CHAPTER XII

The Lines of Torres Vedras

(1810)

“_France is not an enemy whom I despise, nor does it deserve I should._”

WELLINGTON.

Pasquier, who had the privilege of knowing most of the generals of the Revolution and of the Empire, says of Masséna that he was “France’s first military commander after Napoleon.” Neither Pichegru, Moreau, Kléber, nor Lannes gave the Chancellor “as completely as Masséna, the idea of a born warrior, possessing a genius for war, and endowed with all the qualities which render victory certain. His eagle eye seemed made to scan a field of battle. One could understand, on seeing him, that the soldier under his command never believed it was possible to retreat.”

Masséna’s first important operation in the Peninsula was the siege of the Spanish fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo. Although Wellington was in the neighbourhood he was not to be enticed away from his immediate objects, which were the defence of Lisbon and the thorough organization of the army for service when action became absolutely imperative. Notwithstanding a splendid defence for over two months on the part of Governor Herrasti, the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo was compelled to surrender on the 10th July. In August, Masséna crossed the frontier preparatory to beginning the siege of Almeida, near the river Coa, next to Elvas the strongest place in Portugal.

On the 24th July, Craufurd and his famous Light Division--not Light Brigade as some would have it--had a fierce tussle with Ney’s corps of 24,000 men. Craufurd, who had only 4000 troops at his disposal, entertained no wild notion of preventing the investment of the place, but as he was suddenly attacked he was obliged to fight. Had he been a more cautious soldier he would have crossed the Coa before Ney came up, as Wellington had suggested on the 22nd. Indeed, so early as the 11th, the Commander-in-Chief had said, “I would not wish you to fall back beyond that place (_i.e._ Almeida), unless it should be necessary. But it does not appear necessary that you should be so far, and it will be safer that you should be nearer, at least with your infantry.” He delayed too late, and thereby lost over 300 men. While the last of the soldiers were crossing the bridge which spanned the swollen river, for it had rained in torrents the previous night, a lanky Irish lad of nineteen years, named Stewart, and known by the 43rd as “The Boy,” positively refused to pass over. “So this is the end of our boasting! This is our first battle, and we retreat! The Boy Stewart will not live to hear that said,” he cried, and turning back he slashed at the oncoming French until he fell dead. Even more courageous was the conduct of Sergeant Robert M‘Quade, five years Stewart’s senior. He happened to catch sight of two French soldiers with levelled muskets awaiting the British to ascend a bank. A boy of sixteen, afterwards famous as Sir George Brown (Colonel-in-Chief of the Rifle Brigade) was on the verge of being shot by them when the sergeant pulled him back from the fatal spot. “You are too young, sir, to be killed,” he cried as his own body received two bullets and fell in a lifeless heap at the feet of the youth.

That Colonel Cox, who was in charge of the fortress, would have stayed Masséna’s advance for a considerable time is extremely likely, but unfortunately he was not given the opportunity to display his prowess. The powder-magazine blew up, almost destroying the town and necessitating immediate surrender. The pursuit of Wellington, “to drive him into the sea,” seemed a comparatively easy task until the advance showed that the British General had caused the country to be stripped almost entirely of provisions. Thus Napoleon’s policy of making “war support war” by plundering and raiding the enemy’s country, completely broke down. “In war all that is useful is legitimate,” he says, and Wellington had followed the maxim, after having obtained permission for the destruction of provisions from the Portuguese Regency, which included Mr Charles Stuart, the British Minister at Lisbon. What Wellington’s measures meant to Masséna’s army is summed up in a single sentence by Sir Harry Smith, who carried a dispatch to Lord Hill through territory occupied by the enemy. “The spectacle,” he says, “of hundreds of miserable wretches of French soldiers on the road in a state of _starvation_ is not to be described.” Nor was this all. Not only did the place resemble a desert in the difficulty of obtaining means of sustenance, but the majority of the inhabitants had fled, some seeking the fastnesses of the mountains, others the larger cities such as Lisbon and Oporto.

As Masséna advanced so Wellington retreated towards the celebrated lines of Torres Vedras, upon the construction of which thousands of peasants, under the direction of British engineers, had been busy for six months.

These magnificent defences are thus described by one who knew them.[58] They “consisted of redoubts and field-works of various kinds; according to the ground they were to defend, and all connected with each other by entrenchments, etc., so that, when occupied by the army, it would almost be impossible to force them. But, even supposing this first line of defence should be carried by the enemy, there was another, much more contracted, to retreat upon, where a very small force could hold out against the French army and cover the embarkation of the British, should Lord Wellington be at last forced to quit Portugal. I cannot help considering this retreat to the lines, and the pertinacity with which he held them in spite of every difficulty, and the remonstrances of the Government at home, which was seized with alarm, as the greatest proof of a master mind and genius that could be given, and proved Lord Wellington to be superior to any general the French had, except Napoleon; in short, that he was, next to Buonaparte himself, the first general of the day. And I am further convinced that, had he the same opportunities that Napoleon had, he would have proved as great a general, as his capacity and powers of mind would have strengthened and expanded in proportion to the vastness of his views and the obstacles to be surmounted.”

An officer of the 60th Rifles, who served behind them, furnishes a more detailed pen-sketch. “The line of defence was double,” he writes. “The first, which was twenty-nine miles long, began at Alhandra, on the Tagus, crossed the valley of Armia, which was rather a weak point, and passed along the skirts of Mount Agraça, where there was a large and strong redoubt; it then passed across the valley of Zibreira, and skirted the ravine of Runa to the heights of Torres Vedras, which were well fortified; and from thence followed the course of the little river Zizandre to its mouth on the sea-coast. The line followed the sinuosities of the mountain track which extends from the Tagus to the sea, about thirty miles north of Lisbon. Lord Wellington’s headquarters were fixed at Pero Negro, a little in the rear of the centre of the line, where a telegraph was fixed corresponding with every part of the position. The second line, at a distance varying from six to ten miles in the rear of the first, extended from Quintella, on the Tagus, by Bucellas, Montechique, and Mafra, to the mouth of the little river S. Lourenço, on the sea-coast, and was twenty-four miles long. This was the stronger line of the two, both by Nature and art, and if the first line were forced by the enemy, the retreat of the army upon the second was secure at all times. Both lines were secured by breastworks, abattis, stone walls with banquettes, and scarps. In the rear of the second line there was a line of embarkation, should that measure become necessary, enclosing an entrenched camp and the fort of St Julian.” As many as 120 redoubts and 427 pieces of artillery were scattered along these lines. “Lord Wellington had received reinforcements from England and Cadiz; the Portuguese army had also been strengthened, and the Spanish division of La Romana, 5000 strong, came from Estremadura to join the Allies;[59] so that the British commander had about 60,000 regular troops posted along the first and second lines, besides the Portuguese militia and artillery (which manned the forts and redoubts and garrisoned Lisbon), a fine body of English marines which occupied a line of embarkation, a powerful fleet in the Tagus, and a flotilla of gun-boats flanking the right of the British line. It was altogether a stupendous line of defence, conceived by the military genius of the British commander, and executed by the military skill of the British engineer officers.”

Wellington continued to fall back until he reached “Busaco’s iron ridge,” north of the Mondego. Here he determined to offer Masséna battle, for three principal reasons. First, there was a growing discontent amongst the rank and file of his army by reason of lack of active warfare and the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and a victory would put an end to this growing despondency. Second, also a military consideration, the orders he had given for the laying waste of the districts about Lisbon were not yet fully carried out. Third, from a political point of view it was necessary because it would show that he was not about to lock himself up within the lines of Torres Vedras because he was incapable or afraid of Napoleon’s legions. In a word, it would “restore confidence,” a matter of first importance. It is quite incorrect to term Busaco a “useless battle” as some historians have done.

“On the 25th and 26th,”[60] says M. de Rocca, “the French corps arrived successively at the foot of the mountains Sierra de Busaco, whose summits they found occupied by the Anglo-Portuguese army. At six o’clock, on the morning of the 27th, they marched in column against the right and centre of that army, in the two roads leading to Coimbra, by the village of San Antonio de Cantaro, and by the convent of Busaco. These roads were cut up in several places, and defended by artillery. The mountain over which they pass is besides encumbered with steep rocks, and is very difficult of access.

“The French column which attacked the right of the English advanced with intrepidity, in spite of the fire of their artillery and light troops. It reached the top of the eminence after sustaining considerable loss, and began to deploy in line with the greatest coolness, and most perfect regularity. But a superior force again assaulted it, and compelled it to retire. It soon rallied, made a second attack, and was again repulsed. The French battalions, which advanced against the convent of Busaco, where the left and centre of the English divisions joined, were also driven back, a little before they reached that post. General Simon, who had been struck by two balls during the charge, was left on the height, and a great many wounded officers and soldiers.

“The position occupied by the English and Portuguese on the brow of the hill, formed the arc of a circle, whose two extremes embraced the ground over which the French had to advance. The allied army saw the least movements made below them, and had time to form to receive any powerful body before it arrived. This circumstance materially contributed to the advantage they obtained....

“Marshal Masséna judged that the position of Lord Wellington could not be carried in front, and resolved to turn it. He kept up an irregular fire till the evening, and sent off a body of troops by the mountain-road, which leads from Mortago to Oporto. The English and Portuguese, in consequence of this movement, abandoned their position on the mountain of Busaco.”

The attack on the British left was led by Ney, and it succeeded in driving in the sharp-shooters. The French had practically reached the summit, as Rocca states, when Craufurd’s division, concealed in a hollow, gave them the full benefit of their fire. “The enemy,” says Sir Charles Stewart, who fought on this memorable day, “unable to retreat, and afraid to resist, were rolled down the steep like a torrent of hailstones driven before a powerful wind; and not the bayonets only, but the very hands of some of our brave fellows, became in an instant red with the blood of the fugitives. More brilliant or more decisive charges than those executed this day by the two divisions which bore the brunt of the action, were never perhaps witnessed; nor could anything equal the gallantry and intrepidity of our men throughout, except perhaps the hardihood which had ventured upon so desperate an attack.”

Reynier’s two divisions, 15,000 men in all, attacked Picton’s 3rd division on the right. The troops of Generals Hill and Leith, moving rapidly to Picton’s aid, decided their fate. “The right of the 3rd division had been, in the first instance, borne back,” says an eye-witness, “the 8th Portuguese had suffered most severely; the enemy had formed, in good order, upon the ground which they had so boldly won, and were preparing to bear down to the right, and sweep our field of battle. Lord Wellington arrived on the spot at this moment, and aided the gallant efforts of Picton’s regiments, the fire of whose musketry was terrible, by causing two guns to play upon the French flank with grape. Unshaken even with this destruction, they still held their ground, till, with levelled bayonets and the shout of the charge, the 45th and 88th regiments, British, most gallantly supported by the 8th Portuguese, rushed forwards, and hurried them down the mountain side with a fearful slaughter.”

“This movement,” writes Wellington, “has afforded me a favorable opportunity of showing the enemy the description of troops of which this army is composed; it has brought the Portuguese levies into action with the enemy for the first time in an advantageous situation; and they have proved that the trouble which has been taken with them has not been thrown away, and that they are worthy of contending in the same ranks with British troops in this interesting cause, which they afford the best hopes of saving.

“Throughout the contest on the Serra, and in all the previous marches, and those which we have since made, the whole army have conducted themselves in the most regular manner. Accordingly all the operations have been carried on with ease; the soldiers have suffered no privations, have undergone no unnecessary fatigue, there has been no loss of stores, and the army is in the highest spirits.”

The total British and Portuguese losses, according to the official figures, were 197 killed, 1014 wounded, and 58 missing. Masséna reported casualties to the number of 4486 men, including five generals. Anything but a kindly feeling existed between the French Commander-in-Chief and Ney previous to the battle; the result merely deepened their unfriendliness, a pitiful contrast to the cordial relations of Wellington and his colleagues.[61]

It is both delightful and pathetic to know that, after the last roll of the guns had echoed through the valley, the British and the French put aside their weapons and worked side by side in the humanitarian task of searching for the wounded. It was the final scene of the tragedy, acted after the curtain had fallen. It is recorded, as one of the incidents, that a German officer serving with Napoleon’s colours, who had a brother in the British 60th Regiment, asked a sworn enemy of an hour ago if he knew what had happened to his relative? He answered his own pathetic question by finding the soldier’s corpse.

_Books may tell of its story, But only the heart can know How war is robbed of its glory, By the brave ones lying low,_