to follow up at this point General Maude’s summary of his operations, but enough of it has been given to show that from the time he took command he contemplated a “resolute offensive” on the Tigris, threatening Baghdad, and that his preliminary preparations for that movement were steadily pushed on until the 12th December, when all was ready.
The immediate field of conflict on the Tigris, and the positions occupied by the conflicting armies, are shown in the accompanying sketch-map.
The Turks were astride the river. On the north or left bank they held the same positions as they had occupied since the fall of Kut. At Sannaiyat the enemy awaited attack in the same formidable labyrinth of trenches, flanked by marsh and river, from which in the early part of the year he had three times repelled the desperate onslaught of our troops. “Since then he had strengthened and elaborated this trench system, and a series of successive positions extended back as far as Kut, fifteen miles in the rear. The river bank from Sannaiyat to Kut was also intrenched.” On the south or right bank of the river the enemy was not so far forward. He had, on this side, withdrawn to a line of intrenched defences which curved from a point on the Tigris, only about three miles east of Kut, to a point on the Hai stream, and thence round again to the Tigris west of Kut. The Hai stream was also held for some miles southward with posts and mounted Arab auxiliaries.
The British troops held the north bank of the Tigris up to the Turkish trenches at Sannaiyat, and the south bank for about eleven miles farther up-stream. Thus, as General Maude points out, the British were strategically better situated than the enemy, for while their flanks were secure the withdrawal of the enemy’s troops on the south bank seemed to offer a chance for a blow sooner or later at his communications on the north bank, which would mean the retreat or capture of the force at Sannaiyat.
In these circumstances it was decided that the proper course was, first, to secure possession of the Hai stream, then to clear the enemy’s trench systems on the right bank of the Tigris, and finally to cross the Tigris as far west as possible. This idea of a turning movement by the south was not a new one, for during the British operations for the relief of Kut more than one attempt had been made to seize the Hai; but the British forces had been too weak, and the attempts had failed. Now, as shown above, General Maude’s army was better fitted in numbers and equipment to make the attempt with success.
It may be as well to note here what was the composition of the army. Speaking generally, it may be said that about two-thirds of it consisted of Indians, drawn from various races, the remaining third being British. The Indians were not regarded in Europe, or by the Turks, as equal to the British, nor were they--for European warfare at all events. Nevertheless, they had faced the Turks well in previous fighting, and as shown in an earlier chapter, they had won some credit even on the European Front, under great disadvantages. They were, in fact, excellent soldiers, and the Cavalry had a special reputation. The British troops were as good as possible, largely drawn from the old Regular Army, with additions from “Kitchener’s men.” They were all in high spirits, and eager to get at the enemy. This was certainly the case in the Thirteenth Hussars, where the men were very keen to go forward.
On the 12th December the final orders were given. Lieut.-General Cobbe, with a strong force of Infantry and Artillery, was to hold the enemy to his positions on the north bank of the Tigris, and picket the south bank nearly up to the Turkish positions on that side, while the Cavalry and a force under Lieut.-General Marshall were by a surprise march to secure and intrench a position on the Hai. Everything was to be got ready that night for the opening of the campaign on the morrow.
It is curious to note, by the way, that on the 12th December, the day before the advance, a detail which seems to have given special satisfaction to the British troops was the permission to shave the moustache. Private Massey’s diary has the following entry: “On the 12th it came in the orders from the Regimental Office that we could shave the hair off our top lip if we wished. Many a time have I heard the men grousing and grumbling because it was against orders to shave the top lip. A great many took advantage of this order, and Captain Eve appeared on parade with his moustache shaved off. I fetched a pair of scissors, and after cutting the hair on my top lip quite short, I shaved it off, and I felt much healthier and cleaner.” So the Thirteenth, or many of them, went into the Mesopotamian fighting after the manner of their forefathers in the days of Napoleon--“bien rasés.”