CHAPTER VI.

THE IMPEACHMENT OF THE PRESIDENT.

1. In the preceding chapters we have traced step by step the development of the theory of reconstruction and the formulation of the reconstruction acts of the 39th and 40th Congresses. We have noticed the wide divergence between the ideas of Johnson and those of the Republican party, and have seen that the whole program was carried over the vetoes of the President by the overwhelming Republican majority. But the contest between the President and Congress, which had been embittered by so many personalities on both sides, did not come to an end with the passage of legislation which fully embodied the congressional theory, but continued until it culminated in a desperate effort of the Republican party to remove Johnson from the presidential chair.

The very conditions under which he assumed the presidential office rendered his position difficult, and made estrangement of the executive and legislative departments an easy matter. On the particular issue of reconstruction Lincoln and Congress were at variance; but the tragic nature of Lincoln's death caused this matter to be forgotten in the overwhelming sense of the loss of the man who had safely guided the government through the most trying years of its history. But, for a Congress so extremely Northern and Republican, with antagonisms and prejudices which only fratricidal wars can create, to be compelled to work with a man not only a Southerner, but practically a Democrat, must of necessity bring about a crisis.

Moreover, the flourishing condition of the spoils system served to aggravate the antagonism between the two departments. History shows that, while selfish motives are always indignantly repudiated by politicians, they account for many of the more important political movements of the century. With the immense federal patronage at his disposal, Johnson realized that he had a powerful instrument of revenge at hand, and he did not hesitate to use it. At a time when every congressman was under the strongest pressure from his home constituency, inability to gratify the demands of the voracious office-seeker was indeed a cause for bitterness.

We can thus easily distinguish three causes which, working together upon a strongly Republican Congress, resulted in the attempted removal of the President. First, the antagonism arising from different fundamental political ideas, the strained conditions of the times, and the woeful tactlessness of Johnson; second, the almost morbid yet natural fears of the Republican party regarding the sometime seceded States; third, the anger aroused by the use of federal patronage to further the interests of the President.

2. Impeachment, however, was too serious a matter for Congress to enter upon lightly. Art. II, sec. iv, of the Constitution provides for impeachment as follows: "The President, Vice-President and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." Obviously the President had not committed and would not commit anything that could legally be called treason or bribery: Had he done or would he do anything which could be construed as a high crime or misdemeanor? The answer largely depended upon the person's point of view. The extreme radical held that Johnson's whole career as President could be considered as an attempt treasonably to reinstate the Southern States in a position of power. The more moderate Republicans could not be made to acquiesce in this view, and it soon became evident that Johnson would never be brought to trial on impeachment, unless he could be made to violate some clearly defined law. The radical element, however, did not easily accept this situation. By every means possible they tried to force the moderates into line. The whole past career of the President was critically studied, and every act which could by any possible means be construed as a breach of presidential duty was put in the list of offences for which he should be tried. But all to no purpose. Something more tangible must be produced, or the trial would never occur.

3. Notwithstanding the evident indisposition on the part of many to proceed to extreme measures, the radicals determined to force matters to an issue, if possible. Under Mr. James M. Ashley of Ohio as leader, the attack was begun shortly after the opening of the second session of the Thirty-ninth Congress. On December 17, 1866, Mr. Ashley moved to suspend the rules so as to permit him to report a resolution from the Committee on Territories. His motion was not agreed to, and the first step towards impeachment was therefore a failure. The motion is of interest, however, as evidencing the deliberate intention of the radicals to discover some act which would justify impeachment. The resolution provided for a select committee who were to inquire "whether any acts have been done by any officer of the Government of the United States which in contemplation of the Constitution are high crimes or misdemeanors, and whether said acts were designed or calculated to overthrow, subvert or corrupt the Government of the United States, or any department thereof."

Again on January 7 resolutions looking to impeachment were offered by Mr. Ashley and two other persons. Mr. Ashley's resolution was adopted, while the others were referred to the Committee on Reconstruction and the Committee on the Judiciary. The resolutions which were referred gave as a reason for impeachment, "the purpose of securing the fruits of the victories gained on the part of the republic during the late war, waged by rebels and traitors against the life of the nation"--a decidedly strong statement to make, in view of the predominance of the Republican party at the time, and its ability to render nugatory any attempt of the President to take away from the republic "the fruits of the victories gained." Exaggerated expressions of this sort show how far the contest had degenerated from a conflict of opinions as to the constitutional position of the revolted States, into a personal warfare. Another significant reason for impeachment given in these resolutions was, that it was necessary in order to give "effect to the will of the people as expressed at the polls during the recent elections by a majority numbering in the aggregate more than four hundred thousand votes." It has already been shown how disastrously the campaign resulted for Johnson, and how it furnished popular sanction for the radical reconstruction legislation which was passed over the presidential vetoes. But, to assume that a popular expression of disapproval of the President's political program made impeachment a moral necessity, was to assume a novel position. It was also declared in these resolutions that the President was to be impeached for the high crimes and misdemeanors "of which he is manifestly and notoriously guilty, and which render it unsafe longer to permit him to exercise the powers he has unlawfully assumed."

These expressions seeming to be too indefinite, the specific charges submitted by Mr. Ashley met with more favor, and were accordingly adopted. These charges centered about an alleged "usurpation of power and violation of law" which was to be found in corrupt uses of the appointing, pardoning, and veto powers, improper disposition of public offices and corrupt interference in elections. These were clinched again by the general charge that the President had "committed acts which, in contemplation of the Constitution, are high crimes and misdemeanors,"--a charge obviously introduced to include any points which might in the future be made against him.

4. As the event proved, the attempt to bring matters to a successful issue in the 39th Congress was a failure. The Committee on the Judiciary went to work vigorously, calling many witnesses and collecting as much material as possible; but on the 28th of February it reported, with only one dissenting, voice, that in spite of all its efforts not enough testimony had been gathered to warrant any report beyond a recommendation that the investigation be continued. The ninth member of the committee, Mr. Rogers of New Jersey, reported emphatically that a careful examination of the subject had convinced him that "there is not a particle of evidence to sustain any of the charges," and that "the case is wholly without a particle of evidence upon which an impeachment could be founded." He further declared that but little of the testimony taken would be admitted in the courts, and that the whole matter should be dropped, as it would certainly end "in a complete vindication of the President." Logically, the standpoint of Mr. Rogers was a correct one. From a strictly legal view of the case, there was very serious doubt as to the advisability of attempting impeachment; but the opponents of the President counted upon their large majority to force the matter, and the line of action recommended by the majority of the committee was adopted.

As has been seen, the 40th Congress assembled immediately upon the adjournment of the 39th; and on March 7, 1867, the new Judiciary Committee was authorized to proceed with the investigation, and to continue it during any recess the House might take. By another resolution agreed to March 29, the committee was requested to report immediately upon the reassembling of Congress, which was to be in the following July, if political conditions seemed to require it.[180]

The committee accordingly continued its investigations, but, though the radicals felt sure that it was composed of men who would favor impeachment, it at first reported by a majority of five to four against impeachment. A recommitment resulted in the conversion of one member of the committee[181] to impeachment views; and on November 25 Mr. Boutwell, of Massachusetts, reported from the committee a resolution impeaching the President for high crimes and misdemeanors.

5. The debate on this resolution was entered upon in December, 1867, and was marked by the effort on the part of the radicals to support a most indefinite and general charge. In spite of the thoroughness of the investigation of the Judiciary Committee, in which neither time nor expense had been spared, the attitude of the moderates was justified. Nothing had been unearthed which from the legal standpoint could be considered a high crime or misdemeanor. Failing in this, Mr. Boutwell assumed the ground that the evidence showed that President Johnson had been deliberately using his office to bring back, so far as possible, the Democratic party into power, and that his efforts to restore the insurrectionary States to their former power had been in the interest of the rebellion.

Although most Republicans at this time could not believe that the inhabitants of the Southern States were sincere in their protestations of a desire to lay aside all differences and once more become loyal citizens, there were many who could not agree to Mr. Boutwell's definition of high crimes and misdemeanors; and these moderate Republicans, aided by the Democrats, defeated the resolution by a vote of one hundred and eight to fifty-seven.[182] The attempt to impeach without definite legal charges had failed.

But the President soon gave the House the very opportunity it desired. While the direct attack upon the President was being carried on by means of the effort to impeach him, an indirect attack was made by the legislative limitation of his powers. One of the cries of alarmists had been that there was danger that the President might in some way take advantage of his constitutional position as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, so as to injure the government and advance his own interests. Some went even farther and declared that he designed with the aid of the army to overthrow the government, and place the United States in the power of the rebels. Such charges, viewed from the standpoint of history, seem too absurd for consideration, but during the reconstruction period the feverish condition of the country made possible the acceptance of almost any startling rumor.

6. But even those who did not apprehend that Johnson would use the army for any improper purpose, were willing to limit his power and prestige by depriving him of his military authority; and this was accordingly done by a section introduced into the army appropriation bill.[183] This section required all orders to the army to be made through the General of the Army, thus practically making his approval of them necessary. It also prevented the President or the Secretary of War from removing, suspending or relieving from command the General of the Army, and even forbade his being assigned for duty away from headquarters, except at his own request. This had the effect of taking away from the President all his constitutional powers as commander-in-chief. As the section was put as a rider on an appropriation bill and a veto must cover the whole bill, Johnson contented himself with a simple protest and returned the act with his signature.[184]

7. The attack upon the civil powers of the President was made through the Tenure-of-Office Act.[185] As the violation of this act was the ground of the most serious charge in the impeachment trial, a somewhat detailed study of its provisions, and of the views expressed by the President in his veto of it, is advisable. The bill provided that "every person holding any civil office to which he has been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate," and every person so appointed in the future, should be entitled to hold such office until a successor should have been appointed in like manner, that is to say, _with the advice and consent of the Senate_. The only liberty of action allowed the President was during the recess of the Senate, when he was permitted to suspend an officer until the next meeting of the Senate, and appoint a _pro tempore_ official. Within twenty days after the meeting of the Senate, however, he was required to give his reasons for the suspension. If the Senate approved of the removal, a permanent appointment was to be made; if they refused to concur, the suspended officer was immediately to resume his duties. Any violation of this act by the President was made an impeachable offense, by the declaration that "every removal, appointment, or employment made, had, or exercised, contrary to the provisions of this act * * * are hereby declared to be high misdemeanors." The other provisions were of minor importance, and do not require notice here.

The veto message of the President was a calm, dignified and judicial discussion of the constitutionality of the bill, and was in every way a creditable document, sustaining fully the high character of his previous vetoes. He called attention to the fact that the whole question of the authority of the President in cases of removal from office had been discussed thoroughly in Congress as early as 1789, and decided in favor of the President. He quoted Madison's argument to prove that all executive power, except what is specifically excepted, is vested in the President, and that as no exception was made as to the power of removal, it must be vested in him. He also cited many possible cases, in which it would be absolutely necessary for the President to possess the power of removal.[186] A decision of the Supreme Court was referred to,[187] in which it was observed that both the legislative and the executive department had assumed in practice that the power of removal was vested in the President alone. When, for instance, the Departments of State, War and the Treasury were created in 1789, provision was made for a subordinate who should take charge of the office "when the head of the Department should be removed _by the President of the United States_." Story, Kent and Webster were all quoted as affirming the same legislative construction of the Constitution. The great practical value of the power during the Civil War was noticed, and its present and future necessity strongly urged; and the message closed with an earnest appeal to Congress not to violate the original spirit of the Constitution.

8. The passage of the bill over the veto placed Johnson in a situation in which a collision was almost sure to come. As the chief executive of the country he was charged with the duty of carrying out the provisions of the reconstruction acts, notwithstanding his strong personal repugnance to them. Under the advice of Attorney-General Stanbery he had construed the acts literally, and he had thus frustrated in part the object of the legislation. But the co-operation of the army was necessary, and unfortunately for President Johnson, the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, strongly opposed his views, and conducted himself as far as possible in accordance with the wishes of the congressional majority. The continued friction between the President and the Secretary of War seemed to President Johnson to necessitate Stanton's retirement, but repeated hints to that effect were not recognized by the latter. Finally, on August 5, 1867, the President informed him that "public considerations of a high character constrained" him to say that his resignation would be accepted. The Secretary's prompt reply was that "public considerations of a high character" constrained him not to resign until the next session of Congress. A week later, August 12, the President formally suspended him and appointed General Grant Secretary _ad interim_.[188] Stanton then submitted "under protest to superior force."

When Congress met in December the President reported his suspension of Stanton, and after long discussion the Senate, on January 13, 1868, refused to concur.[189] When informed of this action of the Senate, General Grant immediately turned over the Secretary's office to Stanton, thus definitely committing himself to the congressional interpretation of the law. Grant's action was a sore disappointment to the President. Johnson had refused to accept the Tenure-of-Office Act as constitutional, and had purposed to make this a test case. In the correspondence which passed between him and General Grant after the latter's acquiescence in the action of the Senate, Johnson claimed that it was understood that Grant was either to refuse to give up the office to Stanton, or, if he should be unwilling to take so prominent a part in the contest, to resign and permit the office to be filled with some one whose views agreed with the President's, so that Stanton, if he sought to regain the office, might be compelled to resort to the courts. In this way the constitutionality of the act could be tested. Johnson's statements as to the understanding with Grant were substantially endorsed by the Cabinet, on the strength of a conversation between Johnson and Grant at a cabinet meeting. Grant, however, firmly denied that there was any such agreement or understanding.[190]

A few days after Stanton had resumed his duties as Secretary of War, the President sought to put in operation a plan for rendering his possession of the office ineffective. On January 19, he ordered General Grant, in charge of the army, to disregard all of Stanton's orders unless he knew directly from the President that they were the latter's orders.[191] The order was repeated in writing at Grant's request on January 29. On the following day, Grant refused to carry it out, declaring that an order from Secretary Stanton would be considered satisfactory evidence that it was authorized by the Executive.[192] This correspondence between Johnson and Grant was subsequently called for by Congress, and an attempt was made to frame articles of impeachment on the ground that the President was instructing Grant to disobey the orders of his superior. Careful examination of the legal bearings of the question convinced a majority of the Reconstruction Committee that nothing would be gained by inserting charges based on this correspondence. The President had shrewdly worded his communication so as not to violate any legal technicalities.[193]

Having failed in his first two attacks upon Stanton, Johnson finally resorted to a still stronger measure. Completely ignoring the Tenure-of-Office Act, he addressed a letter to Stanton, February 21, removing him from office, and directing him to transfer all the property of the War Department to Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas. Thomas, having received his appointment as secretary _ad interim_, proceeded to the office and formally demanded possession. Stanton avoided giving a direct answer to the demand, and on the following morning Gen. Thomas was arrested for violation of the Tenure-of-Office Act. After bail had been procured he renewed his demand, but Stanton ignored his appointment. Several plans were devised by the President and Thomas' lawyers to make the contest center around Thomas, but the congressional managers decided to drop the matter, and concentrate their energies upon a presidential impeachment.[194]

The last step of the President opened the way for immediate action. Violation of the Tenure-of-Office Act was explicitly declared an impeachable offense, and as to the flagrancy of its violation by the order of February 21 there could be no question. Many of the wavering Republicans now had their doubts of the expediency of impeachment cleared away, and on February 24 the resolution formally impeaching the President of "high crimes and misdemeanors in office" was passed.[195]

9. On March 2, the first nine articles of impeachment were adopted; two additional articles were added on the 3d; and on the 4th they were presented to the Senate. On March 30, the trial began. The articles charged the President with high crimes and misdemeanors in respect of the order for the removal of Stanton, the appointment of Thomas as Secretary of War _ad interim_, the attempt to hinder Stanton in the exercise of his lawful duties, the wilful violation of the Tenure-of-Office Act, the attempt to seize the properties of the War Department, the attempt unlawfully to disburse moneys through the appointment of Thomas, an attempt to make General Emory violate the Tenure-of-Office Act, the attempt to injure the good reputation of the legislative department by speeches delivered at various specified places, and his determined opposition to the reconstruction policy as outlined in the various acts of Congress.[196]

These articles were very sweeping, and were designed as a sort of drag-net to include all of the complaints which could possibly be brought against the President. Yet the House of Representatives, previous to the attempted removal of Secretary Stanton, after the most searching examination into the President's record, had failed to find sufficient ground on which to base an impeachment. Therefore the only charges that deserved really serious attention were those growing out of the violation of the Tenure-of-Office Act. In the President's reply to the charges he explains his attitude on this matter. In his opinion the Tenure-of-Office Act was unconstitutional. The very fact that he as Executive was legally held responsible for the acts of the Secretary of War made it necessary for him to exercise the power of removal or of indefinite suspension. He had at first complied with the letter of the act in order to avoid a further struggle with Congress; but, having been frustrated by Congress in his design, the only alternative that remained to him, in view of his strained relations with the Secretary of War, was the latter's unconditional removal.

10. The President's case, as to the constitutionality of his action and the unconstitutionality of the Tenure-of-Office Act, was strong, and was presented with great ability by the President's counsel. But, from the very beginning, it was obvious that the case would be determined mainly on political lines.

If the Republican party could hold all the Republican Senators to the decision of the majority, a verdict of guilty was assured. Consequently, the strongest efforts were made to bring all into line. But some proved recalcitrant. The prospect that the President of the United States was to be forced out of his office as a punishment for his opposition to the Legislative Department was not edifying. Hitherto the presidential office had possessed great dignity. To be sure, Johnson's conduct had gone far towards the destruction of that dignity, but a conviction on impeachment charges would drag down the office immeasurably. Some of the Senators also realized that the tendency of Congress during the whole struggle had been towards an encroachment upon the executive powers, and that there was serious danger that the balance of the governmental system might be destroyed. While, therefore, they strongly disapproved of Johnson's conduct, they felt unwilling to expose the government to the shock which would accompany his removal from the presidential chair. The trial proceeded slowly and the case was ably contested by counsel on both sides; but the prosecution was practically brought to a close on May 16, by the vote which was taken on the eleventh article of impeachment. This article was chosen for the first test of strength, because it embodied those charges which had caused the most feeling, and which were best calculated to cause Senators to cast aside judicial restraints and vote according to their prejudices. But, seven Republicans refused to line themselves with the radical majority. They and the twelve Democratic Senators voted for acquittal. Thirty-five Republicans voted "guilty," but this lacked one of the needful two-thirds majority. Ten days later another vote was taken on the second and third articles, with the same result. The fight was then given up, and the court of impeachment was declared adjourned.

11. It was a fortunate thing for the country that the attempt failed. The convulsions of the Civil War had unsettled most seriously our conceptions of the relations of the three co-ordinate departments of the government. Lincoln had not hesitated to assume powers totally outside the ordinary functions of the Executive. The country had sustained him in this; but, with the return of peace, and with Johnson in the presidential chair, Congress had determined to resume its powers. Again the country responded, but the violence of the reaction caused the pendulum to swing too far in the opposite direction; and our institutions were placed in greater danger than the were in before. But, just as the Civil War had settled the question as to the indissolubility of the Union, so no less emphatically did the failure of the impeachment trial confirm the equality of the three departments of our government.

AUTHORITIES.

Blaine, James G. Twenty Years of Congress. Norwich, 1884.

Congressional Globe. 37th-40th Congresses. Washington, 1861-1868.

Cooper, T. V., and Fenton, H. T. American Politics. Boston, 1890.

Cox, S. S. Three Decades of Federal Legislation. Providence, 1888.

Dunning, Wm. A. Articles on Civil War and Reconstruction, in Political Science Quarterly, vols. i. and ii., and on The Impeachment, in Papers Am. Hist. Assoc., vol. iv.

Gillet, R. H. Democracy in the United States. New York, 1868.

Herbert, Hilary A. Editor. Why the Solid South? Baltimore, 1890.

House Journal. 37th-40th Congresses. Washington, 1861-1868.

House Reports. Vol. ii., 1865-66. Washington, 1866.

House Reports. Vol. ii., 1866-67. Washington, 1867.

Hurd, J. C. Theory of our National Existence. Boston, 1881.

Johnston, Alexander. History of the United States. New York, 1891.

Johnston, Alexander. Representative American Orations. New York and London.

Johnston, Alexander. Reconstruction, Emancipation Proclamation, Freedmen's Bureau, etc., Lalor, Cyclopedia of Polit. Science. 3 vols. New York, 1890.

Lowell. J. R. Political Essays, in "Works." Vol. V. Boston and New York, 1891.

McPherson, Edward. History of the Reconstruction. Washington, 1880.

Moore, Frank. Speeches of Andrew Johnson. Boston, 1866.

Patton, J. H. The Democratic Party. New York, 1888.

Pollard, E. A. The Lost Cause Regained. New York, 1868.

Poore, Ben: Perley. Veto Messages of the Presidents of the United States. Washington, 1886.

Ridpath. History of the United States. New York and Cincinnati.

Savage, J. Life and Public Services of Andrew Johnson. New York, 1866.

Scott, E. G. Reconstruction during the Civil War. Boston and New York, 1895.

Stanwood, E. History of Presidential Elections. Boston and New York.

Senate Journal. 37th-40th Congresses. Washington, 1861-1868.

Sterne, Simon. Constitutional History and Political Development of the United States. New York and London, 1888.

Stephens, Alexander H. The War between the States. Philadelphia.

Taylor, Richard. Destruction and Reconstruction. New York, 1879.

Williams, G. W. History of the Negro Race in America. New York, 1883.

Wilson, Henry. Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America. New York.

Wilson, Henry. History of the Reconstruction Measures. Hartford, 1868.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Scott, _Reconstruction during the Civil War_, 245 ff.

[2] _House Journal_, 1st Session, 37th Congress, pp. 123-5.

[3] Alexander H. Stephens, in _The War between the States_, uses this fact as a basis for the charge that Johnson was inconsistent in refusing to ratify the Sherman-Johnston Convention.

[4] _House Journal_, 2d Session, 37th Congress, p. 33.

[5] _Senate Journal_, 2d Session, 37th Congress, pp. 202-4.

[6] _House Journal_, 37th Congress, 3d Session, p. 43. Introduced December 5, 1862, by C. L. Vallandigham, whose subsequent career is well known. See Cox _Three Decades of Federal Legislation_, pp. 80-85.

[7] The italics are mine.

[8] _House Journal_, 1st Session, 38th Congress, p. 48.

[9] _Ibid._, pp. 65-6.

[10] See Cox, _Three Decades of Federal Legislation_, 123.

[11] _House Journal_, 1st Session, 38th Congress, pp. 238-9.

[12] For a very able discussion of the "Efforts at Compromise, 1860-61," see Frederic Bancroft's article in _Political Science Quarterly_, vi, pp. 401-423.

[13] _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 37th Congress, p. 129.

[14] _Ibid._, 2d Session, 37th Congress, part i, p. 8.

[15] _Senate Journal_, 3d Session, 37th Congress, p. 24.

[16] See Pollard's _Lost Cause Regained_, pp. 44-57, for a discussion of the growth of Southern sentiment favoring measures of peace.

[17] It is improbable that he ever modified his views as to the continued existence of the States--views which were essentially those of his successor, though less dogmatically asserted. See Hurd, _Theory of Our National Existence_, 36 and _Index_; Pollard, _Lost Cause Regained_, 65.

[18] Cooper, _American Politics_, pp. 141-3.

[19] Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 36.

[20] _Congressional Globe_, 3d Session, 37th Congress, part i, p. 834.

[21] _House Journal_, 3d Session, 37th Congress, pp. 69, 70.

[22] Cooper, _American Politics_, bk. i, pp. 141-3. On Lincoln's plan of Reconstruction, _Cf._ Gillet, _Democracy in the United States_, pp. 297-9; Pollard, _Lost Cause Regained_, 65, which claims that Lincoln could have successfully carried out his policy had he lived, but does not sustain the statement; Cox, _Three Decades_, etc., pp. 336-345; Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power_, iii, 519-20; Scott, _Reconstruction during the Civil War_, 267 ff.

[23] These excepted classes were: (1) Confederate civil and diplomatic officers; (2) Confederates who had left U. S. judicial positions; (3) officers above colonel in army and lieutenant in navy; (4) those who had formerly been U. S. Congressmen and had aided the rebellion; (5) those who left U. S. Army and Navy to aid the rebellion; (6) those who had treated negroes captured while in U. S. military or naval service otherwise than as prisoners of war.

[24] Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America_, iii, 531-41; _Cf._ Gillet, _Democracy in the United States_, pp. 304-7.

[25] For results of this reorganization in Tennessee, see chap. iii.

[26] With one exception--a Republican, Whaley, of West Virginia, voted with the negative.

[27] So called from the chairmen of the House and Senate committees reporting the bill.

[28] _Congressional Globe_, appendix, 1st Session, 38th Congress, p. 84. See also _Lalor_, iii, 546; Cox, _Three Decades_, etc., 339-341; Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America_, iii, 520-28; Johnson's _American Orations_, iii, 242-260; Scott, _Reconstruction during the Civil War_, 274 ff.

[29] Cooper, _American Politics_, bk. i, p. 169.

[30] _Congressional Globe_, part ii, 38th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1246.

[31] _Congressional Globe_, iii, p. 2106, 1st Session, 38th Congress.

[32] Cooper, _American Politics_, bk. i, 169-70. The President's action caused much dissatisfaction, Davis and Wade publishing a protest which impugned Lincoln's motives, declaring that he had committed an outrage on American legislation. See Johnson, in _Lalor_, iii. 5 and 6; Cox, _Three Decades_, etc., 341.

[33] _Senate Journal_, 2d Session, 38th Congress, Feb. 8. Blaine (_Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 46) explains that this joint resolution was intended as a rebuke to the President by the refusal of Congress to accept the proclamation of December 8, 1863, as a basis for the restoration of the States fulfilling its requirements. He then points out how Lincoln, with his usual tact, overthrows what triumph may have accrued to the leaders of the opposition by explaining that he "signed the joint resolution in deference to the view of Congress implied in its passage and presentation." His (Lincoln's) own opinion was that as a matter of course Congress had complete power to accept or reject electoral votes, and that the Executive had no right to interpose with a veto, whatever his own opinions might be. Blaine says that "his triumph was complete, both in the estimation of Congress and of the people."

[34] See Cox, _Three Decades of Federal Legislation_, 123; Johnston, in _Lalor_, iii, 54; Wilson (Woodrow), _Division and Reunion_, 261-2.

[35] _Senate Journal_, 2d Session, 37th Congress, pp. 194-6.

[36] The inconsistency in declaring a State to be extinct, and at the same time acknowledging the obligation to guarantee to it a republican form of government, is due to careless phraseology. Obviously Sumner uses the word "State," in these resolutions, where he means state governments.

[37] _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 38th Congress, part ii, p. 2041. See also his remarks on the Confiscation bill. Cox's _Three Decades of Federal Legislation_, pp. 365-374, contains a chapter on the policy of Stevens.

[38] See Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America_, iii, 531-541.

[39] McPherson, _Reconstruction_, pp. 44 f. Cf. Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America_, iii, 592.

[40] McPherson, pp. 46-7.

[41] McPherson, 44 ff; Moore, _Life and Speeches of Andrew Johnson_, 481 ff.

[42] McPherson, p. 47.

[43] McPherson, pp. 47-8.

[44] See Gillett, _Democ. in the U. S._, pp. 333-337, for a discussion of Johnson's policy and mistakes from the Democratic standpoint.

[45] Mr. Blaine in his _Twenty Years of Congress_, vol. ii, pp. 63-70, ascribes the apparently great modification of Johnson's attitude towards the South to two causes: First, the personal influence of Seward; second, the flattery of Southern leaders. He assumes Johnson to have been thoroughly determined to carry out a harsh policy of reconstruction, and points out that of the six members of the Cabinet, excluding Mr. Seward, three were radical and three conservative in their views, offsetting each other in their influence upon Johnson. He then calls attention to the fact that Mr. Seward's most conspicuous faculty was the power to convince listeners against their will through his personal conversation with them. With this remarkable faculty he believes Mr. Seward to have deliberately settled down to the task of reversing the President's views as to reconstruction. "Equipped with these rare endowments," he says, "it is not strange that Mr. Seward made a deep impression upon the mind of the President. In conflicts of opinion the superior mind, the subtle address, the fixed purpose, the gentle yet strong will, must in the end prevail." Mr. Seward's fervent pleadings, Blaine thinks, caused a marked change in Johnson's beliefs, and inclined him to look favorably upon the glory of a merciful, lenient administration. The leaders in the South, quickly noticing the change in Johnson's attitude, took advantage of the opportunity, and by judicious flattery completed the work which Seward had begun, and placed Johnson before the world as the ardent champion of immediate restoration. The theory impresses one with its apparent reasonableness, but as Mr. Blaine produces no evidence beyond his own authority, one is inclined to look upon it as an ingenious explanation based upon the environment of Johnson. Doubtless Seward presented his view on the situation with his accustomed ability, and probably it influenced Johnson's view to a certain extent. The second part of the supposition can also readily be granted--that the vanity of Johnson was played upon by those whose flattery was most pleasing to one who had sprung from the ranks of those accustomed to be dictated to and spurned by these same men. Yet to ascribe the adoption of so important a policy, affecting all the fundamental principles upon which strict and loose constructionists are divided, to these influences, appears to be a superficial judgment based upon opinions formed in the heat of the struggle, when extraneous influences are always given undue prominence by the participants. The whole career of Johnson proves the logical exactness with which he followed strict construction dogma in all points excepting the doctrine of secession.

[46] McPherson, _Hist. of Recon._, 45, 46

[47] The repudiation of the Sherman-Johnston agreement of April 18th was of a negative character, and did not commit the administration to any policy. Coming, as it did, so shortly after his inauguration, it was taken by those expecting harsh measures from the President as an indication of such a policy. An examination of the circumstances, however, shows that Johnson was merely following the policy supposed to have been adopted by Lincoln, and evidenced by instructions sent to Grant on March 3 in regard to a proposed conference with Lee. Stephens' charge (_War between the States_, ii, 632), that Johnson was bound to ratify the agreement as consistent with the Crittenden Resolution of 1861, is inadmissible. Generals in the field manifestly have no right to decide momentous political questions. For a copy of the Sherman-Johnston agreement, and the official dispatch giving particulars of its disapproval, see McPherson, _Hist. of Recon._, 121-2.

[48] McPherson, p. 13-14.

[49] McPherson, p. 8.

[50] See Appendix; Savage, _Life and Public Services of Andrew Johnson_, 370-373.

[51] Blaine, ii, 70-76, ascribes this amnesty proclamation to the personal influence of Mr. Seward, who favored all but the 13th excepted class (property holders above $20,000). This certainly offers a good explanation of the promptness of his action, and is not inconsistent with the theory of Johnson's attitude as outlined above.

[52] McPherson, p. 11; Blaine, ii, 77, 78.

[53] Tennessee, of course, having been reorganized during Lincoln's administration, under the direction of Military Governor Johnson, cannot be considered in connection with Johnson's policy as President. Louisiana and Arkansas also retained their reorganized governments until the reconstruction acts took effect. See Blaine, ii, 79, 80.

[54] The phraseology differed in the different States, depending upon the sensitiveness and pride of the legislature.

[55] McPherson, _Reconst._, 7, 8.

[56] McPherson, _Reconst._, 49.

[57] _Ibid._, 51-2.

[58] McPherson, 20.

[59] _Ibid._, 21-2.

[60] McPherson, 43; Blaine, ii, 102-3.

[61] See _Why the Solid South_, edited by Hilary A. Herbert, for a detailed presentation of the Southern view.

[62] The report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, June 18th (_House Reports_, No. 30, 1st Session, 39th Congress; McPherson, 84-93), gives a spirited summary of the action of the Southern States since the appointment of the provisional governors. See also Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 84-107.

[63] Lalor, iii, 546.

[64] Senate: Republicans, 40; Democrats, 11; House: Republicans, 145; Democrats, 40. The work before Congress was well expressed by Schuyler Colfax in his speech made upon taking the Speaker's chair. Speaking of Congress he said: "Representing, in its two branches, the States and the people, its first and highest obligation is to guarantee to every State a republican form of government. The rebellion having overthrown constitutional State governments in many States, it is yours to mature and enact legislation which, with the concurrence of the Executive, shall establish them anew on such a basis of enduring justice as will guarantee all the necessary safeguards to the people, and afford what our Magna Charta, the Declaration of Independence, proclaims is the chief object of government--protection to all men in their inalienable rights. * * * * Then we may hope to see the vacant and once abandoned seats around us gradually filling up, until this hall shall contain representatives from every State and district; their hearts devoted to the Union for which they are to legislate, jealous of its honor, proud of its glory, watchful of its rights, and hostile to its enemies." _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 5. See Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 111, 112.

[65] Among the Senators elected were Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederacy, and H. V. Johnson, a Senator in the rebel Congress, both from Georgia; from North Carolina, W. A. Graham, Senator in the rebel Congress; from South Carolina, B. F. Perry, a Confederate States judge, and J. I. Manning, volunteer aid to General Beauregard at Fort Sumter and Manassas (McPherson, 106-7). Among the Representatives chosen were: from Alabama, Cullen A. Battle, a Confederate general, and T. J. Foster, a Representative in the rebel Congress; from Georgia, Philip Cook and W. T. Wofford, generals in the Confederate army; from Mississippi, A. E. Reynolds and R. A. Pinson, rebel colonels, and J. T. Harrison, in rebel provisional Congress; from North Carolina, Josiah Turner was a rebel colonel, and a member of the rebel Congress, and T. C. Fuller a rebel Congressman; from South Carolina, J. D. Kennedy was a colonel, and Samuel McGowan a general in the rebel army, and James Farrow, a rebel Congressman.

[66] By Mr. Brooks, of New York. _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 3, 4.

[67] _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 39th Congress, p. 2; Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 113-115.

[68] Wilson, _History of Reconstruction_, 16 ff.

[69] _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 24-30.

[70] Senator Lane committed suicide on July 11, 1866. Mortification caused by abuse, as the result of his action, is supposed to have unbalanced him mentally. _Cf._, Blaine, ii, 185.

[71] The resolution as adopted by the House on the 4th contained in addition: "and until such report shall have been made, and finally acted upon by Congress, no member shall be received into either House from any of the so-called Confederate States, and all papers relating to the representation of the said States shall be referred to the said committee without debate." The Senate, however, considered such provisions to affect powers granted to each House separately, and which should not be entrusted to a joint committee. Therefore they were struck out, but on December 14 the House of Representatives passed resolutions binding itself to be governed by similar principles.

[72] The other members of the committee were: on the part of the Senate, Howard of Michigan, Grimes of Iowa, Harris of New York, Williams of Oregon, and Johnson of Maryland; on the part of the House, Washburne of Illinois, Morrill of Vermont, Grider of Kentucky, Bingham of Ohio, Conkling of New York, Boutwell of Massachusetts, Blow of Missouri, and Rogers of New Jersey.

[73] Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 115.

[74] Wilson, _History of the Reconstruction Measures_, 42-105, contains a summary of the debates on reconstruction; see also Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 128 ff.

[75] _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 72-5.

[76] _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 39th Congress, p. 1019.

[77] _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 39th Congress, p. 1309. These strong statements of the advisability of confiscation alarmed the Southern States greatly, and caused them to hate and fear Thaddeus Stevens. See Lalor, iii, 546 ff. The following extract from General Taylor's _Destruction and Reconstruction_ (pp. 243-4), is characteristic of the Southern estimate of the man. General Taylor had occasion to call upon Stevens while endeavoring to get permission to visit Jefferson Davis, then in confinement at Fortress Monroe. He goes on to say: "Thaddeus Stevens received me with as much civility as he was capable of. Deformed in body and temper like Caliban, this was the Lord Hategood of the fair; but he was frankness itself. He wanted no restoration of the Union under the Constitution, which he called a worthless bit of old parchment. The white people of the South ought never again to be trusted with power, for they would inevitably unite with the Northern 'Copperheads' and control the government. The only sound policy was to confiscate the lands and divide them among the negroes, to whom, sooner or later, suffrage must be given. Touching the matter in hand, Johnson was a fool to have captured Davis, whom it would have been wiser to assist in escaping. Nothing would be done with him, as the Executive had only pluck enough to hang poor devils, such as Wirz and Mrs. Surratt. Had the leading traitors been promptly strung up, well; but the time for that had passed. (Here, I thought, he looked lovingly at my neck, as Petit Andre was wont to do at those of his merry-go-rounds.)"

[78] _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1476.

[79] _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1616.

[80] _Ibid._, p. 1617.

[81] _Ibid._, p. 1828.

[82] _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 155.

[83] _Ibid._, p. 150.

[84] _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1169.

[85] _Ibid._, p. 2256.

[86] Gillet's _Democracy in the United States_, pp. 309-13, discusses the Freedmen's Bureau from the Northern Democratic standpoint.

[87] The first bill creating a Freedmen's Bureau was introduced in the House during the 37th Congress by Mr. Eliot, of Massachusetts, who during the 39th Congress was chairman of the Select Committee on Freedmen. It was not reported, but the same bill was presented in the first session of the 38th Congress, and passed the House by a vote of 69 to 67. It was returned from the Senate on June 30, 1864, amended so as to attach the Bureau to the Treasury Department. A committee of conference agreed upon a new bill creating a department of freedmen's affairs, reporting to the President. This passed the House, but failed in the Senate. The next attempt succeeded. _Congressional Globe_, 2d Session, 38th Congress, p. 1307. See Cox's _Three Decades of Federal Legislation_ for an account of the Freedmen's Bureau; also Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America_, iii, 472-485; Wilson (Woodrow), _Division and Reunion_, 263.

[88] _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1299. Mr. Doolittle on the 19th of December, 1865, had introduced a bill relative to the Bureau of Freedmen, but when reported from the Committee on Military Affairs, to which it had been referred, it was indefinitely postponed.

[89] This committee had been established by a resolution introduced by Mr. Eliot, of Massachusetts, on December 6, 1865. So much of the President's message as related to freedmen, and all papers relating to the same subject, were to be referred to it. The following were appointed members of the committee: T. D. Eliot of Massachusetts, W. D. Kelley of Pennsylvania, G. S. Orth of Indiana, J. A. Bingham of Ohio, Nelson Taylor of New York, B. F. Loan of Missouri, J. B. Grinnell of Iowa, H. E. Paine of Wisconsin, and S. S. Marshall of Illinois.

[90] Cox confuses this act with the act passed over the veto on July 16, declaring that it was passed over the veto on February 21. _Three Decades of Federal Legislation_, p. 444.

[91] See Wilson (Henry), _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America_, iii, 490-97; Wilson, _History of Reconstruction_, 148-184; Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 164-170; Wilson (Woodrow), _Division and Reunion_, 264.

[92] _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 39th Congress. McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, pp. 73-4.

[93] The veto messages of the Presidents of the United States, from Washington to Cleveland, inclusive, have been compiled by Ben: Perley Poore by order of the Senate.

[94] _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 915-917; McPherson, _History of Reconstruction_, pp. 68-72.

[95] See Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America_, iii, 497-99; Wilson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 184-195; Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 171-2.

[96] The votes were: House, 104 to 33; Senate, 33 to 12. For the text of the bill, see _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 39th Congress; McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, pp. 149-50. Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 172, states that the bill was far less popular than the measure vetoed on February 19. "It required potent persuasion, re-enforced by the severest exercise of party discipline, to prevent a serious break in both Houses against the bill."

[97] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 52-56.

[98] _House journal_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, 300, 315. The resolution was carried particularly to silence the Tennessee claimants for recognition. The somewhat anomalous position of that State gave grounds for the argument that it should be classed in the same category with the other Southern States. Thus Mr. Stevens was able to get the power for the joint committee which he had originally claimed.

[99] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, pp. 58-63.

[100] See Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America_, iii, 684-692; _History of Reconstruction_, 117-149; Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 172-79.

[101] _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 39th Congress, pp. 39, 40.

[102] _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session; McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, pp. 75-8.

[103] _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 1679-81; McPherson, _History of Reconstruction_, pp. 75-8.

[104] _Senate Journal_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 431-2; McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, pp. 82-3; Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 275-80.

[105] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 81-2; _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, 2609.

[106] McPherson, 160-164.

[107] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, pp. 164-6; _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session.

[108] Hurd, in his _Theory of our National Existence_, p. 42, says that this report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction "as being the most authoritative declaration of principles supposed to have been afterwards carried out in political action, is a document which, either for good or evil, will probably be regarded as one of the most important in the history of this country."

[109] For an extended discussion of the constitutional views of the members of the committee, see Hurd's _Theory_, etc., pp. 224 ff.

[110] _House Reports_, No. 30, 39th Congress, 1st Session. McPherson, _History of Reconstruction_, pp. 84-93.

[111] Gillet, _Democracy in the United States_, pp. 318-20.

[112] _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 39th Congress, pp. 9, 10, 351.

[113] _Ibid._, 141-2, 232. For general discussions and summaries of the debates on the 14th Amendment, see Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America_, iii, 647-660; Wilson, _History of Reconstruction_, 218-266; Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 193-214.

[114] The vote was: yeas, 120; nays, 46.

[115] _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 2459.

[116] Yeas, 128, nays, 37.

[117] On May 29, _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 2869.

[118] See Pollard's _Lost Cause Regained_, p. 74.

[119] _Senate Journal_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 502.

[120] On the reorganization of Tennessee, see Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 50-52, 214-17; Cox, _Three Decades of Federal Legislation_.

[121] _House Reports_, No. 30, pt. 1; McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, pp. 105-6.

[122] Ratified by the Senate July 11, yeas, 15, nays, 6; by the House July 12, yeas, 43, nays, 11. Tennessee was the third State to ratify the amendment, Connecticut and New Hampshire being the first two.

[123] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, pp. 151-4.

[124] Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 219-220.

[125] The Congressional committee of investigation, appointed at the beginning of the 2d session, in December, submitted a detailed report of the riots. See _House Reports_, No. 16, 2d Session, 39th Congress. See also Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 233-237.

[126] _House Reports_, No. 16, 39th Congress, 2d Session, p. 26.

[127] See below for an account of this canvass.

[128] _House Reports_, No. 16, 39th Congress, 2d Session, pp. 24-27; McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 137.

[129] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 118, 119; Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 220-223.

[130] Among these Republicans were Thurlow Weed, Edgar Cowan, James R. Doolittle, A. W. Randall, O. H. Browning, James Dixon, Henry J. Raymond, R. S. Hale, J. A. Dix, Marshall O. Roberts and Montgomery Blair.

[131] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 240-1.

[132] Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 222.

[133] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 127.

[134] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 129. This manner of indicating his disinterestedness caused great offense in some quarters. See the account below of the Pittsburg convention of soldiers and sailors of September 26.

[135] See Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 237-239.

[136] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 130.

[137] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 131, 132.

[138] McPherson, 135. The following is a good example of the manner in which Johnson lowered himself to the level of the disorderly element, who made a bedlam out of some of the meetings he attended. The extract is from the Cleveland speech: "Who can come and place his finger on one pledge I ever violated, or one principle I ever proved false to? (A voice, 'How about New Orleans?' Another voice, 'Hang Jeff Davis.') Hang Jeff Davis, he says. (Cries of 'No' and 'Down with him!') Hang Jeff Davis, he says. (A voice, 'Hang Thad. Stevens and Wendell Phillips.') Hang Jeff Davis. Why don't you hang him? (Cries of 'Give us the opportunity.') Have you not got the court? Have not you got the Attorney General? (A voice, 'Who is your Chief Justice who has refused to sit upon the trial?' Cheers.) I am not the Chief Justice. I am not the prosecuting attorney. (Cheers.) I am not the jury.

"I will tell you what I did do. I called upon your Congress that is trying to break up the government. (Cries, 'You be d--d!' and cheers mingled with hisses. Great confusion. 'Don't get mad, Andy.') Well, I will tell you who is mad. 'Whom the gods wish to destroy, they first make mad.' Did your Congress order them to be tried? ('Three cheers for Congress')," etc.

[139] Tennessee, Texas, Georgia, Missouri, Virginia, North Carolina and Alabama were represented among the signers to the call.

[140] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 124.

[141] Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 224-228.

[142] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 241, 242.

[143] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 242.

[144] The address was prepared by Senator Creswell, of Maryland. See Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 223-228.

[145] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 243; Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 228-230.

[146] Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 230-233.

[147] General John A. Logan was first chosen president, but was unable to attend.

[148] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 242, 243.

[149] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 140.

[150] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 194.

[151] Scott, _Reconstruction during the Civil War_, 290 ff.

[152] _House Journal_, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 12-23; McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 143-147.

[153] _House Journal_, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 15.

[154] The resolution passed the House on December 4, and the Senate on December 5. _House Journal_, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 30; _Senate Journal_, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 22.

[155] _Senate Journal_, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 202.

[156] _House Journal_, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 345.

[157] _Congressional Globe_, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 1074.

[158] _Congressional Globe_, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 1076.

[159] _Congressional Globe_, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 1360.

[160] _Ibid._, 1381-2.

[161] _Ibid._, 1360.

[162] _Congressional Globe_, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 1399.

[163] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 192.

[164] _House Journal_, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 563-572.

[165] Act of January 22, 1867.

[166] _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 40th Congress, 13.

[167] The Committee on the Judiciary was instructed on March 7 to report a supplementary bill (_Congressional Globe_, 17), and the Wilson bill was accordingly reported by it.

[168] _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 40th Congress, 302-3; 313-14.

[169] _Congressional Globe_, appendix, 1st Session, 40th Congress, 39; McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 192.

[170] Except in Virginia, where the number was modified in proportion to the change made by the separation of West Virginia.

[171] By the act of that date all persons elected or appointed to any office under the government of the United States were required to take the following oath previous to entering upon the duties of such office: "I, A. B., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have never voluntarily borne arms against the United States since I have been a citizen thereof; that I have voluntarily given no aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to persons engaged in armed hostility thereto; that I have neither sought nor accepted nor attempted to exercise the functions of any office whatever, under any authority or pretended authority in hostility to the United States; that I have not yielded a voluntary support to any pretended government, authority, power or constitution within the United States, hostile or inimical thereto. And I do further swear (or affirm) that, to the best of my knowledge and ability, I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, so help me God."

[172] Appendix, _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 40th Congress, 39, 40.

[173] Johnson, _Reconstruction_, in Lalor, iii, 552; Cox, _Three Decades of Federal Legislation_, 378.

[174] _Congressional Globe_, appendix, 1st Session, 39th Congress, 43-4.

[175] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 335-6.

[176] Stanbery had ruled that the willingness of an applicant to take the oath must be regarded as final evidence of his qualification to register. Thus those notoriously incapacitated from taking the oath honestly, could not be prevented from registering. This additional power virtually enabled the boards of registration to exercise their own discretion as to whom they should enroll.

[177] Scott, _Reconstruction during the Civil War_, 317 ff.

[178] Cox, _Three Decades of Federal Legislation_, 512-14.

[179] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 336-7.

[180] McPherson, 190.

[181] Dunning, in _Papers of the American Historical Association_, iv, 473; _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 40th Congress, p. 565.

[182] McPherson, 264.

[183] _Ibid._, 178.

[184] McPherson, 178.

[185] Vetoed March 2, 1867, and repassed by both houses on the same day. For copy of the act, see McPherson, 176 ff.

[186] His argument here, however, is weak, as the power of suspension would easily have covered all such cases.

[187] _Ex parte_ Hennen, January, 1839, 13 Peters, 139.

[188] McPherson, 261.

[189] _Ibid._, 262.

[190] The text of the correspondence between Grant and Johnson may be found in McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, p. 282 ff.

[191] McPherson, p. 283.

[192] _Ibid._, p. 284.

[193] McPherson, 265. The fact also that Grant had refused to be governed by Johnson's instructions made the attempt still less serious.

[194] See Dunning, _Papers American Historical Association_, 1890, p. 481.

[195] McPherson, 266. The vote was 128 to 47, divided strictly on party lines.

[196] For the full text of the eleven articles, see McPherson, 266 ff. For a critical discussion of the legal points involved in the trial, see Dunning, in _Papers American Historical Association_, iv, 483 ff.

Transcriber's Notes:

Passages in italics are indicated by _italics_.

Foonote 80 appears on page 58 of the text, but there is no corresponding marker on the page.

Punctuation has been corrected without note.

The following misprints have been corrected: "propsed" corrected to "proposed" (page 23) "Constution" corrected to "Constitution" (page 26-27) "reconstructon" corrected to "reconstruction" (page 48) "or" corrected to "for" (page 50) "join tcommittee" corrected to "joint committee" (page 53) "falied" changed to "failed" (page 61) "eqality" corrected to "equality" (page 77) "resolulutions" corrected to "resolutions" (page 93)

Other than the corrections listed above, inconsistencies in spelling and hyphenation have been retained from the original.