CHAPTER XV. OUR SUMMARY REJECTION OF CURRENT SUPERNATURALISM CONSIDERED IN
ITS BEARING ON THE EVIDENCE FOR MIRACLES.
There can be no doubt that there is an enormous mass of supernatural beliefs which we feel at once justified in rejecting without troubling ourselves to inquire into the evidence on which they rest. Others also we reject because on investigation we find them altogether destitute of evidence. Others again which rest on evidence which would be sufficient to establish an ordinary fact, we reject notwithstanding this attestation, on the ground of their inherent improbability. It has been objected that our summary rejection of the great mass of current supernaturalism puts the case of miracles out of court, and renders them so improbable, that it is unnecessary minutely to examine the evidence which can be adduced in support of them. I propose therefore in this chapter to consider the reasons for our summary rejection of the great mass of current supernaturalism, and its bearing on the credibility of the miracles in the New Testament.
First: I observe that the stories of current supernaturalism are not the only ones which we reject in a summary manner. We treat in the same way a great number of other stories which offend against the principles of common sense. It is clear that in these latter cases, we do not reject them merely because they are supernatural, but because they are generally incredible. The fact therefore that we thus reject a number of absurd narratives without inquiry into the evidence on which they rest, cannot be urged as a reason for rejecting other occurrences which are not involved in any such absurdity. If the principle is valid against miracles, it must be equally so against other extensive classes of facts. To assert that miracles are thus absurd or ridiculous is to assume the point which ought to be proved.
Secondly: We reject the great mass of current supernaturalism because it is unable to assign any adequate reason for its existence. When it is alleged that a miracle has been performed as an attestation of a revelation, if it forms a necessary portion of such attestation, this is an adequate reason for the miracle. But the great mass of current supernaturalism is utterly unable to assign any reason for its existence; or if reasons have been given, they are quite inadequate. Of this the case of magic is an example. If it were a reality, it would not only interfere with the order of nature, but no reason could be given for this interference. If, on the other hand, its phenomena were alleged to be due to secret forces in nature, then they would belong to an order of grotesque and monstrous phenomena, which we are justified at once in refusing to believe to be due to the action of intelligence or goodness; and on the supposition that there is a moral Governor of the universe, it is utterly incredible that they would occur either by his agency or with his permission.
Perhaps the best attested occurrences of current supernaturalism are the phenomena of spiritualism. It will tend to the illustration of this subject, if we consider the grounds on which we reject a large portion of its reported phenomena quite irrespectively of the evidence produced in favour of their reality, and ascribe the belief in them to the effect of an excited imagination, and in some cases to imposture. In considering this subject, it is not necessary to examine whether the phenomena alleged by spiritualists, if true, would be really supernatural, or belong to an order of nature hitherto unknown.
Many of the manifestations of spiritualism possess a grotesqueness which we see in no other class of natural phenomena. If they are alleged to be the results of the action of natural forces previously unknown, then they must belong to a class of forces which contrast in a most remarkable degree with all known ones; that is to say, the known and the unknown forces of nature must be utterly out of harmony with one another. I am now speaking on the supposition that such forces are merely natural ones, not under the guidance of intelligence. In that case they must have been always in existence, only latent; yet they now for the first time manifest themselves under very special circumstances and conditions, such as are highly favourable to the existence of delusion. The abnormal character of these phenomena, so entirely at variance with the known order of nature, forms the strongest ground for the conviction that they cannot be the results of the action of unknown natural forces. It would require an overwhelming amount of evidence to convince us that these two sets of natural forces, distinguishable by the strongest possible contrasts, (viz. those which produce the visible phenomena of nature, and those which produce another class, intermittent in their action, of which grotesqueness and monstrosity are the most striking characteristics, and which only manifest their existence under circumstances calculated to throw a suspicion on their reality), can be the results of the action of forces which have been present in nature during all past time.
But further: these phenomena, if natural, must belong to an order of nature which is not only unlike the visible order, but would throw its action into confusion. I am here reasoning on the supposition that the moral order of the universe is due to the action of nothing but physical forces. If this be so, it must form a portion of the existing order of nature. But the forces which, on the supposition of the truth of spiritualism, must be capable of being brought into activity, would interrupt that moral order of which we are actually conscious. Their action, if real, would interrupt the entire course of the moral world. No man would be safe from their intrusion. Even in our deepest retirement we should never be free from the invasion of their prying curiosity. Such a power would be incompatible with the moral order of society. It follows, therefore, that an unknown order of nature, presenting the most violent contrast to the visible one, whose phenomena do not follow an invariable but an intermittent law, and are only alleged to manifest themselves under conditions favourable to imposture, possesses such a degree of inherent improbability as to justify its rejection, even by those who recognise the action of none but material forces in the universe.
But to those who recognise the present order of nature as due to the action of a wise and intelligent Creator, it becomes absolutely incredible that forces such as the phenomena of spiritualism require for their production, can form a portion of that order which He has created, as they contradict every conception which we can rationally form of his character.
But if these phenomena are viewed as due to the action of supernatural agency, the reality of their occurrence becomes still more inconceivable. If such agency is capable of being exerted, we can only conceive that its exertion is permitted for the realization of some known end. Yet the phenomena of spiritualism serve no purpose whatever. Spiritualists have been holding their _séances_ for many years; but no one practical result has yet been realized by them. The spirits of the departed have been invoked, but they have never yet given a single useful response. Surely if there be a spirit world, its occupations cannot be the production of the abnormal, the mean and the grotesque. Its employments must possess some pretensions to be esteemed dignified. It has been alleged that such manifestations help to convince the incredulous of the reality of the immortality of man. On the contrary, the idea that spirits can be guilty of such phantastic tricks can only help to throw discredit on the doctrine. It follows, therefore, that if the phenomena of spiritualism are viewed as due to supernatural causes, it is utterly incredible either that the Governor of the Universe would permit such a course of action, or that the spirits themselves, unless deprived of reason, would exhibit themselves in such a variety of phantastic forms, and for no other apparent purpose than to effect a number of capricious interferences with the visible order of nature. This incredibility is so great as to entitle us summarily to reject the idea that the reputed phenomena can be actual occurrences. In addition to this, the alleged manifestations are made under circumstances pre‐eminently suited to excite suspicion.
The phenomena of modern spiritualism are a fair illustration of the general character of the current supernaturalism of the ancient world. It was for the most part equally senseless and absurd. The attestation to its actual occurrence was of a very inferior character to that which can be urged in favour of the alleged facts of spiritualism. I have merely taken notice of these latter as an illustration of the general aspect of the phenomena of current supernaturalism, and as placing before us the reasons which fully justify us in rejecting a large portion of it without minutely inquiring into its evidence.
I will now proceed to contrast the entire mass of current supernaturalism with the miracles of the New Testament for the purpose of still further illustrating the grounds on which we reject it, while we claim for the latter that their reality must be tested by the evidence which can be adduced in favour of their actual occurrence.
Let me again draw attention to the fact that the only correct conception of a miracle in connection with this controversy, is that of an event wrought in external nature with a definite moral aim and purpose. Extraordinary events, to which no such moral aim and purpose can be assigned, may be unusual occurrences, but are in no proper sense of the words evidential miracles. An isolated occurrence of an extraordinary nature, and an event marked with a definite moral purpose, are two wholly different things. The one may be credible, and the other wholly incredible. We habitually recognise the distinction in ordinary life, and it entirely affects our judgment of the probability of an event. We esteem the action of a particular person quite credible under one set of circumstances, which we should reject as incredible under another. Thus if we were informed that a friend with whom we were intimately acquainted, had precipitated himself from a height into the water, supposing him to be sane, we should not believe it. But if we received the information that he had done it to save a person from drowning, and we knew that he was a man of courage, we should accept the fact without the smallest hesitation. On this account, therefore, the moral aspect of the alleged miracle is of the utmost importance; and it is necessary for its correct conception that it should not only be an extraordinary occurrence in external nature, but that it should take place at the bidding of another, and in order to render it credible, that it should be calculated to effectuate some definite moral purpose.
Alleged supernatural events, which are destitute of these accompaniments, are always liable to a very high degree of _à priori_ suspicion. In fact it would be difficult to prove them to be supernatural. All that could be affirmed respecting them would be that they were very unusual occurrences, which it was impossible to account for by the action of any known force. If the universe is under the government of God, all supernatural action must either be the result of His agency or permission. If He interferes with the order of occurrences, it is evident that such interference cannot be capricious, but must have a definite purpose. We are justified, therefore, in refusing to accept occurrences as supernatural, which are destitute of all appearance of purpose in their performance.
But further: the alleged miracle must be consistent with the character of God, before it is possible to attribute it to Him as wrought by His direct agency. This rests on the same principle on which we refuse to credit the reports of actions performed by men which are contradictory to their well known characters. But this is far more certain with respect to God than it can be of man. Human characters can at best be but imperfectly known, and there are unseen depths in the human heart which sometimes render actions possible, which stand in striking contrast to the general character of the agents. To state the truth generally, as it is impossible that man can act in opposition to the inmost principles of his moral being, so in a far higher degree is it impossible that God can contradict the perfections of His moral nature. This being so, it follows that we are entitled to reject all miracles alleged to have been wrought by God, which are contrary to His moral attributes; all which are low, mean, or grotesque, and unfitted to realize an elevated moral purpose.
It will here be objected that if these positions are true, demoniacal miracles are rendered impossible. I have already pointed out that if demoniacal supernaturalism is affirmed in the New Testament to be an actuality, its action is described as being limited to the human mind, and that whatever permitted activity is conceded to it, always bears the most distinctive marks of being from beneath. There is no possibility of mistaking between such supernatural occurrences and the miracles of God.
Such then are our general principles, the truth of which can hardly be contested. If they are true, the great mass of current supernaturalism is worthy of rejection for the following reasons.
1. While it claims to be the result of supernatural agency, it is destitute of all definite moral purpose, and such moral impress as it bears is mean and degraded. What end, I ask, was it designed to serve? It involved an almost continual interference with the order of nature; or if at times it claimed to be due to occult forces, they were only suited to confound the visible order of the universe. I am reasoning on the supposition that there is a God who rules the world. This being so, it is impossible to conceive that such a mode of acting can be His. Under this head of supernaturalism fall all the monstrous and the grotesque, and the entire range of magical phenomena.
2. The whole range of ancient supernaturalism is in contradiction to everything which we can conceive of the moral character of God. Let us take as an illustration the phenomena of Soothsaying. Who can believe that God employed the entrails of slaughtered beasts as the means of revealing the future? or that it was consistent with his character to manifest his will through a multitude of monstrous portents? There is perhaps not a single occurrence of ancient supernaturalism which does not offend against our primary conception of the Divine character; and, therefore, the whole is worthy of summary rejection.
3. Ancient supernaturalism assigned its occurrences to no cause adequate to produce them. Those who asserted its reality, referred it to the action of deities who possessed very limited power, or to occult powers in nature. Such occult powers we now know to have no existence, and the power attributed to the supposed deities was far too limited to be capable of producing the results in question. All reputed events, the alleged cause of which is unable to produce them, we are entitled to reject without further investigation.
4. A large amount of ancient supernaturalism rested on no evidence whatever. Of those portions for which any reasons were alleged, the evidence itself was of a character exactly suited to discredit it. Of this kind was the whole of the supernaturalism connected with the state religions. These were in the hands of men who used them for the purpose of acting on the vulgar, and who therefore readily accepted the report of anything, however incredible, which could subserve their end. Other portions were palpable impostures worked for the basest and most selfish purposes. A very brief acquaintance with the nature of the evidence on which it rests is sufficient to justify us in rejecting it without entering on any inquiry as to its details.
Such being the general character of ancient supernaturalism, it is absurd to argue that its existence is a reason for rejecting along with it another order of supernaturalism, which stands contrasted with it in every particular. We might as well urge the existence of a vast number of counterfeits as a reason for rejecting everything which is genuine. We do not reject it because it is supernatural, but because it is utterly incredible. A statement of a few particulars will exhibit the contrast between it and the supernaturalism of the New Testament in a striking point of view.
1. Christian supernaturalism alleges that its occurrences are the result of the action of a force which, if present, is certainly adequate to produce them. Ancient supernaturalism alleges no cause whatever, or one wholly inadequate.
2. Christian supernaturalism alleges a perfectly adequate purpose for its production; that purpose being the attestation of the divine mission of Jesus. Ancient supernaturalism alleges either no purpose at all, or a degraded one.
3. Christian supernaturalism is made to centre around the greatest and most exalted character that has ever appeared in history. Ancient supernaturalism, instead of being connected with the most eminent characters of the times, directly connects itself with the most questionable.
4. Christian supernaturalism is stamped throughout with a high moral character and aspect. This is wholly wanting in the supernaturalism of the ancient world.
5. Christian supernaturalism belongs to an elevated order and type; the objects realized by it were for the most part benevolent. The mode of its action was dignified and the effects produced by it were instantaneous, following directly on the word of the agent. The mode in which its miracles were performed is characterized by the utmost simplicity, destitute alike of anything scenic or fantastic, entirely in harmony with the great character who performed them. The supernaturalism of the ancient world is marked by the opposite characteristics.
6. Christian supernaturalism, or to speak more correctly, the greatest supernatural occurrence which Christianity records, namely the Resurrection of Christ, has not only left a mighty impression on history, but has created a civilization of its own which embraces all the progressive nations of the world, and exerts a powerful influence even on those who deny its truth. The only result wrought by the supernaturalism of the ancient world was the moral degradation of those among whom it prevailed.
7. The supernaturalism of Christianity rests on an attestation which even unbelievers would allow to be quite sufficient to establish the truth of any ordinary facts. The other rests either on no testimony at all, or on one which is open to the gravest suspicion.
Such are some of the striking contrasts which distinguish the supernaturalism of the New Testament from that of the ancient world. When two series of events present such opposite features, it is the duty of a sound philosophy to trace these distinctions to their causes, and to show what is the nature of the forces which have impressed on each series its own peculiar characteristics. Instead of this, however, we are invited to pronounce both alike incredible; that is to say, because one series of events is deeply impressed with characteristics which render them incredible, we are invited to pronounce a similar condemnation on another series, which is distinguished by the most opposite features, and which has only this point in common with the former, that both belong to an order of events which we designate as supernatural. Nothing can be more unphilosophical than such a mode of reasoning. We reject the one series in a mass, not because the events which it contains are supernatural, but because they are absolutely incredible. A similar rule we apply to ordinary, no less than supernatural occurrences.
But it will doubtless be objected that there is another series of supernatural occurrences which rational men, with a few exceptions, greet with an equally summary rejection, viz. the long series of ecclesiastical miracles which extends in an almost unbroken succession from the second century of our era nearly to the present day. These, it has been urged, are alleged to have been wrought in attestation of Christianity, and bear some remarkable analogy, as facts wrought in external nature, to the miracles recorded in the Gospels. It is argued that if we reject the one, we are for the same reason bound to reject the others.
The following points may be considered as admitted.
First; That every century from the second downwards has been characterized by a considerable amount of pretension to the possession of supernatural power; and during this period one section of the Christian Church claims to have actually wrought miracles.
Secondly; Several of these miracles, viewed merely as phenomena in outward nature, are precisely similar to those recorded in the New Testament.
Thirdly; When a miracle is alleged to have been performed at the present day, as has recently been the case in a neighbouring country, not only all unbelievers in the possibility of supernatural occurrences, but also all rational Christians concur in its summary rejection, not merely on the ground that the evidence is insufficient, but that the event is in itself incredible.
Fourthly; That rational men reject in a similar manner and for similar reasons the great mass of ecclesiastical miracles as unworthy of serious inquiry into their attestation.
With respect to the second point, I have already observed that if we view miracles merely as phenomena in external nature, and if a similar belief in a current supernaturalism, which we have seen to be one of the phenomena of human nature, prevailed in the Church, it was to be expected that the current forms of ecclesiastical supernaturalism would adopt those of the New Testament for their basis, and consequently that it would abound in narratives of resurrections from the dead and the cures of various diseases. This is actually the case. It may also not only excite our wonder that the model was not far more exactly copied, but that ecclesiastical, and especially monkish miracles, which constitute an overwhelming majority of the miracles of Church history, abound so largely in features which stand in such marked contrast to the miracles of the New Testament, their peculiar characteristics being the same as those of ancient supernaturalism, viz. the monstrous and the grotesque. This point is one which demands the serious consideration of unbelievers; for if, as they aver, they are both due to the action of the same causes, this diversity requires to be accounted for. The truth is, that with the exception that both series contain reports of miracles which are similar or mere objective occurrences, in other respects their characteristics differ widely.
With respect to the fact that rational men concur in the rejection of modern miracles, it should be observed that this is not because all supernatural events are believed to be incredible; but because the reputed events themselves possess characteristics which excite in us the gravest suspicions of their truth; and especially because by far the greatest number of them are well known not to have originated in mere credulity, but in actual imposture. Men or communities who have once lent themselves to the deliberate coining of miracles, are of blasted reputations, and whenever marvellous occurrences are reported by such persons, we are justified in rejecting them without further inquiry. It is evident that these are the grounds on which such stories are rejected, and not simply because they are supernatural, since those who believe in the supernaturalism of the New Testament concur with those who disbelieve in it, in thus rejecting them.
I must now briefly consider the general grounds on which we reject the great mass of ecclesiastical miracles, while we accept those in the Gospels as actual occurrences.
The general ground of our rejection of them is precisely the same as that on which we reject the supernaturalism of the ancient world. The only thing which distinguishes them from the latter, is that they contain a number of events which viewed as bare facts are similar to those recorded in the Gospels. In every other respect the contrast is complete. I shall only draw attention to a few considerations which might otherwise escape the notice of the reader.
The ecclesiastical miracles were not wrought in attestation that the person working them had a divine commission, but that a divine power permanently abode in the Church. The qualification which was thought necessary for the exhibition of this power was the possession of a great degree of reputed sanctity. The exercise of miraculous power was supposed to prove, not that its possessor had a divine commission, but that he was a saint. The saint was supposed to have in himself some inherent power of working miracles, bearing a considerable analogy to that which the woman with the issue of blood believed to be possessed by our Lord. A miraculous power in the shape of a virtue issued from the saint. Hence the supernatural power which was ascribed to dead men’s bones and to relics. Such a supernatural power is devoid of everything which presupposes a divine purpose, and of all evidential value. Its frequency would destroy the nature of a miracle as an attestation of a divine commission, and involve an interference with the order of nature, which would destroy the sense of its regularity, the knowledge of which is so essential to our well being, as well as to the conception of a miracle. Moreover, the supernatural agency is not supposed to be due to the direct intervention of God, but to some imaginary virtue residing in man.
The ecclesiastical miracles of which we have anything like a detailed account, when they are not simply regarded as due to the direct sanctity of the person performing them, are never alleged to be performed in proof of a divine commission; but when they are asserted to have been evidential, they are affirmed to have been wrought in proof of some doctrine, or in favour of some particular party in the Church; or, what invests them with a still greater degree of suspicion, in favour of the power of a particular order. The last class of alleged miracles may at once be dismissed as due to simple imposture. The first are strongly contrasted with those of the New Testament, where we cannot find the account of a single miracle wrought in attestation of a doctrine, the one or two apparent exceptions being really performed to attest a divine commission. But when a miracle is wrought to prove an irrational doctrine, the credibility of the miracle perishes with the truth of the doctrine. We are, therefore, justified in rejecting the miracles whenever we have sufficient evidence that the doctrines which they were alleged to attest are untrue. Again: whenever a particular party alleges a divine attestation in its favour, its character may be known by its works. The parties in the Church who have claimed such miraculous attestation, have proved by their actions that the idea of a divine interference in their favour is incredible, as being inconsistent with the divine character.
It is perfectly true that at the present day all rational men, with few exceptions, concur in rejecting almost the entire mass of ecclesiastical miracles. They do this, however, not because they believe miracles to be impossible, but because they are persuaded that God will not work one on a light or trivial occasion, and because the great mass of such pretended miracles are characterised by marks which are inconsistent with the idea that they have been wrought by God. With our larger acquaintance with the order of nature, we no longer believe that it is possible for miracles to be wrought by any inherent virtue in things themselves, but that if performed at all, it can only be by the direct agency or permission of the Author of Nature. In a word, the general incredibility of the ecclesiastical miracles, and their repugnance to our conception of the mode of the divine acting is the reason why we reject them altogether.
It is also unquestionably true that at the present day a great majority even of religious persons would receive with no little incredulity the report of a miracle, while such incredulity would not have existed at a former period. This is due to two causes: first, our increased knowledge of the permanence of the forces of material Nature; and secondly, our belief that supernatural occurrences can only take place by the direct agency and permission of God, and not by means of my supernatural power inherent in particular persons. From this we draw the inference that almost all the alleged ecclesiastical miracles must be rejected as inconsistent with the divine character. We are of opinion, therefore, that a miracle wrought for any other purpose than the attestation of a revelation is not credible; and as from the nature of the case revelations must be rare, we summarily reject all reports of supernatural occurrences as impostures, or the offspring of a heated and undisciplined imagination.
Now although this is generally the case, yet it is unquestionable that if a miracle was reported to us with a pre‐eminently strong attestation, no rational person would refuse to give a serious consideration to the evidence merely because the event was supernatural. A reported miracle would doubtless be attended with no inconsiderable degree of antecedent improbability; but if a man with whom we were intimately acquainted, of sound intellect, and high moral character were to allege that he had performed an act which, if real, must have been indisputably miraculous, it would be altogether irrational to reject his assertion summarily as unworthy of consideration merely because in all ages miraculous stories have been extensively believed. The application of such a principle would lead us into the grossest error.
This question has a very important bearing on the subject before us. It has been alleged that while nothing has been more common than the ascription of miracles to eminent men, it is impossible to find a man of sound judgment and high moral character who has deliberately affirmed that he has performed one himself. That such affirmations have been very rare is certain, and for the simple reason, that miracles have been very rare occurrences. But the assertion that no such cases are to be found is inaccurate. One, at all events, exists, although probably the only one, but it is that of a man of the most undoubted veracity, the Apostle Paul. As I have already observed, four of the most important writings which have been attributed to him are admitted by a vast majority of those unbelievers who are competent to form an opinion on the subject, to be his genuine productions. These are before us, and we can form from them a full judgment as to the character of the man. In them he distinctly tells us that he performed miracles. He writes: “I have therefore whereof I may glory in those things which pertain to God. For I will not dare to speak of any of those things which Christ hath not wrought by me to make the Gentiles obedient by word and deed, through mighty signs and wonders, by the power of the Spirit of God; so that from Jerusalem, and round about unto Illyricum, I have fully preached the Gospel of Christ.” (Rom. xv. 18, 19.) Here at least we have a direct affirmation on the subject. It is not the only one made by him. But there is also one which is equivalent to another affirmation made by One whom unbelievers must admit to have been the greatest man who ever lived, Jesus Christ Himself. Those with whom I am reasoning allow that the discourses in the Synoptic Gospels are accounts of His real utterances. In them He directly affirms that He performed miracles.
Even those against whose opinions I am arguing, will concede that the characters of Christ and St. Paul stand at the greatest height of moral elevation. If there are any other persons whose utterances have been handed down to us, who have deliberately made this affirmation, their numbers are unquestionably few. Certainly no other thoroughly great and elevated character has done so. This is a remarkable fact and well worthy of consideration. While many of the Fathers have affirmed that miracles were performed by others, not one of them has affirmed that he has wrought any himself. The supernaturalism of the New Testament differs, as we have seen, from all other alleged kinds of supernatural occurrences. It differs moreover in this respect, that one of the persons through whose agency these miracles are declared to have been performed, has made a deliberate affirmation that he wrought them; and that the founder of Christianity, in recorded utterances which are admitted to be genuine, has likewise asserted that miracles were wrought by Him.
It follows, therefore, that our summary rejection of all the current supernaturalism which has been alleged to have taken place at various periods of history, is quite consistent with our accepting as true the series of supernatural events recorded in the New Testament, which are distinguished by characteristics of an entirely different order.