Part II

(_November 30_)

In order to understand the events that followed, we have to imagine a victorious but very weary British Army holding a newly consolidated salient against an enemy whom they have just roused to a revengeful fury by a sudden stinging slap in the face.

The enemy had been horribly frightened, and now that he had recovered he realised how urgently his prestige demanded signal vindication. We were, it would seem, half expecting in a tired unimaginative sort of way that he might hit at us on the new Bourlon Wood flank of our salient. On the Gouzeaucourt side were old-established defences. These we held thinly--it never entering our heads apparently that he would attack an old piece of the line.

But the German Army Commander, General von der Marwitz, had an ambitious scheme in his mind. He meant to pinch off our salient and, if possible, to capture the entire third and fourth Corps, who held it. His right wing was to operate from Bourlon southward, and his left from Masnières westwards, the two attacks converging on Havrincourt and Metz.

The attack was launched shortly after daylight on November 30, and failed completely on the right against Bourlon Wood; here the enemy was caught by our artillery and machine-guns and mown down by hundreds. On the left, however, the attack succeeded; first, it came as a surprise; secondly, the Germans heralded their assault by lines of low-flying aeroplanes, which made our men keep down and so lose observation. Under the protection of this aeroplane barrage and a very heavy trench mortar bombardment the German infantry advanced and speedily captured Villers Guislain and Gouzeaucourt.

It was not till nearly ten o’clock on November 30 that Brigadier-General Courage of the 2nd Tank Brigade received a telephone message warning him of the attack.

The Tanks had been definitely “dismissed,” and were busy refitting, and at that moment every machine was in complete _déshabillé_. Many of the engines were in process of being tinkered with, and not a single Tank was filled up or contained its battle equipment. Those whom some emergency has obliged to get out an ordinary car on a cold winter’s morning when it has neither petrol, oil, nor water in it, and has half its engine strewn about the garage, will understand the difficulties that faced the Tank Corps. They will realise that when no less than twenty-two Tanks of “B” (2nd) Battalion had started for the battle by 12.40, a very smart piece of work had been done. Very soon fourteen Tanks of “A” (1st) Battalion followed them, and by two o’clock twenty Tanks of “H” (8th) Battalion were able to move up in support.

In the words of Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch, “Great credit is due to the officers and men of the (2nd) Tank Brigade for the speed with which they brought their Tanks into action.”

By the time the first twenty Tanks reached Gouzeaucourt, however, the Guards, who had been hurried up with all speed, had managed to retake it, and the Tanks were therefore pushed out as a screen to cover their consolidation.

Here they remained all day, beating off enemy counter-attacks.

All day along both sides of the salient the enemy hammered fiercely at our lines. Here and there he penetrated them. Cooks, servants, and signallers, every available man, was given a rifle and put into the line, and the Despatch tells of wonderful individual deeds that were done as the battle surged and eddied confusedly. We did not propose to allow the Germans to hold their new possessions, the points of vantage out of which they had hustled us.

On December 1, Tanks, Guards, and dismounted Indian cavalry hit back against Villers Guislain and Gauche Wood.

“Tanks were,” the Despatch notes, “in great measure responsible for the capture of the wood. Heavy fighting took place for this position, which it is clear that the enemy had decided to hold at all costs. When the infantry and cavalry finally took possession of the wood, great numbers of German dead and smashed machine-guns were found. In one spot four German machine-guns, with dead crews lying round, were discovered within a radius of twenty yards. Three German field guns, complete with teams, were also captured in this wood.

“Other Tanks proceeded to Villers Guislain, and in spite of heavy direct artillery fire three reached the outskirts of the village, but the fire of the enemy’s machine-guns prevented our troops advancing from the south from supporting them, and the Tanks ultimately withdrew.”

For two more days the enemy pressed on against us, and the battle raged round Bourlon, Fontaine, Marcoing, and La Vacquerie.

Everywhere he dented in our line, and by December 4 the outline of our front showed an impossible series of irregularities. We must either renew the attack on a big scale, or make up our minds

[47]“to withdraw to a more compact line on the Flesquières Ridge.

“Although this decision involved giving up important positions most gallantly won, I had no doubt as to the correct course under the conditions. Accordingly, on the night of December 4–5 the evacuation of the positions held by us north of the Flesquières Ridge was commenced. On the morning of December 7 this withdrawal was completed successfully without interference from the enemy.”

It is as well that the enemy did not “interfere,” for through some oversight the Tanks did not receive due notice of the intended withdrawal, and certain salvage parties, busily at work on disabled Tanks, in forward positions, knew nothing of the evacuation until, to their astonishment, they found our infantry streaming back past them in the darkness. There was then nothing for it but to abandon the wrecks and to get back themselves with such gear as they could carry.

So ended the second phase of the battle.

It had been an exceedingly vexatious business.

Putting the best construction we could upon it, we had to admit to having been caught napping. The German attack had thrown us into complete, if momentary, confusion. But afterwards, when the situation could be calmly reviewed, contemporary criticism was unanimously agreed that we had, after all, suffered little but moral damage. And from that sort of damage the British have the art of deriving wholesome instruction in a unique degree. We braced ourselves up, and determined that this sharp rap over the knuckles should do us good.

But to the Tank Corps the exploits of the 2nd Brigade were more directly advantageous.

Amid the hubbub and confusion the Tank crews, like the Guards and the 2nd Cavalry Division, had known but one impulse--they had gone straight east against the enemy. That was the pole to which their compass pointed.

While everything had been doubt and hesitation they had had but one thought, to fill and adjust their machines and hurry them forward. At 9 a.m. the Tank crews had been peacefully preparing to break camp and leave for their training area. By four in the afternoon seventy-three Tanks had been launched with decisive effect against the enemy.

To many High Commanders who had believed that Tanks could only be used in a “full-dress” attack after weeks of preparation, the events of November 30 came as a joyful revelation.

So for the Tanks ended the 1917 campaign.