Chapter 1
Originally scanned at sacred-texts.com by John B. Hare. This eBook was produced by Chetan K. Jain
THE TATTVA-MUKTAVÂLÎ
by Pûr.nânanda Chakravartin
JOURNAL
OF
THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY.
[New Series, Volume XV]
[London, Trübner and Company]
[1883]
{Scanned and edited by Christopher M. Weimer, April 2002}
ART. IV.--__The Tattva-muktavâlî of Gau.da-pûr.nânanda-chakra- vartin__. Edited and Translated by Prof. E. B. COWELL.
The following poem was written by a native of Bengal, named Pûr.nânanda Chakravartin. Nothing is known as to his date; if the work were identical with the poem of the same name mentioned in the account of the Râmânuja system in Mâdhava's Sarvadaršanasa.mgraha, it would be, of course, older than the fourteenth century, but this is very uncertain; I should be inclined to assign it to a later date. The chief interest of the poem consists in its being a vigorous attack on the Vedânta system by a follower of the Pûr.naprajña school, which was founded by Madhva (or Ânandatîrtha) in the thirteenth century in the South of India. Some account of his system (which in many respects agrees with that of Râmânuja) is given in Wilson's "Hindu Sects;" [Footnote: Works, vol. i. pp. 139-150. See also Prof. Monier Williams, J.R.A.S. Vol. XIV. N.S. p. 304.] but the fullest account is to be found in the fifth chapter of the Sarvadaršanasa.mgraha. Both the Râmânujas and the Pûr.naprajñas hold in opposition to the Vedânta [Footnote: As the different systems are arranged in the Sarva D. S. according to the irrespective relation to the Vedânta, we can easily understand why Mâdhava there places these two systems so low down in the scale, and only just above the atheistic schools of the Chârvâkas, Buddhists, and Jainas.] that individual souls are distinct from Brahman; but they differ as to the sense in which they are thus distinct. The former maintain that "unity" and "plurality" are equally true from different points of view; the latter hold that the relation between the individual soul and Brahman is that of a master and a servant, and consequently that they are absolutely separate. It need not surprise us, therefore, to see that, although Râmânuja is praised in the fifty-third sloka of this poem as "the foremost of the learned," some of his tenets are attacked in the eightieth.
The Sanskrit text of this poem was published in the Benares Pa.n.dit for Sept. 1871, by Pa.n.dit Vechârâma Šarman. An edition, with a Bengali translation, was also published some years ago in Calcutta, by Jagadânanda Goswâmin; [Footnote: No date is given.] but the text is so full of false readings of every kind, and the translation in consequence goes so often astray, that I have not found much help from it. I have collated the text in the Benares Pa.n.dit (A.) with a MS. (B.) sent to me by my friend, Pa.n.dit Mahešachandra Nyâyaratna, the Principal of the Calcutta Sanskrit College. He has also sent me the readings in certain passages from two MSS. in the Calcutta Sanskrit College Library (C.D.); and I have to thank him for his help in explaining some obscure allusions.
The poem itself seems to me an interesting contribution to the history of Hindu philosophical controversy, [Footnote: Dr. Banerjea has quoted and translated several stanzas in his 'Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy.'] and so I have subjoined a literal English translation. I would venture to remind my readers of the words of the manager in the prologue of the Mâlavikâgnimitra, "Every old poem is not good because it is old, nor is every modern poem to be blamed simply because it is modern."
TRANSLATION.
1. Victorious is the garland-wearing foster-son of Nanda,--the protector of his devotees,--the destroyer of the cruel king,-- dark-blue like the delicate tamâla blossoms,--formidable with his many outspread rays,--mighty with all his attendant powers, [Footnote: The Bengali translation explains these as the internal powers (__antara"ngâ__) Hlâdinî, etc., and the external (__bahira"ngâ__) Prahvâ, etc.]--and having his forehead radiant like the moon.
2. This follower of the Purâ.nas, who holds by his own belief, reads to his heart's content the Purâ.na in the morning, and he listens devotedly with profound meditation, his whole mind intent on the meaning of the book.
3. Having abandoned the doctrine of the oneness of the individual and the Supreme Soul, he establishes by argument their mutual difference; having used Šruti and Šm.riti as a manifold proof, he employs Inference in many ways in the controversy.
4. This individual soul must be different from Brahman because it is always circumscribed,--many are the similar arguments which are to be acknowledged in the course of our reasonings.
5. "Might we not say that a jar and a web could be called identical because both are cognizable?" [Footnote: There is a favourite Naiyâyik example of a __kevalânvayi__ middle term, "a jar is nameable because it is cognizable as a web is."] But we cannot say so in regard to these two things in question, for Brahman alone is that which cannot be cognized.
6. The sentence "Thou art That" (__tat tvam asi__) which is understood in its primary meaning as referring to the object of the Veda, [Footnote: Or __vedavishaye__ may perhaps simply mean __vede__, cf. šl. 112.]--the author thus explains its meaning, as he knows his own doctrine, and has fixed his mind on the system of Duality; since the word 'that' (__tat__) is here indeclinable and implies a difference, and the word 'thou' (__tvam__) means that which is to be differentiated, the sign of the genitive case has been elided; [Footnote: The author here explains the sentence __tat tvam asi__, as really meaning __tasya tvam asi__ "thou art Its."] "thou only," such is not the meaning of the sentence [Footnote: In "Thou art that," 'thou' and 'that' would refer to the same subject (__sâmânâdhikara.nya__)].
7. He is all-knowing, all-seeing, Himself the three worlds, in whose belly thou art thyself contained,--He causes at once by a movement of the brow the creation, preservation, and absorption of all beings! Thou art ignorant, and only seest relatively, He is the adorable, the one Witness of all worlds; thou art changing, He is One; thou art all dull and stained, not such is He.
8. As for the text "I am Brahman," you must take the nominative case as only used there for the genitive by the licence of an inspired speaker. How, if it were otherwise, would there be a genitive in the illustration, [Footnote: This is often used as an illustration in Vedânta works, as __e.g.__ B.rihad Âra.ny. Up. ii. 1. 20, "as the spider proceeds with his web, as the little sparks proceed from fire, so from this Soul proceed all vital airs, all worlds, all gods, all beings."] as in the sentence "as the sparks of the fire"?
9. The poets call a lad fire (from his hot temper), the face the orb of a full moon, the eye a blue lotus, the bosom mount Meru, and the hand a young shoot; by a confusion of the superimposed appearance we may thus have the idea of identity where there is still a real difference; and so too must we deal with those words of Šruti "I am Brahman." [Footnote: This is another suggested method of interpreting the words "I am Brahman." It may be only a common case of "qualified superimponent indication," as "the man of the Panjâb is an ox" (cf. Kâvya Prakâša, ii. 10-12). Cf. the definition of upachâra in the Sâhitya Darpa.na: __upachâro hi nâmâtyanta.m višakalitayoh šâd.rišyâtišayamahimnâ bhedapratîtisthaganamâtram__].
10. As there are many waves in the sea, so are we many individual souls in Brahman; the wave can never become the sea; how then wilt thou, the individual soul, become Brahman?
11. In the depths of all Šâstras the two things are both recognized, knowledge and ignorance; so too virtue and vice; and thus also science, and next to it closely clinging behind, but other than it, appears false science; thus everywhere there are opposite pairs, and similar is the notorious pair, Brahman and the soul. How can these two have oneness? Let the good answer with an upright mind.
12. Thou, O Soul, art the reflection of the Supreme Being, who possesses the power of illusion and is the substratum of all, while He, the adorable, shines forth as Himself the original; the one moon in the sky is seen manifold in water and the like; therefore there is a difference between thee and Brahman as between the reflection and its original.
13. Yonder Brahman is described by the words of the sacred texts as not to be known, nor to be reasoned about, and as devoid of all desire; but thou art within the range of speech and of thought; how shall there be oneness of thee and Brahman?
14. Thou art verily bereft of thy understanding, O individual Soul, by the darkness of this doctrine of Mâyâ, while thou constantly proclaimest like a madman "I am Brahman"; where is thy sovereignty, where thy empire, where thy omniscience? There is as vast a difference between Brahman and thee as between mount Meru and a mustard-seed!
15. Thou art a finite soul, He is indeed all-pervading; thou standest only on one spot, while He is everywhere always; thou, being of a moment, art happy and unhappy; He is happy at all times; how canst thou say "I am He"? Fie! art thou not ashamed?
16. Glass is glass, and a gem is a gem; a shell is but a shell, and silver is silver; there is never seen a transposition [Footnote: Dr. Banerjea (__Dialogues__, p. 379) reads __kadâpy atyayajñânam, i.e.__ vyabhichâra; but all the MSS. which I have compared read __na kadâ vyatyaya__ (or __vyatyaya.m__) __jñânam; kadâ__ seems irregularly used for __kadâpi__, as it is also in šl. 113, __c.__] among them. But wherever other things are imagined, to be found in something else, it is through an error; and so it is when the soul utters such words as "that art thou!"
17. The meaning of the word "__that__" (__tat__) is an ocean of immortality, filled with manifest and supreme felicity; the meaning of the word "__thou__" is a most miserable being, bewildered in mind through the burden of the fear of existence; these two can never be one, they are divided by the nature of things; the doctrine of Non-unity is the truth for all worlds, thou art but His slave.
18. If Brahman were meant by these words, the power employed would not be Denotation, for their literal meaning does not apply; [Footnote: In such sentences as "That art thou," "I am Brahman," etc., the primary power of the words, __i.e.__ " Denotation" (__abhidhâ__), could not express the unconditioned Brahman destitute of all attributes; for Denotation rests upon the ordinary conventional meaning, and how could this take in an idea so far removed from ordinary experience? Nor could it be the secondary power "Indication" (__laksha.nâ__), as in the well- known instance of "the herd-station on the Ganges," where the Ganges, by "indication," means the shore and not the stream. For "indication" must be based on some connexion between the primary and the indicated secondary meaning; but how can that which is "without a second" be connected with anything?] consequently it must be the second power of a word, Indication.
19. Yet if so, why should it be Indication? for this arises from some association with the primary meaning; but with what can that substance be associated which is disconnected with everything and without a second?
20. That power of a word is Indication, by which, when the primary meaning is precluded, some other meaning is indicated in connexion therewith, through some motive or through common currency; and its causes are thus three [Footnote: I suppose that these are (1) the incompatibility of the primary sense; (2) the common currency of the secondary meaning, __e.g.__ when "Europe" is used to imply its inhabitants in the phrase "Europe makes war:" (3) a motive, as in "a herd-station on the Ganges," where "Ganges" is used instead of "the bank of the Ganges," in order to imply the coolness and purity of the spot].
21. Now if there is no Denotation in a phrase, how can there arise any Indication? First there should be some primary meaning precluded, and then there may be the Indication of something else.
22. Where there is no accepted Denotation, how can you there have Indication? If there is no village, how can there be a boundary?-- there is no child without a father [Footnote: Cf. the Bengali proverb __mâthâ nâi târ mâthâbyathâ__, "he has no head and yet he has a headache."]
23. "The lances enter, the swords, the bows and arrows,"--here we have Indication; for the sentence must suggest something else to complete itself, as there cannot be "entrance" in the case of an inanimate subject.
24. "A herd-station on the Ganges,"--here we have the self-sacrifice of the primary to another meaning, since the Ganges, as being in the form of water, cannot be the site of a herd-station.
25. In the example "ghî is life" there is produced the idea of sameness of form; in the example "this is life" there arises the idea of identity [Footnote: In the first ex. there is __šuddha- sâropa-laksha.nâ__ or "pure superimponent indication," in the second there is __šuddha-sâdhyavasâna-l.__ or "pure introspeceptive indication," where the ghî is swallowed up in the "life." Most writers, however, disallow __upachâra__ in __šuddha-laksha.nâ__]; but the knowledge of the meaning of the sentences will be produced by a metaphor,--there is not brought about a real oneness.
26. The doctrine of Identity is established with a desperate effort, and men have recourse to the power "Indication"; but there are three things which should rise to our view,--the primary meaning, the indicated meaning, and their connexion [Footnote: He seems to imply that each of these three requisites fails in the present case,-- there is no primary meaning, and still less a secondary, and there is no connexion with any other object.].
27. There is here no Denotation from the absence of conventional agreement; there is no Indication from the absence of any reason [to establish it]; by what reason, on the theory of Mâyâ, can Brahman be ever made known?
28. He is described [Footnote: He now proceeds to declare his own opinions] in the Veda by the primary power of words [Denotation] as the Maker of the Universe; and by Inference we establish the conclusion that all these things have a Maker.
29. The Vedas are a proof, the Šm.ritis are a proof; there is a being to be proved and known there in many passages; it is the great Personality which is to be made known by all the Vedas,--therefore it is this which the Veda takes as its subject.
30. True verbal testimony produces knowledge even in regard to that which is absolutely non-existent,--then how much more in regard to Brahman the Lord, the maker of all that moves or is motionless!
31. It is said, [Footnote: Taitt. Upanish. ii. 4.] "Speech retires therefrom together with the Mind,"--but this is its explanation,-- give ear: Together with the Mind Speech makes Him its object, and then retires, because His nature is not to be fathomed.
32. "Brahman is not to be made the object of mind or of words," [Footnote: Cf. the Ka.tha Up. vi. 12, "The soul is not to be reached by speech nor by the mind nor by the eye."]--from this saying it is understood that he is only to be declared by Revelation, Revelation has no faltering action [Footnote: For __skhaladgati__, cf. __Kâvyaprakâša__, ii. 16.].
33. "He who is versed in the Word-Brahman attains to the highest Brahman," [Footnote: This line is quoted from Šruti in the Maitri Upanishad, vi. 22.]--surely such words of inspired sages are not mistaken babble.
34. Assuredly the conventional meaning of the words "existent," "thought," and "joy" applies to Brahman, just as the words "pot," "cloth," etc., refer to those particular objects.
35. The perception of the conventional meaning of words is aroused by the dialogue of the orderer and the ordered; and afterwards by insertion and omission the child becomes thoroughly skilled in the use of the words. [Footnote: Cf. Sâhityadarpa.na, ii. "On the old man's saying, when giving directions to the middle-aged man," etc. The Sâhitya D. uses the terms __âvâpoddhârau__, the Siddhântamuktâvalî (p. 80) uses __âvâpodvâpan__].
36. So through hearing the words of the teacher and repeated study of the šâstras the conventional meaning of such words as Brahman, etc., is assuredly produced in the pupil.
37. This earth must surely have had a maker; for its having the nature of an effect is a sign, just as we see to be the case in pots, etc.
38. If it is established that the supreme Lord is the maker, then his having a body follows as a matter of course [Footnote: This is one of the tenets of Râmânujas as well as Pûr.naprajñas.]; for in all effects, as pots and the like, the maker is seen to have a body and not to be bodiless.
39. [The objector urges] "If the supreme Lord has a body, then he will be like to beings such as we are; there cannot be a maker without an intermediate agency [Footnote: The __vyâpâra__ or intermediate agency is defined as __taj-janyatve sati taj-janya- janako hi vyâpâra.h__],--I see no difference whatever."
40. But great is the difference which is declared to exist between the Adorable Lord and men working with spades, sickles, ploughshares, and hands; these are helpless in the six waves [Footnote: Compare the memorial line, __Šokamohau jarâm.rityû kshutpipâse sha.dûrmaya.h__.] (of human infirmity,) and wearied with the burden of labour,--He effects everything by a mere motion of his brow.
41. The Master can make, not make [Footnote: With this curious use of __akartum__ (extending the analogy of such forms as __akurvan, ak.ritvâ__, etc.) cf. Theognis, 621: {Greek: __pas tis ploúsion ándpa tíei atíei dè penixrón__}. Cf. Shilleto, Cambridge Journ. of Philology, 1876, p. 161.], and alter; hence one may learn that vast is the interval between the two.
42. If the body is called the site of enjoyment, it is well known that this definition will hold good (even in this highest case [Footnote: Could __loke__ mean that it will hold good "of the world" as his body?]),--there is nothing deficient but everything is present in the Lord's body [Footnote: Cf. "Whose body nature is and God the soul."], since He is the husband of Lakshmî.
43. "Every body is influenced by deserts,"--if this universal law is accepted, then He who is the Maker of all must be impelled [to create the world] by the deserts which dominate over beings like us [Footnote: __I.e.__ he creates the world to give their deserts to the different souls.]
44. "Every body must be non-eternal,"--this is a general law, yet still Κvara's body may be eternal; for earth is everywhere seen to be non-eternal, while in the form of its atoms it is eternal.
45. One must not say, "why should the desert of one attach itself to another?" For it was in consequence of the respective merits and demerits of the elephant and the crocodile that the holder of the discus made all haste to interfere in the battle [Footnote: The objector urges "why should our good or evil deserts oblige God to act in a certain way?" He answers by referring to the well-known legend given in the Bhâgavata Purâ.na, viii. ch. 2-4. A certain king, named Indradyumna, became an elephant through Agastya's curse. One day, while drinking in a lake, he was seized by a crocodile, and the struggle lasted for a thousand years. At last, in despair, he prayed to Vish.nu, who came down mounted on Garu.da and killed the crocodile. Thus we see that, although in one sense the deserts of one being cannot attach themselves to another, still they must cause certain actions in another being, or it would be impossible that each should receive its due reward or punishment.]
46. It has been heard of old that all this universe proceeded from the lotus of the navel of the Lord; hence is it established that be has a body, for how can there be a navel without a body?
47. The body of God is very pure,--to be enjoyed by all the senses, as being richly endowed with the six qualities [Footnote: These six qualities, according to the Commentator on the Bhâgavata P. i. 3. 36, are sovereignty, knowledge, glory, prosperity, dispassion, and virtue; a different list is given in the Sarva Darš. S. p. 54, l. 22 (but cf. p. 69, l. 18). See also __infra__ in šl. 95.],--and to be discovered by means of all the Vedas,--Gangâ verily is the water wherewith he washes his feet.
48. Whenever by the influence of time there comes the increase of evil and the diminution of right, then the adorable Lord accomplishes the preservation of the good and the destruction of the wicked.
49. The Lord is said to be twofold, as the Incarnation and He who becomes incarnate; so too the souls are twofold, as divided into faithful and faithless.
50. Now some say that the personal soul is only the reflection of the Supreme; but their opinion does not at all hold, since it cannot be established.
51. For how could there arise a reflection of that Infinite and stainless one? and how could an insentient [reflection] enjoy the pain and pleasure arising from the merit and demerit declared in the Veda?
52. There may indeed be a reflection of that which is limited; but how shall there be one of Him whose attribute is infinity?
53. Râmânuja, the foremost of the learned, condemned this theory of an original and its reflection; the fact that this doctrine is not accepted by the learned, will not make it seem more plausible.
54. There is an eternal division between the two, from the words of the Veda, "two birds;" [Footnote: Rig V. i. 164, 20, "Two birds associated together, two friends, take refuge in the same tree; one of them eats the sweet fig; the other, abstaining from food, merely looks on."] from the mention there of "two friends," how can there be identity between them?
55. I become Brahman, that is, I cease to have mundane existence through beholding the soul in Brahman; the result of this would be the abolition of sorrow, etc., but in no way absolute Oneness.
56. I become Brahman also through beholding Brahman in the soul [Footnote: Another reading is __brahma.ny âtmanirîksha.nât__]; the result would be the abolition of His being out of sight [Footnote: __I.e.__ it would be always __videre videntem__], but in no way Oneness.
57. It must not be said that by continued meditation with intent thought a man becomes Brahman; there will only enter into him a little merit; as we see indeed in the case of worms, bees, and the like [Footnote: Cf. Hitopadeša, Introd. šl. 45.];
58. By devotedly worshipping Brâhmans without ceasing, a Šûdra will never become a Brâhman; there may enter into him a little merit, but one of the Šûdra caste will never become a Brâhman.
59. The venerable author of the Aphorisms himself established a duality when he spoke of the application of the terms "object" and "agent" [Footnote: In Vedânta S. i. 2. 4, it is shown that certain passages in the Upanishads refer to Brahman and not the embodied soul, "because of the application therein of the terms object and agent;" as __e.g.__ in the passage of the Chhândogya Upan. iii. 14, "I shall attain it when I have departed from hence." These words imply an agent who attains and also an object which is attained, __i.e.__ Brahman. Ša"nkara in his comment on i. 2. 11 illustrates this by the passage in the Katha Upanishad iii. 1, "The two, drinking the due reward from their works, in this world entered the cave, in the highest place of the supreme soul" (sc. the heart)]; and thus has it been explained by the author of the commentary by quoting passages of the Veda which imply duality, as that which says "the two entered the cave."