Chapter 4

In a joint Council held on 11th Dec. 1903, the Cabinets of both Kingdoms were commissioned to resume negotiations on the Consular question, on the basis of the Communiqué. They were carried on slowly during the Spring 1904, but it was not till May that the first official break in the proceedings was made by Mr. HAGERUP presenting to the Swedish government the Norwegian gouvernment proposal for identical laws.

[Sidenote: _The problem of the relations of the Minister of Foreign affairs to the Consular service._]

It was clear that the chief point of the question should concern the real authority to be exercised by the Minister for Foreign affairs over the Consuls in diplomatic matters. It must necessarily be the chief interest of the Swedish government to insure a guarantee for this. It was partly a purely practical matter, that the Minister for Foreign affairs, who was responsible for the relations of both Kingdoms to Foreign powers, should be able to exercise an efficient control over all matters in any way connected with the Diplomatic service. And it was also necessary to hinder the Norwegian Consular service, in its progressive development, from acting in the direction of a division of the Foreign administration within the Union.

The practical necessity of strict co-operation between the Foreign Service and the Consular Service had previously been acknowledged in Norway on certain sides. It may thus be of interest to recall the strong efforts that were made by the Norwegian majority in the latest Union Committee, to emphasize the importance of having the consuls under the direct control of the Minister for Foreign affairs and Envoys in all matters which are likely to assume a diplomatic character. The same conclusions may also be drawn from the plan of some Norwegians to solve the Consular question, by arranging for the separation of the mercantile part of the joint Consular service, while the diplomatic part remained intact[30:1].

But the problem now presented a somewhat different aspect from the one it had for the Norwegian Majority of the last Union Committee, for it had postulated a Union Minister of Foreign affairs. And, undoubtedly, a deeper penetration into questions it included, had made clearly manifest the impossibility of drawing a distinct line between the diplomatic and mercantile functions of the Consuls. The question, for instance, now arose, as to whether a Norwegian civil official, in certain cases, would be subordinate to a Swedish Minister. In the face of this problem, the Norwegians on their part lost sight of the real points at issue in a most remarkable way. In the Consular Committee's deliberations, Norwegian opinion on the question of subordination, that it would be an »anomaly», in conflict with the spirit of the Norwegian Constitution etc. etc. made it evident that the Swedish claim would come into collision, on the part of Norway, with the formal respect to which the abstract demand of State Sovereignty, viewed logically, is entitled.

From this conflict, the Swedish government had no duty, nor even the right to withdraw without protest. Facts are of more importance than mere forms. The evasive talk of the »spirit» of constitutional law, and the administrative anomalies could not be decisive. Many events both in public annals and administrative legislature are very illogical, and very great anomalies. The main fact which the Swedish government had to hold in view, was this, _that the responsibility of the Swedish Minister of Foreign affairs, for the joint Foreign policy of the two Kingdoms, must presuppose a fully effective administration of the same in all its branches_.

[Sidenote: _The Norwegian proposal. May 1904._]

The Norwegian proposal of the 28th May 1904 showed that the views of the Swedish governement could not entirely be ignored. According to this proposal[31:1] the Consular administration in Christiania should regularly inform the Minister of Foreign affairs of nominations, orders issued etc., etc. which it would be of importance for him to know.

Furthermore, when an affair seemed likely to assume a Diplomatic character and required immediate treatment, the Consul should send the report directly to the Minister for Foreign affairs, and the latter, under similar conditions, would give direct instructions to the Consul. Ambassadors were also empowered to give orders to the Consuls, but on no account to exceed the instructions given by the Norwegian Authorities.

This was undoubtedly something, but manifestly not much. The connection between the Diplomatic Service and the Norwegian Consular administration was very unsatisfactorily provided for. There was no guarantee whatever that the orders of the Norwegian Consular administration would not come into conflict with those of the Minister for Foreign affairs, a deficiency so much the more serious as the Act § 1--c allowed the Norwegian Consular administration rather extensive powers of more or less diplomatic significance, for instance, that of giving instructions to Consuls respecting the regulations of International Law.

Furthermore it was deficient of any provisions that would entitle the Minister of Foreign affairs and the Ambassadors to the authority to secure a guarantee, by strict control, that the Consuls would not compromise the Foreign administration, and, in fact, there was good cause for declaring from the Swedish side, »that the proposition includes scarcely any rules calculated to secure the guarantee referred to in the Communiqué, that the Consuls would not exceed the proper limits of their office», and _was therefore in that respect not in accordance with the acknowledged principles of the Communiqué_.

[Sidenote: _Mr Bostrom's Conditions._]

From what has been already stated, it seems that in the Swedish Cabinet there were divided opinions. But the Government was unanimous in not accepting the Norwegian proposal, and even in the summer of 1904 it must have been evident to the Norwegian Council, that the Swedish Cabinet cil would not in any essentials comply with the Norwegian proposal. But the question was not thoroughly discussed by the Swedish Cabinet in pleno, till the autumn.

During the autumn Mr LAGERHEIM resigned on the grounds of difference of opinion with the Prime Minister, though the real cause of his resignation was said to have no direct connection with the Union negotiations. In November His Excellency Mr BOSTRÖM went to Christiania and presented his conditions, as to which the Swedish Cabinet had declared its approval if the Norwegian government would approve of them[33:1]. These conditions stipulated among other matters, that no orders should be issued from the Consular Office that would come into conflict with the commands of the Minister of Foreign affairs; that, if a Consul acted in any way likely to disturb the relations between the United Kingdoms and the Foreign Powers, the Minister of Foreign affairs could send in an appeal to the King, recommending his dismissal; that the Ambassadors, in certain cases, should also be empowered to suspend the Consul from his Office[33:2].

After personal consultations in Christiania His Excellency Mr HAGERUP made a written statement of his objections.

[Sidenote: _Mr Hagerups Reply._]

In this, and the ensuing interpolations on the Norwegian side, the Norwegian system of conducting negotiations appears in its typical manner. Of real facts and reasons there is not a trace. For instance, though the Norwegian majority itself, in the last Union Committee, emphasized the danger of separating the Consular Service from the Diplomatic administration, Mr HAGERUP does not make the slightest acknowledgement that interminable practical difficulties would be the results of acceding to the Norwegian proposition. Neither is there a single proposal, which, from a Norwegian point of view, would be acceptable, to make decisions that might in any possible degree remedy the deficiences. On the contrary, Mr HAGERUP mentions that such decisions would be calculated to stamp Norway as a dependency, according to international and common law principles, and declared that from a national point of view, it indicates a very great retrogression on the present arrangement of the Consular Service[34:1]. In this, he forgets that Mr BOSTRÖM'S conditions refer to exceptional decisions and do not touch the Norwegian Consul's normal position as being a Norwegian civil Official, and he omits to observe that the interference of the Diplomatic Officials with Consular affairs, as proposed by Mr BOSTRÖM, would very seldom occur.

[Sidenote: _The Swedish Government's proposal._]

It is, meanwhile, easy to understand that Mr BOSTRÖM'S demand, that the King, on the Swedish Minister's representations, should be empowered to dismiss a Norwegian civil official, would deeply injure the Norwegian susceptibilities, and that it was therefore quite possible to be blind to the fact that the Swedish Minister was also responsible for Norway's Foreign politics. When therefore His Excellency Mr HAGERUP went to Stockholm for further discussions, all the rest of the Swedish Ministers, as will be seen, were ready to present a Swedish proposal[34:2] for identical laws modified especially to meet the sensitive point.

The demand that the Consular Office should not issue orders in conflict with those given by the Minister of Foreign affairs, remained, but it naturally did not necessarily imply a formal subordination, as the Minister could not give orders directly to the Consular Office. Further, the decision remained, that the Ambassadors could, on especial occasions, suspend the Consuls from their office, but this decision need not necessarily offend the Norwegian susceptibility, as the Ambassadors, though more directly under the influence of the Minister for Foreign affairs, are nevertheless, according to the Norwegian legal point of view, not only Swedish Officials, but Officials of the Union[35:1]. On the other hand, the form for the interference of the Minister for Foreign affairs with the Consuls was modified in a way which showed great consideration for Norway; thus when a Consul had compromised the United Kingdoms, the Minister of Foreign affairs was to bring the matter before the joint or the Ministerial Council, after which it was laid before the King for decision at a State Council especially dealing with the affairs of that State.

[Sidenote: _The Norwegian government's Ultimatum._]

What reply now does the Norwegian government give to these apparently perfectly fair and moderate demands?[35:2]

It declares that it »stands to reason» that the Norwegian Consular Office would not issue orders in conflict with those of the Minister for Foreign affairs, and remarks that it is not very appropriate in a form of law, to presuppose want of loyalty in a Public Office[35:3]. If the Swedish proposals had been accepted, the Norwegian Consular service would have been very largely placed under the control of the Foreign Minister, who is constitutionally a Swedish Minister. It claims for other more important points the unsuitability of a »hierarchal» relation between Swedish and Norwegian officials, and several times cites the decisions of the Consular Committee, the one-sided formal views of which the Norwegian government itself had abandoned. But when the Norwegian government intends offering other guarantees of cooperation between the Minister for Foreign affairs and the Norwegian Consular Office, and that the Consuls shall not exceed the limits of their duties, it has only to refer to the loyalty of the Norwegian Consular Office, and its interest in keeping Norway from being compromised abroad, guarantees, which, of course, have their significance, when reliable, but manifestly are not of the legislative binding nature intended by the Communiqué. Finally the Norwegian government declares these and sundry other Swedish conditions unacceptable, and adds, that »if they should be adhered to further discussion the Swedish draft about would be useless»[36:1]. Really a formal ultimatum!

[Sidenote: _The Swedish government's reply._]

Before the Swedish government replied to the Norwegian government's Ultimatum, the critical attitude of the Consular negotiations became the subject of debate in the Lower Chamber of the Swedish Diet, and from the liberal party's side, a strong appeal was made to the government to try, if possible, to avoid any interruption of the negotiations. The reply of the Swedish Cabinet is dated Jan. 30th 1905[36:2]. Its tone is one af decision tempered with undoubted moderation and good-will. The Cabinet firmly maintains the real grounds of the disputed claims. It especially emphasizes the importance of the Minister for Foreign affairs having the power in exceptional cases to interfere in Consular matters, as the limits between the Diplomatic and Consular operations are exceedingly indistinct and, on both sides, there is a natural tendency to extend operations into departments that had previously been considered as belonging to the other party. The reference, made by the Norwegian Cabinet, to the Consular Committee's resolution that the Norwegian Consuls should be entirely under the control of Norwegian authority, was met by the Norwegian Cabinet's own admissions, that the Minister for Foreign affairs should be authorised to give the separate Consuls instructions, and, herewith the claim that, in the Diplomatic branch of affairs, the Norwegian Consuls should be solely under the control of Norwegian authority may be considered void. Furthermore it points out the unsatisfactory attitude of the Norwegian proposal with reference to the guarantees presupposed by the Communiqué that the Consuls shall not exceed the proper limits of their duty, and the objection made only on Norway's side, that the best guarantee would be the control exercised by the Norwegian Consular Office, is met on the grounds that a guarantee of that kind was not intended in the Communiqué, as it had nothing to do with the internal relations between Norwegian Consuls and the Norwegian Consular Office.

On the whole the Swedish Cabinet maintains its claims, but it offers to modify them, if they can be proved to be in conflict with the provisions of the Communiqué. Furthermore the possibility is not excluded, of making on other accounts changes and modifications in the proposed resolutions, but their essential items must »be adhered to». The Cabinet does not consider itself entitled, in the interests of the Union, unconditionally to refuse the points designated by the Norwegian Cabinet.

[Sidenote: _The Norwegian government breaks off negotiations._]

To this document from the Swedish Cabinet, is immediately despatched the reply, »that the Norwegian Cabinet finds no grounds for further communication on the matter.»

FOOTNOTES:

[30:1] Thus, their claim for a separate Consular service was worded in the Norwegian Moderate party's programme as follows: »Our own Norwegian Consular Service with the exception of all matters connected with the relations between the Consular Service and Diplomatic administration is hereby declared established».

[31:1] N:o 4.

[33:1] N:o 5.

[33:2] Some other points in Mr BOSTRÖM'S Memorandum were rejected by the Norwegian side. They ran as follows:

1:o Before a Consul was nominated, opportunity should be given to the Minister for Foreign affairs to make such observations as he might think necessary.

2:o In the Consular Diploma, the King shall be styled King of Sweden and Norway--not King of Norway and Sweden, as was the case in Norway--as these Diplomas are intended for presentation to Foreign powers, and the King always makes use of this title abroad Foreign powers.

3:o As long as the appointment of separate consuls was not approved of by Foreign powers and so long as ambassadors in a Foreign conntry had not been stationed, the joint Consular Service should continue its functions. --Mr HAGERUP did not refer to these points in his reply partly because the difficulties of his agreeing on them with Mr BOSTRÖM were not, according to his own account, so very insurmountable.

[34:1] N:o 6.

[34:2] N:o 7.

[35:1] They are mentioned, for instance, in the Act of Union.

[35:2] It is characteristic that NANSEN in his review of the negotiations (page 76 and following) does not mention one of the Swedish demands. It can, however, be safely referred to all, who are impartial on the subject, as to whether its decisions, as NANSEN (page 77) insists, imply the subordination of the Norwegian Consular Service to the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs on a very extensive scale.

[35:3] In that case, what numbers of legislative rules and regulations would have remained unwritten!

[36:1] N:o 8.

[36:2] N:o 9

V.

[Sidenote: _Norwegian accusations aganist the Swedish government._]

The breaking off of the negotiations caused great depression in Norway, and even in wide circles in Sweden the issue was deeply deplored.

Norwegian policy had always been a policy of strong feelings, and now it made it an object systematically to work up illwill against Sweden. Strong expressions were not wanting, and soon the whole of Europe-- thanks to the indefatigable manner in which the Norwegians cultivated the European Press--resounded with accusations against the Swedish government, and the entire Swedish nation of unreasonableness, fickleness etc. etc.; it was important now to make good cause for the plans then already existing in Norway, plans which had probably been laid years ago.

Now in what does the truth of their accusations lie?

[Sidenote: _The responsibility of breaking off the negotiations._]

The accusations implied in the mildest form that the attitude of the Swedish government had caused the break down in the negotiations. To this it must be first pointed out, that the side which first formulated its demands as an ultimatum formally bears the responsibility. Formally, therfore, the Norwegian government is unquestionably the responsible party, so much the more so, that not even after the Norwegian Ultimatum, did the Swedish government maintain its standpoint as being absolutely inflexible. It must also be observed that the first Norwegian proposition in May 1904, in fact, propounded the essentials contained in the Ultimatum. It was certainly held to be only the grounds for further negotiations, but it was proclaimed afterwards on the Norwegian side, that the Norwegian Cabinet had found it possible that divergencies in the form and contents of the law, would be limited to a very slight number of points of minor importance.

The formal responsibility for the breaking off of the negotiations may now, on the whole, be considered of slight importance. It is interesting only on the grounds that it illustrates the Norwegian method of negotiating, which all but commences with the ultimatum, for it explains to a great extent the difficulties of the opposite party in gaining their lawful rights.

The accusations on the Norwegian side, of course, imply, that the Swedish government, in making unreasonable conditions, had practically caused the breaking off of the negotiations, and even wished to bring about that result. As regards the former, an impartial examination of the Swedish final proposal is the best refutation. And as regards the latter, it may assuredly be affirmed, that there was no want of good will, on the part of Sweden, to come to a good understanding on the point, the last letter on the question written by Sweden is a sufficient proof of this. But the government could not reasonably be expected to go further in granting concessions.

It was indisputably clear to the Norwegian government, that they could not make greater concessions. During the proceeding of the negotiations it had become intimately acquainted with the opinions in Norwegian political circles, and it knew that if it went further, it would risk a defeat in the Storthing. But with equal right, it behoved the Swedish government to take into consideration the prospects of getting the proposal approved of by the Swedish Diet, so much the more so, as the Swedish government, in respect to this question, occupied a more insecure position than the Norwegian. The Norwegian government was supported in the Storthing by a majority on the side of the negotiations. The Swedish government had no support at all. The Diet had certainly not insisted on the breaking off of the negotiations, but it firmly maintained its old standpoint, that the Consular question should be solved in conjunction with the Foreign Minister question. It must therefore be of importance to the Swedish government, to have the proposition worded in such a way that it would remove the doubts of the Diet regarding an isolated solution of the Consular question. In the matter of the immutability of the identical laws, it had sought an effectual guarantee that the independent Consular office would not disloyally--when the time was ripe for it--be provided by Norway with its own Minister for Foreign affairs. This question had been shirked by Norway. It was therefore necessary to cling to other guarantees, in order, if possible, to prevent the Norwegian Consular Office from drifting away from under the direction of the Minister for Foreign affairs, and thus, paving the way by degrees to its original goal--the breaking op of the joint administration for Foreign affairs. It is in this light that his Excellency BOSTRÖM'S demands ought undoubtedly to be seen.

It may in short be said: If during the negotiations the Norwegian government was bound by Norwegian Union-political traditions, the Swedish government had the same right to refer to its attachment to Swedish Union-political traditions. And, it must be added: That if any of the Swedish conditions, which the Norwegian government pointed out, were an expression for a suspicion of Norway's implicit loyalty in conducting its own Consular affairs, _it was Norwegian traditional Radical Policy from the beginning of 1890 which cast its shadow before it_. And that the old Norwegian Radical traditions had to be taken into account was prowed by the number and length of the discussions in the Storthing, which were dinned into the ears of the negotiators, during the whole period of the negotiations. That even Mr MICHELSEN, one of the parties to the negotiations on the Norwegian government side, in a debate at the Storthing, during the Spring 1904, cast friendly glances on the old lines, showed plainly how little they had forgotten the old talk of taking matters into their own hands.

[Sidenote: _The question as to whether the Swedish government had broken the covenant of the Communiqué._]

But the Norwegian accusations were not limited to the negotiators' (especially Mr BOSTRÖM'S) bringing about the breaking off of the negotiations by their unreasonable demands. They went further; it was loudly proclaimed that the Swedish government had not kept their word, had broken their agreement etc. etc., and, when all of a sudden Sweden became identical with the government of Sweden she was pathetically pointed at as untrustworthy etc. etc. The amount of moral indignation contained in these Norwegian accusations has plainly been made manifest by late events. Their object--to throw on Sweden the responsibility of plans that were designed to be executed in Norway--was too transparent, but just on that account they must be explained, in order that the responsibility of Sweden for what happened in Norway, may appear in its true light.