CHAPTER XXVII

CORRESPONDENCE WITH MR. CHAMBERLAIN

As I have said, we felt that the result of the Conference had been a very serious set-back and discouragement to all our wishes. I therefore watched public opinion very carefully and with considerable anxiety, and I noticed two or three uncomfortable indications. In the first place a restlessness manifested itself among the manufacturing classes in Canada, particularly in the woollen trade, against the British preference which pressed upon them, while Canada received no corresponding advantage, and a discussion began as to whether the British preference should not be cut off. The next thing which alarmed me was that during the following winter a movement arose in the United States to secure the establishment of a reciprocity treaty with Canada. Suggestions were made to renew the sittings of the High Joint Commission which had adjourned in 1898 without anything being done. This was evaded by our Government, but a strong agitation was commenced in the Eastern States, and supported in Chicago, to educate the people of the United States in favour of tariff arrangements with Canada.

The more far-seeing men in the United States were uneasy about the movement for mutual preferential tariffs in the British Empire. They saw at once that if successful it would consolidate and strengthen British power and wealth and would be a severe blow to the prosperity of the United States, which for fifty years had been fattening upon the free British markets, while for thirty years their own had been to a great extent closed to the foreigner and preserved for their own enrichment. I felt that the failure of the Conference would give power to our enemies in the United States and aid them to enmesh us in the trade entanglements which would preclude the possibility of our succeeding in carrying our policy into effect.

Every week I became more and more alarmed. It will be remembered that there was then no Tariff Reform movement in England. That Lord Salisbury was dying, that Mr. Chamberlain had not yet openly committed himself, and that nothing was being done, while our opponents were actively at work both in the States and in Canada. The small faction in Canada who were disloyal were once more taking heart while the loyal element were discouraged.

Still further to cause anxiety the Imperial Federation Defence Committee took this opportunity, through Mr. Arthur Loring, to make an imperious demand upon the Colonies to hand over at once large cash contributions in support of the Navy, or practically to cut us adrift. Had the desire been to smash up the Empire, the attack could not have been better timed than when everything was going against the Imperial view. I wrote a reply which appeared in _The Times_ on the 2nd March, 1903:

SIR,

With reference to your issues of January 9th and 10th which contained the letter of Mr. Arthur Loring, Hon. Secretary of the Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee, and your leading article upon the question of colonial contributions to the Imperial Navy, I desire to send a reply from the Canadian point of view.

Mr. Loring's proposition is practically that the Mother Country should repudiate any further responsibility for the defence of the Empire, unless the Colonies pay over cash contributions for the Navy in the way and under the terms that will suit the Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee. The British Empire League in Canada and the majority of the Canadians are as anxious for a secure Imperial Defence as is Mr. Loring, but the spirit of dictation which runs through the publications of his committee has always been a great difficulty in our way, by arousing resentment in our people, who might do willingly what they would object to be driven into. Because we hesitate to pay cash contributions we are attacked as if we had made no sacrifices for the Empire. Mr. Loring seems to forget our preference to all British goods, which has caused Germany to cut off the bulk of our exports to that country, to forget that we imposed a duty on sugar in order by preference to help the West Indies in the Imperial interest, that we helped to construct the Pacific cable for the same reason, or that numbers of our young men fought and died for the cause in South Africa. We have proved in many ways our willingness to make sacrifices for the Empire, and yet, because we will not do just exactly what Mr. Loring's committee suggest, they wish to cut us adrift.

This is a very impolitic and dangerous suggestion. It is so important that we should understand each other, and that you in England should know how we look at this question, that I hope you will allow me to say a few words upon this subject.

The British Empire League in Canada requested me as their president to go to Great Britain last April to advocate a duty of 5 to 10 per cent. all round the Empire on all foreign goods in order to provide a fund for Imperial Defence. This proposition was approved of at a number of meetings held in various parts of Canada, and by political leaders of all shades of politics and I am certain it would have been confirmed by a large majority in our Parliament had Great Britain and the other Colonies agreed to it.

I addressed a number of meetings in England and Scotland, and discussed the question with many of the political leaders in London. I soon discovered while the audiences were receptive, and many approved of the proposition, that nevertheless it was new, contrary to their settled prejudices, and that it would take time and popular education on the subject before such an arrangement could be carried in the House of Commons. When Sir Wilfrid Laurier came over just before the Conference, knowing that I had been discussing the subject for two months, he asked me if I thought the proposition I had been advocating could be proposed at the Conference with any prospect of success. I replied that I did not think it could, that Great Britain was not ready for it, that Australia at the time was engaged in such a struggle over her revenue tariff that she could not act, and that if I was in his place I should not attempt it. He did, however, make a number of suggestions at the Conference which, if accepted by the home Government, would have gone a long way to place the Empire on a safer footing. The Mother Country would not agree to relieve Canada from the corn duty, but was quite willing to accept and ask for contributions for defence. This Sir Wilfrid refused; and a large portion of our people approve of that course, not because they do not feel that they ought to contribute, not because they are not able to contribute, but because they do not feel disposed to spend their money in what they would consider a senseless and useless way.

We feel that to save our Empire, to consolidate it, to make it strong and secure, there are several points that must be considered and that, as all these points are essential, to spend money on some and leave out others that are vital would be a useless and dangerous waste. If our Empire is to live, she must maintain her trade and commerce, she must keep up her manufactures, she must retain and preserve her resources both in capital and population for her own possessions, she must have bonds of interest as well as of sentiment, and she must have a system of defence that shall be complete at all points. An army or a navy might be perfect in equipment, in training, in weapons, in organisation, in skilled officers, &c., and yet if powder and cordite were left out all would be useless waste. If food were left out it would be worst of all, and yet Mr. Loring asks us to contribute large sums to maintain a navy, and to have that navy directed and governed by a department in which we would have little or no voice--a department under the control of an electorate who in the first war with certain Powers (one of which we at least know is not friendly) would be starving almost immediately, and would very soon insist on surrendering the fleet to which we had contributed in order to get food to feed their starving children. They might even be willing to surrender possessions as well. While you in England maintain this position, that you will not include food in your scheme of defence, do you wonder that we in Canada should endeavour to perfect our own defence in order to secure our own freedom and independence as a people, if the general smash comes, which we dread as the possible result of your obstinate persistence in a policy, which leaves you at the mercy of one or two foreign nations.

I wish to draw attention to the following figures, which seem to show that there is weakness and danger in your commercial affairs as well:

1900.

United Kingdom imports (foreign) £413,544,528 United Kingdom exports (foreign) 252,349,700 ------------ Balance of trade against United Kingdom £161,194,828

1901.

United Kingdom imports (foreign) £416,416,492 United Kingdom exports (foreign) 234,745,904 ------------ Balance of trade against United Kingdom £181,670,588

We see the result of this great import of foreign goods in the distress in England to-day. The cable reports tell us of unemployed farm labourers flocking into the towns, of unemployed townsmen parading the streets with organised methods of begging, of charity organisations taxed to their utmost limit to relieve want. We see the Mother Country ruining herself and enriching foreign nations by a blind adherence to a fetish, and we begin to wonder how long it can last.

Adopt the policy of a duty upon all foreign goods, bind your Empire together by bonds of interest, turn your emigration and capital into your own possessions, produce ten or twelve million quarters more of wheat in your own islands, no matter what the cost may be, and then ask us to put in our contributions towards the common defence, for then an effective defence might be made.

Yours truly, GEORGE T. DENISON.

I was so alarmed at the state of affairs that on the 23rd March, 1903, I wrote to Mr. Chamberlain the following letter, which shows my anxiety at the time:

DEAR MR. CHAMBERLAIN,

There are one or two very important matters I wish to bring to your attention.

Just before the Conference I had a conversation with you and Lord Onslow in reference to Canada's action. You considered that it would be useless at the time to attempt to carry the proposition that I had been advocating in Great Britain, of a 5 to 10 per cent. duty around the Empire for a defence fund. You told me what line you thought the most likely to succeed, and advised me that Canada should try to meet your views by further concessions to Great Britain in return for advantages for us in your markets. I urged this upon Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and I understand that he was willing to meet you, if possible, on the lines indicated. Unfortunately, nothing was done. I fancy your colleagues got frightened, for I know that you personally had a clear insight into the matter, and fully appreciated the importance of something being done.

Now I wish to tell you how matters stand out here. Our people are very much discouraged. Many of our strongest Imperialists in the past are beginning to advocate the repeal of our preference to Great Britain. The manufacturers who were in favour of the preference, provided we had a prospect of getting a reciprocal advantage in your markets, are, many of them for their personal ends, now desirous of stopping it. All the disaffected (there are not very many of them) are using the failure of the Conference to attack and ridicule the Imperial cause. This is all very serious. The gravest danger of all, however, is that the United States will never give our Empire another chance to consolidate itself if they can prevent it. They are already agitating for the reassembling of the High Joint Commission to consider, among other things, reciprocal tariffs. Only the other day a member of the Massachusetts House of Assembly declared in that house that he had assurances from Washington that the passage of a resolution in favour of reciprocity with Canada would be welcomed by the administration. We see the danger of this, and our Government have made excuses to delay the meeting of the Commission until October. Now if nothing is done in the meantime towards combining the Empire--if nothing is done to make such a start towards it as would give our people encouragement, what will happen? The United States will give us the offer of free reciprocity in natural products. What would our people be likely to do in that case? All along the frontier our farmers would find it very convenient to sell their barley, oats, hay, butter, poultry, eggs, &c., to the cities on the border. In the North West it would appeal to our western farmers, who would be glad to get their wheat in free to the mills of Minneapolis and St. Paul. Such a proposition might therefore carry in our Parliament, and would probably bind us for ten or fifteen years. This would be a dead block against any combination of the Empire for preferential trade, for then you could not give us a preference, as we would be debarred from putting a duty on United States articles coming across our border, which would be necessary if an Imperial scheme were carried out.

A proposition for reciprocity with the United States was made in 1887. At the dinner given to you in Toronto that year I fired my first shot against Commercial Union, and ever since I have been probably the leader in the movement against it. My main weapon, my strongest weapon, was an Imperial discriminating tariff around the Empire. We succeeded in getting our people and Parliament and Government to take the idea up and to do our side of it, and we have given the discriminating tariff in your favour. We hoped that you would meet us, but nothing has been done, and our people feel somewhat hurt at the result. Where will we Imperialists be this autumn when the High Joint Commission meets? The people of the United States will be almost sure to play the game to keep back our Empire, and we will be here with our guns spiked, with all our weapons gone, and in a helpless condition.

I feel all this very deeply and think that I should lay the whole matter before you. I do not wish to see the Empire "fall to pieces by disruption or by tolerated secession." I do not wish to see "the disasters which will infallibly come upon us." I wish to see our Empire "a great Empire" and not see Great Britain "a little State," and I do urge upon you as earnestly as I can to get something done this Session that will give us a preference, no matter how small, in order that our hands may be tied before the High Joint Commission meets, so that we may escape the dangers of a reciprocity treaty, for if we are tied up with one for ten years, our Empire may have broken up before our hands are free again.

If something was done on the preference, I believe we could carry large expenditures for Imperial Defence in our Parliament. I enclose a letter to the _Times_ which appeared while you were on the sea, which I believe pretty fairly expressed the views of most of our people.

I send my hearty congratulations on the success of your mission to South Africa, and on the magnificent work you have done there for our Empire,

Believe me, Yours, &c.

_The Right Hon Joseph Chamberlain, M.P._

On the 16th April, 1903, I received a letter from Mr. Chamberlain which was quite discouraging. I wrote to him again on the 18th April, and on the 10th May received an answer which was much more encouraging.

I was not surprised when, on the 15th May, Mr. Chamberlain made his great speech at Birmingham, which resulted soon afterwards in his resignation from the Government, and the organisation of the Tariff Reform movement, which he has since advocated with such enthusiasm, energy, and ability.

The result of this speech was like the sun coming out from behind a cloud. Instantly the whole prospect brightened, every Canadian was inspirited, and confidence was restored. Such an extraordinary change has seldom been seen. The Toronto correspondent of the _Morning Post_, 17th May, 1903, said:

Canada has seldom before shown such unanimity over a proposed Imperial policy, as that which greets the project of Mr. Chamberlain for the granting of trade concessions to the British Colonies in the markets of Great Britain.

It is this hope in the ultimate triumph of Mr. Chamberlain's policy which has caused the Canadian people to wait patiently for that result. The extraordinary defeat of the Unionist party in the elections of 1906 has not destroyed this confidence, and the Empire has yet a chance to save herself.

The 6th annual meeting of the British Empire League took place on 19th May, 1903, in the Railway Committee Room, House of Commons, Ottawa.

A very unpleasant event occurred about this time in the Alaskan Award. I had looked into the matter very closely while Sir Wilfrid Laurier was in Washington engaged in the negotiations over the dispute, and I felt confident that we had a very weak case for our contentions, in fact I thought we had none at all. I saw Chief Justice Armour, who was to be one of the Canadian Commissioners, just before he left for England. He was a friend of mine, and one of the ablest judges who ever sat in the Canadian Courts, and I told him what I thought. He evidently felt much the same. I said to him that I wished to make a remark that might be stowed away in the back of his head in case of any necessity for considering it. It was that when he had done his very best for Canada, and had done all that he could, if he found that Lord Alverstone would not hold out with him, not to have a split but if the case was hopeless to join with Lord Alverstone and make the decision unanimous. I said if Lord Alverstone went against us the game was up, there was no further appeal, no remedy, and there was no use fighting against the inevitable, and it would be in more conformity with the dignity of Canada, and good feeling in the Empire, to have an award settled judicially, and by all the judges. Unfortunately the Chief Justice died, and the Government appointed a very able advocate Mr. Aylesworth, K.C., who happened to be in England at the time, to fill his place. Mr. Aylesworth had been the advocate all his life. At that time he had absolutely no knowledge of political affairs. The award was better than I expected and gave us two islands, which the United States had held for years, and on one of which a United States Post Office had been long established. Mr. Aylesworth forgetting there was no appeal, and that the matter was final, prevailed on Lt.-Governor Jetté who was with him to make a most violent protest, and a direct attack upon Lord Alverstone. Owing to this, the award created a good deal of resentment in Canada. The people were very much aroused, and believed they had been betrayed.

By the time Mr. Aylesworth arrived in Toronto he had time to think the matter over. The Canadian Club had organised a great banquet in his honour, and I am of opinion that when he arrived at home, he was astonished at the storm he had aroused. He at once allayed the excited feelings of his audience by a most loyal, patriotic, and statesmanlike speech, and quieted the feeling to a great extent, although it is still a very sore question in Canada, and Lord Alverstone is placed on the same shelf with Mr. Oswald of the treaty of 1783, and Lord Ashburton who gave away a great part of the State of Maine; but had I been in Lord Alverstone's place, and I am an out and out Canadian, with no sympathy whatever with the United States, I should have done as he did.

In the spring of 1903 a controversy arose between Mr. Joseph Chamberlain and the present Lord Salisbury in which I was able to intervene on Mr. Chamberlain's side with some effect.

Mr. Chamberlain had said in a public letter that the late Lord Salisbury had favoured retaliation and closer commercial union with the colonies. The present Lord Salisbury wrote to _The Times_ saying that his father profoundly dissented from Mr. Chamberlain's fiscal policy. Several letters followed from Mr. Chamberlain and Sir Michael Hicks-Beach. I published in _The Times_ on the 18th May, 1905, the following letter:

SIR,

The controversy which has been lately going on in the Press in Great Britain over the question of the late Lord Salisbury's view on protection and preferential tariffs has excited considerable interest in this country. As I am in a position to throw some light upon the late Premier's opinions on these questions, I would ask your permission to say a few words.

I was for some years president of the Imperial Federation League in Canada, and since it was merged in the British Empire League I have held the same position in that body. In 1890 I was appointed specially to represent the Canadian League in England for the purpose of advocating the denunciation of the German and Belgian treaties, and of urging the establishment of a system of preferential tariffs between Canada and the Mother Country. In two interviews with Lord Salisbury, I urged both points upon him as strongly as possible, and pointed out to him that our League had taken up the policy of preferential tariffs in order to counteract the movement for commercial union or unrestricted reciprocity between the United States and Canada, which at that time was a very dangerous agitation. After hearing my arguments, Lord Salisbury said that he felt that the real way to consolidate the Empire would be by a Zollverein and a Kriegsverein. This was substantially our policy, and I begged of him to say something on that line publicly, as it would be a great help to us in the struggle we were having on behalf of Imperial Unity. He did not say whether he would do so or not; but a few months later at the Lord Mayor's banquet at the Guildhall in November, 1890, he made a speech which attracted considerable attention, and which gave us in Canada great encouragement. He spoke of the hostile tariffs and said: "Therefore it is that we are anxious above all things to conserve, to unify, to strengthen the Empire of the Queen because it is to the trade that is carried on within the Empire of the Queen that we look for the vital force of the commerce of this country. . . . The conflict which we have to fight is a conflict of tariffs."

At Hastings on May 18th, 1892, he made another speech still more pronounced the terms of which are well known.

We carried on a correspondence for many years, and I saw him on several occasions when I visited England. We discussed the policy of preferential tariffs and the denunciation of the German and Belgian treaties, which were denounced by his Government in August, 1897. His letters to me show how strongly he was in sympathy with us; but he was a statesman of great caution and evidently would not commit himself to practical action in regard to either preference or fair trade, as long as he believed that the prejudice against any taxation on articles of the first necessity was too strong to be overcome.

The following extracts are taken from letters received by me from Lord Salisbury, and they give a clear idea of what his opinions were. In the early days of the movement I was probably the only one who was pressing on Lord Salisbury the urgent need of some action being taken, and he may not have had occasion to express his views upon the subject to many others.

In a letter dated March 21st, 1891, in reply to one from me telling him of the danger of reciprocity or commercial union with the United States, he wrote:

"I agree with you that the situation is full of danger, and that the prospect before us is not inviting. The difficulties with which we shall have to struggle will tax all the wisdom and all the energy of both English and Canadian statesmen during the next five or ten years. I should be very glad if I saw any immediate hope of our being able to assist you by a modification of our tariff arrangements. The main difficulty I think, lies in the great aversion felt by our people here to the imposition of any duties on articles of the first necessity. It is very difficult to bring home to the constituency the feeling that the maintenance of our Empire in its integrity may depend upon fiscal legislation. It is not that they do not value the tie which unites us to the colonies; on the contrary, it is valued more and more in this country, but they do not give much thought to political questions and they are led away by the more unreasoning and uncompromising advocates of free trade. There is a movement of opinion in this country, and I only hope it may be rapid enough to meet the necessities of our time."

In another letter, dated November 22nd, 1892, he wrote:

"I wish there were more prospect of some fiscal arrangements which would meet the respective exigencies of England and Canada, but that appears still to be in the far distance."

"In another letter written nine years later, dated March 1st, 1901, a little over a year before his final retirement from office, referring to a report of the speeches at the annual meeting of our League in Canada, which I had sent to him, he wrote:

"It is very interesting to read Mr. Ross's address about the error into which free trade may run, for I am old enough to remember the rise of free trade, and the contempt with which the apprehensions of the protectionists of that day were received. But a generation must pass before the fallacies then proclaimed will be unlearnt. There are too many people whose minds were formed under their influence, and until those men have died out no change of policy can be expected."

"These extracts show very clearly Lord Salisbury's views, and prove that personally he would have favoured preferential tariffs in order to save and preserve a great Empire."

Yours, GEORGE T. DENISON.

This was much commented on in the British Press.

_The Times_ said:

The extraordinarily interesting letter which we publish from Colonel Denison, the president of the British Empire League in Canada, shows how deeply sensible was the late Lord Salisbury of the obstacles which prejudice and tradition offer to the adoption of a genuine policy of tariff reform, and how conscious he was of the difficulties to a practical statesman of overcoming them.

The London _Globe_ said:

Few more remarkable contributions have been made recently to the controversy over fiscal reform than the letters of the late Marquis of Salisbury, which Colonel Denison, of Toronto, has communicated to _The Times_.

The _Outlook_ said:

The invaluable letter in _The Times_ from Colonel G. T. Denison, of Toronto, has disposed once for all of Lord Hugh Cecil's theory that the system of free imports ought to be regarded as a Conservative institution. Passages cited by Colonel Denison from unpublished letters and forgotten speeches prove that the late Lord Salisbury's agreement with the principles of Mr. Chamberlain's policy was complete.

Lord Hugh Cecil had the following letter in _The Times_ of the 20th May, 1905.

SIR,

I have no desire to enter into any controversy with Colonel Denison as to Lord Salisbury's opinion in 1891 or 1892. The extracts from the letters published by Colonel Denison do not seem to me to have any bearing on Lord Salisbury's attitude towards any question that is now before the public.

I myself think that it is undesirable to quote the opinions of the dead, however eminent, in reference to a living controversy. But since the attempt continues to be made by tariff reformers to claim Lord Salisbury's authority in support of their views, it is right to say that I have no more doubt than have any of my brothers that Lord Salisbury profoundly dissented from Mr. Chamberlain's proposals so far as they were developed during his lifetime. Not only did he repeatedly express that dissent to us, and to others who had been in official relations with him, but he caused a letter to be written in that sense to one of my brothers.

In conclusion, may I point out that it would have been more courteous in Colonel Denison, if he had at least consulted Lord Salisbury's personal representatives before publishing extracts from Lord Salisbury's private correspondence?

Yours obediently, ROBERT CECIL. _19th May._

I replied to this in the following letter to _The Times_, which was published in the issue of 13th June, 1905:

SIR,

I have seen to-day, in _The Times_ of the 20th inst., Lord Robert Cecil's letter in reply to mine, which appeared on the 18th inst. As his letter contains a reflection on my action in publishing extracts from the late Lord Salisbury's letters to me, I hope you will allow me to make an explanation.

Mr. Chamberlain had claimed that the late Lord Salisbury had approved of his policy of preferential tariffs, while the present Lord Salisbury held that his father "had profoundly dissented from Mr. Chamberlain's fiscal policy."

As Lord Salisbury and his brothers had published their father's private opinions, which may have referred more to the time and method and details of Mr. Chamberlain's action than to the general principle of preferential tariffs, I had no reason to think that there could be any objection to publishing the late Premier's own written words on the subject. The letters from which I quoted, although not intended for publication at the time, contained his views on a great public question, and did not relate to any person, or any private matter, and as he was not here to speak for himself, I felt that it was desirable to publish the extracts in order to show clearly what his views were.

Lord Robert Cecil says that it would have been more courteous in me to have consulted with his father's representatives before publishing, but in view of their own action in publishing his oral, private opinions, it would seem discourteous to assume that they could, under the circumstances, desire to suppress positive evidence on a matter of grave public importance to our Empire.

Yours, etc., GEORGE T. DENISON. TORONTO, CANADA, _31st May, 1905_.

This closed the episode.