Chapter V. The picture you draw belongs to the earlier stages, when

the two sides worked rather upon regulation than upon formula. The later stages of the war saw a very full appreciation of each other’s point of view and the growth of a very sturdy spirit of co-operation, which carried us over more than one difficulty to meet which special appliances or special construction were necessary.

* * * * *

The Tank, as a weapon, has been threatened with several crises. Some have been averted by intelligent forecast in specification. Some have been dealt with by the improvisations of the engineers both in France and in England. Some have disappeared before a general improvement in design. You, I think, have touched on one crisis only--the mud crisis. The mud crisis was defeated at long last, but the swamp crisis, never. Although none of the other troubles was of long duration, any one of them, unless cured, would have caused a permanent disappearance of the arm.

Failure of rollers was succeeded by failure of sprockets. Sprockets and rollers were hardly cured when the Germans produced a very reliable armour-piercing bullet. This after a very short innings was defeated by the arrival of the Mark IV. Tank. The Mark IV. Tank was barely rescued from the mud of Flanders by the invention of the unditching beam, when we discovered that the Hindenburg trenches were about one foot too wide to cross without some form of help to the Tank. This difficulty was overcome, but about this time the effect of concentrated machine-gun fire upon Mark IV. Tanks must have become known to the Germans, as also their vulnerability to the ordinary field gun. The position with regard to both splash and casualties from guns firing over the sights, was becoming serious when the arrival of Mark V. Tank, with its increased handiness and speed, put an end to the splash difficulty for ever, and defeated the field gun for a good long time.

So on to the last days of the war, when we were able to look forward to 1919 with a certain knowledge that we had much in hand against any measure of opposition--short of a superior Tank--that the enemy could produce.

The idea undoubtedly exists still in the minds of certain people that the particular form of Tank which they have seen or fought with represents the latest word in design. It does not. The latest Tank produced in any bulk was the type that marched through London on July 19. It has never fought, and it represents the last word only of the elementary series of Tanks of which Mark I. was the original.

* * * * *

If finality in design has by no means been approached in the war, the same may be said as regards the employment of the then existing types. This depended, after due consideration of their limitations and powers, on the training of personnel, not only of the Tank Corps, but essentially of infantry too. Lack of time, lack of opportunity, and wastage of trained personnel were the great difficulties which confronted commanders of every arm and formation in their efforts to reach even average standards of skill in only a few of the commoner phases of warfare. With the Tank Corps the additional difficulties of mechanical training were no more than balanced by freedom from the trench routine of troops employed for defence. For the infantry Tank, the training of Tank personnel alone is not sufficient. In the assault, Tanks are no more than a part of infantry, an integral part of the _troupes d’assaut_. For real success, i.e., cheap success, not only must the two arms train and re-train together, but they should live together, feed together, and drink together.

Much was attempted and much was done to supplement the lack of opportunity by demonstration, lectures, attachments. But by reason of the incomplete military education of our hastily-trained troops it was necessary to limit manœuvre and tactics on the battlefield to the simplest elements. Anything in the nature of finesse had to be avoided. Skilful use of ground and mutual fire support were things hoped for more often than achieved.

It was a question of bulk production against time, but the results obtained only prove how much more could be achieved with the same material had conditions of training been those of peace time with its long service and rigorous and plentiful supervision.

* * * * *

The preceding paragraph may seem ungracious from one who has had the privilege of commanding a great force of citizen soldiers. It is nevertheless true that soldiering, like any other trade, takes time and experience to learn--that though there may be many who, being engineers, or advocates, or business men, or farmers, learn soldiering with great aptitude, the great bulk of any body of men, call them regular soldiers or citizen soldiers, require a deal of training under the best instructors, if they are to draw the full advantage from the ever varying conditions of the battlefield.

* * * * *

I have alluded above to the Tank Corps as a citizen force. It was, indeed, peculiarly so, for of the 20,000 odd souls that went to compose it, perhaps not more than two or three per cent. were professional soldiers; and, while the General Staff officers on H.Qs. were almost without exception regulars, the whole of the Administrative and Engineering staffs with one solitary exception were drawn from various civil vocations.

Moreover, units as they came into being were built up, not on any old-time tradition of a parent regiment, but each one very much around the personality of its own commanding officer. And it has indeed been interesting to watch the development of particular idiosyncrasies of whole battalions and companies from the characters of their leaders.

Your record has faithfully set forth what has been accomplished by these troops. They are well able to sustain criticism in the light of their achievements.

* * * * *

I have alluded before to the esprit de corps, founded as it was upon the sentiment of saving of life--a sentiment to which appeal has never failed. Other factors went to strengthen it. It was braced by a high standard of results demanded, by the determination to make good in spite of partial first successes. But the strongest element in it was the faith in our weapon--the machine necessary to supplement the other machines of war, in order to break the stalemate produced by the great German weapon, the machine-gun--our mobile offensive answer to the immobile defensive man-killer.

* * * * *

It is indeed a curious reflection that the Germans before committing themselves to their great final offensive, should not have followed to their logical conclusion the preparations which they made for the preceding phases of the war with such meticulous forethought. In 1914, they removed from the path of their attacking infantry the prepared obstacles of permanent fortification by means of specially-constructed machines--siege cannon of unprecedented size. Later, they developed the machine-gun in bulk, and so modified the preconceived course of warfare to their own advantage for defence. It is astonishing that for their final offensive effort, they should not have equipped their men with armament for overcoming the very defence in depth supported by the very machine-guns from which they had reaped so much advantage in the previous years.

And yet we see them in March, 1918, reverting after an initial attack, powerfully covered by artillery fire, to the same attempt to break through with men that had failed in 1914. Although machine-gun support was stronger, there was little help from the other arms beyond scanty artillery support and considerable frightfulness of day and night bombing and long-range bombardment. The German infantry was well, often magnificently, led, whether in Picardy or Flanders; and one could not watch the work of the strong offensive patrols without intense admiration of their skill and courage.

The Germans failed against defence in depth. The elements that were wanting were those of continuous mobility necessary to overcome such defence, against which infantry without powerful support and plentiful supply sooner or later become powerless. The Germans lacked the means to move and to supply their guns rapidly. They lacked Tanks to produce surprise or to carry forward the battle as an alternative to guns. They lacked lorries, they lacked cross-country vehicles.

With us, when the tide turned, the converse was the case, and it was at least a part reason of success against an enemy who fought bravely and often bitterly almost to the end.

* * * * *

Whether you justly appraise the contribution of the Tank Corps towards the final victory is for history to declare--at some interval yet--but I am hardy enough to give you a parable in the terms of a great national pastime.

Rugby football of all games affords the closest analogy to war--to warfare on the Western Front the parallel, without labouring the detail, is remarkable.

In the early nineties the accepted tactics of the game demanded a distribution of the team into nine forwards and six backs. The orthodox believed in forward play, and in emergency sometimes even a tenth forward would be added at the expense of one back.

At this time there occurred in the annual matches between two countries an uninterrupted series of defeats for one. As a measure of resource or despair, I do not know which, a new distribution was made in its forces. Instead of nine, eight forwards were played, one back was added--the fourth three-quarter.

The tactics were for the forwards to hold the opposing attack and for the backs to play offensively. The game is historic. For three-quarters of the match the nine forwards pressed the eight heavily, and these were very hard put to it to maintain their lines. In the last phase of the game one of the four three-quarters got away unmarked, the game was won and lost.

That was twenty-five years ago. The rules of the game remain unchanged, but the distribution of the players has been modified and the tactics of teams have developed on the lines of that historic match and beyond.

Whether the parallel of the Tank Corps to the extra three-quarter is a completely true one history will record in due season. What, however, we may claim is that the fourth three-quarter after a nervous start, in which perhaps he was sometimes out of his place, nevertheless on more than one occasion got away unmarked; that he ran straight even when he was being heavily tackled and drew the opposition for his side; that he went down well to the rushes of the German forwards; and that, finally, he more than once handled the ball in the great combined run which took his team from within its own twenty-five over the opponents’ goal line.

Yours sincerely,

_United Service Club, July 28, 1919._

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE INTRODUCTION v

I A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE TANK, ITS CREW AND ITS TACTICAL FUNCTIONS, AS THEY WERE AT THE DATE OF THE ARMISTICE 25

II THE EARLIEST TANKS, GENERAL SWINTON, ADMIRAL BACON,--THE HOLT TRACTOR AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE “LAND CRUISER” 31

III THE TANK CORPS IN EMBRYO 46

IV THE FIRST TANK BATTLES--THE ATTACK ON MORVAL, FLERS, THE QUADRILATERAL, THIEPVAL, AND BEAUMONT-HAMEL 57

V WINTER TRAINING, EXPANSION AND READJUSTMENTS 77

VI THE BATTLES OF ARRAS AND BULLECOURT 89

VII THE BATTLE OF MESSINES AND THE “HUSH” OPERATION 110

VIII THE FLANDERS CAMPAIGN--PREPARATIONS FOR THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES 124

IX THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES 138

X THE FIRST BATTLE OF CAMBRAI 160

XI THREE NEW TYPES OF TANK--THE DEPOT--CENTRAL WORKSHOPS 190

XII THE FRENCH TANK CORPS--AMERICAN TANKS AND BRITISH TANKS IN EGYPT 209

XIII SUSPENSE--THE “SAVAGE RABBITS” EPISODE--THE ENEMY’S INTENTIONS 235

XIV THE MARCH RETREAT 243

XV THE EQUILIBRIUM--MINOR ACTIONS--HAMEL--THE BALLON D’ESSAI 265

XVI WITH THE FRENCH--THE BATTLE OF MOREUIL 280

XVII THE BATTLE OF AMIENS, OR BATTLE OF AUGUST 8 288

XVIII THE GERMAN ATTITUDE--“MAN-TRAPS AND GINS”--THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME 323

XIX BREAKING THE DROCOURT-QUÉANT LINE--THE BATTLE OF EPEHY 341

XX THE SECOND BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, OR THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI-ST. QUENTIN 361

XXI THE SECOND BATTLE OF LE CATEAU--THE RUNNING FIGHT 380

XXII THE ROUT--MORMAL FOREST--THE BATTLE OF THE SAMBRE--THE ARMISTICE 392

EPILOGUE 402

INDEX 417

ILLUSTRATIONS

MAJOR-GENERAL HUGH ELLES, C.B., D.S.O. From a portrait by Sir William Orpen, A.R.A. _Frontispiece_

FACING PAGE

GENERAL ARRANGEMENTS OF MARK V. TANK--FRONT VIEW 28

GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF MARK V. TANK--SECTIONAL ELEVATION 28

GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF MARK V. TANK--SECTIONAL PLAN 29

DIAGRAM SHOWING ADAPTATION TO THE “LARGE-WHEELED TRACTOR” IDEA 29

THE ORIGINAL THIEPVAL MARK I. TANK WITH ANTI-BOMB ROOF AND “TAIL” 64

FIELD CAMOUFLAGE 64

A DERELICT. VALLEY OF THE SCARPE 96

A BURNING TANK 96

“DIRECT HITS” 97

BELLIED ON A TREE-STUMP AND SUBSEQUENTLY HIT 97

A FLANDERS PILL-BOX 132

THE UNDITCHING BEAM IN ACTION 132

THE STEENBEEK VALLEY BEFORE THE BATTLE 133

THE STEENBEEK VALLEY AFTER BOMBARDMENT 133

A DEADLY SWAMP (THE WRECKS OF SIX TANKS MAY BE COUNTED) 144

“CLAPHAM JUNCTION” NEAR SANCTUARY WOOD 145

“THE SALIENT” 145

PREPARING FOR CAMBRAI. A TRAIN OF TANKS WITH FASCINES IN POSITION 176

THE BAPAUME-CAMBRAI ROAD 177

A TANK CRUSHING DOWN THE ENEMY’S WIRE 177

SLEDGE TOWING TANK TAKING UP SUPPLIES 200

BERMICOURT CHATEAU NEAR ST. POL. TANK CORPS MAIN HEADQUARTERS 200

GUN-CARRYING TANK TAKING UP A HOWITZER 201

A WHIPPET GOING IN 201

SMOKE SCREEN AND SEMAPHORE 304

A TANKADROME 304

MOVING UP. BATTLE OF AMIENS 305

THE ARMOURED CARS GOING UP 305

GERMAN ANTI-TANK GUNNERS. (From a photograph found on a prisoner) 336

AN ANTI-TANK GUN IN A STEEL CUPOLA (YPRES) 336

A CAPTURED GERMAN TANK 337

A GERMAN ANTI-TANK RIFLE 337

INFANTRY ADVANCING BEHIND TANKS. A PRACTICE ATTACK AT BERMICOURT 368

THE ST. QUENTIN CANAL TUNNEL, BELLICOURT 369

CARRIER PIGEON BEING RELEASED 369

HIS MAJESTY THE COLONEL-IN-CHIEF AND GENERAL ELLES 384

MANUFACTURE 385

THE WESTERN EDGE OF MORMAL FOREST 396

A “WIRELESS” TANK 397

MAP OF TANK OPERATIONS, AUGUST–NOVEMBER, 1918 416

THE TANK CORPS