Chapter 34

COLLATED FROM THE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

Realizing the importance of presenting its case to the neutral world, each of the warring nations published its diplomatic correspondence leading up to the outbreak of the war, at a period during hostilities when the publication seemed best calculated to serve the end in view.

THE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

British White Papers, July 20 to September 1, 1914.

Belgian Gray Book, April 7, 1914, to September 30, 1914.

German White Book, July 23 to August 4, 1914.

French Yellow Book, March 17, 1913, to September 4, 1914.

Russian Orange Book, July 23 to August 6, 1914.

Serbian Blue Book, June 29 to August 4, 1914.

Austro-Hungarian Red Book, June 29 to August 24, 1914.

Official publications in the press by Great Britain, Russia, Germany, and Italy, July 30 to December 6, 1914.

Various speeches by officers of the Governments.

It is from these official documents, cast into one form by rearranging all letters, telegrams, proclamations, speeches, etc., in their chronological order, that the following history of the diplomatic controversy is compiled.

It will be observed that, from the necessity of the case, the books of the six principal allies against the Teutonic Powers are threefold in number the books of those powers; and that, from choice of their promulgators the books of the Teutonic Powers are also disproportionately less in total volume, owing to the almost entire absence in them of communications between Austria-Hungary and Germany; while the correspondence between their adversaries is presented by these with a fulness which gives the neutral reader the impression that nothing of importance has been withheld--indeed, that the Allies (to use for convenience the popular designation of the anti-Teutonic powers) have laid all their cards face upward on the table. The intelligent reader will not have to be cautioned that this is a psychological, rather than logical, inference.

If any prevalent arguments on either side fail to be upheld by the evidence here given, it will be because this evidence does not appear in the official documents; the editors feel that their functions do not warrant their inclusion of pleas or testimony formed outside of the records mentioned above. The time will not come until long after the close of the war when the conflicting claims in the vast amount of propagandial literature issued by both parties can be judicially weighed by impartial historians, and presented at the bar of public opinion. In the meantime, however, we can bring before this court the case as officially presented by the contesting parties, a "perfect enumeration" of all the available. The editor acts merely in a reporting capacity. He does not discriminate between "Trojan and Tyrian," unless it be called discrimination to refuse by allotment of lesser space to inflict on the party neglecting fully to present its case a penalty beyond that which necessarily results, in adverse effect, on the mind of the reader from this omission.

In brief, the controversy is presented as a case in law. The evidence is given in the correspondence between ministers of state and the pleadings are presented in the words of responsible statesmen, who apply this evidence to the issues in question.

Since the validity of the evidence is based not only on its inherent motive but on the character and authority of those communicating it, and the force of the pleadings is even more dependent upon the character and authority of the advocates, it is necessary at the outset to state the offices held by the chief representatives of the parties to the controversy, and to present something of their past records, especially in the case of the more responsible statesmen. This will also serve to make graphic the story of the great trial before the bar of the world; it will visualize it as a contest, man to man, in which the distance between the combatants is eliminated, and they seem to be in each other's presence, testifying and arguing in behalf of their respective causes, as in a case at law. And, when it is borne in mind that these persons are representative of the dignity of great and sovereign peoples, the exponents and conservators of their national and individual rights and aspirations, their ideas and ideals of civilization, the contest will gain rather than lose in impressiveness by the concrete form in which it is presented. The sovereigns and statesmen of the anti-Teutonic allies are listed first; of the Teutonic allies next, and a few statesmen of neutral countries who were involved in the controversy last.

LIST OF SOVEREIGNS AND DIPLOMATS

GREAT BRITAIN

George V, King of Great Britain and Ireland, Emperor of India, and Sovereign of the entire British Empire.

Haldane, Richard Burdon (Viscount), Lord High Chancellor. Born 1856, studied German at Gottingen, member Parliament for Haddingtonshire 1885-1911; Secretary of State for War 1905-12; Lord High Chancellor 1912. As Secretary of State for War, Haldane, introduced into his department several innovations, the knowledge of which he had acquired during his residence at Gottingen and in his frequent visits to the Continent. He has been in public life since entering Parliament in 1885, and, despite his later removal from the office which he held at the outbreak of the war, is still recognized as one of Great Britain's most brilliant men. Previous to the war, he was looked on as an especially warm friend of Germany, and frequently went to Berlin in the interests of British amity with that country.

Grey, Sir Edward: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Born April 25, 1862, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1892-95; Secretary State for Foreign Affairs December, 1905.

Of the conduct of the British Foreign Office since 1906 Gilbert Murray in his "Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey" ("Clarendon Press," Oxford, 1915) says:

"In general, Grey is often supposed to represent the principle of continuity in foreign policy, but this is not quite exact. In certain very large issues the Liberal Government of 1906 and onward agreed entirely with the conservative policy of Lord Salisbury (Prime Minister), and Lord Lansdowne (Foreign Secretary), and therefore followed their action. On other issues it differed. For instance, it stopped indentured Chinese labor in the Transvaal, and it granted immediate self-government to South Africa. But in Europe the policy has been mostly continuous. The principles are conveniently stated in the House of Commons debate of foreign policy on November 27, 1911:

"'1. In my opinion the wise policy for this country is to expand as little as possible.' 'I say without any hesitation that we do not desire accessions of territory, and in saying that I am not speaking for one small section of the House. I believe I am speaking for the nation at large.' The first sentence comes from Sir Edward Grey, the second from Mr. Bonar Law (leader of the opposition).

"This is made a little clearer in a latter sentence of Sir Edward Grey's speech. 'If there are to be changes of territory brought about by good will and negotiation between other powers, then we are not an ambitious competing party.... And if it is wise policy not to go in for great schemes of expansion ourselves, then I think it would be morally and diplomatically wrong to indulge in a dog-in-the-manger policy in regard to others.' In particular, he explains, if Germany wishes, 'by friendly arrangement with other powers,' to extend her territories, we do not wish to stand in her way, or to claim 'compensations.'"

Nicholson, Sir Arthur: Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Bertie, Sir Francis: Ambassador to France. Born August 17, 1844; private secretary to Hon. R. Bourke (Under-Secretary State), 1874-80; attached to Embassy, Berlin, 1878; Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1894; Ambassador to Rome, 1903; Paris, 1905.

Buchanan, Sir George: Ambassador to Russia. Born Copenhagen November 25, 1854; entered Diplomatic Service 1875; Third Secretary, Rome, 1878; Second Secretary, Tokyo, 1879; Second Secretary, Vienna, 1882; Berne, 1889; British Agent to Venezuela Arbitration Tribunal, 1898; Secretary Embassy, Rome, 1900; Berlin, 1901-3; Minister Plenipotentiary, Sofia, 1903-8; Hague, 1908-10; St. Petersburg, 1910.

Goschen, Sir Edward: Ambassador to Germany. Born July 18, 1847; entered Diplomatic Service, 1869; Attache, Madrid, 1870; Buenos Aires, 1873; Second Secretary, Rio de Janeiro, 1877; Constantinople, 1881; Secretary Legation, Peking, 1885; Copenhagen, 1888; Lisbon, 1890; Secretary Embassy, Washington, 1893; St. Petersburg, 1894; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Belgrade, 1898-1900; Copenhagen, 1900-5; Ambassador, Vienna, 1905-8; Berlin, 1908.

Rumbold, Sir Horace: Counsellor German Embassy and Charge d'Affaires. Born February 5, 1869; Attache, Hague, 1888; Charge d'Affaires, Munich, 1908; served at Cairo, Teheran, and Athens; Counsellor Embassy, Tokyo, 1909; learned in Arabic, Persian, and Japanese.

De Bunsen, Sir Maurice: Ambassador in Austria. Born January 8, 1852; entered Diplomatic Service, 1877; Secretary Legation, Tokyo, 1891; Secretary Embassy, Constantinople, 1897-1902; Paris, 1902-5; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Lisbon, 1905; Ambassador, Madrid, 1906-13; Vienna, 1913.

Beaumont, Henry Dawson: Charge d'Affaires, Turkey. Born February 4, 1867; entered Diplomatic Service, 1892; served in Copenhagen, Madrid, Rio de Janeiro, St. Petersburg, and Montenegro; Charge d'Affaires, Turkey, 1914.

Villiers, Sir Francis: Minister to Belgium. Born August 13, 1852; entered Foreign Office, 1870; Assistant Under-Secretary State Foreign Affairs, 1896-1905; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Portugal, 1905-11; Belgium, 1911.

Des Graz, Charles Louis: Minister to Serbia. Born March 2, 1860; entered Diplomatic Service, 1884; Constantinople, Teheran, Athens; Counsellor Embassy, Rome, 1905; Charge d'Affaires, Cettinje, 1906; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Peru and Ecuador, 1908-13; Minister, Serbia, 1913.

Crackanthorpe, Dayrell Eardley Montague: First Secretary of Legation to Serbia. Born September 9, 1871; entered Diplomatic Service, 1896; Madrid, Washington, Brussels, Bucharest, Vienna, Belgrade, 1913.

Rodd, Sir Rennell: Ambassador to Italy. Born November 9, 1858; entered Diplomatic Service, 1883; Berlin, Athens, Rome, Paris; Secretary Embassy, Rome, 1901-4; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Sweden, 1904-8; Ambassador, Italy, 1908.

FRANCE

Poincare, Raymond: President of the Republic.

Viviani, Rene: President of the Council, a Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Premier of the Cabinet. Had been Minister of Instruction in the Cabinet of Gaston Doumergue, which resigned June 2, 1914; Poincare asked him at that time to form a cabinet, but Ambassador Paleologue intimated from St. Petersburg that the Czar feared a Viviani ministry would modify the three years' military service law, and therefore another was sought for this position. After the failure of the Ribot Cabinet on June 12, 1914, he was again called upon, and, no objections being made, he formed the ministry acting at the outbreak of the war. After the beginning of the hostilities he retained the position of President of the Council without portfolio.

Jonnart, Charles Celestin: Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born December 27, 1857; Governor General Algiers and Minister of the Interior.

Pichon, Stephen: Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born August 10, 1857 Diplomatic Service in Hayti, San Domingo, Rio de Janeiro, and at Peking during the Boxer Rebellion.

Bienvenu-Martin, Jean Baptiste: Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born July 22, 1847; Minister Instruction, 1905; in public life since 1878.

Doumergue, Gaston: Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born 1863; Minister Colonies, 1902-5; Commerce, 1906-7; Premier, resigning, June 2, 1914.

Delcasse, Theophile: Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born March 1, 1852; started life as journalist; Counsellor General; Under-Secretary Colonies, 1893; Colonial Minister, 1894-5; Foreign Minister, 1898-1905; Minister Marine, 1905-13; Mediator between Spain and the United States, 1899; Ambassador, St. Petersburg, 1913; Minister Foreign Affairs, 1913. Is one of the strong men of France; in 1904 was the French negotiator of the Anglo-French Convention (the "Entene") concerning Egypt and Morocco; was sacrificed to assuage German feeling at the time of the Algeciras conference; called the "Deadly Enemy of Germany."

Berthelot: Political Director.

Cambon, Paul; Ambassador to Great Britain. Born January 20, 1843; Ambassador Madrid, Constantinople, and at London, 1898.

Fleuriau, M. De: Charge d'Affaires, London.

De Manneville: Charge d'Affaires, Germany. Born February 27, 1865; entered Diplomatic Service at Berlin, 1893; later at London; a Minister of the First Class in 1904.

Paleologue, Maurice: Ambassador to Russia. Born January 13, 1859; served in Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service at Rome, Berlin, Peking, Korea, and in Bulgaria.

Cambon, Jules: Ambassador to Germany. Born April 5, 1845; entered Diplomatic Service, 1874; Ambassador, Washington, 1897; Madrid, 1902; Berlin, 1907.

Allize: Minister at Munich, Germany.

Ronssin, P.: Consul General at Frankfort, Germany.

Dumaine, Chilhaud: Ambassador to Austria-Hungary.

d'Apchier-le-Maugin: Consul General at Budapest.

Bompard, Maurice: Ambassador to Turkey. Born May 17, 1854; Minister, First Class, 1898; Ambassador to Russia, 1902.

Klokowski, Antony: Minister to Belgium. Born September 23, 1855; served at Yokohoma, Calcutta, and Bangkok.

Boppe, Jules: Minister to Serbia. Born June 26, 1862; entered Diplomatic Service, 1890; served at Constantinople and St. Petersburg.

Barrere, Camille: Ambassador to Italy.

Bapst, Constant: Minister to Holland.

Mollard, Armard: Minister to Luxemburg.

Chevalley: Minister to Norway.

Thiebaut, Eugene: Minister to Sweden.

Farges: Consul General at Basle, Switzerland.

RUSSIA

Nicholas II: Emperor (Czar).

Sazonof: Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Suchomlinof, Vladimir Alexandrovitch: Minister for war. In 1890 at the age of forty-eight Suchomlinof was made a major general, and in 1904 became commander of Russia's most important military zone--Kiev. In 1909 he was appointed to the post which he has since relinquished, and the amazing rapidity with which Russia mobilized her army in August, 1914, can be accredited to the methods which he instituted. As a writer he is known as "Shpioa" (Spur), and is the biographer of Peter the Great, Frederick the Great, and Murat.

Benckendorff, Count A.: Ambassador to Great Britain. Born in Berlin, August 1, 1849; entered Diplomatic Service, 1869; served at Rome, Vienna; Minister Copenhagen, 1897-1903; Ambassador London, 1903.

Isvolsky, Alexander P.: Ambassador to France; was Russian negotiator of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 regarding Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet.

Swastopoulo: Charge d'Affaires, France.

Swereiev, S. N.: Ambassador to Germany.

Broniersky, A.: Charge d'Affaires, Germany.

Schebeko, N.: Ambassador to Austria-Hungary.

Koudacheff, Prince Nicholas: Charge d'Affaires, Austria-Hungary.

Salviatti, A.: Consul General at Fiume.

Kazansky: Acting Consul General at Prague.

Strandtman: Charge d'Affaires in Serbia.

BELGIUM

Albert: King of the Belgians.

Davignon, M. J.: Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Elst, van der, Baron: Secretary General.

Renkin, J.: Colonial Minister.

Lalaing H. de, Count: Minister to Great Britain. Entered Foreign Office, 1879; served Vienna, Bucharest, Berlin, Hague, London; Minister, Brazil, 1893; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Bucharest, 1898; Berne, 1899; London, 1903.

Guillaume, Baron: Minister to France.

Beyens, Baron: Minister to Germany.

De Dudzeele, Errembault, Count: Minister to Austria-Hungary.

De Welle, Michotte, Baron: Minister to Serbia.

Grenier, A., Baron: Minister to Spain.

Fallon, Baron: Minister to Holland.

SERBIA

Peter Karageorgevitch: King.

Pashitch, Nikola P.: Prime Minister. In 1878, at the age of thirty-two, M. Pashitch entered the Serbian Parliament, and in three years he became leader of the "Old Radicals." Always a champion of liberty, he joined the Zayenchar Mutiny of 1883, and, of twenty-two, he alone escaped execution by flight. Upon his return he was appointed Mayor of Belgrade and in 1893 Minister to Russia, where he made a lasting impression. In 1899 he was again accused of hatching a conspiracy, but Russia served him well and intervention saved him. To him, in no slight degree, does Serbia owe Russia's friendship, and to his efforts has been attributed the Balkan Alliance.

Patchou, Dr. Laza: Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Boschkovitch: Minister to Great Britain.

Vesnitch, M. R.: Minister to France.

Spalaikovitch, Dr. M.: Minister to Russia.

Yovanovitch, Dr. M.: Charge d'Affaires in Germany.

Yovanovitch, Yov. M.: Minister to Austria-Hungary.

Georgevitch, M.: Charge d'Affaires in Turkey.

Michailovitch, Ljub: Minister to Italy.

ITALY

Victor Emmanuel (Vittorio Emanuele) III.: King.

San Giuliano, Antonio di, Marquis: Minister Foreign Affairs. Born Catania, December 10, 1852; Mayor Catania, 1879; member Chamber Deputies, 1882-1904; Senate, 1904; Under-Secretary for Industry and Commerce, 1892-3; Minister Posts and Telegraph, 1899-1900; Minister Foreign Affairs, 1905-6; Ambassador, London, 1906-10; Minister Foreign Affairs, 1910. His opposition to war with Austria precipitated his downfall. Said to be the repository of more European secrets than any European statesman since Bismarck.

D'Avarna, Duke: Ambassador to Austria-Hungary.

Salandra: Premier. Appointed November 5, 1914.

Sonnino, Baron Sidney: Minister Foreign Affairs. Born March 11, 1847; entered Diplomatic Service, 1867; Parliament, 1880; Minister Finance, 1893-4; Treasury, 1894-96; Interior, 1906 and 1909-10; Foreign Affairs, November 5, 1914.

JAPAN

Yoshihito: Emperor.

Shigenobu Okuma, Count: Prime Minister.

Takaaki Kato, Baron: Minister Foreign Affairs.

GERMANY

William (Wilhelm) II.: Kaiser of Germany, King of Prussia.

Bethmann-Hollweg, Dr. Theobald von: Imperial Chancellor. Born November 29, 1856, at Hohenfinow, Brandenburg; entered Civil Service, 1879; Prussian Minister Interior, 1905; Imperial Secretary of State and Vice President of Prussian Council, 1907; Imperial Chancellor, 1909; member of Reichstag since 1890. His actions before the present war seemed to indicate an earnest desire for the peace of Europe; he appeared to oppose the military party and align himself with the moderates. His manner is frank to the point of bluffness.

Jagow, Gottlieb von: Secretary of State. Born June 26, 1863; entered Diplomatic Service, 1895, at Rome; Minister to Rome, 1907; Ambassador, 1908; Minister Foreign Affairs, 1913; credited with postponing the inevitable conflict between Italy and Austria while at Rome.

Zimmerman, von: Under-Secretary of State. Appointed 1911; previously Vice Consul Shanghai; Consul at Tientsin and in Diplomatic Corps.

Lichnowsky, Prince Karl Maximilian: Ambassador to Great Britain. Born 1860; Attache, London, 1885; Counsellor Embassy, Vienna; Foreign Office, Berlin; Ambassador to London, 1912. Member Roman Catholic party. Did all he could to prevent rupture between Great Britain and Germany. Was very popular in England.

Schoen, Baron Wilhelm von: Ambassador to France. Born June 3, 1851; entered Diplomatic Service, 1877; Madrid, Hague, Athens, Berne, Paris, Copenhagen, St. Petersburg; Ambassador, Paris, 1910.

Pourtales, Count Frederic: Ambassador to Russia. Born October 24, 1853; appointed St. Petersburg, 1908.

Tschirschky, Heinrich von: Ambassador to Austria-Hungary. Born August 15, 1858; entered Diplomatic Service, 1873; Constantinople, Vienna, St. Petersburg; Ambassador to Vienna, 1907.

Below Saleske, Konrad von: Minister to Belgium. Born April 18, 1866; Secretary Legation, Athens; Ambassador, Constantinople, 1907.

Storck, von: Secretary Legation in Serbia.

Flotow, Hans von: Ambassador to Italy. Born September 10, 1862; entered Diplomatic Service, 1893; Second Secretary Legation, Washington, Hague, Paris.

Buch, von: Minister to Luxemburg.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Francis Joseph (Franz Josef): Emperor.

Berchtold, Count Leopold: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Born April 18, 1863; saw Diplomatic Service in Paris. London; Ambassador to St. Petersburg, 1906; appointed Secretary of State, 1914; emulated his predecessor, Count d'Herenthal, the annexor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in strong foreign policy.

Macchio, Dr. K., Baron: Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Forgach, Count: Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Diplomatic Service in Belgrade and Dresden.

Tisza, Count Stephen: President of the Ministry of Hungary. Born April 22, 1861; served as President Ministry, 1903-06.

Mensdorff, A.: Ambassador to Great Britain. Born September 5, 1861; Diplomatic Service in Paris, London, St. Petersburg; Secretary Ambassador, London, 1896-1904; Minister Plenipotentiary, 1903-04; Ambassador, 1904.

Szecsen, Count Nicolaus: Ambassador to France.

Szapary, Count Josef: Ambassador to Russia.

Czernin, Count Jaromir: Charge d'Affaires, Russia.

Szogyeny, Count Ladislaus: Ambassador to Germany.

Zehlitschka: Consul General in Turkey.

Clary, S., Count: Minister to Belgium.

Giesl von Gieslingen, Baron: Minister to Serbia.

Hoflehner: Consular Agent at Nish, Serbia.

TURKEY

Mohammed V: Sultan.

Said Halim Pasha, Prince: Grand Vizier.

Tewfik Pasha: Ambassador to Great Britain.

NEUTRAL NATIONS

Loudon: Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Eyschen, Dr.: Minister of State and President of the Government of Luxemburg.

Gerard, James Watson: American Ambassador to Germany.

Penfield, Frederic Courtland: American Ambassador to Austria-Hungary.

Whitlock, Brand: American Minister to Belgium.

* * * * *

It will be convenient for the reader, before entering into the diplomatic history of the war, to have before him the dates of the war marking diplomatic crises.

IMPORTANT DATES PRECEDING THE WAR

June 28, 1914. Assassination of Austrian hereditary Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo, Bosnia.

July 23, 1914. Austria-Hungary hands note to Serbia.

July 24, 1914. Russia proposes extension of time limit in note; decides on mobilization in South Bosnia; and seeks unconditional support of Great Britain in conflict with Austria-Hungary. Great Britain proposes four-power intervention.

July 25, 1914. Austria-Hungary sends memorandum to powers containing _dossier_ of evidence discovered at Sarajevo trial, and declares dispute lies wholly between her and Serbia. Serbia replies to note, having previously ordered mobilization. Austro-Hungarian Legation leaves Belgrade. Germany refuses to enter mediation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, wishing to "localize" the conflict, and proposes mediation of powers between Russia and Austria-Hungary. Russia mobilizes fourteen army corps on Austro-Hungarian frontier. Great Britain asks Austria-Hungary to extend time limit and suspend hostilities pending four-power conference.

July 26, 1914. Russia proposes direct conversations to Austria-Hungary. France and Italy accept four-power conference in London.

July 27, 1914. William II returns from Norway cruise to Potsdam. Austria-Hungary informs Russia she will respect Serbian integrity and independence. Russia agrees to four-power conference if direct negotiations with Austria-Hungary fail.

July 28, 1914. Austria-Hungary breaks off direct negotiations with Russia; refuses four-power mediation; declares war on Serbia, and mobilizes eight army corps. Russia begins partial mobilization. Great Britain asks Germany her plan of mediation between Russia and Austria-Hungary.

July 29, 1914. Germany attempts to secure neutrality of Great Britain in case of Austro-Hungarian and Russian war. Great Britain warns Germany that if France is involved in war she will support her.

July 30, 1914. Austria-Hungary, advised by Germany, agrees to resume negotiations with Russia, but not on basis of Serbian reply. Germany asks Russia's explanation of her mobilization. Russia agrees to stop mobilization if Austria-Hungary respects Serbian sovereignty. After negotiations with Austria-Hungary, Russia orders general mobilization of army and navy. France reminds Great Britain of her naval agreement. Great Britain refuses Germany's proposal that she remain neutral if French territory in Europe is respected, and proposes that Germany occupy Belgrade and force mediation by the powers.

July 31, 1914. Austria-Hungary accepts Anglo-German proposal for four-power mediation on basis of temporary prosecution of military measures against Serbia. Russia agrees to take no military action pending negotiations. Germany refuses to press Austria-Hungary so long as Russia mobilizes; sends ultimatum to Russia and France, and refuses to answer about respecting neutrality of Belgium. France agrees to respect this neutrality.

August 1, 1914. Austria orders general mobilization, but continues discussion with Russia, and gives way on only point remaining at issue. Germany orders general mobilization and declares war on Russia. France orders general mobilization. Great Britain refuses Germany's request to secure French neutrality in Russo-German war, and to remain neutral herself if Germany respect Belgian neutrality. Belgium declares she will uphold neutrality. Italy decides to remain neutral.

August 2, 1914. Great Britain agrees to give naval aid to France in event of German attack. Germany sends ultimatum to Belgium about passage of troops. German troops enter Luxemburg.

August 3, 1914. Germany declares war on France and bids for British neutrality by offering not to attack northern French coast nor use Belgium and Dutch ports as bases. Great Britain refuses offer. Belgium refuses Germany's ultimatum.

August 4, 1914. Germany sends second ultimatum to Belgium, threatening force, and offers Great Britain not to annex Belgian territory. Great Britain demands that Germany respect Belgian neutrality, and in default of reply declares war on Germany.

August 5, 1914. Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia.

August 6, 1914. Montenegro declares war on Austria-Hungary.

August 9, 1914. Serbia declares war on Germany.

August 10, 1914. France declares war on Austria-Hungary.

August 12, 1914. Great Britain declares war on Austria-Hungary.

August 12, 1914. Montenegro declares war on Germany.

August 23, 1914. Japan declares war on Germany.

August 27, 1914. Austria-Hungary declares war on Japan.

August 28, 1914. Austria-Hungary declares war on Belgium.

November 3, 1914. Russia declares war on Turkey.

November 5, 1914. France and Great Britain declare war on Turkey.

May 23, 1915. Italy declares war on Austria-Hungary.

June 3, 1915. San Marino declares war on Austria-Hungary.

August 20, 1915. Italy declares war on Turkey.

October 14, 1915. Bulgaria declares war on Serbia.

October 15, 1915. Great Britain declares war on Bulgaria.

October 19, 1915. Russia and Italy declare war on Bulgaria.

WARNINGS OF HOSTILE INTENTIONS

The first evidence presented before the court of nations was that of France, in regard to the hostile intentions of Germany. To this Germany has made no official answer in the form of documentary evidence, and any inference as to the hostile intentions of France against Germany, if there were any, must be inferred by the reader without any help from cross-examination by the official advocates of Germany. The value of the French evidence must be judged by later events. Have they, or have they not, corroborated the anticipations of France, held for a year before the war, as to an attack upon her by Germany?

On March 17, 1913, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, wrote to M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, transmitting reports by French military and naval attaches in Berlin to their respective French departments on German military affairs, and called his attention to the importance of the documents. Delay, he said, in the publication of the reports was due to lack of funds wherewith to provide for these military measures. The rich classes objected to a forced levy in times of peace, and the Federal states to the Imperial Government adopting direct taxation which had heretofore been reserved to them.

"However this may be, in increasing the strength of the German army the empire desires to leave nothing to chance in the event of a possible crisis.

"The German changes have produced a result unexpected by that country, viz., the proposal of the Government of the [French] Republic to reestablish the three years' service, and the manly determination with which this proposal has been welcomed in France. The surprise occasioned by these proposals of insisting on the absolute necessity of an increase of German military strength; the German proposals are represented as a reply to our own. The reverse is the case, since the immense military effort which France is undertaking is but the consequence of German initiative.

"The Imperial Government is constantly rousing patriotic sentiment. Every day the emperor delights to revive memories of 1813. Yesterday evening a military tattoo went through the streets of Berlin, speeches were delivered in which the present situation was compared to that of a hundred years ago.... It was of course to be expected that national patriotism would be worked up just when fresh sacrifices are being required, but to compare the present time to 1813 is to misuse an historical analogy. If, to-day, there is anything corresponding to the movement which a hundred years ago roused Germans to fight the man of genius who aspired to universal dominion, it is in France that such a counterpart would have to be sought, since the French nation seeks but to protect itself against the domination of force.

"Nevertheless, it is true that the state of public opinion in both countries makes the situation grave."

The first inclosure in M. Cambon's letter was the report of Lieutenant Colonel Serret. He speaks of a "virulent" article in the "Koelnische Zeitung" ("Cologne Gazette") on the menace of France, which, though immediately disavowed by the Government, cannot be disregarded, since its sentiments have been approved by other prominent newspapers, and it appears to express a "real feeling" among the people, a "latent anger." It throws light on the present German armaments.

"For some time now it has been quite a common thing to meet people who declare that the military plans of France are extraordinary and unjustified. In a drawing room a member of the Reichstag who is not a fanatic, speaking of the three years' service in France, went so far as to say: 'It is a provocation; we will not allow it.' More moderate persons, military and civil, glibly voice the opinion that France with her 40,000,000 inhabitants has no right to compete in this way with Germany.

"To sum up, people are angry, and this anger is not caused by the shrieking of certain French papers, to which sober-minded people pay little attention. It is a case of vexation. People are angry at realizing that in spite of the enormous effort made last year, continued and even increased this year, it will probably not be possible this time to outrun France completely.

"To outdistance us, since we neither will nor can be allied with her, is Germany's real aim....

"At the moment when German military strength is on the point of acquiring that final superiority which, should the occasion arise, would force us to submit to humiliation or destruction, France suddenly refuses to abdicate, and shows, as Renan said: 'her eternal power of renaissance and resurrection.' The disgust of Germany can well be understood.

"Of course the Government points to the general situation in Europe and speaks of the 'Slav Peril.' As far as I can see, however, public opinion really seems indifferent to this 'Peril,' and yet it has accepted with a good grace, if not with welcome, the enormous burdens of these two successive laws....

"To sum up, if public opinion does not actually point at France, as does the 'Koelnische Zeitung,' we are in fact, and shall long remain the nation aimed at. Germany considers that for our 40,000,000 of inhabitants our place in the sun is really too large.

"Germans wish for peace--so they keep on proclaiming, and the emperor more than anyone--but they do not understand peace as involving either mutual concessions or a balance of armaments. They want to be feared and they are at present engaged in making the necessary sacrifices. If on some occasion their national vanity is wounded, the confidence which the country will feel in the enormous superiority of its army will be favorable to an explosion of national anger, in the face of which the moderation of the Imperial Government will perhaps be powerless.

"It must be emphasized again that the Government is doing everything to increase patriotic sentiment by celebrating with eclat all the various anniversaries of 1813.

"The trend of public opinion would result in giving a war a more or less national character. By whatever pretext Germany should justify the European conflagration, nothing can prevent the first decisive blows being struck at France."

The second inclosure in M. Cambon's letter is the report of M. de Faramond, Naval Attache. He says that there will be no increase in the German fleet this year, and that the whole military effort will be directed against France.

By October 1, 1914, the imperial army will be increased from 720,000 to 860,000 men, and proposed legislation will place the army corps near the French frontier most nearly on a war footing, in order on the very day of the outbreak of hostilities to attack us suddenly with forces very much stronger than our own. It is absolutely imperative for the Imperial Government to obtain success at the very outset of the operations....

"William II cannot allow a retreat to enter into his calculations, although the German soldier is no longer to-day what he was forty years ago, a plain religious man, ready to die at the order of his king. When it is remembered that at the last elections 4,000,000 votes were cast by the Socialists and that the franchise is only obtained in Germany at the age of twenty-five, it may be presumed that the active army, composed of young men from twenty to twenty-five, must contain in its ranks a considerable proportion of Socialists.

"It would indeed be foolish to think that the German Socialists will throw down their rifles on the day when France and Germany come to blows; but it will be very important that the Imperial Government should persuade them that on the one hand we are the aggressors, and on the other that they can have entire confidence in the direction of the campaign and its final result....

"And it is because a German defeat at the outset would have such an incalculable effect on the empire that we find in all the plans worked out by the general staff proposals for a crushing offensive movement against France.

"In reality the Imperial Government wishes to be in a position to meet all possible eventualities. It is from the direction of France that the danger seems to them greatest....

"In this connection I think it is interesting to quote a conversation which a member of our embassy had the other evening with the old Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck, as it may serve to reflect the opinions which dominate court circles.

"Referring to the new German military proposals Prince Donnersmarck spoke as follows:

"'French people are quite wrong in thinking that we harbor evil designs and want war. But we cannot forget that in 1870 popular opinion forced the French Government to make a foolish attack on us before they were ready. Who can assure us that public opinion, which in France is so easily inflamed, will not force the Government to declare war? It is against this danger that we wish to protect ourselves.'"

The prince, a veteran of the French war, expressed the opinion that Germany would again conquer France in event of another war.

"Frenchmen, who have a great facility for work, are not as punctual as Germans in the fulfillment of their duty. In the coming war that nation will be victorious whose servants from the top of the ladder to the bottom will do their duty with absolute exactitude, however important or small it may be. And Prince Donnersmarck added: 'An exactitude which played so great a role forty years ago in moving an army of 500,000 men will have a far greater importance in the next war, when it will be a question of moving masses far more numerous.'

"In this way the old prince gave expression to the confidence shared by all Germans in the superiority of their military organization."

The attache then discusses German finances.

He mentions particularly the large loans raised by the empire and Prussia: 500,000,000 marks on January 29, 1912, and 350,000,000 marks on March 7, 1913. Quite an important part of these loans must have been applied to military expenses.

"The military law of 1913 will require quite exceptional financial measures.

"According to the indications given by the semiofficial press, the 'nonrecurring' expenditure will amount to a milliard marks, while the 'permanent' annual expenditure resulting from the increase of effectives will exceed 200,000,000 marks.

"It seems certain that the 'nonrecurring' expenditure will be covered by a war contribution levied on capital. Small fortunes would be exempted and those above 20,000 marks would be subject to a progressive tax. Presented in this guise the war tax would not be objected to by the Socialists, who will be able, in accordance with their usual tactics, to reject the principle of the military law and at the same time to pass the votes which assure its being carried into effect."

The attache then discusses a subject already mentioned--the persuasion of the rich and bourgeois classes by the Government to submit to the increased taxation by "noisy celebrations of the centenary of the War of Independence" in order to convince them of the necessity of sacrifice, and to remind them that France is to-day, as 100 years ago, their hereditary enemy.

"If it is established that the German Government are doing their utmost to secure that the payment of this enormous tax should be made in full, and not by way of installment, and if, as some of the newspapers say, the whole payment is to be complete before July 1, 1914, these facts have a formidable significance for us, for nothing can explain such haste on the part of the military authorities to obtain war treasure in cash to the amount of a milliard."

On April 2, 1913, M. Etienne, French Minister of War, wrote to M. Jonnart, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, enclosing a German official secret report concerning strengthening of the army. This report is interesting in that it mentions knowledge that, as a result of her entente with France and Russia, Great Britain was prepared to send an expeditionary force of 100,000 to the Continent, and confesses that Germany refrained from declaring war on France at the time of the Agadir incident because of "the progress made by the French army, the moral recovery of the nation, and the technical advance in the realm of aviation and of machine guns."

"Public opinion is being prepared for a new increase in the active army, which would ensure Germany an honorable peace and the possibility of properly ensuring her influence in the affairs of the world. The new army law and the supplementary law which should follow will enable her almost completely to attain this end....

"Neither ridiculous shriekings for revenge by French chauvinists, nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of the Slavs will turn us from our aim of protecting and extending _Deutschtum_ (German influence) all the world over.

"The French may arm as much as they wish, they cannot in one day increase their population. The employment of an army of black men in the theatre of European operations will remain for a long time a dream, and in any case be devoid of beauty.

"Our new army law is only an extension of the military education of the German nation. Our ancestors of 1813 made greater sacrifices. It is our sacred duty to sharpen the sword that has been put into our hands and to hold it ready for defense as well as for offense. _We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of the French._ We must accustom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity, in order to combat the provocations of our adversaries. We must act with prudence so as not to arouse suspicion, and to avoid the crises which might injure our economic existence. We must so manage matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak (_Losschlagen_) should be considered as a relief, because after it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We must prepare for war from the financial point of view; there is much to be done in this direction. We must not arouse the distrust of our financiers, but there are many things which cannot be concealed.

"We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand we must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is a means of keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that we should open up relations, by means of well-chosen agents, with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, in order to prepare the measures which would be necessary in the case of a European war. Of course in case of war we should openly recognize these secret allies; and on the conclusion of peace we should secure to them the advantages which they had gained. These aims are capable of realization. The first attempt which was made some years ago opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately these relations were not sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like it or not it will be necessary to resort to preparations of this kind, in order to bring a campaign rapidly to a conclusion.

"Risings provoked in time of war by political agents need to be carefully prepared and by material means. They must break out simultaneously with the destruction of the means of communication; they must have a controlling head to be found among the influential leaders, religious or political. The Egyptian School is particularly suited to this purpose; more and more it serves as a bond between the intellectuals of the Mohammedan world.

"However this may be, we must be strong in order to annihilate at one powerful swoop our enemies in the east and west. But in the next European war it will also be necessary that the small states should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain conditions their armies and their fortified places can be rapidly conquered or neutralized; this would probably be the case with Belgium and Holland, so as to prevent our enemy in the west from gaining territory which they could use as a base of operations against our flank. In the north we have nothing to fear from Denmark or Scandinavia, especially as in any event we shall provide for the concentration of a strong northern army, capable of replying to any menace from this direction. In the most unfavorable case, Denmark might be forced by Great Britain to abandon her neutrality; but by this time the decision would already have been reached both on land and on sea. Our northern army, the strength of which could be largely increased by Dutch formations, would oppose a very active defense to any offensive measures from this quarter.

"In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against France, and thus protecting our flank.

"As was stated above, the situation with regard to the small states on our northwestern frontier cannot be viewed in quite the same light. This will be a vital question for us, and our aim must be to take the offensive with a large superiority from the first days. For this purpose it will be necessary to concentrate a large army, followed up by strong Landwehr formations, which will induce the small states to follow us or at least to remain inactive in the theatre of operations, and which would crush them in the event of armed resistance. If we could induce these states to organize their system of fortification in such a manner as to constitute an effective protection for our flank we could abandon the proposed invasion. But for this, army reorganization, particularly in Belgium, would be necessary in order that it might really guarantee an effective resistance. If, on the contrary, their defensive organization was established against us, thus giving definite advantages to our adversary in the West, we could in no circumstances offer Belgium a guaranty for the security of her neutrality. Accordingly, a vast field is open to our diplomacy to work in this country on the lines of our interests.

"The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after the complete concentration of the army of the Lower Rhine. An ultimatum with a short-time limit, to be followed immediately by invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for our action in international law.

"Such are the duties which devolve on our army and which demand a striking force of considerable numbers. If the enemy attacks us, or if we wish to overcome him, we will act as our brothers did a hundred years ago; the eagle thus provoked will soar in his flight, will seize the enemy in his steel claws and render him harmless. We will then remember that the provinces of the ancient German Empire, the County of Burgundy and a large part of Lorraine, are still in the hands of the French; that thousands of brother Germans in the Baltic provinces are groaning under the Slav yoke. It is a national question that Germany's former possessions should be restored to her."

REPORT OF M. CAMBON IN 1913

On May 6, 1913, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, wrote to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, giving an account of an interview with the German Secretary of State, Herr von Jagow, concerning the conference of ambassadors in London on May 5th, and the results there obtained. It was agreed by Cambon and Von Jagow that the immediate crisis was over. Cambon submitted proofs of the anxiety of the German Government over the crisis.

"1. Von Jagow had questioned a colleague of Cambon about Russia's situation in the Far East, whether there was cause for Russia to fear difficulties in that quarter which would cause her to retain troops there. The ambassador answered him that he knew of absolutely no trouble in the Far East, and that Russia had her hands free for Europe.

"2. The mobilization of the German army is not restricted to the recall of reservists to their barracks. There is in Germany a preliminary measure which we have not got, and which consists in warning officers and men of the reserve to hold themselves ready for the call, in order that they may make the necessary arrangements. It is a general call to 'attention' and it requires an incredible spirit of submission, discipline, and secrecy such as exists in this country, to make a step of this kind possible. If such a warning were given in France, a thrill would run through the whole country, and it would be in the papers the next day....

"The intention of the General Staff is to act by surprise. 'We must put on one side,' said General von Moltke, 'all commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor. When war has become necessary it is essential to carry it on in such a way as to place all the chances in one's own favor. Success alone justifies war. Germany cannot and ought not to leave Russia time to mobilize, for she would then be obliged to maintain on her eastern frontier so large an army that she would be placed in a position of equality, if not of inferiority, to that of France. Accordingly,' added the general, 'we must anticipate our principal adversary as soon as there are nine chances to one of going to war, and begin it without delay in order ruthlessly to crush all resistance.'

"This represents exactly the attitude of military circles and it corresponds to that of political circles; the latter, however, do not consider Russia, in contradistinction to us, as a necessary enemy....

"From these events the following conclusions may be drawn ... these people are not afraid of war, they fully accept its possibility and they have consequently taken the necessary steps. _They wish to be always ready._

"As I said, this demands qualities of secrecy, discipline and of persistence; enthusiasm alone is not sufficient. This lesson may form a useful subject of meditation when the Government of the [French] Republic ask Parliament for the means of strengthening the defenses of the country."

On July 30, 1913, M. Pichon, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, made an official report on the state of German public opinion, as derived from French diplomatic and consular agents. It said that:

"1. The treaty of November 4, 1912, is considered a disappointment for Germany.

"2. France--a new France--undreamed of prior to the summer of 1911, is considered ... to want war.

"Members of all the parties in the Reichstag, from the Conservatives to the Socialists [and of all classes of the people] are unanimous on these two points, with very slight differences corresponding to their position in society or their political party. Here is a synthesis of all these opinions:

"The treaty of November 4 is a diplomatic defeat, a proof of the incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the Government (so often denounced), a proof that the future of the empire is not safe without a new Bismarck; it is a national humiliation, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German prestige, all the more serious because up to 1911 the military supremacy of Germany was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the powerlessness of the Republic were a sort of German dogma....

"And the attitude of France, her calmness, her reborn spiritual unity, her resolution to make good her rights right up to the end, the fact that she has the audacity not to be afraid of war, these things are the most persistent and the gravest cause of anxiety and bad temper on the part of German public opinion....

"German public opinion is divided into two currents on the question of the possibility and proximity of war.

"There are in the country forces making for peace, but they are unorganized and have no popular leaders. They consider that war would be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride, Prussian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armor plate would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war would profit Great Britain.

"The forces consist of the following elements:

"The bulk of the workmen, artisans, and peasants, who are peace loving by instinct.

"Those members of the nobility detached from military interests and engaged in business, such as the _grands seigneurs_ of Silesia and a few other personages very influential at court who are sufficiently enlightened to realize the disastrous political and social consequences of war, even if successful.

"Numerous manufacturers, merchants and financiers in a moderate way of business, to whom war, even if successful, would mean bankruptcy, because their enterprises depend on credit, and are chiefly supported by foreign capital.

"Poles, inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, and Schleswig-Holstein--conquered, but not assimilated and suddenly hostile to Prussian policy. There are about 7,000,000 of these annexed Germans.

"Finally, the governments and the governing classes in the large southern states--Saxony, Bavaria, Wuerttemburg, and the Grand Duchy of Baden--are divided by these two opinions: an unsuccessful war would compromise the Federation from which they have derived great economic advantages; a successful war would profit only Prussia and Prussianization, against which they have difficulty in defending their political independence and administrative autonomy.

"These classes of people either consciously or instinctively prefer peace to war; but they are only a sort of makeweight in political matters, with limited influence on public opinion, or they are silent social forces, passive, and defenseless against the infection of a wave of warlike feeling.

"An example will make this idea clear: The 110 Socialist members of the Reichstag are in favor of peace. They would be unable to prevent war, for war does not depend upon a vote of the Reichstag, and in the presence of such an eventuality the greater part of their number would join the rest of the country in a chorus of angry excitement and enthusiasm.

"Finally it must be observed that these supporters of peace believe in war in the mass because they do not see any other solution for the present situation. In certain contracts, especially in publishers' contracts, a clause has been introduced cancelling the contract in the case of war. They hope, however, that the will of the emperor on the one side, France's difficulties in Morocco on the other, will be for some time a guaranty of peace. Be that as it may, their pessimism gives free play to those who favor war....

"On the other hand there is a war party with leaders and followers, a press either convinced or subsidized for the purpose of creating public opinion; it has means both varied and formidable for the intimidation of the Government. It goes to work in the country with clear ideas, burning aspirations, and a determination that is at once thrilling and fixed.

"Those in favor of war are divided into several categories; each of these derives from its social caste, its class, its intellectual and moral education, its interests, its hates, special arguments which create a general attitude of mind and increase the strength and rapidity of the stream of warlike desire.

"Some want war because in the present circumstances they think it is _inevitable_. And, as far as Germany is concerned, the sooner the better.

"Others regard war as necessary for economic reasons based on overpopulation, overproduction, the need for markets and outlets; or for social reasons, i. e., to provide the outside interests that alone can prevent or retard the rise to power of the democratic and socialist masses.

"Others, uneasy for the safety of the empire, and believing that time is on the side of France, think that events should be brought to an immediate head. It is not unusual to meet, in the course of conversation or in the pages of patriotic pamphlets, the vague but deeply rooted conviction that a free Germany and a regenerated France are two historical facts mutually incompatible.

"Others are bellicose from 'Bismarckism,' as it may be termed. They feel themselves humiliated at having to enter into discussions with France, at being obliged to talk in terms of law and right in negotiations and conferences where they have not always found it easy to get right on their side, even when they have a preponderating force. From their still recent past they derive a sense of pride ever fed by personal memories of former exploits, by oral traditions, and by books, and irritated by the events of recent years. Angry disappointment is the unifying force of the _Wehrvereine_ [defense leagues] and other associations of Young Germany.

"Others again want war from a mystic hatred of revolutionary France; others, finally, from a feeling of rancor. These last the people who heap up pretexts for war.

"Coming to actual facts, these feelings take concrete form as follows: The country squires, represented in the Reichstag by the Conservative party, want at all costs to escape the death duties, which are bound to come if peace continues. In the last sitting of the session which has just closed the Reichstag agreed to these duties in principle. It is a serious attack on the interests and privileges of the landed gentry. On the other hand, this aristocracy is military in character, and it is instructive to compare the Army List with the Year Book of the nobility. War alone can prolong its prestige and support its family interest. During the discussions on the Army Bill a Conservative speaker put forward the need for promotion among officers as an argument in its favor. Finally this social class, which forms a hierarchy with the King of Prussia as its supreme head, realizes with dread the democratization of Germany and the increasing power of the Socialist party, and considers its own days numbered. Not only does a formidable movement hostile to agrarian protection threaten its material interests, but in addition the number of its political representatives decreases with each legislative period. In the Reichstag of 1878, out of 397 members, 162 belonged to the aristocracy; in 1898, 83; in 1912, 57. Out of this number 27 alone belong to the Right, 14 to the Center, 7 to the Left, and 1 sits among the Socialists.

"The higher bourgeoisie, represented by the National Liberal party, the party of the contented spirits, have not the same reasons as the squires for wanting war. With a few exceptions, however, they are bellicose. They have their reasons, social in character.

"The higher bourgeoisie is no less troubled than the aristocracy at the democratization of Germany. In 1871 they had 125 members in the Reichstag; in 1874, 55; in 1887, 99; in 1912, 45. They do not forget that in the years succeeding the war they played the leading role in Parliament, helping Bismarck in his schemes against the country squires. Uneasily balanced to-day between Conservative instincts and Liberal ideas they look to war to settle problems which their parliamentary representatives are painfully incapable of solving. In addition, doctrinaire manufacturers declare that the difficulties between themselves and their workmen originate in France, the home of revolutionary ideas of freedom--without France industrial unrest would be unknown.

"Lastly, there are the manufacturers of guns and armor plate, big merchants who demand bigger markets, bankers who are speculating on the coming of the golden age and the next war indemnity--all these regard war as good business.

"Among the 'Bismarckians' must be reckoned officials of all kinds, represented fairly closely in the Reichstag by the Free Conservatives or Imperial party. This is the party of the 'pensioned,' whose impetuous sentiments are poured out in the 'Post.' They find disciples and political sympathizers in the various groups of young men whose minds have been trained and formed in the public schools and universities.

"The universities, if we except a few distinguished spirits, develop a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by statistics Germany's need for a colonial and commercial empire commensurate with the industrial output of the empire. There are sociological fanatics who go even further. The armed peace, so they say, is a crushing burden on the nations; it checks improvement in the lot of the masses and assists the growth of Socialism. France, by clinging obstinately to her desire for revenge, opposes disarmament. Once for all she must be reduced for a century to a state of impotence; that is the best and speediest way of solving the social problem.

"Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers, and other apologists of German _Kultur_ wish to impose upon the world a way of thinking and feeling specifically German. They wish to wrest from France that intellectual supremacy which, according to the clearest thinkers, is still her possession. From this source is derived the phraseology of the Pan-Germans and the ideas and adherents of the _Kriegsvereine_ [war leagues], _Wehrvereine_, and other similar associations too well known to need particular description. It is enough to note that the dissatisfaction caused by the treaty of November 4 has considerably swelled the membership of colonial societies.

"We come finally to those whose support of the war policy is inspired by rancor and resentment. These are the most dangerous. They are recruited chiefly among diplomatists. German diplomatists are now in very bad odor in public opinion. The most bitter are those who since 1905 have been engaged in the negotiations between France and Germany; they are heaping together and reckoning up their grievances against us, and one day they will present their accounts in the war press....

"During the discussion on the Army Bill one of these warlike diplomatists exclaimed: 'Germany will not be able to have any serious conversation with France until she has every sound man under arms.'

"In what terms will this conversation be couched? The opinion is fairly widely spread, even in Pan-German circles, that Germany will not declare war in view of the system of defensive alliances and the tendencies of the emperor. But when the moment comes she will have to try in every possible way to force France to attack her. Offense will be given if necessary. That is the Prussian tradition.

"Must war, then, be considered as inevitable?

"It is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk if France can make it clear to the world that the _Entente Cordiale_ and the Russian alliance are not mere diplomatic fictions but realities which exist and will make themselves felt. The British fleet inspires a wholesome terror. It is well known, however, that victory on sea will leave everything in suspense. On land alone can a decisive issue be obtained.

"As for Russia, even though she carries greater weight in political and military circles than was the case three or four years ago, it is not believed that her cooperation will be sufficiently rapid and energetic to be effective.

"People's minds are thus getting used to consider the next war as a duel between France and Germany."

On November 22, 1913, M. Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, reported to M. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, an account of a recent conversation between the Kaiser and the King of the Belgians in the presence of General von Moltke, Chief of the General German Staff, which gravely impressed King Albert. It showed that German enmity against France was increasing, and that the Kaiser had ceased to be the friend of peace. The Kaiser had come to believe that war with France was inevitable; and, when it did come, that German success was certain. General von Moltke strengthened his sovereign in these opinions:

"This time the matter must be settled, and your majesty can have no conception of the irresistible enthusiasm with which the whole German people will be carried away when that day comes.

"The king of the Belgians protested that it was a travesty of the intentions of the French Government to interpret them in that sense, and to let oneself be misled as to the sentiments of the French nation by the ebullitions of a few irresponsible spirits or the intrigues of unscrupulous agitators.

"The emperor and his chief of the General Staff nevertheless persisted in their point of view.

"During the course of this conversation the emperor seemed overstrained and irritable. As William II advances in years, family traditions, the reactionary tendencies of the court, and especially the impatience of the soldiers, obtain a greater empire over his mind. Perhaps he feels some slight jealousy of the popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of the Pan-Germans and who does not regard the position occupied by the empire in the world as commensurate with its power. Perhaps the reply of France to the last increase of the Germany army, the object of which was to establish the incontestable supremacy of Germany is, to a certain extent, responsible for his bitterness, for, whatever may be said, it is realized that Germany cannot go much further.

"One may well ponder over the significance of this conversation. The emperor and his chief of the General Staff may have wished to impress the king of the Belgians and induce him not to make any opposition in the event of a conflict between us....

"The Emperor William is less master of his impatience than is usually supposed. I have known him more than once to allow his real thoughts escape him....

"If I may be allowed to draw a conclusion I would submit that it would be well to take account of this new factor, namely, that the emperor is becoming used to an order of ideas which were formerly repugnant to him, and that, to borrow from him a phrase which he likes to use, 'we must keep our powder dry.'"

[See also letter of M. Allize, French Minister at Munich, of July 10, 1914, in pages following.]

The next evidence presented before the court of the world is that by Serbia and her witnesses, the nations thus far, to all appearances, interested solely in maintaining the peace of Europe, as to Serbia's non-responsibility for the assassination of the hereditary Archduke of Austria at Sarajevo, Bosnia, on June 28, 1914, and as to her sincere desire to do all she could, short of impairing her sovereignty and suffering national humiliation; and that by Austria-Hungary and the same witnesses that were brought forward by Serbia as to Serbia's complicity in the assassination, and to Austria-Hungary's right to fix this, and to exact guaranties that Serbia should not in the future prosecute her evil designs against Austria-Hungary.

THE ASSASSINATION OF THE AUSTRIAN ARCHDUKE

On June 28, 1914, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, reported to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, the assassination that day of the hereditary Archduke of Austria and his wife at Sarajevo, Bosnia.

On June 29, 1914, Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, telegraphed to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade, that the Vienna press asserted that magisterial inquiry had already shown that the Sarajevo outrage was prepared at Belgrade; that the whole conspiracy in its wider issues was organized there among youths inspired with the great Serbian idea; and that the Belgrade press was exciting public opinion by articles about the intolerable conditions in Bosnia, papers containing which were being smuggled in large quantities into Bosnia.

On the same day, June 29, 1914, Ritter von Storck, Secretary of the German Legation at Belgrade, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, Baron Giesl von Gieslingen being absent from his post on leave, reported to Count Berchtold, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Vienna, the following facts:

"Yesterday the anniversary of the battle of the Amselfeld was celebrated with greater ceremony than usual, and there were celebrations in honor of the Serbian patriot, Milos Obilic, who in 1389 with two companions treacherously stabbed the victorious Murad.

"Among all Serbians, Obilic is regarded as the national hero. In place of the Turks, however, we are now looked on as the hereditary enemy, thanks to the propaganda which has been nourished under the aegis of the royal Government and the agitation which for many years has been carried on in the press.

"A repetition of the drama on the field of Kossovo seems, therefore, to have hovered before the minds of the three young criminals of Sarajevo, Princip, Cabrinovic, and the third person still unknown, who also threw a bomb. They also shot down an innocent woman and may, therefore, think that they have surpassed their model.

"For many years hatred against the [Dual] Monarchy has been sown in Serbia. The crop has sprung up and the harvest is murder.

"The news arrived at about five o'clock; the Serbian Government at about ten o'clock caused the Obilic festivities to be officially stopped. They continued, however, unofficially for a considerable time after it was dark. The accounts of eye-witnesses say that people fell into one another's arms in delight, and remarks were heard such as: 'It serves them right; we have been expecting this for a long time,' or 'This is revenge for the annexation [of Bosnia].'"

On the following day (June 30, 1914), M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, warned M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, by telegraph, that the tendency in Vienna was becoming more and more apparent to represent, in the eyes of Europe, the assassination as the act of a conspiracy engineered in Serbia.

The idea was to use this as a political weapon against Serbia. Great attention should therefore be paid to the tone of the Serbian press.

On the same day (June 30, 1914), Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Charge d'Affaires in Berlin, in two telegrams informed M. Pashitch that the Berlin press was misleading German public opinion on the outrage; that German hostility toward Serbia was growing, being fostered by false reports from Vienna and Budapest, which were diligently spread in spite of contradictions by some newspapers and news agencies.

On the same day (June 30, 1914), M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, reported to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, a conversation he had held, in the absence of Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with Baron Macchia, Under-Secretary of the Foreign Department. In this the Serbian Minister adopted the following line of argument:

"The Royal Serbian Government condemn most energetically the Sarajevo outrage and on their part will certainly most loyally do everything to prove that they will not tolerate within their territory the fostering of any agitation or illegal proceedings calculated to disturb our already delicate relations with Austria-Hungary. I am of opinion that the Government are prepared also to submit to trial any persons implicated in the plot in the event of its being proved that there are any in Serbia. The Royal Serbian Government, notwithstanding all the obstacles hitherto placed in their way by Austro-Hungarian diplomacy (creation of an independent Albania, opposition to Serbian access to the Adriatic, demand for revision of the Treaty of Bucharest, the September ultimatum, etc.) remained loyal in their desire to establish a sound basis for our good neighborly relations. You know that in this direction something has been done and achieved. Serbia intends to continue to work for this object, convinced that it is practicable and ought to be continued. The Sarajevo outrage ought not to and cannot stultify this work."

M. Yovanovitch said that he had communicated the substance of this conversation to the French and Russian Ambassadors.

On the same day (June 30, 1914), the Serbian Prime Minister received from M. Georgevitch, Serbian Charge d'Affaires at Constantinople, the information that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador there had told him that, in recent conversations, Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Prime Minister and Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had expressed himself as satisfied with the attitude of the Serbian Government, and desired friendly relations with it.

On the same day (June 30, 1914), Herr von Storck, Secretary of the German Legation at Belgrade, telegraphed to Count Berchtold that he had asked Herr Gruic, General Secretary of the Serbian Foreign Office, what measures the Royal Serbian police had taken, or proposed to take, to follow up clues to the crime which notoriously were partly to be found in Serbia, and that the reply was that the matter had not yet engaged the attention of the police.

On July 1, 1914, M. Pashitch, Serbian Prime Minister was informed by telegraph from the Serbian Minister in London, M. S. Boschkovitch, that, basing their conclusion on Austrian reports, the English press attributed the Sarajevo outrages to Serbian revolutionaries. He was informed by telegraph on the same day, by M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, of popular hostile demonstrations in front of the Serbian Legation, which were quelled by the police. A Serbian flag was said to have been burned.

"Hatred against Serbians and Serbia is being spread among the people, especially by the lower Catholic circles, the Vienna press, and military circles. Please do what is possible to prevent demonstrations taking place in Serbia, and to induce the Belgrade press to be as moderate as possible in tone.... It is expected that decision as to the attitude to be adopted toward Serbia and the Serbians will be taken after the funeral [of the archduke]."

Thereupon, on the same day (July 1, 1914), M. Pashitch warned all the Serbian legations at foreign courts of the evident purpose of the Austrian and Hungarian press to take political advantage of the act of a "young and ill-balanced fanatic." All ranks of Serbian society, official and unofficial, he said, condemned the act, recognizing that it would be most prejudicial not only to good relations with Austria-Hungary, but to their coreligionists in that country.

"At a moment when Serbia is doing everything in her power to improve her relations with the neighboring monarchy it is absurd to think that Serbia could have directly or indirectly inspired acts of this kind. On the contrary, it was of the greatest interest to Serbia to prevent the perpetration of this outrage. Unfortunately this did not lie within Serbia's power, as both assassins are Austrian subjects. Hitherto Serbia has been careful to suppress anarchic elements, and after recent events she will redouble her vigilance, and in the event of such elements existing within her borders will take the severest measures against them. Moreover, Serbia will do everything in her power and use all the means at her disposal in order to restrain the feelings of ill-balanced people within her frontiers. But Serbia can on no account permit the Vienna and Hungarian press to mislead European public opinion and lay the heavy responsibility for a crime committed by an Austrian subject at the door of the whole Serbian nation and on Serbia, who can suffer only harm from such acts....

"Please ... use all available channels in order to put an end as soon as possible to the anti-Serbian campaign in the European press."

On the same day (July 1, 1914), Herr Jehlitschka, Austrian Consul General to Turkey, wrote from Uskub, in European Turkey, to Count Berchtold, Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna, of the actions at Prestina on the 525th anniversary of the battle of the Amselfeld (1389), for the first time officially celebrated as the "Festival of the Liberation" of the Serbian nation, and carefully prepared to make it an especially solemn and magnificent demonstration of Serbian nationality.

"The propaganda connected with this at the same time extended to Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia, but especially to Hungary; those who took part in it received free passes on the Serbian state railways; food and lodging at low prices, maintenance by public bodies, etc., were promised....

"The various speeches ... dealt ... with the well-known theme of the union of all Serbia and the 'liberation of our brethren in bondage' beyond the Danube and the Save, even as far as Bosnia and Dalmatia.

"When, during the course of the evening, the news of the horrible crime of which Sarajevo had been the scene was circulated, the feeling which animated the fanatical crowd was, to judge by the numerous expressions of applause reported to me by authorities in whom I have absolute confidence, one that I can only characterize as inhuman.

"In view of this attitude of the population, which was also displayed at Uskub, all attempts of the Serbian press to divest Serbia of the moral responsibility for a deed which was received by a representative gathering with such unvarnished satisfaction collapse miserably."

On July 2, 1914, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, reported to M. Viviani, Prime Minister in Paris, the resentment against Serbia in Austrian military circles and by those persons opposed to Serbia's maintenance of the position she had acquired in the Balkans. If the Serbian Government refused as intolerable to its dignity the demand of Austria-Hungary that the Serbian Government investigate into the origin of the archduke's assassination, he feared that this would furnish Austria-Hungary a ground for resort to military measures.

On the same day (July 2, 1914), Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Serbian Minister at Paris, telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that the French Government advised Serbia to remain calm, in official circles as well as in public opinion.

On July 3, 1914, M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, sent two reports to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, the first containing an account of a mob which gathered before the Serbian Legation on July 2, on account of his having hoisted the national flag at half-mast as a sign of mourning; the bodies of the victims of the Sarajevo tragedy having been brought that day to the Austrian capital. The police dispersed the mob. The papers of July 3, under the heading of "Provocation by the Serbian Minister," falsely described the incident. The minister mentioned by name leading instigators of attacks in the Austrian and German press on Serbia as haranguing the crowd. In the second letter he reported a conversation he had had with Baron Macchio, Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in which the Baron severely censured the Belgrade press for its antimonarchical propaganda, and, implicitly, the Serbian Government for not controlling the press. The Serbian Minister had replied that the press was free, and that there was no means of curbing it except by going to law; and, in rejoinder, he censured the Austro-Hungarian Government, which could control the press of its empire, for permitting it shamefully to attack Serbia by accusing the whole nation of being an accomplice in the Sarajevo crime. Baron Macchio had replied: "We accuse only those who encourage the Great Serbian scheme, and work for the realization of its object." Yovanovitch had rejoined that, till the assassination, Bosnia Serbs had been uniformly called "Bosniaks," yet the assassin was now described as "a Serb," and no mention was made that he was a Bosnian and an Austrian subject. This was evidently to cast odium upon Serbia.

On July 4, 1914, Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Serbian Minister at Paris, reported to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, a recent conversation with M. Viviani, the new French Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the Sarajevo incident.

"I described to him briefly the causes which had led to the outrage and which were to be found, in the first place, in the irksome system of Government in force in the annexed provinces, and especially in the attitude of the officials, as well as in the whole policy of the monarchy toward anything orthodox. He understood the situation, but at the same time expressed the hope that we should preserve an attitude of calm and dignity in order to avoid giving cause for fresh accusations in Vienna.

"After the first moment of excitement public opinion here has quieted down to such an extent that the minister-president himself considered it advisable in the Palais de Bourbon to soften the expressions used in the statement which he had made earlier on the subject in the Senate."

On the same day (July 4, 1914), Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Serbian Minister at Petrograd,[1] telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonof, had expressed his opinion that the outrages upon the Serbs in Bosnia would increase the sympathy of Europe for Serbia; that the accusations made in Vienna would not obtain credence and that therefore Serbia should remain calm.

[Footnote 1: Although the name St. Petersburg was not changed officially to Petrograd until after the outbreak of the war, the latter name is used uniformly in the Serbian Blue Book and Russian Orange Book.]

On the same day (July 4, 1914), Count Szecsen, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Paris, telegraphed to Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Vienna, that, in officially thanking M. Poincare for his sympathy over the Sarajevo tragedy, the President had excused the hostile demonstrations against Serbia by citing those against all Italians in France after the assassination of President Carnot.

"I drew his attention to the fact that that crime had no connection with any anti-French agitation in Italy, while in the present case it must be admitted that for years past there has been an agitation in Serbia against the [Dual] Monarchy fomented by every means, legitimate and illegitimate.

"In conclusion, M. Poincare expressed his conviction that the Serbian Government would meet us with the greatest willingness in the judicial investigation and the prosecution of the accomplices. No state could divest itself of this duty."

On the same day (July 4, 1914), M. de Manneville, French Charge d'Affaires at Berlin, reported to M. Viviani, President of the Council in Paris, a conversation with Herr von Zimmermann, German Under-Secretary of State, in which von Zimmermann had expressed the hope that Serbia would satisfy Austria's demands with regard to the investigation and prosecution of the accomplices in the crime of Sarajevo. Otherwise she would be condemned by the whole civilized world.

"The German Government do not then appear to share the anxiety which is shown by a part of the German press as to possible tension in the relations between the Governments of Vienna and Belgrade, or at least they do not wish to seem to do so."

Two days later (July 6, 1914), M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reported to M. Viviani, Prime Minister at Paris, a recent interview which M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, had had with Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Charge d'Affaires at the request of the latter. The Count intimated that the Austro-Hungarian Government would perhaps be compelled to search for the instigators of the crime of Sarajevo on Serbian soil. M. Sazonof interjected:

"No country has had to suffer more than Russia from crimes prepared on foreign territory. Have we ever claimed to employ in any country whatsoever the procedure with which your papers threaten Serbia? Do not embark on such a course."

On the same day (July 6, 1914), M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that the excitement in military and government circles against Serbia was growing, owing to the tone of the press, which was diligently exploited by the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade. On the same date he informed the Prime Minister in detail of the press agitation against Serbia. By headlines the people were led to infer, on the date of the crime of Sarajevo, that the two perpetrators were Serbs from Serbia proper. In later reports there was a marked tendency to connect the crime with Serbia. Belgrade was indicated as the place of its origin by the visit to that capital of the assassins, and by the bombs originating there, which facts had been elucidated at the trial of the assassins in Sarajevo. The Hungarian press claimed that there was evidence to show:

"1. That the perpetrators while in Belgrade associated with the _comitadji_ [revolutionist] Mihaylo Ciganovitch; and (2) that the organizer and instigator of the outrage was Major Pribitchevitch....

"Further ... the latest announcement which the Hungarian _Korrespondenzbureau_ made to the newspapers stated:

"'The inquiries made up to the present prove conclusively that this outrage is the work of a conspiracy. Besides the two perpetrators, a large number of persons have been arrested, mostly young men, who are also, like the perpetrators, proved to have been employed by the Belgrade Narodna Odbrana in order to commit the outrage, and who were supplied in Belgrade with bombs and revolvers.' [This item was later recalled.]

"At the same time the Vienna _Korrespondenzbureau_ published the following official statement:

"'We learn from authoritative quarters that the inquiries relating to the outrage are being kept absolutely secret. All the details, therefore, which have appeared in the public press should be accepted with reserve.'

"Nevertheless the Budapest newspapers continued to publish alleged reports on the inquiry. In the last 'report' of the Budapest newspaper 'A Nap,' which was reprinted in yesterday's Vienna papers, the tendency to lay the responsibility for the outrage on the Narodna Odbrana is still further emphasized. According to this report the accused Gabrinovitch had stated that General Yankovitch is the chief instigator of the outrage."

On the same day Herr Hoflehner, Austro-Hungarian Consular Agent at Nish, Serbia, wrote to Count Berchtold, Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna, of the satisfaction and even joy expressed, especially in the leading circles, over the crime at Sarajevo.

On the next day (July 7, 1914), M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, wrote to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that, though Emperor Francis Joseph had appealed to the Prime Ministers of Austria (Count Berchtold) and of Hungary (Count Tisza), and to the Minister of Finance (Herr Bilinski) for calmness, it was impossible to tell what attitude toward Serbia the Government would take.

"For them one thing is obvious; whether it is proved or not that the outrage has been inspired and prepared at Belgrade, they must sooner or later solve the question of the so-called Great Serbian agitation within the Hapsburg Monarchy. In what manner they will do this and what means they will employ to that end has not as yet been decided; this is being discussed especially in high Catholic and military circles. The ultimate decision will be taken only after it has been definitely ascertained what the inquiry at Sarajevo has brought to light....

"Austria-Hungary has to choose one of the following courses: either to regard the Sarajevo outrage as a national misfortune and a crime which ought to be dealt with in accordance with the evidence obtained, in which case Serbia's cooperation ... will be requested in order to prevent the perpetrators escaping the extreme penalty; or, to treat the Sarajevo outrage as a Pan-Serbian, South-Slav, and Pan-Slav conspiracy with every manifestation of the hatred, hitherto repressed, against Slavdom. There are many indications that influential circles are being urged to adopt the latter course: it is, therefore, advisable to be ready for defense. Should the former and wiser course be adopted, we should do all we can to meet Austrian wishes in this respect."

On July 9, 1914, M. Pashitch telegraphed to all the foreign Serbian Legations that the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince Alexander was receiving daily threatening letters from Austro-Hungarians, and that they should make use of this information with other foreign ministers and journalists.

On July 10, 1914, M. Allize, French Minister In Munich, wrote to M. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, that the Bavarians were asking the object of the new German armaments.

"Recognizing that no one threatens Germany, they consider that German diplomacy had already at its disposal forces sufficiently large and alliances sufficiently powerful to protect German interests with success."

Nevertheless, public opinion will support the Imperial Government in any enterprise in which they might energetically embark, even at the risk of conflict.

"The state of war to which all the events in the East have accustomed people's minds for the last two years appears no longer like some distant catastrophe, but as a solution of the political and economic difficulties which will continue to increase."

On July 11, 1914, M. d'Apchier-le-Maugin, French Consul General at Budapest, reported to M. Vivian, Prime Minister at Paris, that Count Tisza, Hungarian Prime Minister, had refused to make to the Hungarian Chamber any disclosures on the Sarajevo incident until the judicial inquiry was closed. The chamber approved.

"He did not give any indication whether the project of a _demarche_ [proceeding] at Belgrade, with which all the papers of both hemispheres are full, would be followed up."

The virulence of the Hungarian press has diminished, and the papers are unanimous in advising against this step, which might be dangerous.

"The semiofficial press especially would desire that for the word '_demarche_,' with its appearance of a threat, there should be substituted the expression '_pourparlers_' [conversations], which appears to them more friendly.

"The general public, however, fears war. It is said that every day cannon and ammunition were being sent in large quantities toward the frontier.... The Government, whether it is sincerely desirous of peace, or whether it is _preparing a coup_, is now doing all that it can to allay these anxieties.... Their optimism to order is, in fact, without an echo; the nervousness of the Bourse, a barometer which cannot be neglected, is a sure proof of this; without exception, stocks have fallen to an unaccountably low level."

On July 14, 1914, Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Charge d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State, had told him that Austria-Hungary, as a great power, could not tolerate the provocative attitude of the Serbian press.

On the same day M. Yov. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, wrote M. Pashitch that the Literary Bureau of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, which supplied the press with material and set its tone, was exciting opinion against Serbia. Official German circles in Vienna were especially ill disposed toward Serbia. The "Neue Freie Presse," under instructions from the Vienna Press Bureau, summarized the feeling:

"We have to settle matters with Serbia by war; it is evident that peaceable means are of no avail. And if it must come to war sooner or later, then it is better to see the matter through now.

"The Bourse is very depressed. There has not been such a fall in prices In Vienna for a long time."

On the same day, July 14, 1914, M. Pashitch sent two letters to all the foreign Serbian Legations.

In the first letter he gave specific illustrations of misinformation by the Austro-Hungarian press such as that Austro-Hungarian subjects were maltreated in Belgrade, and were now panic-stricken, and that there had been a demonstration against the Austrian Minister at the funeral of Dr. Hartwig, the Russian Minister. There was no foundation whatever for these statements.

In the second letter he notified the Legations that the Austro-Hungarian news bureaus, the channel of Serbian news to the world, misrepresented, through garbling extracts, the tone of the Belgrade press, and that all Serbian papers were forbidden entry into Austria-Hungary.

"With us the press is absolutely free. Newspapers can be confiscated only for _lese-majeste_ or for revolutionary propaganda; in all other cases confiscation is illegal. There is no censorship of newspapers."

Accordingly the Serbian foreign ministers were instructed to give out information that the Serbian Government lacked the power to control the newspapers, and further to spread knowledge of the fact that it was Austro-Hungarian papers which originated all the controversies, while the Serbian ones only replied. There was no desire in Serbia to provoke Austria-Hungary.

On July 15, 1914, M. Yov. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, reported to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that the Ministers of the Dual Monarchy had been consulting about the Sarajevo incident, and that it appeared nothing was decided. Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, had gone to Ischl, where Emperor Francis Joseph was recovering from the shock of the assassination, to report to him. Count Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister, had replied evasively to interpellations made in the Hungarian Parliament by the Opposition. Owing to the absence on leave from his post of the War Minister and his chief of staff, the Bourse had recovered.

"One thing is certain: Austria-Hungary will take diplomatic steps at Belgrade as soon as the magisterial inquiry at Sarajevo is completed and the matter submitted to the court."

In a second letter of the same date M. Yovanovitch reported to M. Pashitch that it was thought that the inquiry had not produced sufficient evidence to justify officially accusing Serbia more than for tolerating in her borders certain revolutionary elements. Austro-Hungarian methods were criticized in diplomatic circles and the Serbian attitude was commended as in accord with the dignity of a nation.

"In spite of the fact that it appears that the German Foreign Office does not approve of the anti-Serbian policy of Vienna, the German Embassy here is at this very moment encouraging such a policy."

In a third letter of the same date M. Yovanovitch informed the Prime Minister that it appeared that Austria-Hungary would not invite the Serbian Government to assist her in discovering and punishing the culprits of the Sarajevo crime, but would make it a case against Serbia and the Serbians, or even against the Jugo-Slavs (on her own border), looking in this for the approval of Europe, which would prepare the way for the sharp reactionary measures she contemplated to take internally to suppress the great Serbian propaganda and the Jugo-Slav idea. The Government must take some action for the sake of its prestige at home as well as abroad....

The accusation against Serbia will extend from April, 1909, to the present. Austria-Hungary will claim to the powers that the facts developed therein give her the right to take diplomatic steps at Belgrade, and demand that Serbia in future act as a loyal neighbor. Austria-Hungary will ask Serbia to accept unconditionally her demands.

On the same day, July 15, 1914, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, reported to M. Viviani, Prime Minister at Paris, that certain press organs in Vienna, specifically the "Militaerische Rundschau," represented France and Russia as incapable of holding their own in European affairs, and that Austria-Hungary, with the support of Germany, could therefore subject Serbia to any treatment she pleased. The "Rundschau" argued that now was the most propitious time for the war in which Austria-Hungary would have to engage in two or three years at the latest.

"At this moment the initiative rests with us: Russia is not ready, moral factors and right are on our side, as well as might. Since we shall have to accept the contest some day, let us provoke it at once. Our prestige, our position as a great power, our honor, are in question; and yet more, for it would seem that our very existence is concerned....

"Surpassing itself, the 'Neue Freie Presse' of to-day reproaches Count Tisza for the moderation of his second speech, in which he said: 'Our relations with Serbia require, however, to be made clear.' These words rouse its indignation. For it tranquillity and security can result only from a _war to the knife_ against Pan-Serbism, and it is in the name of humanity that it demands the extermination of the cursed Serbian race."

On July 16, 1914, Dr. Yovanovitch, Serbian Charge d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that Secretary of State Von Jagow had informed him that reports of the German Minister at Belgrade pointed to the existence of a great Serbian propaganda, which should be energetically suppressed by the Serbian Government in the interest of good relations with Austria-Hungary.

On July 17 M. Boschkovitch, Serbian Minister at London, telegraphed to M. Pashitch that the Austrian Embassy there was endeavoring to favor the idea that Austria must give a good lesson to Serbia. Despite peaceable official statements by Austria-Hungary the way was preparing for diplomatic pressure upon Serbia which might develop into an armed attack.

On the same day, July 17, M. Ljub Michailovitch, Serbian Minister at Rome, telegraphed to M. Pashitch that the Marquis di San Giuliano, Prime Minister of Italy, had stated to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador:

"Any step undertaken by Austria against Serbia which failed to take into account international considerations would meet with the disapproval of public opinion in Italy, and that the Italian Government desire to see the complete independence of Serbia maintained."

On July 19, 1914, M. Pashitch telegraphed a long notice to the foreign Serbian legations, telling of the accusation of the Austrian press from the time of the Sarajevo outrage that the crime was the direct result of the great Serbian idea, propagated by various associations such as the Narodna Odbrana, which were tolerated by the Serbian Government. The notice detailed the attitude of the Serbian Government toward the Serbian press, presented in the preceding correspondence. In regard to its attitude toward Austria-Hungary it said:

"The Serbian Government at once expressed their readiness to hand over to justice any of their subjects who might be proved to have played a part in the Sarajevo outrage. The Serbian Government further stated that they had prepared a more drastic law against the misuse of explosives. The draft of a new law in that sense had already been laid before the State Council, but could not be submitted to the Skupshtina [Serbian Parliament], as the latter was not sitting at the time. Finally, the Serbian Government stated that they were ready, as heretofore, to observe all those good neighborly obligations to which Serbia was bound by her position as a European state.

"From the date of the perpetration of the outrage until to-day not once did the Austro-Hungarian Government apply to the Serbian Government for their assistance in the matter. They did not demand that any of the accomplices should be subjected to an inquiry, or that they should be handed over to trial. In one instance only did the Austrian Government ask for information; this was as to the whereabouts of certain students who had been expelled from the Pakratz Teachers' Seminary and had crossed over to Serbia to continue their studies. All available information on this point was supplied."

The notice related the anti-Serbian propaganda conducted by the Austro-Hungarian press, the interpellations in the Hungarian Parliament, etc., and the probable intention of the Austro-Hungarian Government to demand a categorical reply from Serbia, which, if not satisfactory, would be followed by war.

That Austria-Hungary was picking a quarrel had been evidenced by her use of an exploded rumor of a contemplated attack on the Austrian Legation in Belgrade to prove how excited public opinion was in Serbia, and to what lengths she was ready to go.

"There is reason for apprehension that some step is being prepared against us [in the evident intention] that the inquiry which is being made is not to be limited to the perpetrators and their possible accomplices in the crime, but is most probably to be extended to Serbia and the Great Serbian idea....

"On the other hand the Serbian Government have given their particular attention to the improvement and strengthening of their relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which had lately become strained as a result of the Balkan wars and of the questions which arose therefrom. With that object in view the Serbian Government proceeded to settle the question of the Oriental Railway, the new railway connections, and the transit through Serbia of Austro-Hungarian goods for Constantinople, Sofia, Saloniki, and Athens.

"The Serbian Government consider that their vital interests require that peace and tranquillity in the Balkans should be firmly and lastingly established. And for this very reason they fear lest the excited state of public opinion in Austria-Hungary may induce the Austro-Hungarian Government to make a _demarche_ which may humiliate the dignity of Serbia as a state, and to put forward demands which could not be accepted.

"I have the honor, therefore, to request you to impress upon the Government to which you are accredited our desire to maintain friendly relations with Austria-Hungary, and to suppress every attempt directed against the peace and public safety of the neighboring monarchy. We will likewise meet the wishes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the event of our being requested to subject to trial in our independent courts any accomplices in the outrage who are in Serbia--should such, of course, exist.

"But we can never comply with demands which may be directed against the dignity of Serbia, and which would be inacceptable to any country which respects and maintains its independence.

"Actuated by the desire that good neighborly relations may be firmly established and maintained, we beg the friendly Governments to take note of these declarations and to act in a conciliatory sense should occasion or necessity arise."

ATTEMPTS AT MEDIATION

With Serbia's case now fully before the courts of Europe, there began a movement among the powers desiring to keep the peace of the continent for mediation between the disputants. This was begun by Germany and Great Britain.

On July 20, 1914, Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote to Sir Horace Rumbold, British Charge d'Affaires at Berlin, recounting a conversation with the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky. The prince said that Austria was certainly going to take some step in the Serbian matter; that the situation was uncomfortable, and that it would be desirable if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Russia. Sir Edward Grey presumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Serbia, founded upon what they had discovered at the trial of the Sarajevo assassins. This would make it easier for other powers, such as Russia, to counsel moderation in Belgrade. The more reasonable the demands of Austria, the easier it would be to smooth things over.

"I hated the idea of a war between any of the great powers, and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Serbia would be detestable.

"The ambassador agreed whole-heartedly in this sentiment."

On the same day, July 20, 1914, M. Yov. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, reported to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that the word had been passed round in Vienna to maintain absolute secrecy about what was being done in the Serbian matter. There was no room for the optimism reported to exist in Belgrade. It was highly probable Austria-Hungary was preparing for war against Serbia.

"The general conviction that prevails here is that it would be nothing short of suicide for Austria-Hungary once more to fail to take advantage of the opportunity to act against Serbia. It is believed that the two opportunities previously missed--the annexation of Bosnia and the Balkan War--have been extremely injurious to Austria-Hungary. In addition, the conviction is steadily growing that Serbia, after her two wars, is completely exhausted, and that a war against Serbia would, in fact, merely mean a military expedition to be concluded by a speedy occupation. It is also believed that such a war could be brought to an end before Europe could intervene.

"The seriousness of Austrian intentions is further emphasized by the military preparations which are being made, especially in the vicinity of the Serbian frontier."

On the same day, July 20, 1914, a French consular report was made from Vienna to the Government at Paris, which referred to the diplomatic situation.

"Much will be demanded of Serbia; she will be required to dissolve several propagandist societies, she will be summoned to repress nationalism, to guard the frontier in cooperation with Austrian officials, to keep strict control over anti-Austrian tendencies in the schools; and it is a very difficult matter for a government to consent to become in this way a policeman for a foreign government. They foresee the subterfuges by which Serbia will doubtless wish to avoid giving a clear and direct reply; that is why a short interval will perhaps be fixed for her to declare whether she accepts or not. The tenor of the note and its imperious tone almost certainly insure that Belgrade will refuse. Then military operations will begin.

"There is here, and equally in Berlin, a party which accepts the idea of a conflict of widespread dimensions; in other words, a conflagration. The leading idea is probably that it would be necessary to start before Russia has completed the great improvements of her army and railways, and before France has brought her military organization to perfection. But on this point there is no unanimity in high circles; Count Berchtold and the diplomatists desire at the most localized operations against Serbia. But everything must be regarded as possible."

The report commented on the departure from usage by the Austro-Hungarian press in prominently reporting the remarks of the most obscure Serbian newspapers,

"which, just on account of their obscurity, employ language freer, bolder, more aggressive, and often insulting. This work of the official agency has obviously for its aim the excitement of public feeling and the creation of opinion favorable to war. The fact is significant."

On July 21 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, that M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister to Germany, had declared to the German Government that Serbia was willing to entertain Austria's requirements arising out of the Sarajevo outrage, provided that she asked only for

"judicial cooperation in the punishment and prevention of political crimes, but that he was charged to warn the German Government that it would be dangerous to attempt, through that investigation, to lower the prestige of Serbia.

"M. Browniewsky, Russian Charge d'Affaires at Berlin, mentioned this subject to Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State. Von Jagow said that he supposed the German Government now had full knowledge of the note prepared by Austria, and were therefore willing to give the assurance that the Austro-Serbian difficulties would be localized. The Secretary of State protested that he was in complete ignorance of the contents of that note, and expressed himself in the same way to me. I could not help showing my astonishment at a statement which agreed so little with what circumstances lead one to expect.

"I have also been assured that from now on the preliminary notices for mobilization, the object of which is to place Germany in a kind of 'attention' attitude in times of tension, have been sent out here to those classes which would receive them in similar circumstances. That is a measure to which the Germans, constituted as they are, can have recourse without indiscretion and without exciting the people. It is not a sensational measure, and is not necessarily followed by full mobilization, as we have already seen, but it is none the less significant."

On the same day, July 21, 1914, M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, notified the French Legations at London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Rome that the Berlin Bourse was extremely weak on the 20th, probably on account of anxiety over the Serbian question, and that M. Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, had grave reason that Germany would support Austria-Hungary in her contemplated _demarche_ at Belgrade without seeking to play the part of mediator.

On the same day, July 21, 1914, Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, wrote a long letter to Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Vienna, reviewing the situation. Most of his statements have been given in more moderate language in the preceding correspondence. He describes how the relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary have been "poisoned" by Serbian national aspirations, due to the great Serbian propaganda (carried on in Austria-Hungary as well as in Serbia), and to Serbian success in the Balkan wars. This chauvinism has increased to a paroxysm, bordering on insanity. The policy is to separate from Austria-Hungary the southern Slav provinces, and so abolish the Dual Monarchy as a great power. Bosnia and Herzegovina are expected to revolt, and the Slav regiments in the Austro-Hungarian army to mutiny. Out of the ruins will be builded the great Serbian Empire, and that in the immediate future.

Serbian newspapers without fear of reprimand discuss the decrepitude of the Dual Monarchy and insult her officials, and even "the exalted person of our ruler." The press is the educator of the Serbian people; it promoted the great Serbian propaganda, from which sprang the crime of Sarajevo. Political parties and governmental policy are wholly subservient to it. Its accusations that the sudden death of the Russian Minister, Dr. Hartwig, was due to poison are on the verge of insanity--the London "Times" called them ravings. The people, in gratitude for the past, and in anxiety for the future, outbid one another in servility to Russia. They despise Austria-Hungary as powerless, for internal and external reasons. The serious words of our statesmen are regarded as "bluff."

"This picture leads up to the conclusion that a reckoning with Serbia, a war for the position of the [Dual] Monarchy as a great power, even for its existence as such, cannot be permanently avoided.

"If we delay in clearing up our relations with Serbia we shall share the responsibility for the difficulties and the unfavorable situation in any future war which must, however, sooner or later be carried through....

"Should we therefore ... put forward far-reaching requirements joined to effective control--for this alone could clear the Augean stable of great Serbian intrigues--then all possible consequences must be considered, and from the beginning there must be a strong and firm determination to carry through the matter to the end.

"Half measures, the presentation of demands, followed by long discussions and ending only in an unsound compromise, would be the hardest blow which could be directed against Austria-Hungary's reputation in Serbia and her position in Europe."

On July 22, 1914, Sir Horace Rumbold, British Charge d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of Foreign Affairs at London, that he had had an interview with the German Secretary of State, Herr von Jagow, who insisted that the question at issue between Serbia and Austria-Hungary was for these alone to settle, without interference from outside, and said that it was inadvisable for the German Government to approach the Austro-Hungarian Government on the matter. The German Secretary had frequently emphasized to the Serbian Charge d'Affaires at Berlin, M. Yovanovitch, that Austro-Serbian relations should be put on a proper footing. He thought that Austria had acted toward Serbia with great forbearance.

On the same day, July 22, 1914, M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, notified the foreign French legations of the information in M. Cambon's report of the 21st, and said that the Marquis di San Giuliano, Prime Minister at Rome, was interceding with Austria-Hungary that nothing impracticable be demanded of Serbia; thus, that the dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana be required, and not a judicial inquiry into the causes of the crime of Sarajevo. Evidently the Cabinet at Vienna, under pressure of the press and military party, is trying to intimidate Serbia by extreme demands, expecting German support in this policy.

"I have asked the French Ambassador at Vienna [M. Dumaine] to use all his influence with Count Berchtold [the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs] and to represent to him in a friendly conversation how much Europe would appreciate moderation on the part of the Austrian Government, and what consequences would be likely to be entailed by violent pressure on Serbia."

On the same day, July 22, 1914, M. Dumaine reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that Count Berchtold was still at Ischl evidently waiting for the decision of Kaiser Francis Joseph on the Serbian question.

"The intention of proceeding against Serbia with the greatest severity ... of 'treating her like another Poland,' is attributed to the Government. Eight army corps are said to be ready to start on the campaign, but M. Tisza [Hungarian Prime Minister], who is very disturbed about the excitement in Croatia, is said to have intervened actively in order to exercise a moderating influence.

"In any case it is believed that the _demarche_ will be made at Belgrade this week. The requirements of the Austro-Hungarian Government with regard to the punishment of the outrage, and to guarantees of control and police supervision, seem to be acceptable to the dignity of the Serbians; M. Yovanovitch [Serbian Minister at Vienna] believes they will be accepted. M. Pashitch [Serbian Prime Minister] wishes for a peaceful solution, but says that he is ready for a full resistance. He has confidence in the strength of the Serbian army, besides, he counts on the union of all the Slavs in the [Dual] Monarchy to paralyze the effort directed against his country.

"Unless people are absolutely blinded, it must be recognized here that a violent blow has every chance of being fatal both to the Austro-Hungarian army and to the cohesion of the nationalities governed by the emperor, which has already been so much compromised.

"Herr von Tschirschky, the German Ambassador, is showing himself a supporter of violent measures, while at the same time he is willing to let it be understood that the Imperial Chancellery would not be in entire agreement with him on this point. The Russian Ambassador [M. Schebeko], who left yesterday for the country in consequence of reassuring explanations made to him at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, has confided to me that his Government will not raise any objection to steps directed toward the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the societies which are notoriously revolutionary, but could not accept requirements which would humiliate Serbian national feeling."

On the same day, July 22, 1914, M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, had told him that Prince Lichnowsky, had stated that a _demarche_ of Austria-Hungary against Serbia was expected at Berlin, and that the German Government was endeavoring to hold back the Austro-Hungarians, but thus far had been unsuccessful. Sir Edward Grey had answered that he would like to believe that Austria-Hungary, before intervening at Belgrade, were assured that the Serbian Government had been cognizant of the conspiracy resulting in the crime of Sarajevo, and had not done all in their power to prevent the crime.

"For if it could not be proved that the Serbian Government were responsible and implicated to a certain degree, the intervention of Austria-Hungary would not be justified and would arouse against them the opinion of Europe."

The Italian Ambassador and Serbian Minister, M. Boschkovitch, share Sir Edward Grey's apprehensions. M. Boschkovitch fears that demands will be made on the Serbian Government which their dignity and public opinion may not allow them to accept without protest.

"Notwithstanding the sacrifices which Serbia has made for her recent victories she can still put 400,000 men in the field, and public opinion, which knows this, is not inclined to put up with any humiliation.

"Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador [Count Mensdorff], asked him to recommend his Government not to depart from the prudence and moderation necessary for avoiding new complications, not to demand from Serbia any measures to which she could not reasonably submit, and not to allow themselves to be carried away too far."

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NOTE TO SERBIA

The expected blow now fell on Serbia. On the same day, July 22, 1914, Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent out to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, St. Petersburg, and Constantinople, the contents of the note which was to be presented on the morrow to the Serbian Government.

A justification of the demands in it were given. All of the complaints here made against Serbia have already been given, except the charge that

"individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia had come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

"The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government, in the face of the provocative attitude of Serbia, was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Serbian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude toward the political interests of Serbia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Serbia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandizement of Serbia possible."

This benevolence, however, was repaid by the Serbian Government tolerating the propaganda which ended in the crime of Sarajevo.

"In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Serbian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

"The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilized nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade."

The ambassadors were instructed each to submit a copy of the note to the Government to which he was accredited, together with a _dossier_

"elucidating the Serbian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th of June."

On the following day, Thursday, July 23, 1914, Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London, that, as Great Britain of all the powers might be most easily led to form an impartial judgment on the action taken, in presenting the copy of the note, he should point out that Serbia might have rendered less acute the serious steps she must expect from Austria-Hungary by spontaneously investigating the conspiracy tending to the crime of Sarajevo, and that on the contrary she had endeavored to wipe out all its traces, for example, in the case of the Serbian civil servant Ciganovic, who was compromised by the independent testimony of both of the assassins, and who was in Belgrade on the day of the crime, yet whom the director of the Serbian press declared to be completely unknown in that city.

"The short time limit attached to our demand must be attributed to our long experience of the dilatory arts of Serbia.

"The requirements which we demand that Serbia should fulfill, and which indeed contain nothing which is not a matter of course in the intercourse between states which are to live in peace and friendship, cannot be made the subject of negotiations and compromise; and, having regard to our economic interests, we cannot take the risk of a method of political action by which it would be open to Serbia at pleasure to prolong the crisis which has arisen."

Later in the day Count Mensdorff had an interview with Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the substance of which Sir Edward communicated on the same date to Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.

Count Mensdorff intimated the general nature of the note. Sir Edward regretted the time limit set as akin to an ultimatum, and so likely to inflame opinion in Russia, and render difficult securing a satisfactory reply from Serbia. If it later developed that proceedings were unduly protracted, a time limit could then be set. By that time Russian opinion would be less excited, and, if the case appeared strong against Serbia, the Russian Government would be in a position to influence Serbia to reply satisfactorily to the demands of the note. A time limit was generally a thing used only as a last resort, when all other means had failed.

Count Mensdorff instanced the bad faith of Serbia in not fulfilling her promise of 1909 to live on neighborly terms with Austria-Hungary, and said that, on the contrary, she had conducted an agitation to disintegrate that country, which made it absolute for Austria to protect herself. On this Sir Edward did not comment. He said that the French Ambassador, M. Cambon, and the Russian, Count Benckendorff, and others were agreed that those who had influence at St. Petersburg should exert it on behalf of patience and moderation.

"I had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four great powers of Europe--let us say, Austria, France, Russia, and Germany--were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial states, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away.

"Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible consequences of the present situation, but he said that all would depend upon Russia.

"I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this, it was just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say ordinarily that it took two to make a quarrel. I hoped very much that, if there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them directly with each other.

"Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, but he was under the impression that the attitude in Petrograd had not been very favorable recently."

On the same day, July 23, 1914, before the copy of the note had been presented to him, M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, notified the French Ambassadors at London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Rome, that it was reported by M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, that the intention of Austria-Hungary was to proceed with the greatest severity against Serbia, while keeping eight army corps ready to start operations.

Nevertheless Baron Macchio, Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had assured M. Dumaine that the tone and demands of the note were such as to allow us to count on a peaceful result.

"In view of the customary procedure of the Imperial Chancellery, I do not know what confidence ought to be placed in these assurances....

"The Serbian Minister [M. Vesnitch] holds that as M. Pashitch [Serbian Prime Minister] wishes to come to an understanding, he will accept those demands which relate to the punishment of the outrage and to the guaranties for control and police supervision, but that he will resist everything which might affect the sovereignty and dignity of his country.

"In diplomatic circles at Vienna the German Ambassador [Von Tschirschky] is in favor of violent measures, while at the same time he confesses that the Imperial Chancellery is perhaps not entirely in agreement with him on this point; the Russian Ambassador [Schebeko], trusting to assurances which have been given him, has left Vienna, and before his departure confided to M. Dumaine that his Government will not raise any objection to the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the revolutionary associations, but that they could not accept requirements which were humiliating to the national sentiment of Serbia."

On the same day, July 23, 1914, M. Allize, French Minister at Munich, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that the Bavarian press were optimistic over a peaceful solution of the Serbian question, but that official circles were pessimistic.

The note was presented at 6 p. m., Thursday, July 23, 1914, by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, to the Serbian Minister of Finance, M. Laza Patchou, in the absence of M. Pashitch, the Prime Minister, who was away electioneering. The time limit for acceptance of its demands was forty-eight hours. Giesl added verbally that, if the demands were not accepted within that period, the Austro-Hungarian Legation would leave Belgrade on the morrow, Friday, at 10 a. m. This information was telegraphed that evening to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Petrograd, M. Sazonof, by the Russian Charge d'Affaires in Belgrade, M. Strandtman. Through him M. Patchou solicited the help of Russia, declaring that no Serbian Government could accept the demands of Austria-Hungary. M. Patchou at the same time telegraphed to the foreign Serbian Legations the news of the delivery of the note, and informed them that he was in a position to state that no Serbian Government could accept its demands in their entirety.

TEXT OF THE NOTE

The following are the contents of the note:

"On March 31, 1909, the Royal Serbian Minister to the court of Vienna made the following statement, by order of his Government:

"'Serbia declares that she is not affected in her rights by the situation established in Bosnia, and that she will therefore adapt herself to the decisions which the powers are going to arrive at in reference to Article XXV of the Berlin Treaty. By following the councils of the powers, Serbia binds herself to cease the attitude of protest and resistance which she has assumed since last October, relative to the annexation, and she binds herself further to change the direction of her present policies toward Austria-Hungary, and in the future to live with the latter in friendly and neighborly relations.'"

Here follow the charges with which the reader is already familiar: That there is in Serbia a movement to separate certain territories from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, which, developed under the eyes of the Government of Serbia, has found expression beyond that kingdom in a series of acts of terrorism and assassination.

The Serbian Government has done nothing to suppress the movement, its violent propaganda in public education and the press, or the participation in its intrigues by public officials.

"It becomes plain from the evidence and confessions of the criminal authors of the outrage of June 28 that the murder at Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade, that the murderers received the arms and bombs with which they were equipped from Serbian officers and officials who belonged to the Narodna Odbrana, and that, lastly, the transportation of the criminals and their arms to Bosnia was arranged and carried out by leading Serbian frontier officials.

"These results impose upon the Imperial and Royal Government the duty to terminate intrigues which constitute a permanent menace for the peace of the monarchy.

"In order to obtain this purpose, the Imperial and Royal Government is forced to demand official assurance from the Serbian Government that it condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i. e., the entirety of the machinations whose aim it is to separate parts from the monarchy which belong to it, and that Serbia binds herself to suppress with all means this criminal and terrorizing propaganda.

"In order to give to these obligations a solemn character, the Royal Serbian Government will publish on the first page of its official organ of July 26, 1914, the following declaration:

"'The Royal Serbian Government condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i.e., the entirety of those machinations whose aim it is to separate from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging thereto, and she regrets sincerely the ghastly consequences of these criminal actions.

"'The Royal Serbian Government regrets that Serbian officers and officials have participated in the propaganda, cited above, and have thus threatened the friendly and neighborly relations which the Royal Government was solemnly bound to cultivate by its declaration of March 31, 1909.

"'The Royal Government, which disapproves and rejects every thought or every attempt at influencing the destinations of the inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty to call most emphatically to the attention of its officers and officials, and of the entire population of the kingdom, that it will henceforward proceed with the utmost severity against any persons guilty of similar actions, to prevent and suppress which it will make every effort.'

"This explanation is to be brought simultaneously to the cognizance of the royal army through an order of his majesty the king, and it is to be published in the official organ of the army.

"The Royal Serbian Government binds itself, in addition, as follows:

"'1. To suppress any publication which fosters hatred of, and contempt for, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and whose general tendency is directed against the latter's territorial integrity.

"'2. To proceed at once with the dissolution of the society Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate their entire means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against the other societies and associations in Serbia which occupy themselves with the propaganda against Austria-Hungary. The Royal Government will take the necessary measures, so that the dissolved societies may not continue their activities under another name or in another form.

"'Without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in Serbia, so far as the corps of instructors as well as the means of instruction are concerned, that which serves, or may serve, to foster the propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

"'4. To remove from military service and the administration in general all officers and officials who are guilty of propaganda against Austria-Hungary, and whose names, with a communication of the material which the Imperial and Royal Government possesses against them, the Imperial and Royal Government reserves the right to communicate to the Royal Government.

"'5. To consent that in Serbia officials of the Imperial and Royal Government cooperate in the suppression of a movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy.

"'6. To commence a judicial investigation against the participants of the conspiracy of June 28, who are on Serbian territory. Officials, delegated by the Imperial and Royal Government, will participate in the examinations.

"'7. To proceed at once with all severity to arrest Major Voja Tankosic and a certain Milan Ciganowic, Serbian state officials, who have been compromised through the result of the investigation.

"'8. To prevent through effective measures the participation of the Serbian authorities in the smuggling of arms and explosives across the frontier, and to dismiss those officials of Shabatz and Loznica who assisted the originators of the crime of Sarajevo in crossing the frontier.

"'9. To give to the Imperial and Royal Government explanations in regard to the unjustifiable remarks of high Serbian functionaries in Serbia and abroad who have not hesitated, in spite of their official position, to express themselves in interviews in a hostile manner against Austria-Hungary after the outrage of June 28.

"'10. The Imperial and Royal Government expects a reply from the Royal Government, at the latest by Saturday, 25th inst., at 6 p.