CHAPTER XXVI.
1. The first of these quotations is from the Stoic Cleanthes, the second from a lost play of Euripides; in the third Epictetus has joined together two sayings of Socrates, one from the _Crito_ and one from the _Apologia_. Anytus and Meletus were the principal accusers of Socrates in the trial which ended in his sentence to death.
NOTES ON PRINCIPAL PHILOSOPHIC TERMS USED BY EPICTETUS.
[I give under this head only those terms the exact force of which may not be apparent to the reader in a mere translation.]
[Greek: Aidêmôn].--Pious, reverent, modest. The substantive is [Greek: aidôs], the German Ehrfurcht (_Wilhelm Meister_, _Wanderjahre_, Bk. II. ch. ii.), a virtue in high regard with Epictetus, who generally mentions it in connection with that of "faithfulness," [Greek: pistis]. In Wordsworth's poem, "My heart leaps up when I behold a rainbow in the sky," the "natural piety" which he prays may abide with him in his old age seems to be just that moral sensitiveness or [Greek: aidôs] which passes into reverence and worship in the presence of certain things, and into shame and dread in that of others.
[Greek: Apatheia].--Peace--that is, peace from passion, [Greek: pathê]. [Greek: Pathos] was any affection of the mind causing joy or grief. As it appears from Bk. II. iii. I., [Greek: apatheia] is not, in Epictetus, the state of absolute freedom from these passions, but that of being able to master them so that they shall not overwhelm the inner man.
[Greek: Diarthrôtikos].--That which _organizes_, constitutes organically, forms into a system. From [Greek: arthron], a joint. The word "analyze," by which Long translates [Greek: diarthroun], seems to me wanting in the formative sense expressed by the original.
[Greek: Dogma].--An opinion, that which seems ([Greek: dokein]) true; generally in the special sense of a philosophic dogma.
[Greek: Euroein].--To prosper; literally, to flow freely, [Greek: euroia], prosperity. A common Stoic phrase for a happy life.
[Greek: Eusebeia].--Religion, piety. [Greek: sebomai]--"_to feel awe_ or _fear_ before God and man, especially when about to do something disgraceful" (_Liddell and Scott_); to worship, respect, reverence.
[Greek: Hêgemonikon to].--The Ruling Faculty--that in a man which chooses, determines, takes cognizance of good and evil, and sways the inferior faculties ([Greek: dynameis], powers) to its will. Lotze notes this _hegemonic_ quality in the human soul as that which distinguishes it from the bundle of sensations into which the Association Philosophy would resolve it.
[Greek: thaumazein].--To admire, be dazzled with admiration by, to worship, to be taken up with a thing so as to lose the power of cool judgment. A frequent word in Epictetus, the sense of which is precisely rendered in Hor. _Sat._ I, 4, 28, "Hunc capit argenti splendor, _stupet_ Albius ære."
[Greek: Idiôtês].--One of the vulgar, an unlettered person; in Epictetus, one uninstructed in philosophy. Originally the word meant one who remained in private life, not filling any public office, or taking part in State affairs. A man might be an [Greek: idiôtês], or "layman," with respect to any branch of science or art.
[Greek: Kalos kai agathos].--The good and wise man--literally, beautiful and good. A standing phrase to denote the perfection of human character. [Greek: kalos] is a word sometimes difficult to render. Curtius connects it etymologically with Sanscrit, _kalyas_; Gothic, _hails_=healthy.
[Greek: Oiêsis].--"Conceit"--defined by Cicero as "Opinatio"--intellectual self-sufficiency, the supposing one's self to know something when one does not. "The first business of a philosopher," says Epictetus, "is to cast away [Greek: oiêsis], for it is impossible that one can begin to learn the things that he thinks he knows" (_Diss._ II. xvii. 1.) He is not, in short, to be "wise in his own conceit."
[Greek: orexis, ekklisis, hormê, aphormê].--Pursuit, avoidance, desire, aversion. According to Simplicius (Comment. _Ench._ i.), [Greek: orexis] and [Greek: ekklisis] were used by the Stoics to express the counterparts in outward action of the mental affections, [Greek: hormê] and [Greek: aphormê], and were regarded as consequent upon the latter.
[Greek: proairesis].--The Will; but as used in Epictetus, this word implies much more than the mere faculty of volition. Literally, it means a choosing of one thing before another; in Epictetus, the power of deliberately resolving or purposing, the exercise of the reflective faculty being implied. It is hardly to be distinguished from [Greek: to hêgemonikon], _q. v._
[Greek: prolêpseis].--"Natural Conceptions." See Preface, xxviii., xxix. The "primary truths" of Lord Herbert of Cherbury.
[Greek: Synkatatithesthai].--To assent to or acquiesce in anything, to ratify by the judgment the emotions produced by external things or events, such as the sense of dread, or pleasure, or reprobation, which they arouse in us. To be on one's guard against the hasty yielding of this assent is one of Epictetus's main injunctions to the aspirant in philosophy.
[Greek: Tarassesthai].--To be troubled; [Greek: a-taraxia], tranquillity. [Greek: Tarassein] is primarily to stir up, confuse, throw into disorder.
[Greek: phantasia].--An appearance; with the Stoics, any mental impression as received by the perceptive faculty before the Reason has pronounced upon it, a bare perception.
INDEX OF REFERENCES.
[The references in the right-hand column are to the books, chapters, and verses of the _Dissertations_, to the chapters of the _Encheiridion_, and to the _Fragments_, in Schweighäuser's edition of Epictetus.]