CHAPTER XXIII

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

During the summer of 1899 the relations between the British and the Boers in the Transvaal became very strained. As early as the 26th April, 1899, Mr. George Evans, Secretary of the British Empire League received the following cablegram from Kimberley, South Africa. "Twenty-one thousand British subjects, Transvaal, have petitioned Imperial Government obtain redress grievances and secure them status which their numbers, industry, stake in country, entitle them. We strongly sympathise, if you do too, would you as kindred Societies cable Imperial Government sympathetic resolution." "Signed, South African League Congress, Kimberley, representing 10,000 enrolled members."

At this time we knew very little of the state of affairs in South Africa, or of the merits of the dispute, and there was a hazy idea that the Boers had opened up the country and should not be disturbed, and after a conference of the principal members of the Executive Committee it was decided to forward the cable to the Head Office of the League in England leaving the matter in their hands. A cable was sent to Kimberley telling them that we had asked the Head Office to decide what to do. Principal Grant at the beginning of the difficulties in South Africa, in the early summer of 1899, was in sympathy with the Boers as against the gold seeking speculators of Johannesburg, and publicly expressed his views in that way. I sympathised somewhat with his view, but advised him to keep quiet, saying we could not tell how events might shape, and we might have to take a strong stand on the other side. I felt I did not understand the question.

In the following July, Mr. J. Davis Allen, representing the South African Association, came from England to Ottawa, and explained to the Canadian authorities the situation in South Africa and urged the passing of a resolution that would strengthen the hands of the British Government, in its negotiations with Mr. Kruger and the Transvaal Government. Mr. Alexander McNeill naturally took up the cause and wrote to me asking me to go to Ottawa to help Mr. Davis Allen in his efforts. I declined to go, saying I did not sufficiently understand the question, but a few days later, on the 31st July, 1899, Sir Wilfrid Laurier introduced and Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution which concluded as follows:

That the House of Commons desires to express its sympathy with the efforts of Her Majesty's Imperial authorities, to obtain for the subjects of Her Majesty who have taken up their abode in the Transvaal such measures of justice and political recognition as may be found necessary to secure them in the full possession of equal rights and liberties.

This resolution, seconded by the Hon. George E. Foster, was carried unanimously, and the House rose and sang "God Save the Queen."

Mr. Allen came to Toronto on the 10th August. Mr. McNeill had written to me saying that Mr. Allen was coming to see me, and we had several long interviews. He explained to me the whole situation, and read me some of Lord Milner's despatches in which he pointed out clearly the dangers that were looming up. He explained that the whole trouble was a conspiracy on the part of the Boers to drive the British out of South Africa altogether. He insisted that the Orange Free State was deeply engaged in it, and that the Dutch in the Cape Colony were also involved. All that Mr. Allen told me was absolutely verified before six months had elapsed. After these explanations, and reading the despatches of Lord Milner, I took up a very decided stand against the Boers.

Colonel Sam Hughes, M.P., had as early as the 13th July called the attention of the Government to the fact that Queensland had offered a contingent, and he urged them to make an offer of one on behalf of Canada. He also offered to raise a regiment, or brigade, for service in case war should break out. Other officers in various parts of the country made similar offers. Sir Charles Tupper, about the end of September, came out boldly in favour of offering a contingent, and agreed to help the Government in Parliament in any action they might take in that direction. On the 25th September there was a small meeting of senior officers in Toronto, Lieut.-Colonel James Mason being the moving spirit. At that meeting we decided to call a meeting of the members of the Canadian Military Institute for Saturday, the 30th September, to consider the question of what Canada should do. The _Globe_ of the 2nd October, 1899, reported me in part as follows:

Lieut.-Colonel Denison followed. In his opening remarks he expressed the belief that there was no difference of opinion among British peoples, except those in South Africa, in regard to the question. The opinion had prevailed to a certain extent that the question was simply one as to the rights of the Uitlanders in the Transvaal. He was bound to admit that up to a certain period that had been his impression, and that being the case he had not been convinced that the matter was one which necessitated the Empire's going to war. Some time ago, however, he had been in the position of learning a good deal about the inside working of affairs in South Africa from one who was thoroughly posted in all the details. He had then discovered that it had got altogether beyond any question of interest or rights of the Uitlanders, and that for the last few years there had been a widespread conspiracy among the Dutch-speaking settlers over the whole of South Africa for the purpose of ousting the British. Ample proof was constantly being furnished as to the continuity of this conspiracy. Sir Alfred Milner's despatch of 14th May stated in the plainest possible language that such was the case, and it was a question whether Britain was to hold the balance of power in that part of the world or be driven out of it altogether. The conspiracy extended further back than the Jameson raid, and was one of the hidden causes leading to that affair. It was because of it that the English people and Government had become so angry over the famous telegram sent by the German Emperor to President Kruger.

Continuing, Colonel Denison said it could not be gainsaid that the question was one of vital importance to the whole empire, and Canadians were as much interested as any of Her Majesty's subjects. The Dominion had not fully and properly appreciated her responsibilities as part of a great empire. If Canada was an independent nation of six millions of people it would have to support a standing army of 40,000 men, besides reserves of 200,000 or 300,000. "Is it right," he asked, "that we should all the time be dependent upon the home Government and the British fleet for protection? Is it fair that we should not give any proper assistance? What kind of treatment would we have received from Washington in the Behring's Sea business or in reference to this Alaskan question if we had not had behind us the power of the Empire?"

Such a course was not only selfish but impolitic and foolish. In his opinion not only should one contingent of 1,500 men be offered in the present crisis, but another 1,500 should be immediately got together and drilled so as to be ready in case of emergency. No one could tell where the thing was going to end, and reverses might be expected in the beginning. Other great nations envied the power of Britain and would be ready to seize the opportunity if the Empire was in a tight hole. Therefore they should be prepared, not only to send one contingent and have another on hand ready for the call, but should be in a position to relieve the garrisons at Halifax and Esquimalt, allowing the regulars to be added to the forces in the field. "We have been children long enough," he concluded; "let us show the Empire that we have grown to manhood."

He then moved "That the members of the Canadian Military Institute, feeling that it is a clear and definite duty for all British possessions to show their willingness to contribute to the common defence in case of need, express the hope that in view of impending hostilities in South Africa the Government of Canada will promptly offer a contingent of Canadian militia to assist in supporting the interests of our Empire in that country."

This was carried unanimously.

This meeting started a strong movement of public opinion in favour of the Government making an offer. On the 3rd October an article appeared in the Canadian _Military Gazette_ which began in these words: "If war should be commenced in the Transvaal--which seems most probable--the offer of a force from the Canadian Militia for service will be made by the Canadian Government," and it went on to give details of the composition and methods of organising the force. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, on behalf of the Government, at once disavowed it, and on the same day gave an interview to the _Globe_, which appeared in that paper on the 4th October. He said:

There exists a great deal of misconception in the country regarding the powers of the Government in the present case. As I understand the Militia Act--and I may say that I have given it some study of late--our volunteers are enrolled to be used in defence of the Dominion. They are Canadian troops to be used to fight for Canada's defence. Perhaps the most widespread misapprehension is that they cannot be sent out of Canada. To my mind they might be sent to a foreign land to fight. To postulate a case: Suppose that Spain should declare war upon Great Britain. Spain has or had a navy, but that navy might be being got ready to assail Canada as part of the empire. Sometimes the best method of defending one's self is to attack, and in that case Canadian soldiers might certainly be sent to Spain, and it is quite certain that they legally might be so despatched to the Iberian Peninsula. The case of the South African Republic is not analogous. There is no menace to Canada, and although we may be willing to contribute troops, I do not see how we can do so. Then, again, how could we do so without Parliament's granting us the money? We simply could not do anything. In other words, we should have to summon Parliament. The Government of Canada is restricted in its powers. It is responsible to Parliament, and it can do very little without the permission of Parliament. There is no doubt as to the attitude of the Government on all questions that mean menace to British interests, but in this present case our limitations are very clearly defined. And so it is that we have not offered a Canadian contingent to the Home authorities. The Militia Department duly transmitted individual offers to the Imperial Government and the reply from the War Office, as published in Saturday's _Globe_, shows their attitude on the question. As to Canada's furnishing a contingent the Government has not discussed the question for the reasons which I have stated, reasons which, I think, must easily be understood by everyone who understands the constitutional law on the question. The statement in the _Military Gazette_ published this morning is a pure invention.

This interview proves that Sir Wilfrid Laurier at that time had no intention of sending a contingent.

On the 7th October Sir Wilfrid Laurier left for Chicago, and returned to Ottawa on the 12th. The Boer ultimatum had been given on the 9th October, was refused by Lord Milner on the 10th, and war opened on the 11th. This turned Sir Wilfrid back. He travelled on the train from Chicago with Mr. J. S. Willison, editor of the _Globe_, who urged him strongly to send a contingent at once. I called to see Sir Wilfrid on his way through Toronto in order to press the matter upon him. He had evidently made up his mind, for he told me he would send a contingent no matter whether it broke up his Government or not, that it was the right thing to do and he would do it. He was anxious, however, about how his own people would take it, and told me that Mr. Bourassa would resign as a protest, and he seemed very sorry that it should be so. I was very much pleased at the decision and firmness he evinced, and have always been very grateful to him for his action in this matter, as in many other things in the interest of the Empire.

On the next day, the 13th October, the Order in Council was passed. It provided that a certain number of volunteers in units of 125 men each with a few officers, would be accepted to serve in the British army operating in South Africa, the moment they reached the coast, provided the expense of their equipment and transportation to South Africa was defrayed, either by themselves or by the Canadian Government, and the Government undertook to provide the equipment and transportation for 1,000 men.

I knew that it was the intention to send these eight units of 125 men each, as distinct units to be attached to eight different British regular infantry regiments, and that no officer of higher rank than a captain was to be sent. I felt that our men would be swallowed up and lost, and could gain no credit under such conditions. I therefore published in the _Globe_ of the 14th October the following letter:

The _Globe_ on Wednesday morning published in its Ottawa correspondence a proposed scheme for a Canadian contingent for the war in South Africa.

If the Imperial Government proposes, as the report indicates, to enlist a number of units of one hundred and twenty-five men each, to be attached to the British Infantry Regiments, and to be paid and maintained at imperial expense, there can be no objection raised to their doing it, in any way they like, and under any conditions that may be agreed upon between the imperial authorities and the Canadians who enlist in what will practically be British regiments. Of course, these units will not be a Canadian contingent, any more than were the 40,000 Canadians who fought in the northern army during the civil war, or the large numbers who fought in the ranks of the United States army and navy in the late Spanish war. A thousand Canadians may go and fight for the Empire in the British army, but it will not be a Canadian contingent, nor will it represent Canadian sentiment, or a Canadian desire to aid the Empire. For what part will the six millions who stay at home contribute to that contingent?

If Canada sends a contingent as her share in helping the common cause, she should send a force commanded by our own officers, and paid and maintained by our own people. They should feel that they represent our country, and that the honour of all who stay at home is in their keeping. Men would go in such a corps for such a purpose who would never dream of enlisting as the ordinary Tommy Atkins, in regiments they did not know, among comrades unfamiliar, and under strange officers. A Canadian contingent sent to represent our militia and country in an imperial quarrel would attract the very best of our young men, but every officer should be a Canadian.

The slurs that have been thrown out in some quarters, that our officers are not qualified, are not based upon fact, and are grossly insulting to our people. We have had over 35,000 militia for over thirty years, we have had a Military College of the highest class for over twenty years, a permanent corps for over fifteen years, a number of our officers have been sent for long courses of instruction at Aldershot, and not long since 6,000 of our militia were engaged in a campaign of some four months' duration. If Canada with all that experience has not produced one man fit to command a battalion of infantry, we are too inferior a type of fellaheen to offer assistance to anyone. I repudiate, however, any such idea of inferiority. It does not exist, and even if it did, our own Government should not admit it until it has been clearly proven.

It has been said that our men have not had war service, and that a lieutenant-colonel in command of a battalion in war must have war experience. I examined the list of imperial battalions published in this evening's _Telegram_, as being in South Africa, or told off to be sent there, and I find, after consulting Hart's army list, that out of these thirty-four battalions seventeen are commanded by lieutenant-colonels who have had war service, and the same number by lieutenant-colonels who have never had experience of any kind in active operations. An examination of our militia list of the 1st April last shows that in the seniority lists of lieutenant-colonels there are no less than seventy-six who have the crossed swords before their names, indicating that they have had active service. It seems strange that out of the seventy-six one could not be found sufficiently qualified. Let us send a Canadian contingent entirely our own, and at our own cost. Let us send the best we have, and then let us stand or fall with what they can do on our behalf. I think we can await the result with confidence.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier read this letter the same evening, and wrote me at once, asking me to do nothing further on that line, but to meet him at Sir Wm. Mulock's at ten p.m. on Monday evening, the 16th, on his arrival from Bowmanville, and he asked me to get Mr. Willison to come also.

On the Monday afternoon the evening papers published a despatch from Ottawa, saying that the British Government had agreed to change their order, and allow the contingent to go as a unit under a Canadian officer. When I met Sir Wilfrid he told me he had received a telegram at Bowmanville to that effect, but was surprised to hear that it had got into the newspapers. He then told me that he had cabled to England on the Saturday evening, the 14th, and had urged strongly that our men should be sent as one corps, and that it had been agreed to. Once more I was under obligations as a Canadian to Sir Wilfrid Laurier, in his efforts to maintain the dignity of Canada. The feeling here was that the dividing up our force into companies attached to British regiments was the idea of General Hutton, who had the regular officer's view as to the lack of capacity of colonial militia. The three years' war which followed, with colonial forces side by side with imperial troops, pretty effectually settled the question whether the colonial levies were inferior or not to any of their comrades.

I was very much criticised by the more timid of my friends in Toronto for the action I had taken in favour of having a Canadian officer in command. The opinion was that Colonel Otter would, as senior permanent officer, get the position, and some of the militia officers did not have a high opinion of his capacity. The only regrettable incident connected with the Canadian contingents was the coming home of the bulk of Colonel Otter's regiment (when their term of service had expired) in spite of Lord Roberts' express request. The other contingents stood by their colonels, notably the Canadian Mounted Rifles under Col. Lessard, who three times, at his request, postponed their return after their term of service had expired, and only went home when there were very few men left to represent the corps.

The Canadians who represented Canada, on the whole, did exceedingly well, and brought great credit to our country. There were no Canadian surrenders, in a war where Arnold White says that there were 226 surrenders of British troops. At the skirmish of Lilliefontein, Capt. Cockburn, whom I had recommended to represent my old regiment, and his troop of about thirty-five men, fought and would neither retreat nor surrender until all but four were either killed or wounded. Capt. Cockburn received the Victoria Cross for this affair. At the last battle of the war, Hart's River, Lieut. Bruce Carruthers and about thirty-five Canadian mounted riflemen fought until the last man was killed or wounded. Lord Kitchener cabled to England that the battle was won principally through the brilliant gallantry of Lieut. Bruce Carruthers and his party.

There was one circumstance in connection with this fight that was very gratifying to me. It will be remembered that in 1890 I had been chairman of the deputation that had started the movement for raising the flag over the schools, and for holding patriotic exercises of various kinds. This movement had spread, and during the years 1890 to 1899 there had been a wave of Imperialism moving through the country. The boys at school in 1890 were in 1899 men of twenty to twenty-five years of age, the very men who formed our contingents. The proof of this spirit of Imperialism which animated these men was strikingly illustrated by an incident of this fight at Hart's River. I will quote from the _Globe_ of 19th April, 1902:

Standing alone in the face of the onrushing Boers at the battle of Hart's River on the 31st March, every comrade dead or disabled, and himself wounded to the death, Charles Napier Evans fired his last cartridge and then broke his rifle over a boulder.

In the last letter thus far received by his father, Mr. James Evans, of Port Hope, Charlie looked not without foreboding into the future. "Before this reaches you we will probably be after De Wet. We can only hope for a safe and victorious trip. Many a good man has died for the old flag, and why should not I? If parents had not given up their sons, and sons had not given up themselves to the British Empire, it would not be to-day the proud dictator of the world. So if one or both of us (he had a brother with him) should die, there will be no vain regrets, for we will have done what thousands have done before us, given our lives for a good cause."

There could not be a better sermon on Imperialism than that young man's letter to his father.