"The System," As Uncovered by the San Francisco Graft Prosecution

CHAPTER XV.

Chapter 158,007 wordsPublic domain

RUEF PLEADS GUILTY TO EXTORTION.[207]

While the Supervisors were making full confessions of their participation in the bribery transactions, and the Grand Jury was dragging from unwilling promoters, capitalists and corporation employees information as to the source of the corruption funds, Ruef's days and nights were devoted to consideration of plans for his own safety. Ruef, after his arrest and confinement under Elisor Biggy, became one of the scramblers of his broken organization to save himself.

But Ruef was more clever, more far-seeing than any of the Supervisors. His course from the beginning indicates that, in considering confession, he carefully weighed against the power of the regularly constituted authorities of San Francisco to protect him if he testified for the State, the ability of organized corruptionists to punish for betrayal. Ruef realized that although the all-powerful State "machine," labeled Republican, of which the San Francisco organization labeled Union Labor, which he had built up, was but a part, had for the moment lost control of the San Francisco District Attorney's office, but the "machine" still dominated the other departments of the municipal government, as well as of the State government[208]. Ruef realized that Langdon might die; that the State Attorney General might set Langdon aside and himself conduct the graft prosecution. And he realized that some day a district attorney other than Langdon would be prosecutor in San Francisco. In any of these events, what would be the lot of the man who had betrayed the scarcely-known captains of the powerful machine?

On the other hand, the hour when the evidence which the District Attorney had accumulated against him would be presented before a trial jury, approached with deadly certainty.

Such considerations led to Ruef devoting his days to resistance of the proceeding against him in the trial court, where a jury to try him on one of the five extortion charges on which he had been indicted, was being impaneled, while his nights were given to scheming to wring from the District Attorney immunity from punishment for the extortions and briberies which had been brought to his door.

The period was one of activity for both District Attorney and Ruef. On the whole, however, the District Attorney had the liveliest time of it.

To be sure, Ruef had been brought before the trial judge; that is to say, the impaneling of a trial jury had begun, but Ruef's technical fight had not been abandoned for a moment.

The appearance of Ruef under arrest was signal for a fight to have him admitted to bail. But release under bonds Judge Dunne denied him on the ground of the immediate approach of his trial, and because he had attempted to put himself beyond the process of the court. Ruef's attorneys appealed to the United States District Court for a writ of habeas corpus, but this was denied them. His attorneys filed affidavits alleging bias and prejudice on the part of Judge Dunne against Ruef, and demanding a change of venue. And with these various motions, all of which the District Attorney was called upon to meet, was the appeal from Judge Hebbard's order to the Federal Supreme Court, which was considered in a previous chapter.

The actual work of drawing a jury to try Ruef began on March 13,[209] eight days later than the date originally set for trial. The State was represented by District Attorney Langdon, Francis J. Heney and Hiram W. Johnson. At the defense end of the table with Schmitz and Ruef were Attorneys Joseph C. Campbell, Samuel M. Shortridge, Henry Ach, Charles A. Fairall and J. J. Barrett. But it developed that one of the four citizens drawn for jury service was not in the courtroom. The defense objected to proceeding during the absence of the venireman. The hearing was accordingly postponed. Because of one technical obstruction and another, the work of impaneling the trial jury was delayed until April 2. Even after that date there were interruptions, but the work of securing the jury[210] went on until May 13, when the twelfth man to try Ruef was accepted.

But while Ruef was making this brave fight in public to head off trial on the extortion charge, behind the scenes he was imploring representatives of the Prosecution to grant him immunity from punishment in return for such confession as he might see fit to make.

As early as March 20, Ruef sent word to Heney through Burns[211] that he was willing to make confession, provided he were given immunity from punishment for all crimes which he had committed or in which he had participated.

Heney refused absolutely to consider any arrangement which involved complete immunity for Ruef. Negotiations on the basis of partial immunity followed.[212]

Heney, on the ground that he did not trust any of Ruef's lawyers, refused to discuss the matter with them, but stated that he would meet any lawyer in whom he had confidence to negotiate terms of partial immunity, provided that Ruef's representative were permitted:

(1) To give the names of Ruef's accomplices who would be involved by his testimony.

(2) To give the general nature of the offenses in which the various accomplices were involved.

(3) To be prepared to assure Heney that Ruef's evidence against his accomplices could be corroborated, and was sufficient to sustain a conviction.

Ruef at first appeared to be well satisfied with the plan. He sent for a list of San Francisco attorneys, and set himself enthusiastically to the work of selecting a list of the names of attorneys to be submitted to Heney. But he failed to make a selection, urging all the time to Burns that Heney accept Henry Ach. Ruef's insistence that he deal with Ach convinced Heney that Ruef was not acting in good faith, and he refused to yield to Burns's urging that he give way to Ruef in this particular and accept Ach as Ruef's representative.[213]

Under Ruef's temporizing, negotiations dragged until April 2, the day that, Ruef's technical obstructions in the main set aside, his trial was to be resumed before Judge Dunne.

On that day, a new actor appeared in the person of Dr. Jacob Nieto, a Jewish Rabbi of some prominence in San Francisco.

Nieto, according to Burns's statement to Heney, asked the detective if he had any objection to his (Nieto's) calling upon Ruef. Nieto stated further that he believed that he could get Ruef to confess, and volunteered the theory that the "higher-ups" were endeavoring to make Ruef a scapegoat for all the boodling that had been committed.

Burns reported to Heney that he not only replied to Nieto that he had no objection to Nieto's visiting Ruef, but would be glad to have the Rabbi endeavor to get Ruef to tell the truth.

When Burns told Heney of this conversation, Heney did not show himself so well pleased with the arrangements as Burns might have expected. The prosecutor took occasion to warn Burns against Nieto. Heney had already had unpleasant experience with Rabbi Nieto.[214] Nevertheless, Nieto visited Ruef. Members of Ruef's family were called into consultation. Conferences were held between Ach, Ruef and Burns. Heney states in his affidavit that he did not attend these meetings. Finally Burns brought Heney word that Ach and Ruef wanted citations to show that the District Attorney had authority to grant immunity. Heney sent back word that he was confident that the District Attorney had no such power, but with the further statement that if the terms of the immunity agreement were reasonable and in the interest of justice, that the Court, provided it had confidence in the District Attorney, would unquestionably follow such recommendation as that official might make.

Burns brought back word to Heney that Ruef and Ach continued to insist upon complete immunity.

Heney sent back an ultimatum to the effect that Ruef must plead guilty to the extortion case then on trial before Judge Dunne[215] and take his chances with the sentence that would be given him; that if Ruef did this, Heney was willing to arrange for complete immunity in all the other cases, provided Ruef showed to Heney's satisfaction that his testimony could be sufficiently corroborated and would sustain a conviction of his accomplices other than Supervisors, in cases where members of the Board of Supervisors had been bribed.

In the meantime, the work of selecting a jury to try Ruef on the extortion charge was going on with the deadly certainty of the slide of the knife of a guillotine. The second week of the examination of prospective jurors brought Dr. Nieto to Heney's office. Burns accompanied the Rabbi.

Nieto[216] described himself as no particular friend of Ruef. He expressed the opinion that Ruef should be punished; that he should restore his ill-gotten gains. Heney stated to Nieto his attitude toward Ruef, as he had expressed it many times before. From that time on Dr. Nieto was a frequent caller at Heney's office, always for the purpose of discussing the question of Ruef's confession. During all these meetings Heney did not depart a jot from his original position that the extortion charge against Ruef should not be dismissed.

Later on, a second Rabbi, Dr. Bernard M. Kaplan, joined Nieto in these visits to Heney's office. Kaplan continued active in the negotiations to secure immunity for the fallen boss.[217] Finally Nieto, Kaplan and Ach sent word to Heney and Langdon by Burns that they desired to meet the District Attorney and his assistant at Heney's office to discuss the immunity question. Heney and Langdon consented and the meeting was held in the latter part of April.

Ach insisted upon complete immunity, but admitted that he had advised Ruef to take the best he could get.[218] Neither Langdon[219] nor Heney would consent to complete immunity, nor to material change in the stand which Heney had taken. Ach wanted assurance that the Judges before whom the bribery cases were pending would, on motion of the District Attorney, dismiss them as to Ruef, and suggested to Heney that he go to the judges and get them to consent to the proposed agreement. To this Heney made emphatic refusal, stating that the utmost he would do would be to go with Ach to Judges Dunne and Lawlor and ask each of them whether he had confidence in him (Heney) and what the Judge's general practice was in relation to matters of this kind, generally, when they came before his court.

Other conferences[220] were held, at which Ach continued to urge complete immunity for Ruef, which finally brought out emphatic statement from Heney that he did not trust Ruef and would enter into no agreement with him which did not leave it in the power of the District Attorney to send him to the penitentiary if at any time the District Attorney and himself concluded that during the progress of the matters Ruef was acting in bad faith, or that the information which he might give was not of sufficient importance to the people of the city and the State equitably to entitle him to go without punishment.

Heney takes pains all through his affidavit to make it clear that he treated with Nieto and Kaplan at all times upon the theory that they were Ruef's special pleaders and special representatives, who believed that Ruef was sure to be convicted upon as many of the felony bribery charges as the District Attorney tried him on, and that he would go to the penitentiary for a term of years equivalent to life.

On the night of April 21,[231] when the work of selecting a jury to try Ruef was nearing completion, Ach, Kaplan and Nieto visited Heney's office with assurance that Ruef had about concluded to accept Heney's terms. But, they explained, a new difficulty had come up. Rabbi Nieto was to leave San Francisco the next morning for a trip to Europe. Neither he nor Dr. Kaplan was familiar with the practices of the courts, and while the judges would no doubt consider favorably any recommendation which was made by Mr. Langdon or by Mr. Heney, nevertheless, the two Rabbis would like to hear from Judge Dunne and Judge Lawlor statement as to what the practice of each of these judges was in that respect before they urged Ruef any further to accept the terms which had been offered him. As Dr. Nieto was to leave for Europe early in the morning, they wanted to see the judges that night.

Heney assured his visitors that owing to the lateness of the hour, he was afraid it would be impossible for them to see the judges before morning. But they insisted. Burns was finally sent out to find the judges if he could. He succeeded in locating Judge Lawlor at the theater. Judge Lawlor at first refused to see Nieto and Heney that night, stating that they could appear at his chambers the next morning. But Burns explained that Nieto had to leave for Europe the next morning, adding that he was sure that both Nieto and Heney would consider it a great favor if the Judge would see them that night, as the matter was very important. Lawlor finally consented to see them, but stated that he would do so only at his chambers, if, as he understood it, Heney and Nieto wanted to see him about his duties as judge. Burns took word back to Heney's office that they could go to Judge Lawlor's chambers, where the Judge would go as soon as the theater was over.

Heney, Kaplan and Nieto met Lawlor at his chambers. Heney went straight at the purpose of the meeting.

"Judge," Heney sets forth in his affidavit he said in substance, "we come up here tonight to ask you what the practice of your court is in criminal cases in relation to recommendations which may be made by the District Attorney?"

Judge Lawlor replied in effect that the District Attorney represents the public in the prosecution of crime, and that under the law it was the practice for that official to submit to the court recommendations concerning persons who turn state's evidence; that the law vests the authority in the Court to determine all such recommendations and that it is proper for the District Attorney to make them; that such recommendations should be carefully considered by the Court; and if they are in the interests of justice they should be followed, otherwise not. Judge Lawlor stated further that he would not consider or discuss any cause or case of any individual except upon a full hearing in open court, and that it would be determined alone upon what was so presented. Final decision, he said, would in every case rest with the Court, and if the application was in the interest of justice, it would be granted, but if not it would be denied.

Immediately after having made this statement Judge Lawlor excused himself and left the building.

Judge Dunne, when finally found by Burns, objected as strongly as had Judge Lawlor to going to the courtroom that night, but finally yielded to the same representations as had been made to Judge Lawlor.

All parties at the meeting with Judge Dunne at the courtroom were agreed and the incident was quickly over.

Heney asked the Judge, in effect, to state for the benefit of Nieto and Kaplan the practice of his court in criminal matters in relation to any recommendations which may be made by the District Attorney's office in the interest of justice when the defendant becomes a witness on behalf of the State against his accomplices. Heney stated further that the two Rabbis would also like to know whether or not Judge Dunne had confidence in District Attorney Langdon and himself.

Judge Dunne replied in substance: "I have confidence in you, Mr. Heney, and in the District Attorney, and while I have confidence in the District Attorney, whenever a recommendation or suggestion is made by him in a case pending in my department, it is my practice to entertain and be guided by it, provided, of course, it is in the interest or furtherance of justice."

Kaplan wanted to know what the course would be should a man plead guilty and afterwards ask to change his plea.

"You have heard what I have said, gentlemen, as to my practice," replied Judge Dunne. "Of course, in all cases of such recommendations, and which I insist shall always be made in open court, whenever the District Attorney fails to convince me that he is well advised, or that good and sufficient grounds exist for his motions, it must be remembered that the final determination must always rest with me. But, of course, I would give great weight to any recommendation either you, Mr. Heney, or Mr. Langdon might make."

From the courtroom Nieto, Kaplan and Burns went to Ruef, but Ruef still insisted that he should not plead guilty to the extortion charge, "backed and filled," as Burns expressed it.

Ruef sent word to Heney by Burns, asking an interview. But this Heney refused to grant, bluntly stating that should he meet Ruef, Ruef would misrepresent anything that he might say. Heney instructed Burns to tell Ruef that he could accept the proposition that he had made to him or let it alone as he pleased, that no more time would be wasted on him; that trial of the extortion charge would be pressed to conclusion and regardless of whether conviction were had or not, Ruef would be tried immediately on one of the bribery charges.

Nevertheless, the persistent Ruef got an interview with Heney. He secured it in this way:

After Heney had retired on the night of May 1st, Burns called him up on the telephone, to state that if Heney would give Ruef a moment's interview that Burns was confident that Ruef would accept Heney's proposition. Heney granted the hearing.

Ruef plead for complete immunity. He argued that for him to plead guilty to the extortion charge would weaken his testimony in the bribery cases. He urged that public opinion would approve his release. He charged Heney with being prejudiced against him.

Heney listened to him patiently, but refused to consider any suggestion that he alter the original proposition.

By this time ten jurors had been secured to try Ruef. Ruef begged for an interview with Langdon. It was granted, with Heney and others present. The same ground was gone over again; the same denials made. And then Heney bluntly told Ruef in substance: "You must plead guilty in case No. 305 and take your chances on the sentence which will be imposed in that case. This is our ultimatum and you must agree to this before the first witness is sworn in case No. 305, or we will withdraw our proposition and will never again renew it, or any other proposition looking to any sort of leniency or immunity for you."[222]

The day following, Burns brought word to Heney that Ruef had concluded to accept the Prosecution's proposition, and had begun his confession by reciting the particulars of the United Railroad's bribery. Burns recited what Ruef had told him. Burns's enthusiasm suffered a shock from Heney's cool analysis of Ruef's statement.[223]

Heney pointed out that Ruef had made no revelation which the Prosecution had not known before, and further that Ruef was certainly concealing part at least of what had occurred between him and General Ford. Heney was now convinced of Ruef's treachery.[224] Ruef's future course tended to strengthen this conviction.

Having agreed to make full statement of his connection with the bribing of the Supervisors, Ruef haggled over the form of immunity contract. He endeavored to force upon the Prosecution a contract of his own drawing. Failing in that he tried to persuade Heney and Langdon to enter into a stipulation that he might withdraw his plea of guilty in the extortion case.

In neither move was he successful. Heney refused to depart a jot from his original proposition. Ruef finally accepted the immunity contract which Heney had submitted.[225]

Even after the immunity contract had been signed, Ruef continued to urge Burns that he be not required to plead guilty. The prosecution was not sure what Ruef would do. The examination of jurors to try him went on. The jury was completed on May 13,[226] and was sworn. But the actual taking of testimony was delayed by Ruef demanding change of venue from Judge Dunne's court. This motion after the filing of numerous affidavits by both sides, was denied.

However, Ruef's last motion delayed the taking of testimony for two days more.

Upon Judge Dunne's ruling the next move would have been the placing of witnesses on the stand. But before this could be done, Ruef whispered to his attorney, Ach. Ach arose and addressed the Court.

"I am requested by our client, your Honor," Ach said in substance, "that it is his desire to have a conference with his counsel. I would like to draw your Honor's attention to the fact that up to this time Mr. Ruef has not had a single opportunity to confer with his counsel alone. If the elisor, or the guards, were not in the same room they were quite close by. I think, in view of this fact, that we might be granted an adjournment until say two o'clock of this afternoon so that Mr. Ruef may have this privilege of conferring with us."

Heney promptly denied Ach's statement. "What Mr. Ach has stated is not a fact," said Heney. "Mr. Ruef has always been granted privacy in his conference with counsel."

On Langdon's suggestion, a half hour's recess was granted to allow Ruef to confer with counsel. With his attorneys, Henry Ach, Samuel M. Shortridge, Frank J. Murphy and Judge Fairall, Ruef went into Judge Dunne's chambers for conference.

On their return to the courtroom, Ach and Shortridge, with Ruef's consent, withdrew from the case on the ground that they could not agree with Ruef as to the manner in which the case should be conducted. Fairall and Murphy remained by their client.

And then Ruef, the tears streaming down his face, addressed the Court. He stated his intent to acknowledge whatever there may have been of wrong or mistake in his record, and pledged himself, so far as it lay in his power to make it right.[227]

"I desire," concluded Ruef, "to withdraw my plea of not guilty heretofore entered, and to enter the contrary plea, and at the proper time submit to the Court further suggestions for its consideration.[228]

"If the defendant wishes to change his plea of 'not guilty' to 'guilty,'" said Heney, "the prosecuting attorney will consent to the discharge of the jury, as he requests, but we think the indictment should first be re-read so that he may enter the plea as he wishes."

The indictment was read.

"What is your plea?" asked Judge Dunne of the prisoner.

And Ruef replied, "Guilty."[229]

FOOTNOTES:

[207] The statements contained in this chapter are based on affidavits filed in the case of The People vs. Patrick Calhoun et al., No. 823. Many of the statements are qualified, and in many instances denied, in affidavits filed by Ruef, his friends, associates and attorneys, in the same proceedings.

[208] In this connection, in discussing the difficulties in the way of bringing criminals to trial, the San Francisco Chronicle, in its issue of March 14, 1907, said:

"The penal laws of California are admirable, and cover almost every transaction deserving moral reprobation. The only reason why all our people are not either virtuous or in jail is that the same Legislatures which have so carefully defined crimes and prescribed punishments have been still more careful to enact codes of criminal procedure that nobody can be convicted of any crime if he has the cash to pay for getting off. And what the legislatures have failed to do in this direction the courts have usually made good."

[209] Four years later to a day, March 13, 1911, Ruef was taken to the penitentiary at San Quentin to begin service of his fourteen-year term for bribing a Supervisor.

[210] As the impaneling of the Ruef jury proceeded, that Ruef's nerve was breaking became apparent to all who saw him. The Chronicle, in its issue of March 18, 1907, thus describes his condition:

"Ruef's nerve is breaking down. He is a prey to doubts and fears which never troubled him in those days when he could see his political henchmen every day and bolster up their confidence in his ability to fight off the prosecution. Reports reach his ears of confessions of guilt on the part of some of his official puppets, of the sinister activities of Burns and his agents and treachery on the part of those whom he considered his most devoted adherents, and fill him with alarm.

"It was different when he could hold his Sunday evening caucus with the members of the Board of Supervisors, and reassure them that all would be well. He knows the men he used in his political schemes and their weaknesses."

[211] Heney, in instructing Burns as to his policy regarding Ruef, took occasion to state to the detective his attitude toward the broken boss. In an affidavit filed in the case of The People vs. Calhoun et al., No. 823, Heney sets forth that he told Burns: "Ruef was not a mere accessory or tool in the commission of these briberies. He is a man of extraordinary brain power, keen intelligence, fine education, with the choice of good environment, great power of persuasion over men, dominating personality, great shrewdness and cunning, coupled with a greedy and avaricious disposition. He has not been led into the commission of these crimes through weakness, but on the contrary has aided in the initiation of them and has joined hands with the most vicious and depraved elements in the city to secure unlawful protection for them in conducting their resorts of vice, and has joined hands with the special privilege seeking classes to place improper burdens upon the people of this city by granting franchises to public service corporations which ought never to have been granted, and by fixing rates which may be charged by them in excess of the amounts which such rates ought to be, and thus indirectly robbing the poor people of this city of a large part of their meagre earnings, and that to let Ruef go free of all punishment under such circumstances would be a crime against society."

[212] Running through the affidavits which resulted from the differences between the forces of the prosecution and the defense concerning these negotiations, is a thread of suggestion that individual members of the prosecution differed as to the policy that should be followed toward Ruef. Burns, the detective, leaned toward granting him complete immunity. Heney was unalterably opposed to this course. Langdon, on the whole, sided with Heney.

[213] See Heney's affidavit in the matter of The People vs. Patrick Calhoun et al., No. 823.

[214] Nieto, according to Heney, had endeavored to make it appear that race prejudice entered into the prosecution of Ruef. Heney, in an affidavit filed in the case of The People vs. Calhoun et al., No. 823, tells of Nieto's interference even when the Oliver Grand Jury was being impaneled. Heney says: "During the latter part of October or the first week in November, 1906, while said Grand Jury was being impaneled, Dr. Jacob Nieto introduced himself to me in the court room of Department No. 10, where I had noticed that he was a constant attendant and close observer of the proceedings connected with the impaneling of the Grand Jury.

"Some days after he had introduced himself to me he stepped up to me, just as court had adjourned and after I had been examining some of the grand jurors as to their qualifications, and said in substance:

"'Mr. Heney, it seems to me that you discriminate somewhat against the Jews in examining jurors, and I think that in your position you ought to be more careful not to exhibit any prejudice against a man on account of his religion.'

"I asked what in particular I had done to cause him to criticise my conduct in that way, and he referred to some question which I had asked a grand juror, but which I cannot now recollect. I then said to him in substance:

"'Why, Doctor, you are supersensitive. Some of the best friends I have in the world are Jews, and some of the best clients I ever had in my life were Jews, and I have no prejudice against any man merely on account of his religious belief. I am sorry that you have so misapprehended the purpose and motives of my questions to jurors.'

"On a subsequent day, during the time the Grand Jury was being impaneled, Dr. Nieto again approached me after an adjournment of the court and again reproached me for having again shown prejudice or discrimination against some grand juror of the Jewish faith by the questions which I asked him * * * and I said to him in substance, in a very emphatic tone of voice: 'Dr. Nieto, I have heretofore told you that I have no prejudice against any man whatever on account of his religion. All I am trying to do in this matter is to get fair grand jurors, and I am just as willing to trust honest Jews as honest Christians, but I want to make sure that a man is honest, whether a Jew or Christian, and it looks to me as if you are trying to find some excuse to line up in opposition to this prosecution. I do not see why you need to seek for excuses if that is what you want to do. I am conscious of my own singleness of purpose and purity of purpose in examining grand jurors, and it is wholly immaterial to me, therefore, what you or anybody else may think of my method of questioning them.'"

As a matter of fact Jews not only sat on the Oliver Grand Jury, but were among the most earnest and effective in sifting the graft scandal to the bottom. But that the false cry that Ruef was persecuted because he was a Jew influenced many of his fellow Jews in his favor is unquestionably true.

[215] This case was numbered from the indictment, 305. Schmitz was indicted jointly with Ruef in this indictment, and later was convicted under it and sentenced to five years in the penitentiary. See Chapter XVI. The testimony at the Schmitz trial showed that Ruef had taken the extortion money from the French-Restaurant keepers, after Schmitz had acted with him to imperil the French-Restaurant keepers' liquor licenses, and had given part of the proceeds of the enterprise to Schmitz.

[216] In his affidavit, Heney quotes Rabbi Nieto as saying In substance: "I do not care to get publicly mixed up in the Ruef case, because among other things, I am not a particular friend of Ruef's, and am not interested in the matter as an individual but only in the welfare of this community. I think that Ruef has grievously sinned against this community and that he can do a great deal to undo the wrongs which he has committed and to clear up the situation, and I have told him that it is his duty to himself and to his family and to the city of his birth to do so. I want you to understand, Mr. Heney, that I have not come here to ask you to let Ruef go free and without punishment. I think he ought to be punished, and I think he ought to give a large part of the money which he obtained from these corporations to the city to improve its streets. He ought to give $300,000 for that purpose, but Ruef thinks more of money than he does of his family, or even of his liberty, and I think he would rather go to the penitentiary than give up any very large amount of it."

[217] Heney, in his affidavit, makes the following statement of his impression of Kaplan: "Dr. Kaplan appeared to be far more interested in finding out just what would be done to Ruef, provided he plead guilty in the French Restaurant case than he was in the moral issue which was involved in the discussion, or in the beneficial effect which the testimony of Ruef might have upon the deplorable situation then existing in San Francisco on account of its municipal corruption.

"This was evidenced more from his manner and form of questioning than by anything which he said. I immediately became convinced that he was influenced by no motive or purpose other than that of getting Ruef off without any punishment if possible; but I also formed the opinion that he was honest and unsophisticated."

[218] Heney, in his affidavit, states: "During the conversation Ach stated, in substance: 'You can't convict Ruef in this French Restaurant case, but I realize that you are sure to convict him in some of the bribery cases, and I think it is useless for him to stand out and fight any longer, he had better take the best he can get, and I have told him so. He insists, however, that he ought not to be required to plead guilty in the French Restaurant case, or to submit to any punishment.'"

[219] In the course of the interview, Langdon stated to Ach and the two Rabbis that he had authorized Heney to conduct the negotiations for him, but that he wanted it to be distinctly understood by everybody that he had the final say in the matter and would exercise it, and that no agreement could be concluded without his personal sanction.

[220] Heney, In his affidavit describing these meetings, states that Ach, Kaplan and Nieto habitually came In the back way so they would not be seen by newspaper reporters who at the time frequented the front halls of the private residence in which Heney, after the fire, had his offices. Ach, Heney states, was desirous of not being known as party to the negotiations. Heney in his affidavit says: "In this same conversation (at the first conference) Ach said in substance: 'I want everybody here to agree that the fact that I participated in this conference, or had anything to do with advising Ruef to turn state's evidence, shall never be made known; it would absolutely ruin my business if it became known. A lot of the people whom Ruef will involve as accomplices are close friends of clients of mine. Of course I do not know just whom he will involve, but I do have a general idea. For instance, while he has never told me so in so many words, I understand that he will involve William F. Herrin. Now just to illustrate to you how it would affect me in business if it was known that I participated in urging Ruef to do this I will tell you that I am attorney for one company, an oil company, that pays me ten thousand dollars a year as a salary for attending to its business, and Herrin is one of the directors of the company and undoubtedly has sufficient influence with the other directors to take this client away from me. This is only one instance, and there are many others.'"

[221] See affidavits of Francis J. Heney and Judge William P. Lawlor on file in the case of The People vs. Patrick Calhoun et al., No. 823.

[222] See Heney's affidavit in the case of The People vs. Patrick Calhoun et als., No. 823.

[223] Ruef in this confession to Burns stated that he had received $200,000 from General Tirey L. Ford, head of the United Railroads law department. Of this amount, he said $50,000 he had given to Schmitz and retained $50,000 for himself. Ruef, five years later, in his story "The Road I Traveled," published in the San Francisco Bulletin, again stated that he had received $200,000 from Ford, of which he gave to Schmitz $50,000, to Gallagher his share for the Supervisors, and retained $50,000 for himself. Gallagher received $85,000. This leaves a balance of $15,000 which Mr. Ruef does not account for.

[224] It is significant to note in this connection that Heney did not call Ruef as a witness before the Grand Jury in the United Railroads cases until after the Grand Jury had found indictments against the officials of that corporation. In the opinion of the Grand Jurors, the testimony, exclusive of that of Ruef, justified these indictments.

[225] The immunity contract signed by Ruef and the District Attorney will be found in full in the appendix.

[226] At the completion of the Ruef Jury, the Chronicle, issue of May 15, 1907, said:

"The Ruef jury is complete and we are now in a way to learn all the truth about the particular crime for which Ruef is this time on trial, but which, compared with most other crimes for which he has been indicted, is a mere peccadillo. That Ruef got the money is proved, for he has confessed. His defense, of course, will be that the French-Restaurant proprietors voluntarily presented him with it. The state will have to prove, in order to secure a conviction, that they did not give the money voluntarily, but yielded it up under threats which they believed it to be in his power to execute. If the state fails to prove that Ruef will stand before the community merely as a moral leper, loathsome to be sure, and despicable almost beyond human conception, but yet not proved guilty of that for which the law prescribes punishment in state's prison. If proper proof cannot be made he must, of course, be acquitted of this crime and at once put on trial for another. Nothing is gained by society by the conviction even of the most unmitigated scoundrel on insufficient testimony. But when the proof is sufficient the salvation of society demands punishment, and more particularly of punishment of the rich criminal."

[227] Ruef's statement was in full as follows:

"If your honor please, with the permission of the court, I desire to make a statement. I do so after only a short consultation with my attorneys, to whom I have only within the last half hour disclosed my determination, and against their express protest. I take this occasion to thank them for their services, fidelity and friendship. Notwithstanding the Court's finding yesterday that this trial might safely be carried on without serious injury to my health, physical or mental, I wish to assure you that my personal condition is such that I am at the present time absolutely unable to bear for two or three months daily the strain of an actual trial of this case, the constant, continual, nightly preparations therefor, the necessary consultation and conversation with my attorneys in regard thereto, to say nothing of other cares and responsibilities.

"Moreover, the strain of these proceedings upon those whom I hold nearest and dearest of all on earth has been so grave and severe that as a result of these prosecutions their health has all been undermined, they are on the verge of immediate collapse and their lives are indeed now actually in the balance.

"I have occupied a somewhat prominent position in this city of my birth, in which I have lived all my life, where are all my ties and interests, whence, when the time shall come, I hope to pass into the eternal sleep. I have borne an honored name. In my private and in my professional life there has been no stain. In my public affiliations, until after the municipal campaign of 1905 and the election of the present Board of Supervisors, the abhorrent charges of the press to the contrary notwithstanding, no action of mine ever gave just ground for adverse criticism or deserved censure; but the assaults of the press and its failure to credit honesty of purpose, a desire to hold together a political organization which had been built up with much effort, the means of otherwise holding them, did after the election of this Board of Supervisors in a measure influence me and the high ideals for which I had heretofore striven.

"During the past few weeks I have thought deeply and often of this situation, its causes and conditions. To offer excuses now would be folly. To make an effort at some reparation for the public good is, however, more than possible; to assist in making more difficult, if not impossible, the system which dominates our public men and corrupts our politics will be a welcome task.

"I have decided that whatever energy or abilities I possess for the future shall be devoted even in the humblest capacity to restoring the ideals which have been lowered; shall, as soon as opportunity be accorded, be re-enlisted on the side of good citizenship and integrity. May it be allotted to me at some time hereafter to have at least some small part in re-establishment on a clear, sane basis, a plane of high civic morality, just reciprocal relations between the constantly struggling constituent element of our governmental and industrial life.

"In the meantime I begin by earnestness of purpose, a purpose to make the greatest sacrifice which can befall a human being of my disposition to make, to acknowledge whatever there may have been of wrong or mistake and so far as may be within my power to make it right.

"I reached this final determination last night after careful reflection and deliberation. Where duty calls I intend to follow, whither hereafter the path of my life may lead and however unpleasant and painful may be the result. I make this statement so that the Court and the whole world may know at least the motives which have guided me in the step I am about to take.

"As an earnest I have determined to make a beginning, I am not guilty of the offense charged in this indictment. I ask now, however, that this jury be dismissed from further consideration of this case. I desire to withdraw my plea of not guilty heretofore entered and to enter the contrary plea, and at the proper time submit to the Court further suggestions for its consideration."

[228] The Chronicle, to its issue of May 16, said of Ruef's confessions:

"Abraham Ruef should have thought of his family before he entered upon his career of crime. They are innocent and the public need not, as indeed it cannot, withhold its sympathy for them. The most terrible punishment which is inflicted on such criminals is the distress which their crimes brings upon the innocent persons who have been accustomed to respect and honor them. But it is the inexorable doom which crime brings upon itself.

"For Ruef himself the only sympathy possible is that which one might feel for a wolf which, having devastated the sheep fold, has been pursued, brought to bay and, after a long fight, finally disposed of. It is not a case in which the safety of society permits leniency to be shown. Ruef has corrupted every branch of the city government which he could get hold of and brought the city almost to the verge of ruin. Seldom has a man occupying an unofficial station in life been able to achieve so much evil. It will be many a year before San Francisco can outlive the shame which the man Ruef has brought upon her.

"He has not been ingenuous even in his confession, for while pleading guilty as charged, he professes to be not guilty of this particular crime--meaning merely by that that he did not extort the money by threats within the meaning of the law. Witnesses, however, would have sworn that he did so. It is unthinkable that such sums should have been paid him voluntarily by the restaurant keepers. All that Ruef can mean by his profession of 'innocence' while pleading guilty, is a claim that he succeeded in terrifying the restaurant men into submitting to blackmail without the use of words which the law would construe as a threat. There is no moral difference between what Ruef would claim that he did and the crime to which he has pleaded guilty.

"Ruef also shows his disingenuousness by attributing his situation to 'the assaults of the press.' Doubtless he has been assaulted by the press. But the press has accused him of nothing but what he has confessed and intimated. What fault has he to find with that? Shall the press remain silent while thieves plunder a distressed city and rob it of its good name? Ruef fought the forces of decency until he could fight no longer. No man is strong enough to stand up against the wrath of an outraged community. His physical collapse was inevitable and the only mantle which charity can throw over him is that his physical weakness broke down his mental faculties and caused the self-contradictions in what is a virtual confession of all that he has been charged with."

[229] The position of the Prosecution was most difficult. Every department of the municipal government, with the exception of the District Attorney's office, was controlled by the corrupt administration, of which Schmitz was the official head. The necessity of dealing with Ruef, and the question of immunity arose primarily and almost entirely, from the fact that there was practically no evidence against Schmitz, except in the French restaurant case, and that there was no evidence in that case that Schmitz received any of the money which was collected by Ruef. Consequently without Ruef's testimony no conviction of Schmitz was possible at all except in the French restaurant case, and in that case his conviction was not at all certain. Union Labor party adherents were naturally unwilling to believe Schmitz guilty until he had been so proven. The big public service corporations and Herrin of the Southern Pacific were all still in sympathy with him and ready to back him for re-election. An election was approaching early in November. The redemption of the city depended upon taking its control away from Schmitz. The Police Commission and the Board of Public Utilities were part of the corrupt and discredited administration. During the rebuilding of San Francisco it was of vital importance to have these two boards honest. Hence the Prosecution felt justified in going to unusual length to secure the additional testimony against Schmitz, which ought to make his conviction certain in the French restaurant case, and thus immediately depose him from office and place the entire city government in the hands of honest men. The new Mayor could appoint a new Board of Supervisors, new Police Commission and new Board of Public Works, as well as many other important officials; and such new Mayor and Supervisors would be reasonably sure of re-election. Agents of the Public Service corporations realized to the full extent the importance of preventing the conviction of Schmitz, and of forcing the prosecution to submit to the appointment of a new Board of Supervisors before any conviction of Schmitz could possibly be secure so that the new Board of Supervisors, so selected through Schmitz by themselves, would have the power of appointing the new Mayor in case Schmitz were convicted. This new Mayor could appoint a new Police Commission and it in turn a new Chief of Police, and the new officials would be controlled by the same interests which controlled the old ones.